

# 7 The Formation of the Greek State, 1821–33

DOUGLAS DAKIN

If the Greeks of 1821 were not fully fledged Mazzinians, they had, each according to his station and experience, characteristics which gave them, to some degree or other, the sense of nationality. They had a common spoken language which was remarkably uniform; they had a common creed which was free from doctrinal and liturgical dispute; and, despite the relative freedom they enjoyed under a Greco-Turkish regime, they all had a sense of inferiority, each according to his status. Every Greek must have felt that he belonged to a different order from that of the Muslim Turk, no matter whether the Turk was a fellow peasant, a fellow landowner, or a fellow official. As a non-Moslem the Greek paid the *harac*, a capitation tax, in receipt for which he was given an identity card<sup>1</sup> which expressly permitted the bearer as an infidel 'to keep his head upon his shoulders'. This tax was highly objectionable, not only because it was relatively heavy, but because it was a constant reminder of inferior status; and it is surely significant that during the disturbances that heralded the formal proclamation of the Greek revolution in the Peloponnese, one Soliotis and his band attacked a party of Turkish officials who were collecting the *harac*.

Yet another mark of inferiority was the heavier rate of tithe paid by the Christian tenants in respect of their holdings. This was a tax on earnings, whether from land, from commercial enterprise, or from a profession. Levied usually in kind upon the products of the soil, as in eighteenth-century France and Italy, it was particularly onerous in those regions and in those periods where the crops were poor. From the evils of this tax, in the administration of which there was much abuse, the Moslem tenant was not greatly more immune than his Christian neigh-

bour. But although the peasants of both creeds suffered in common at the hands of a ruling class composed of both Turks and Greeks,<sup>2</sup> their common suffering showed no signs of giving rise to a peasants' revolt. When rebellion at length broke out, the Greek peasantry joined their betters in a national revolt against the Turks – a revolt which displayed from its outset all the fanaticism of a religious war. Indeed, the Greek rebellion was primarily the work of a people who, though disunited in many ways, had long achieved a form of nationhood under the aegis of the hierarchy of the Orthodox Christian Church.

In the Ottoman Empire at large the thirteen million or so Orthodox Greek Christians (approximately one-quarter of the total Imperial population) were under the theocratic rule of the Greek Patriarch and the Bishops. In the villages, townships and cities, they formed self-governing theocracies; and under the Turkish system, which hardly distinguished between the temporal and spiritual spheres of government, these theocracies regulated, in accordance with canon and custom, almost the whole of life's activities – indeed, all those activities that were not ruthlessly determined by the routine of the agricultural seasons, by the need to toil to avoid starvation, and by the obligation to perform labour services and to pay tithes and taxes. All things pertaining to the family (marriage, births, death and probate), to holy days and holidays, to religious feasts and name days, came within the province of the Church, which had its own independent legal system. Rather than go to the Turkish courts, the Orthodox Christians would frequently submit their differences to the arbitration of their priests, and, as time went on, almost every conceivable kind of case had come to be dealt with by the Christian clergy.<sup>3</sup> It was the Church, too, that provided a rudimentary education for the young and a way of life for those who reached man's estate. In teaching the time-honoured Christian rites, the Bible and the lives of the saints to the Christian communities, it taught the Greek that he belonged to a nation, a chosen race, whose trials and tribulations would one day pass and which, when God willed it, would regain complete control of the Holy City of Constantinople. In so far as the tolerant Turk allowed the Christian Church a large degree of autonomy, the Orthodox Christian peasant was free – as free, perhaps, as his counterpart in western Europe.

But even where the tentacles of the Turkish state system touched the pockets of the Greeks, those in the higher strata of society enjoyed, besides religious liberty, a considerable degree of secular freedom. In the Peloponnese the Greek primates or landowners (known variously as *proestoi*, *prokritoi*, and *hocabaşıs*) had a hand in the allocation of taxation, both regular and extraordinary, and, as tax farmers, most of the work of collection was done by them. In certain other regions, above all in the islands, the Greeks administered the state and the local taxation completely, fulfilling their communal obligation to raise fixed sums demanded by the Turks and to make provision for local expenditure. Hence it is no exaggeration to say that the numerous self-governing Christian theocracies of Turkish Greece were, in certain aspects, miniature republics, more strictly oligarchies, for the rulers were the well-to-do. More democratic were the *klephtokhoria*, the villages of the *klephts* or outlaws,<sup>4</sup> who had for long defied Turkish rule. Here again, however, the organisation tended to oligarchy, almost to popular monarchy, for the chief *klepht* was usually a man of substance and authority. Much the same is true of the seafaring Greeks of the islands. A few of them were very wealthy, and there were many who were certainly not poor. The shipowners (*noikokyreoi*), like the landowners, were known as primates (*proestoi*, etc.). It was not unusual, however, for the sailors to have shares not only in the ships but in the cargoes they carried. Each vessel was a noisy floating republic (except when all aboard were listening to some yarn told by story-tellers,<sup>5</sup> who were always in much demand). Kinglake travelled in Greek ships shortly after the war of liberation, but conditions had not vastly changed. In his *Eothen* he wrote:

[The crew] choose a captain to whom they entrust just power enough to keep the vessel on her course in fine weather, but not quite enough for a gale of wind: they also elect a cook and a mate. The cook whom we had on board was particularly careful about the ship's reckoning and when . . . we grew fondly expectant of an instant dinner, the great author of pilafs would be standing on the deck with an ancient quadrant in his hands . . . But then, to make up for this, the captain would be exercising a controlling influence over the soup.

Kinglake goes on to say that one of the principal duties of the mate was to act as counter captain, or leader of the opposition: his task was to denounce the first symptoms of tyranny and to protect even the cabin boy from oppression.

No matter whether the Greek was a sailor, a labouring share-cropper, a *pallikari* in a klephtic band, a professional man, a small trader or artisan, a landowner or merchant, he enjoyed considerable freedom. Turkish rule had become inefficient. The Imperial writ, even in those areas of administration where the Sultan had most interest, had ceased to run. The *paşas*,<sup>6</sup> who went to rule the provinces, had to come to terms with local authorities and prescriptive powers, with the result that the whole provincial scene had become one of political intrigue, of frequent truces and treaties, and of marauding and vendetta. It was here that the lawless men of Greece, who among themselves observed strict codes of honour and duty, learned their patriotism – their loyalty to their locality (*patrida*), faith, families, and patrons; and it was this patriotism that finds expression in the *klephtika*<sup>7</sup> – ballads which tell of the relentless struggle, not against the Sultan, but against the petty tyrant and the infidel. This poetry, like the liturgy of the Church, was a great spiritual force among the Christian masses. It was the basis of their sense of nationality, the force that was to give a kind of unity to their intense local patriotism. Indeed, before they rose in 1821, the Greeks already formed a potential national state within a state, a national state which consisted of a complex of authorities within an Empire in which, to a very large degree, local institutions had broken loose from central control. It is true that where Ali Paşa and his sons<sup>8</sup> had usurped the Sultan's power, local institutions were certainly less free. But they existed all the same, and Ali worked through them when it was convenient to do so. He constantly made bargains with the local communities and the *klephts*; he employed Greeks in his administration; and he usually refrained from interfering with spiritual affairs whether Orthodox or Muslim. In his miniature Turkish Empire, the Greeks certainly did not lose their identity. Indeed, it can be argued that it was here precisely that they had the greatest urge to throw off Turkish rule, or at least to usurp the authority which Ali and his sons had themselves usurped. It was within Ali Paşa's orbit that the Greek *klephts* began to

