

CHAPTER II

THE HATT-I HÜMAYUN OF 1856 AND THE CLIMATE OF ITS RECEPTION

The lull which overtook the reform movement in the early 1850's was soon broken by the impact of the Crimean War. In the wake of the English and French armies that swarmed into the Bosphorus and went on to the Black Sea came new western influences, good and bad. Britain and France used their status as allies of the Ottoman Empire to urge the Turks toward further westernization and more effective application of the doctrine of equality.¹ At the end of the war, their pressure culminated in a new edict, the Hatt-ı Hümayun of 1856, which inaugurated the second and final phase of the Tanzimat.

Already during the war period the British ambassador Stratford Canning, now become Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, had been instrumental in securing the proclamation of a ferman which removed one of the distinctions among Ottoman subjects by allowing the admission of Christian testimony in some criminal actions.² Secular police courts were set up to take cognizance of these mixed criminal cases,³ in an effort to avoid the prejudice of the Muslim kadı against Christian testimony; the courts, however, were filled with nominees of the Muslim governors. In the same year the establishment of a new council of reforms was probably hastened by the presence if not the direct pressure of the allies. This was the Tanzimat Council (*Meclis-i âli-i Tanzimat*), which took over the function of drafting reform legislation formerly exercised by the Supreme Council of Judicial Ordinances.⁴ The council was also, significantly, charged with investigating ministers and with general oversight of the administration of law and order. It was, in fact, to be a sort of watchdog for the grand vezir over the bureaucracy, and instances of corruption were among the events that impelled Reşid to establish the council.⁵ Âli Paşa was its

¹ The French and English influence and pressure appear clearly throughout Cevdet Paşa, *Tezâkir* 1-12, ed. by Cavid Baysun (Ankara, 1953); cf. Fatma Aliye, *Ahmed Cevdet Paşa ve zamani* (İstanbul, 1336), pp. 118-119.

² Text of regulations in F. Eichmann, *Die Reformen des osmanischen Reiches* (Berlin, 1858), pp. 429-432.

³ Text of ferman in *ibid.*, pp. 426-428.

⁴ Text of edict in Friedrich Wilhelm von Reden, *Die Türkei und Griechenland* (Frankfurt a.M., 1856), pp. 298-300.

⁵ Cevdet, *Tezâkir*, pp. 27, 36; Fatma Aliye, *Cevdet*, pp. 119-122.

first president, and among the members were Fuad Efendi (later Paşa) and Mütercim Mehmed Rüşdi, with whom Âli often worked closely. The council could draft new laws on subjects referred to it, or could take the initiative in proposing new legislation. During the war the Tanzimat Council, again under allied pressure, prepared another measure to remove one of the important inequalities between Muslims and non-Muslims. This abolished the *haraç*, or tax paid by non-Muslims in place of military service, and permitted them to do such service thereafter.⁶ But it proved impossible to render this measure effective because of antagonism on both sides.

The allies' initiative in these measures was symptomatic of their concern throughout the war for a more general reform in the Ottoman Empire. Their original intention of securing guarantees for the rights of Christians in particular brought strong objections from Âli Paşa that this was unnecessary and would infringe the sovereign rights of the sultan.⁷ So the diplomats turned to discussion of more thoroughgoing reform which should affect equally all the sultan's subjects. From this discussion resulted the Hatt-ı Hümayun of 1856, which was in many ways the magnum opus of Lord Stratford. Throughout the month of January 1856 he met regularly with Thouvenel, the French ambassador, and Prokesch, the Austrian internuncio to the Porte. Âli Paşa and Fuad Paşa, now grand vezir and foreign minister respectively, and Prince Kallimaki, an Ottoman Greek, met with the three ambassadors to discuss their project.⁸ The three powers were pushing the Turks to complete the decree before the Paris peace conference opened, so that Russia would have no hand in Turkish reform, but would be presented with a *fait accompli*. In this they were successful; but Turkish resentment of what was essentially foreign dictation of a reform program shows through accounts of the negotiation, even though Âli and Fuad were prepared to admit the validity of almost all the points made in the *hat*. Stratford did not obtain all he wished,

⁶ Text in Eichmann, *Reformen*, pp. 436-440. Cf. Felix Bamberg, *Geschichte der orientalischen Angelegenheit* (Berlin, 1892), p. 263; Eichmann, *Reformen*, pp. 226-232; Edouard Engelhardt, *La Turquie et le Tanzimat* (Paris, 1882-1884), I, 126-127. The terms *haraç* and *cizye* were used interchangeably in the nineteenth century to mean a head tax paid by the non-Muslim peoples of the book, with the understanding that this was in lieu of military service, although neither term originally had this meaning.