roam more widely, to stretch their minds, and to think politically upon a larger scale. Those who were driven to seek asylum in the Ionian Islands<sup>9</sup> came into close contact with the French, the Russians, and the British, all of whom brought them into the arena of the politics of the Napoleonic Wars. By the time of the Congress of Vienna (1814–15) many of them had visions of emulating the Ionian Greeks and of establishing some form of independence or at least autonomies on the Greek mainland. These visions became more pronounced under the influence of a growing intellectual conception of a regenerated Greece<sup>10</sup> – an idea which was not entirely beyond the grasp of many of the unruly warriors. Of perhaps greater importance in the formation of their ideas was the decision of the Congress of Vienna to recognise an independent Ionian Septinsular State, the first Greek state to be created in the modern age. It is true, indeed, that this state was placed under the protection of Great Britain, who was to rule it more or less as a Crown colony; nevertheless, it was in theory an independent state, and its very existence was of some importance (exactly how much it is difficult to say) in the process of the intensification of Greek nationalism.

But although the sense of nationhood in all its various forms and at all its various levels was to be a vital factor in developments leading to the outbreak of the War of Independence in 1821, much more important for the prosecution of the war and for the evolution of the Greek nation state were the apparently conflicting forces of local lawlessness and the entrenched habits of local self-government in the regions of the Turkish empire, which were ultimately to be assigned to Greece. Militarily the war was fought largely in terms of local lawlessness by men who got their hands on the institutions of local self-government and on local funds. But exactly how these local institutions functioned we do not know in any detail. What we do know, however, in a general way, is how the westernised Greeks attempted, under the influence of their political theories, their more refined patriotism, and their wider strategic conceptions, to replace and to improve upon the Turkish governmental superstructure that had been destroyed during the first two months of the Revolution. Roughly speaking, they succeeded in replacing (at least on paper) the higher Turkish officials by a number of committees. What we do not know precisely is the degree of efficiency with

which these committees worked – how far, if at all, they were able to assert administrative authority over local bodies and local worthies. What we do know, however, in some detail, is the story of the intense political struggle waged over these central committees and between these committees and the localities. From that story it is evident that the leaders of the major regions of Greece – the Peloponnese, Western Greece, Eastern Greece, and the Islands – were all reluctant to submit to a central authority unless they themselves had a controlling influence in it. What we also know in some detail is the history of the intense rivalries within those four principal regions. Indeed, George Finlay, the British historian of modern Greece,<sup>11</sup> who himself took part in the War of Independence, must be somewhere very near the mark when he said that a whole crop of minor Ali Paşas sprang up on the ruins of Turkish power.

These intense local struggles had the curious and paradoxical effect of providing support for central institutions. Disappointed local worthies – those who had come off badly in the regional struggles for power – not infrequently sought the help of, and gave support to, those engaged in the attempt to create central institutions and to provide a central direction of the war – a task close to the hearts of the westernised Greeks, and above all of the Phanariots<sup>12</sup> who had joined the struggle. Foremost among these during the early stages of the war were Alexandros Mavrokordatos,<sup>13</sup> Theodoros Negris,<sup>14</sup> and Dimitrios Ypsilantis, brother and representative of Alexandros Ypsilantis, the leader of the *Philiki Etairia*.<sup>15</sup> None of them had property or connections in Greece. But all of them quickly became leaders of followers, who wished, not so much to be led, as to monopolise them and to push them from behind. Thus, they soon found themselves in a position to exploit the struggles, not only those between the military leaders (*kapetanioi*) and the primates but also those between the different regions. Their activities gave rise to the idea, though not necessarily to the reality, of central government – an idea by no means outside the ken of certain *kapetanioi* (Theodoros Kolokotronis, for example<sup>16</sup>), much as they detested civilians, and much as they asserted their local independence. Strong local attachments do not necessarily preclude thinking or action on a national scale. One has only to read the local histories of the seventeenth-century civil war in

England to appreciate that national issues were fought over by those whose immediate allegiances were essentially parochial. In early nineteenth-century Greece, strong local attachments, combined with the intense individualism displayed by Greeks of all ranks, merely complicated the picture, making central institutions of government almost unworkable, yet at the same time emphasising the need for them. Certain foreign observers of nascent Greece, George Finlay and Colonel Leicester Stanhope for example,<sup>17</sup> thought that Greece should have been fashioned as a Balkan Switzerland. But this idea was never mooted by any Greek of importance; and the whole history of the Greek War of Independence shows that, so strong were the forces working in their devious ways for the creation of a centralised monarchical state, the chances of establishing a republican federation were very slight indeed.

Already, before the arrival in Greece of the three leading Phanariots, a whole crop of regional authorities had sprung up to assume direction of the war, claiming the right to speak for Greece as a whole and hoping to extend their activities to other regions. Early in April 1821 Petros Mavromikhalis (Petrobey), chief of the district of Mani in the southeast of the Peloponnese, had appealed in the name of the Greek nation to the powers of Europe for assistance and recognition. Having stated that the Greeks were determined to free themselves or perish, he continued:

We invoke therefore the aid of all the civilised nations of Europe, that we may the more promptly attain to the goal of a just and sacred enterprise, reconquer our rights, and regenerate our unfortunate people. Greece, our Mother, was the lamp that illuminated you; on this ground she reckons on your active philanthropy. Arms, money, and counsel are what she expects from you. We promise you her lively gratitude, which she will prove by deeds in more prosperous times.

Shortly afterwards Petrobey set up a body known as the Senate (*gerousia*) of Messinia, a body which resembled the so-called Directory of Achaia established by Bishop Germanos and the notables of the region of Patras. In May 1821 Petrobey and his partisans invited the islands of Hydra, Spetsai and Psara<sup>18</sup> to send representatives to a general Peloponnesian (Moreot)

Assembly.<sup>19</sup> The islanders, however, did not respond, and when in early June the assembly met at the monastery of Kaltezies, with Petrobey as chairman and Rigas Palamidis as secretary, it was restricted to the Peloponnesian notables. This assembly established at Stemnitsa an elected senate under the presidency of Petrobey. Its task was to co-ordinate the work of a multiplicity of lesser authorities, to centralise funds and military plans, and generally to face Dimitrios Ypsilantis, who had been appointed by his brother Alexandros as the chief representative of the *Etairia* in Greece, with a *fait accompli*.