⁷ Memorandum of December 28, 1854, and Âli's argument in Eichmann, *Reformen*, pp. 214, 374-381.

⁸ Kallimaki kept records of the discussions: Cevdet, *Texâkir*, p. 73.

since the Turks found French and Austrian support for softening some of the demands, but the resultant Hatt-ı Hümayun of 1856 was, in contrast to the Hatt-ı Şerif of 1839, essentially made in Europe, and autochthonous in form alone. Turkish face was saved because the edict was proclaimed as a spontaneous act of the sultan, and because the Treaty of Paris included a provision that the *hat* was not to lay the basis for foreign interference.⁹

Although the Hatt-ı Hümayun¹⁰ sprang from foreign dictation, while the Hatt-ı Şerif of Gülhane did not, in a number of ways the two documents were alike. Each was promulgated when the Ottoman Empire was deeply involved in international complications, and each was aimed at European opinion as well as at domestic reform.¹¹ Each

⁹ On negotiations see Great Britain, *Parliamentary Papers*, 1856, vol. 61, *Accounts and Papers*, vol. 24, Eastern Papers (part 18); Prokesch's report of 24 January 1856 in HHS, XII/56 and enclosure; Bamberg, *Geschichte*, pp. 263-265; Stanley Lane-Poole, *Life of . . . Stratford Canning* (London, 1888), II, 439-443; Harold Temperley, "The Last Phase of Stratford de Redcliffe," *English Historical Review*, 47 (1932), 226-231; Enver Ziya Karal, *Nizam-ı cedû ve Tanzimat devirleri* (Ankara, 1947), pp. 257-258. Cevdet, *Tezâkir*, p. 67, says that the şeyhülislâm Ârif Efendi was also on the drafting commission. Stratford's efforts to urge the Turks to solemn proclamation, and his regrets that the *hat* was not more explicit and inclusive, are clear from his dispatches in FO 78/1173, #176, 13 February 1856, and #213, 21 February 1856.

¹⁰ Westerners have always called this edict the Hatt-ı Hümayun, following the title as officially communicated by the Porte to the Paris peace conference of 1856 and as written on the Turkish texts distributed just after the proclamation. But Turks almost always call it the "Islahat Fermanı," the "reform ferman," as it is referred to in *Düstur*, I (İstanbul, 1289), 1 and 7, or popularly the "imtiyaz fermanı," the ferman of privileges or concessions. To avoid confusion with the edict of 1839, the author will use the common western form.

Well-preserved copies of the original edict as distributed in 1856 may be seen in both the Turkish and French versions in Stratford to Clarendon, #213, 21 February 1856, enclosures, FO 78/1173, and in Prokesch to Buol, #16A-C, 21 February 1856, HHS, XII/56; a facsimile of the Turkish text of 1856 is in *Tanzimat*, I, following p. 56. The Turkish text in printed form is available in many places: as in Ahmed Rasim, *Resimli ve haritalı osmanlı tarihi*, IV (İstanbul, 1328-1330), 2048-2062; and most usefully with transliteration and comments in Thomas Xavier Bianchi, *Khathihy Humaioun . . . en français et en turc* (Paris, 1856). A transliteration in modern Turkish is in Karal, *Nizam-ı cedû ve Tanzimat devirleri*, pp. 266-272. The Turkish text was not numbered by articles; hence the various French versions differ in paragraphing. The official French text may be found in many places, for instance: George Young, *Corps de droit ottoman* (Oxford, 1905-1906), II, 3-9; Eichmann, *Reformen*, pp. 353-360; Engelhardt, *La Turquie*, II, 263-270. Grégoire Aristarchi Bey gives an independent translation from the Turkish in *Législation ottomane* (Constantinople, 1873-1888), II, 14-22. An English translation is in J. C. Hurewitz, *Diplomacy in the Near and Middle East* (Princeton, 1956), I, 149-153.