Dimitrios Ypsilantis<sup>20</sup> had proceeded first to Hydra, where he had attempted to organise the resources of the islands. From Hydra he crossed over to the Peloponnese and early in July entered into discussion with the Peloponnesian primates at Vervena. By the masses and men of intermediate rank he was well received. It was generally thought that he had the support of Russia in whom the wishful-thinking Greeks still had some hopes, and almost everyone was prepared at least to listen to his plans for the prosecution of the national struggle, the *kapetanioi* in particular wanting his blessing in their conflict with the primates. On his arrival at Vervena he proposed that the Peloponnesian Senate should be dissolved, and that his own plan, 'the General Organisation of the Morea', should be adopted – a plan for establishing twenty-four *ephories*, each consisting of five *ephoroi* (ephors) elected by the notables. One out of each of these five *ephoroi* was to serve in a *vouli* (parliament) over which Ypsilantis himself as the chief representative of the *Etairia* was to preside. This central *vouli* was to be divided into committees, each taking charge of a branch of government. In the *ephories* the five *ephoroi* were each to specialise in one of the tasks of administration – supplies, recruitment, communications, finance, and police – but all of them, and their assistants, were to have judicial functions.

To these plans the notables of the Peloponnese objected. They wanted the *ephoroi* to be elected in their districts and, instead of the twenty-four member *vouli*, they wanted the Peloponnesian senate, with Petrobey as president, to continue. They were prepared, however, to admit Ypsilantis to the meetings of the Senate. With this arrangement Ypsilantis was himself ready to fall in, but his strong entourage of *kapetanioi* persuaded him to



withdraw to Leondari. Later he established at Trikorfo (near Vitina) his headquarters, which was, in effect, the government of the *Etairia* and which competed with that established by the primates. From this headquarters he sent out circulars to the lesser authorities, hoping to secure their co-operation and allegiance. To Trikorfo he invited Mavrokordatos, who had first gone to Mesolonghi in Western Greece, where he had been well received by both the *kapetanioi* and the primates, it being thought that the funds he carried were an instalment of more to come. Like Ypsilantis, Mavrokordatos hoped to establish a central authority in Greece. What he wished to prevent was a government under the exclusive control of the *Etairia* and the *kapetanioi*, a government which looked towards Russia as the saviour of Greece. Both these Phanariots, however, were anxious to avoid a head-on clash and were prepared (with reservations) to work together, Ypsilantis going so far as to give his blessing to Mavrokordatos' proposal to draw up an instrument of government, which, it was hoped, all parties would accept.

In this task, Mavrokordatos sought the assistance of Negris and eventually presented his plan to the Peloponnesian primates assembled at Zarakova. Briefly, this plan provided for a national parliament of the Peloponnesian primates' nominees, who were to be joined by representatives from other regions; there was to be a senate of twenty-four persons under the presidency of Ypsilantis and district administrative officers (*ephoroi*) who were to serve a four-year term. These proposed arrangements, however, met with resolute opposition from the *kapetanioi*, who even threatened to massacre the primates. The most they would accept was a temporary measure – a senate of five primates to administer the Peloponnesians only, a body which, more or less, was the old Peloponnesian Senate of Turkish days. To this arrangement Ypsilantis, Mavrokordatos and Negris, all being powerless, reluctantly agreed.

All this time Ypsilantis had been making further attempts to establish an administration of the islands. But here, as on the mainland, although he found considerable popular support, he soon discovered that the entrenched authorities were not prepared to submit to the *Etairia*. The whole task indeed of setting up an effective central authority in Greece was exceedingly difficult. Everywhere those with local power and influence

were determined to slip quietly into the places vacated by the Turks, and all that the Phanariots could do (they had no local roots, no land, no family influence, and, except for Ypsilantis, no following among the masses) was to exploit the fierce conflicts between the primates and the *kapetanioi*,<sup>21</sup> each one after his own fashion. Mavrokordatos, realising that he could make little headway in the Peloponnese, returned to Western Greece where his prospects were somewhat better, while Negris repaired to Salona in Eastern Greece. In November 1821 Mavrokordatos convened an assembly of thirty persons. This body established a senate of ten elected by *ephoroi* and *kapetanioi* for one year, under the presidency of Mavrokordatos. But real authority rested with the *kapetanioi* who administered their own districts, each according to his whim. Much the same happened in Eastern Greece. Here, Negris convened an assembly of seventy-three persons, among whom were representatives of Thessaly, Epirus and Macedonia. This assembly established a senate, the *Areios Pagos*, consisting of twelve members. In theory this body supervised the communal institutions, but in practice these, as in Western Greece, took their orders from the *kapetanioi*.

Each of the three regional governments envisaged the convention of a national assembly or parliament (*vouli*), that of Eastern Greece having gone so far as to contemplate that this assembly should make a formal request to the European powers to arrange for Greece a monarchy – an idea already widely current among the Greek revolutionaries, who wished to appear respectable in the eyes of Europe. But when the so-called National Assembly met at Argos in December 1821, its twenty-four members were nearly all primates from the Peloponnese. Its president was Ypsilantis,<sup>22</sup> but, becoming disgusted with its intrigues, he retired to Corinth to organise the siege of that stronghold which was in Turkish hands. The task of drawing up an instrument of government again fell to Mavrokordatos and Negris, who were assisted by Vincenzo Gallina, an Italian philhellene. Known as the ‘Provisional Constitution of Epidavros (Piada)’, and dated 1 January 1822, this instrument’s basic provision was as follows: primates and respectable citizens were to elect for one year *ephoroi* from each village or township – one to five according to the size of the population; these were, in turn, to elect five representatives from each district (*eparkhia*)<sup>23</sup>

to form a senate, to which were to be attached four *kapetanioi* as military advisers. This basic provision, despite the pronouncements of revolutionary and democratic principles, merely confirmed the pre-revolutionary influence of the primates, to whom it gave, in theory at least, the authority relinquished by the Turks.

In no way a slavish imitation of the French Constitution of August 1795,<sup>24</sup> this Greek constitution merged the functions of the executive and the legislative. The executive, a body of five to be elected in a special assembly, could revise legislation, while the legislature was empowered to review all executive action. Both bodies were to be served by eight ministers, who like the departmental civil servants, were to be appointed by the executive. These eight ministers had no independent power and, being debarred from being deputies, they had little or no political influence. They were, in fact, merely heads of department in a rudimentary civil service. Power, if it resided anywhere, resided in the executive of five, four of whom represented the Peloponnese, Eastern Greece, Western Greece, and the islands. The fifth member was the president, Mavrokordatos. Negris was made minister of foreign affairs and president of a ministerial council, which had no power; and he was given the high-sounding but empty title of Chancellor of State. Ypsilantis was likewise placed in a minor position. Although made president of the legislative body (Petrobey was vice-president), he could derive but little influence from that office. Indeed, the constitution as a whole was chiefly the outcome of Mavrokordatos' determination, by throwing in his lot with the primates and by attempting to pacify the *kapetanioi*, to obtain a firm footing in Greece. What it also did, behind a façade deliberately fashioned to impress and deceive Europe,<sup>25</sup> was to organise anarchy, or rather to give a form of legality to the existing regional governments. These, however, were soon to undergo changes. In the Peloponnese effective power passed more and more into the hands of Kolokotronis; in Western Greece first Georgios Varnakiotis and later the Souliot Markos Botzaris,<sup>26</sup> both *kapetanioi*, came to the fore; while in Eastern Greece the famous *klepht*, Androutsos (Odysseas),<sup>27</sup> left the *Areios Pagos* and convened his own assembly.

Owing to the calls of military operations, the provisional constitution was prolonged until April 1823 when a second

national assembly met at Astros. No regular elections were held. The assembly was simply a gathering of leaders who chose to attend or who were afraid to stay away. Its main task was to revise the constitution which satisfied no one. The principal revisions were: the substitution of a suspensive veto for the absolute veto of the executive on the resolutions of the legislature; a voice for the legislature in the appointment of higher civil servants; and the replacement of the war and naval ministers by two committees representing regional interests. After further elections (which were irregular) the following appointments were made: Petrobey, president of the executive (Kolokotronis, vice-president); Mavrokordatos, secretary-general; and Ioannis Orlandos, president of the legislature. In theory, the legislature was supreme; in practice, it counted for little, for the chieftains in the executive had their own armies and a tight grip upon provincial administration. Orlandos resigned in disgust. Mavrokordatos succeeded him (July 1823), but he, too, became disgruntled and fled (in danger) to Hydra. Ypsilantis no longer counted, for it had become generally known that Greece could expect no help from Russia. In any case his ideas were not in harmony with the intense nationalist thinking of fellow Greeks. 'The War', he said (and here he was imploring the captains not to massacre the Turks at Tripolitsa), 'is not against tyranny. We are fighting in order to be able to live with the Turks in a state based on law. The cities we conquer are our cities and you should not destroy them.' No wonder then that his place as the leader of the 'military-democratic' factions passed to Kolokotronis who, having become richer than ever from booty from the villages, was able to keep the majority of the lesser Peloponnesian chieftains under his own control.

So disgusted were the members of the legislature with the situation that most of them left Astros and established themselves at Kranidi where they elected a rival executive with Koundouriotis<sup>28</sup> as president. This schism was the result of new political alignments which were based on regional rather than on class division. On the one side were the Peloponnesian chieftains and primates, temporarily in alliance; on the other, were the maritime Greeks, the Greeks of Western Rumeli, and men like Mavrokordatos who were remnants of a national party.

Eventually the two governments found themselves at war. In December, however, the legislative body managed to dismiss Petrobey from the executive (Kolokotronis had already left) and in his place appointed Koundouriotis. This move in some measure reduced the tension. At least it marked a victory for the Peloponnesian primates, now in alliance with the island interest, over the Peloponnesian *kapetanioi*. The executive, thus reconstructed, prolonged its existence until October 1824. Meanwhile, civil strife had continued throughout the summer. All attempts to establish a national congress of conciliation at Salona in Eastern Greece, in which Negris and Androutsos had hoped to play a leading role, had failed completely, and the Peloponnesian chieftains not only drove the executive body from its seat at Nafplion, but also attacked Argos where the members of a newly-elected legislative assembly were beginning to arrive. It was at this juncture, however, that the executive body managed to raise Rumeliot troops under Notaras<sup>29</sup> and Makriyannis<sup>30</sup> to send against the Peloponnesians. It was able to do this because it had every prospect of obtaining the proceeds of the English loan and because it had as a member Ioannis Kolettis,<sup>31</sup> a ruthless, uncompromising politician, who was determined to break the power of the Kolokotronists. In June 1824 Notaras and Makriyannis defeated the Peloponnesians at the mills of Lerna and forced Panos, the eldest son of Theodoros Kolokotronis, to abandon Nafplion.

Here in Nafplion in October 1824 a new assembly was formed. It reappointed Koundouriotis as president of the executive and (later) Mavrokordatos as secretary-general. Within the executive was Kolettis, a rival of both, but indispensable because of his influence with the Rumeliots. These appointments, however, were little to the satisfaction of either the Kolokotronists or of the Peloponnesian primates, who did their utmost to win over Petrobey and Androutsos to their side. But these two remained aloof; and it was Kolettis who ultimately came out best in the political manoeuvres that were taking place. By some means or other he managed to enlist the support of Gouras, who was gaining influence in Eastern Greece at the expense of Androutsos, in whose entourage he had served as lieutenant.<sup>32</sup> In December 1824 and early in 1825 Gouras defeated the Peloponnesians. The primates Sisinis and Deliyannis, and the

chieftain Theodoros Kolokotronis were taken prisoner. This political victory, however, was militarily a disaster for Greece. Already the Sultan's Egyptian allies, who had earlier formed a base in Crete, were on the point of building a bridgehead in the southwest Peloponnese. As the threat developed Koundouriotis had the good sense to release Kolokotronis from prison,<sup>33</sup> ignoring the protests of his colleague Mavrokordatos.

Despite the failure of the Greeks to set up a central authority, their constant attempts to do so kept before them the idea of national unity, without which they could never have survived to enjoy independence.<sup>34</sup> These attempts were, however, made less with a view to co-ordinating military operations than with the object of creating a state that would qualify for recognition by the European powers. Military and naval operations could, for the most part, be left to the initiative of individual chiefs and captains of the ships. Turkish strategy was no mystery and needed no Greek general staff to combat it. In the years 1822-4 Moslem armies advanced at their leisure (and the War of Independence as a whole was a most leisurely affair) along predictable routes, traversing the broken coastal plains of eastern and western continental Greece and passing through the gates of Makrinoros in the west and the gates of Thermopylae in the east. The plan was that the western and eastern armies should converge on the Isthmus of Corinth and enter the Peloponnese. Here the Turkish squadrons and transports would land reinforcements and provisions, utilising as salients such maritime fortresses as remained in Turkish hands. Like the land routes, the sea lanes were predictable and there was usually an ample warning of the movements of the Turkish ships. The sea captains, among them Miaoulis, the Tombazis brothers, and Kanaris, needed no direction. Nevertheless, there were occasions when the Greeks made attempts to co-ordinate their military and naval operations and it was on these occasions that the central authority used its none too ample central funds to impart to the Greek campaigns (though not necessarily to their execution) some semblance of a general plan. But once these funds got into the pockets of the *kapetanioi*, there was no knowing what might happen; indeed, most of the proceeds of the first English loan (the raising of which was the work of a central government<sup>35</sup>) were largely dissipated in civil war.