¹¹ This point, that the edict of 1856 was made to assuage European opinion, is made specifically in the report of a special meeting of Ottoman statesmen to consider ways of applying some of its promises: Mehmet Selâheddin, *Bir türk diplomatinin evrak-ı siyasiyesi* (İstanbul, 1306), p. 149.

THE HATT-I HÜMAYUN OF 1856

was cast in the most solemn form of imperial decree, and made promises which required implementation by more specific regulations. The guarantees of 1839 were logically repeated and extended in the edict of 1856. But there were also significant differences. The edict of 1856 was more meticulous than its predecessor in enumerating the changes to be made; it started with a confirmation of the promises of 1839, but went far beyond. And the edict of 1856, unlike that of 1839, did not have a split personality. Not only were its tone and language more modern and western, to the point of clarity and conciseness unusual for Ottoman documents of those days, but it contained not one mention of the sacred law, the Koran, or the ancient laws and glories of the empire. Psychologically, this was dangerous. But the whole decree looked ahead, not back.

This remains true despite the fact that some of the pledges of 1856 had been made before. The abolition of tax farming was again promised; likewise the abolition of bribery. The equal liability of Muslims and non-Muslims to military service was reiterated. A note annexed to the *hat* repeated the affirmation of 1844 that apostasy from Islam would not be punished by death.¹² But other stipulations of the Hatt-ı Hümayun went beyond the promises of 1839: strict observance of annual budgets, the establishment of banks, the employment of European capital and skills for economic improvement, the codification of penal and commercial law and reform of the prison system, and the establishment of mixed courts to take care of a greater proportion of cases involving Muslims and non-Muslims.

These and other reforms were to be for the benefit of all the sultan's subjects, of whatever creed or class. Although this reaffirmation of the principle of equality again echoed the Hatt-ı Şerif of Gülhane, equality received considerably greater emphasis in 1856. The implications of Osmanlılık were elaborated in some detail: Muslims and non-Muslims should be equal in matters of military service, in the administration of justice, in taxation, in admission to civil and military schools, in public employment, and in social respect. A special anti-defamation clause banned the use by officials or private persons of deprecatory epithets¹³ "tending to make any class whatever of the sub-

¹² The text of the Hatt-ı Hümayun itself did not go so far on this touchy subject, stating only, "No one shall be compelled to change his religion"—perhaps an echo of Sura, 11:257 (Bell's translation), "There is no compulsion in religion."

¹³ This presumably included not only the popular term for infidel, *gâvur*, and its literary equivalent *kâfir*, but also *reaya*, which from its original meaning of "flocks"

jects of my empire inferior to another class on account of religion, language or race." Before mixed tribunals, witnesses of all creeds were to have equal status, and to be sworn according to their own formulae. The whole edict implied the removal of millet barriers and the substitution of a common citizenship for all peoples of the empire. Throughout the *hat recur* phrases innocent of religious distinction—"imperial subjects," "subjects of the sublime sultanate," and "subjects of the Exalted [Ottoman] State."¹⁴ In the preamble of the Hatt-ı Hümayun was introduced the concept of patriotism or "compatriotism" as the bond among all the subjects of the empire.¹⁵ This was a step toward a secular, western concept of nationality. Yet there was a dualism implicit in the fact that the Hatt-ı Hümayun, with all its emphasis on equality without distinction as to religion, was in part devoted to enumerating the rights of the Christian and other non-Muslim communities, and specifically retained the millet organizations, although prescribing their reform. Millet boundaries were to be blurred, but they were still there. Complete equality, egalitarian Ottomanism, was yet to come, even in theory.

The Hatt-ı Hümayun promised also an extension of the principle of representation in government, in three separate provisions. The

had come to designate the mass of the sultan's peasant subjects, but in the nineteenth century was commonly used only to refer to the non-Muslim subjects of the empire. Cf. Bianchi, *Khaththi Humaşoun*, p. 12, n.1, and H. A. R. Gibb and Harold Bowen, *Islamic Society and the West*, I, part 1 (London, 1950), 237. Joseph von Hammer-Purgstall, *Des osmanischen Reichs Staatsverfassung und Staatsverwaltung* (Vienna, 1815), I, 181, makes clear the bitter connotations of the term *reaya*.