If military efforts could be left for the most part to local enterprise, the long hoped for dealings with the European powers must be the concern of a national government or at least of a government that masqueraded as such. There was, it is true, much private enterprise even in Greek diplomacy. Among Greeks of all parties there was a constant itch to dangle a non-existent Greek crown before the eyes of Europe, and certain individuals and factions became involved in intrigues with agents (often self-appointed) of the European powers, who themselves were disposed within limits to intrigue in Greece.<sup>36</sup> In the course of these intrigues many names were put forward and Greeks of all parties speculated endlessly on the tortuous twists and turns of European diplomacy. There were even plans for making Count Ioannis Kapodistrias king of Greece, and the name of Lord Byron was also put forward. But amidst all these intrigues and individual initiatives, there ran the idea that the Greeks themselves must create a centralised state on western lines. However disruptive his action might be in the field of politics, every Greek of importance had as his political ideal a centralised state which he and his friends would control and a figurehead (a monarch or perhaps even a president) whom he could monopolise. So disposed indeed were all the leading Greeks to distrust one another that it was generally agreed that the head of state should come from outside Greece.

The desire for monarchy (or for a president brought in from outside) gave a form of unity to Greek politics and led to the formation of three parties which were more national, less regional, and less class parties than those that tended to form on other issues. These groupings were not rigid: certain individuals moved from one to another or kept a connection with all of them, hoping to choose the one that promised most at a later stage. Of these groupings the first to attain a definite shape was the Kapodistrian faction, consisting of some six or seven leading<sup>37</sup> figures, who early in 1822 were hoping to bring either Count Ioannis or his brother Viaro Kapodistrias to Greece, it being assumed that he would gain the support of many of the *kapetanioi* with whom he had associated in his Levkas days.<sup>38</sup> This grouping was in no way a pro-Russian party: by 1822 no leading Greek placed any hope in Russia, unless it were Varvakis, one of Orloff's old veterans of 1770.

As a reaction to the Kapodistrian intrigue a so-called French party took shape, the prime movers being the French philhellene Colonel Jourdain and the Vitalis brothers, who were merchants from Zante. Their plan was to place an Orleanist on the throne of Greece, a plan which gained considerable Greek support when General Roche, agent of the Paris Greek committee, arrived in Greece to promote it. But already there had developed an English interest to which greater dimensions were given by the founding of the London Greek Committee, by Lord Byron's arrival among the Greeks, by Edward Blaquiere's efforts to raise a Greek loan in London, by Canning's elevation to the British foreign office, by his policy generally and by his formal recognition of Greek blockades (March 1823). But it was not until 1824 that a definite party emerged from the activities of Lord Guilford,<sup>39</sup> his pupil Spyridon Trikoupis, and a committee of Zantiots which included Count Romas,<sup>40</sup> who managed to win the support of Theodoros Kolokotronis, formerly, if anything, a 'Kapodistrian'. With this party Mavrokordatos had some dealing, but he also retained a connection with the French intrigue, hoping, in case it should be successful, to prevent it from being monopolised by his rival Kolettis. From the outset Mavrokordatos had seen that the acceptance by Europe of a Greek national state might be best promoted by the rivalry of France and England for influence in a regenerated Greece – a rivalry which would activate the European concert, of whose mysterious workings he had some inkling. By way of contrast neither Kolokotronis nor any of the leading *kapitanioi* had a clear picture of European diplomacy, but in the hour of danger (the Egyptian advance in the Peloponnese in 1825) they began to look to England or to France – a development which led to more intense thinking on a national scale and to groupings which cut across the earliest regional and personal groupings which we have examined.

Encouraged by the British Naval Commander, Commodore Hamilton, the pro-English Greeks circulated for signature a petition requesting for the Greek nation the sole protection of Great Britain. This petition, the so-called Act of Submission (30 June 1825), was sent to England. It was subsequently approved (1 August) by the Greek Legislative Assembly and a further copy was sent to London in a Greek ship, much to the



annoyance of Kolokotronis who resented its becoming a governmental act. He had envisaged the petition, which he had signed, as an anti-governmental measure: he had had visions of monopolising the English connection. (It was at this time that he was hoping to prevail upon his old friend General Sir Richard Church<sup>41</sup> to appear in Greece.) Later he signed, along with Ypsilantis, Nikitas,<sup>42</sup> and others, an act of submission to Russia, having been persuaded, no doubt, that under Nicholas I the policy of Russia towards Greece had changed. Shortly afterwards (February 1826) other Greeks signed an address to the Duke of Orleans, asking him to accept, on behalf of his son the Duke of Nemours, the Crown of Greece.

The years of crisis (1825–6) brought about in Greek political life many other subtle changes which increased the trickles from the pools of localism into the growing catchment (or quagmire) of central institutions. Ibrahim Paşa's<sup>43</sup> campaign in the Peloponnese revealed the limitations of klephtic military tactics and the military organisation based upon the *kapetanioi* and their bands.<sup>44</sup> The idea of a regular army and of the introduction of western military science gained adherents, especially among those lesser *kapetanioi* who had been thrown up by the war and who had no connection with the old fighting families of the Peloponnese and Rumeli – men like 'Captain' Makriyannis, who joined Colonel Fabvier's regulars as a private, and like Karatzas, the shoemaker from Patras. The new captains operated, for the most part, according to governmental orders and were kinder to the local populations, whereas the traditional *kapetanioi* simply lived upon the country, levying taxes and stealing animals. Nevertheless, the principal resistance to the Turks and Egyptians still depended on the old system. Kolokotronis, on being released from prison, went back to the Peloponnese and raised fresh bands, which inflicted on the enemy heavy casualties. Karaiskakis (Georgios Karaiskos), a former *armatolos* leading an army of 11,000 Rumeliots, kept the war going in continental Greece.

During the winter of 1825–6 the three Greek 'national' parties prepared for the third National Assembly which met at Epidavros in April 1826 and which consisted principally of those Peloponnesian primates and *kapetanioi* who had been defeated in December 1824. This assembly appointed a

governmental committee of eleven members and a legislative body of thirteen. The governmental committee 'created', or rather recognised, certain existing local committees through which it attempted, though without much success, to co-ordinate the war effort. The legislative body was to concern itself with the expected negotiations with the European powers and to continue the attempts to find a western military commander. Already in August 1825 Lord Cochrane's services had been secured in principle and a decision had been taken to use the second London loan (of February 1825) chiefly for the provision of a steam fleet for this prospective commander of the Hellenic navy.

Upon the National Assembly and new government the fall of Mesolonghi in April 1826, after a long siege, had a sobering effect and momentarily led the leading Greeks to close their ranks. It was not long, however, before Kolokotronis was at loggerheads with certain Peloponnesian primates. He joined forces with Koundouriotis who was in conflict with fellow primates of Hydra. Reinforced by the primate Sisinis these two called in February 1827 their own assembly at Kastri (Ermioni). As a counter move the old government convened its supporters at Aegina. This division was a reversion to the old personal and regional divisions of the years 1822 to 1824. There was no division on policy. All factions, having learned of the St. Petersburg protocol of April 1826 (the decision of Russia and Great Britain to work together for the creation of a Greek tributary state of unspecified size), fully realised that the probable outcome would be a settlement of the Greek question by Great Britain, France and Russia – a settlement which would eventually be accepted by Prussia and Austria, in other words a settlement made by the concert of Europe. What each Greek faction was out to do was to dominate the government that would negotiate the details of that settlement. Kolokotronis, for example, saw that his own interests (and the interests of the nation) might best be served if Count Kapodistrias could be brought to Greece. He realised, however, that this could be done only with the concurrence of the English 'party' and to strengthen his hand in that quarter he made renewed, and this time successful, attempts to bring General Church to Greece, hoping thereby to counter the combined influence of

Mavrokordatos, of certain primates, and of Lord Cochrane whose services had at long last been secured.

Church and Cochrane arrived separately in Greece in March 1827. The two principal factions at Aegina and Kastri respectively attempted to monopolise them. But Church and Cochrane seized the opportunity to form an alliance between the Kapodistrian and English interests. Following their mediation the two rival assemblies came together on 'neutral' ground at Damala (Troezene). Here the Greek deputies appointed Kapodistrias as president of Greece for a period of seven years and a provisional committee of three to carry on the government until his arrival. They appointed Cochrane as chief admiral and Church as generalissimo.

Although the deputies at Damala had decided to vest the executive function in one man, they designed a constitution to limit his powers. His ministers, who were made liable to impeachment, were to countersign all decrees. To the legislative body the president was denied access except at the opening and closing of each session. He had no right of dissolution and no absolute veto on legislation. Indeed, the new constitution, to which was attached a bill of rights, showed a greater aversion to a strong executive power than did its predecessors: it was the work of men (foremost among them was Mavrokordatos) who had their gaze firmly on the future – men who probably had grave doubts of the wisdom of intruding an ex-minister of Russia into the affairs of Greece.

Of this constitution Kapodistrias, although in accepting office he implicitly subscribed to it, was certainly not enamoured. By this time (his earlier political thinking was extremely vague) his own ideal was a nation of small farmers and peasants under his own paternal rule and a version of the French civil code, in other words, a democratic society but not a democratic state. Shortly after his arrival in January 1828, he transferred the powers of the legislature to a council (*panellinion*) chosen by himself and later to an even more docile senate. He filled many offices with those whom he considered to be the more worthy Ionian Greeks; he appointed non-local men as *ephoroi* in the provinces; and, when in July 1829 he belatedly convened a National Assembly, he packed it with his nominees. Although all these measures aroused the opposition of factions which

called themselves the constitutional party, he enjoyed considerable popularity among lesser Greeks and the *kapetanioi*. Indeed, he led a national party which was not identified with any particular region or class and which survived into the reign of King Otho. As a consequence, the opposition, although largely based on regions and class, had, nevertheless, some of the characteristics, too, of a national party.

To what extent Kapodistrias created for Greece a centralised machine of government that really worked is not an easy question to answer. We can read the blueprints of the Kapodistrian regime, but we do not know precisely how the administration worked at the extremities. What is important, however, is that the effort to create a centralised state continued and that the principle of centralised government was generally accepted. What is equally important is that the administrative system of the Kapodistrian period survived into the period of the Bavarian regency and throughout the remainder of the nineteenth century. The same is substantially true of the ecclesiastical system, the legal code, taxation, and education.

Kapodistrias had gone to Greece at a time when the creation of a Greek state of unknown dimensions had been assured. The treaty of London of July 1827 had affirmed the monarchical principle. It had provided at least a threat of international force to impose a settlement on Turkey. This threat had issued in the battle of Navarino (October 1827), with the result that, when Kapodistrias arrived in Greece, the dangers to the Greek nation were no longer so great as in the years 1825-6. Kapodistrias was, therefore, able to introduce a military *organismos* based upon the ideas which Dimitrios Ypsilantis had put forward in 1821. Gradually he reduced the independent military power of the *kapetanioi* by recruiting their followers into first *khiliarkhies* and later *tagmata*<sup>45</sup> and by inviting the more amenable old leaders to enrol in the *taxiarkhia*, which gave them high sounding titles and honourable retirement. Not all the old warriors responded to this treatment: many became brigands and even left Greece for Turkey where they were more at home. Nevertheless, a fair proportion joined the *typikon* (a model battalion), which became a kind of training school for the regular army.

Kapodistrias's more immediate task, however, was to

negotiate with the European powers,<sup>46</sup> whose diplomacy continued to follow its tortuous course. At a conference of ambassadors held at Poros he worked for as large a Greek state as the powers would allow; and it was he who proposed that Leopold of Saxe-Coburg should be made king of Greece in the hopes that this nomination would reconcile the Duke of Wellington to the idea of a relatively large Greek state embracing all regions that had risen in 1821. When, however, on 3 February 1830 the powers offered Leopold the Greek crown, they abandoned the Arta-Volos line on which they had earlier reached provisional agreement, and substituted the more southerly, less favourable Aspropotamos-Zitouni frontier. They excluded Crete, Samos and Chios from the proposed Greek kingdom. Leopold withdrew his candidature. Kapodistrias bravely soldiered on in face of a growing national, regional and personal opposition to his regime. His brave struggle was cut short by his assassination in October 1831. Civil war ensued and once again, as in 1824, Kolettis sent the Rumeliots into the Peloponnese. Eventually, however, a government commission of seven and a cabinet of five ministers were appointed – an arrangement under which most factions were represented. Once again it was shown that the Greeks, though always prone to fly at one another's throats, could, when need be, arrive at a compromise. The labels they gave themselves were highly misleading. No Kapodistrian was absolutely opposed to a constitution and no self-styled constitutionalist despised naked power when he got the chance to wield it. The great need at this juncture was to preserve at least the semblance of nationality in face of the European powers who had chosen Otho of Bavaria to be king of Greece.

The new-found unity was apparent when on 26 July 1832 a national assembly met at Pronia. This assembly abolished the senate, proclaimed an amnesty, approved Otho's nomination, and declared itself a constitutional body. But its work was cut short by the Rumeliot soldiery. Chaos again reigned, and in the confused struggle of the factions the great question was who should have places of honour when Otho should arrive to govern his kingdom (which, by the treaty of May 1832, had been granted the Arta-Volos frontier). Eventually French troops were called in by the European agents (the residents) to restore

order, but it was not until 6 February 1833 that the scene was quiet enough for Otho to step ashore at Nafplion. He was the idol of the moment and the symbol of Greek nationhood – at least of 750,000 Greeks, the remaining 2,000,000 being still under Turkish and British rule. The state that had emerged was centralised in form, but local ties, which were to dominate Greek politics for many a decade, remained strong and disruptive. Moreover, the state was based upon conflicting principles – the unconstitutional power of Otho implicit in the treaty of May 1832, and the constituent power of the Greek nation, which was implicit in its recent history and which had, indeed, been recognised in a proclamation of the powers in August 1832. These conflicting principles, along with the regional and personal divisions in Greek society, were to dominate Greek politics throughout most of the nineteenth century.

#### NOTES TO CHAPTER 7

For this subject the following works of G. Dimakopoulos are most important: *I doiikitiki organosis kata tin Ellinikin Epanastasin, 1821-1827* (Athens, 1966); *I doiikitiki organosis tis Ellinikis Politeias, 1827-1833, I (1827-1829)* (Athens, 1971); *O Kodix ton Psiphismaton tis Ellinikis Politeias, I (1828-1829)* (Athens, 1970), II (1829-1832) (Athens, 1972); *To Ethnikon Nomisma tis Ellados 1821-1833* (Athens, 1971); 'Ai kyvernitikai arkhai tis Ellinikis Politeias, 1827-1833', *O Eranistis*, IV (1966) 117-54. Other valuable works are N. Kaltchas, *Introduction to the Constitutional History of Greece* (New York, 1940); J. A. Petropoulos, *Politics and Statecraft in the Kingdom of Greece, 1833-1843* (Princeton, 1968), a work which, though dealing chiefly with the reign of Otho, contains a good bibliography and important material on the origins of the Greek monarchical state; A. Vakalopoulos, *Ta ellinika strateumata tou 1821* (Thessaloniki, 1948); K. A. Alexandris, *Ai nafiikai epikheiriseis tou yper anexartisias agonos 1821* (Athens, 1930); E. G. Kyriakopoulos, *Ta syntagmata tis Ellados* (Athens, 1960); A. Lignadis, *To proton daneion tis Anexartisias* (Athens, 1970); G. P. Nakos, *Ai 'Megalai Dynameis' kai ta 'Ethnika Kitimata' tis Ellados, 1821-1832* (Thessaloniki, 1970); N. Pantazopoulos, *Ellinon syssomatoseis kata tin Tourkokratian* (Athens, 1958); E. Protopsaltis (ed.), *Istorikon Arkheion Alexandrou Mavrokordatou*, 3 vols. (Athens, 1963-70); T. Stamatopoulos, *O esoterikos agonas prin kai kata tin epanastasi tou 1821*, 2 vols. (Athens, 1957); D. Zakythinos, *I Tourkokratia* (Athens, 1957). The standard collection of state documents is that edited by A. Z. Mamoukas, *Ta kata tin anagennisin tis Ellados, itoi syllogi ton peri tin anagennomenin Ellada syntakthenton politeumatou, nomou, kai allon episimon praxeon, apo tou 1821 mekhri telous tou 1832* (Athens-Piraeus, 1839-52).

1. The distribution of these cards was a black market business. Tax collectors, who included Greeks, bought them and peddled them at a profit.

2. In the Peloponnese the Greeks outnumbered the Turks by roughly 400,000 to 40,000. Out of one million acres, they held about 350,000 much of this acreage being held in large estates. The Greek upper classes, however, enjoyed a position out of all proportion to the land they held. Much of the business of raising taxation was in their hands and, as these taxes were usually levied in kind, the Greeks, who owned warehouses and animals of burden, amassed capital and became wealthy merchants and moneylenders. They often lived as *paşas*, and not infrequently had their own armed retainers (*kapoi*).

3. The Orthodox Christian was subject to three legal systems, Turkish law, the Ecclesiastical (Roman Law) and the customary law, which in some regions was codified. Between these three systems there was always some conflict. Gains made by the Ecclesiastical law courts at the expense of the Turkish were not infrequently lost to the tribunals administering customary law. On this intricate subject, see N.J. Pantazopoulos, *Church and Law in the Balkan Peninsula during the Ottoman Rule* (Thessaloniki, 1967).

4. The *klephts* (literally, robbers) were bands of outlaws who, in the early days of the Turkish occupation, had taken to the mountains. (In the Slav regions these outlaws were known as *haiduks*.) Sometimes the Turks found it expedient to employ the *klephts* as *armatoloi* (guards) in outlying fortresses or frontier passes. *Armatoloi* were not unknown in Byzantine and Venetian Greece. They were taken over by the Turks who increased their number by recruiting *klephts*. There were, however, no *armatoloi* in the Morea. Here there were only *klephts* and *kapoi*. These *kapoi* were employed, however, not by the Turks but by the Greek primates. See G. Vlachogiannis, *Klephtes tou Morea* (Athens, 1935) and T. Vournas, *Armatoloi kai klephtes*, (3rd ed.; Athens, 1963).

5. Their fabulous stories were often in the style of the *Arabian Nights*.

6. The Turkish lands which were eventually to be incorporated in Greece consisted at the time of the outbreak of the Greek War of Independence of six major *paşaliks* or provinces – Morea (Peloponnese), Negropont (the island of Evia and the mainland opposite), South Albania (including Western Greece), Selanik (Thessaloniki and most of Macedonia), Crete, and the Aegean Islands. These Aegean islands formed the *paşalık* of the *kapitan paşa*, who was at the head of the Turkish navy.

7. See C. Fauriel, *Chants populaires de la Grèce moderne*, 2 vols. (Paris, 1825).

8. Born in 1744, Ali, an Albanian, became a *klepht* at the age of fourteen. He amassed wealth, formed a strong band of marauders, and became the most powerful chief in a locality ever growing in size. In 1786 he was appointed *paşa* of Trikkala, to which *paşalık* the *sancak* (district) of Ioannina was added in 1788. Leaving one of his sons, Veli, in charge of Trikkala, he devoted his own attention to Epirus. As a reward for his victory in 1799 over the Christian Albanian Souliots, he was appointed to the high office of *beylerbeyi* of Rumeli (which included Bulgaria, Macedonia, and Thrace). Veli became *paşa* of Morea, where he began a relentless war against the *klephts* and eventually drove hundreds of them to take refuge in the Ionian

Islands. Ali's other sons were Mouktar and Salih. Much is known of the activities of the so-called Lion of Ioannina, but we are still without a detailed study of this famous man whose history is so closely linked to the history of Greece.

9. These seven islands had not been Turkish except for a very brief period in the fifteenth century. Until the Treaty of Campo Formio (1797) by which they passed under French control, they had been ruled by Venice. From 1799 to 1807 these islands were under first a Turco-Russian condominium and later exclusively under Russian rule. Following the treaty of Tilsit, they passed once more under the control of France. In 1809 a British force captured Zante. By 1814 all the seven islands were occupied by British troops. In theory they had come to form a separate state, known as the Septinsular Republic.

10. See Chapter 3.

11. Finlay's *History of the Greek Revolution* was first published in two volumes in 1861. An enlarged and revised edition was published in 1877 as volumes VI and VII of H. R. Tozer's edition (Oxford) of Finlay's *History of Greece*. These two volumes, bound in one, were reprinted and published in 1971 in London. Finlay's vigorous and well-informed work is very good reading. Unfortunately, although he has much to say in a general way about local Greek institutions (and he must have had first-hand knowledge of their working), he obviously did not think it incumbent on him to explain them in detail for the enlightenment of posterity.

12. See Chapter 2.

13. Descended from a famous family which had provided dragomans to the Porte and governors in the Danubian Principalities, in 1818 he had gone into exile with his uncle Ioannis Karatzas, the governor of Wallachia, to whom he had been secretary. He had settled down in Pisa along with another exile from the Principalities, Ignatios, formerly bishop of Oungro-Vlakhia. On 10 July he had left Marseilles in a ship carrying French, Italian and Greek volunteers, along with military supplies and funds provided by Prince Karatzas. It was probably intended that he should prepare the way for his patrons Ignatios and Karatzas, both of whom imagined that they would attain dominating positions in liberated Greece.

14. Negris had left the Principalities to take an appointment in the Turkish Embassy in Paris. On his way to France by ship he had heard of the outbreak of the Greek Revolution and had disembarked in the Peloponnese, arriving there before Mavrokordatos.

15. See Chapters 4 and 5.

16. A *klepht* from Leondari in the Peloponnese, he had been employed as *kapos* (a retainer) by the wealthy Moreot family of Deliyannis. When in exile in the Ionian Islands he had served as captain in the Duke of York's Greek Light Infantry.

17. Lieutenant-Colonel Leicester Stanhope (later fifth Earl of Harrington) was a philhellene and Benthamite. He was sent to Greece towards the end of 1823 by the London Greek Committee to assist Lord Byron in arranging for employment of officers sent to Greece by that committee and in establishing an arsenal.



18. These three islands, which had joined the revolution shortly after the revolt of the Peloponnese, were to provide the principal naval forces for the prosecution of the war at sea.

19. Already the etairist Papaphlessas (Dikaïos) had made attempts to organise an *ephoria* (administration) to include the whole of the Peloponnese (Morea).

20. On his career, see the excellent study of K. A. Diamantis, *Dimitrios Ypsilantis, 1793-1832* (Athens, 1966).

21. The war had given the *kapetanioi* greater power and prestige than they had enjoyed under the old order. Kolokotronis, for instance, upon whom the primate Deliyannis had spent a fortune, had found war so profitable that he ceased to be a docile retainer: he imposed contributions on the villages; he took lesser captains into his pay; and he soon became a man of great political importance.

22. Already in October he had sent out invitations for an assembly at Tripolitsa, but, as the primates resented his initiative, there had been no response.

23. In fact, the old Turkish *kaza*.

24. There are some features which resemble the pre-French Corsican Constitution. Nothing seems to be known of Gallina or, for that matter, of the way in which the three constitution makers worked.

25. In July 1821 Count Kapodistrias advised Mavrokordatos and the primates to satisfy the European powers by setting up a strong central government based on existing local institutions. Little did Kapodistrias then realise that this was a contradiction in terms.

26. The change came in October 1822. Varnakiotis, an *armatolos*, had made a *kapaki* (accommodation) with the Turks.

27. He had formerly served Ali Paşa of Ioannina.

28. A primate from Hydra, he represented the island interest, although it would not be true to say that he represented all the islanders.

29. Ioannis Notaras, who was nephew of the aged primate, Panoutsos Notaras.

30. Yannis 'Makriyannis' (Triantaphyllos), later a general, began life as a small trader in Arta. Like Ioannis Notaras he favoured the creation of and was prepared (probably with certain reservations) to obey a strong central government.

31. He had served as a physician at Ali Paşa's Court.

32. Gouras later captured Androutsos and held him prisoner in the Akropolis. Here Androutsos was murdered. Thus perished a man whose enmity with Kolettis dated from the time they had both served the tyrant Ali Paşa.

33. Kolokotronis was given the rank of field-marshal. Following the failure of Koundouriotis and Mavrokordatos to save the fortresses of Navarino for the Greeks, he mustered strong forces for the defence of the Peloponnese.

34. This point is well brought out by Dimakopoulos (see various works cited above).

35. See the thorough and important study, A. Lignadis, *To proton daneion tis Anexartias* (Athens, 1970).

36. On the diplomacy of the Greek revolution, see C. W. Crawley, *The Question of Greek Independence, 1821-33* (Cambridge, 1930) and on certain of the intrigues of Greek parties, see my *British Intelligence of Events in Greece* (Athens, 1959).

37. This adjective is relative. The scene of the Greek War of Independence is crowded with minor characters.

38. See Chapter 5.

39. This was Frederick North. An old philhellene, he had been received into the Orthodox Church and had founded an academy (university) at Corfu.

40. His *Istorikon Arkheion*, ed. D. G. Kambouroglou, 2 vols. (Athens, 1901; 1906) is a most important source.

41. On Kolokotronis's relations with Church, see my *British and American Philhellenes*, (Thessaloniki, 1955) *passim*.

42. 'Nikitas' or 'Nikitaras' was Stamatelopoulos, a former Peloponnesian *kapos* who was one of the great warriors of the war of independence.

43. Ibrahim was the son of Mehmet Ali, the viceroy of Egypt.

44. On this subject, see the excellent study, A. Vakalopoulos, *Ta ellinika Stratevmata tou 1821* (Thessaloniki, 1948).

45. That is, regular regiments. The *khilarkhies* (thousands) were not regular regiments in the strict sense.

46. For this subject the well-documented monograph, D. C. Fleming, *John Capodistrias and the Conference of London, 1828-1831* (Thessaloniki, 1970) is essential.