¹⁴ *tebaa-yı şahane, tebaa-yı saltanat-ı seniye, tebaa-yı Devlet-i Aliyye*. In the 1839 Hatt-ı Şerif the expression *tebaa-yı saltanat-ı seniye* had been used once, and was evidently coined for the occasion: see T. X. Bianchi, *Le Nouveau Guide de la conversation* . . . , 2nd ed. (Paris, 1852), p. 296, n.2.

¹⁵ Bianchi, *Khaththi Humaşoun*, p. 4, n.1, says the term *vatan*, here used for the French *patriotisme*, was a new form. The word *vatan*, which down to the nineteenth century meant "place of birth or residence," was by mid-century equated to "fatherland," the French *patrie*, both in popular and official usage. Cf. Reşid's use of *vatan* in 1856 in Cevdet, *Tezâkir*, p. 75. Curiously, the official French text of the 1839 Hatt-ı Şerif twice translated *vatan*, which appeared in the Turkish text, as *pays*, while rendering *millet* as *patrie*. See comments on the evolution of the word in Bernard Lewis, "The Impact of the French Revolution on Turkey," *Journal of World History*, 1:1 (July 1953), 107-108; cf. Sylvia G. Haim, "Islam and the Theory of Arab Nationalism," *Die Welt des Islams*, n.s. 1v:2/3 (1955), 132-135, on the evolution of the term in Arabic. *Vatandaş* came to be used for "citizen," and "patriotism" to be translated by *vatanperverlik*, as illustrated, for instance, in the Turkish translation of French terms in Mustafa Fazıl Paşa's letter to the sultan in 1867. *Vatan* continued to be used for "fatherland," but gathered most of its emotional content from the manner in which the New Ottomans used it, especially Namık Kemal in his play of 1873, also called *Vatan*, on which see below, chapter VIII.

provincial and communal councils, which already embodied this principle, were to be reconstituted to ensure the fair choice of Muslim and non-Muslim delegates and the freedom of their discussion in the councils. The Supreme Council of Judicial Ordinances was henceforth to include representatives of the non-Muslim millets. And the millet structures themselves were to be recast so that temporal affairs of the non-Muslim communities would be supervised not by the clergy alone, but by councils including lay delegates. In the Supreme Council and the millet organizations the representative principle was thus introduced on an empire-wide scale.

Reaction to the proclamation of the Hatt-ı Hümayun was mixed, but in general it aroused more opposition than enthusiasm. This was above all true among the Muslim Turks. Many of them, particularly in the capital, were resentful of the foreign pressures which led to the edict. The *şeyhülislâm* referred pointedly to the fact that not only English and French fleets, but also land armies of both nations, were in the environs of Istanbul. Reşid openly criticized the *hat*, referring to it as the ferman of concessions. In a lengthy memorandum he argued that Âli and Fuad were going too far too fast in giving political privileges to Christians. To be sure, Christians could no longer be treated as they were a hundred or even twenty years ago, but all change must be gradual and without foreign interference. The complete equality promised in the ferman, he said, will give the Ottoman Empire a color completely different from that of the past six centuries, eliminating the distinction between the ruling millet and the ruled. Muslim opinion will object to this; minds must be prepared. Reşid predicted troubles in various parts of the empire. He also objected strongly to the manner in which the ferman was drafted and to its mention in the Treaty of Paris. These matters seriously affected the honor, independence, and integrity of the state and sultan. Yet, continued Reşid, the ministers and a few slavish followers acted hastily, without summoning the time-honored general assembly of notables for discussion.¹⁶

Reşid was moved by personal pique at the fact that his pupils now controlled the government while he was out of office, but his criticisms were not without weight and were echoed by other Turks, who re-

¹⁶ Reşid's memorandum is in Cevdet, *Tezâkir*, pp. 76-82. At the same time, however, Reşid was evidently telling his European friends that the Hatt-ı Hümayun did not go far enough! Prokesch to Buol, #16D, 21 February 1856, HHS XII/56.

sented the emphasis on equality and could, of course, not be legislated into giving up the term *gâvur*. The ruling position of the Muslim millet won by the blood of their forefathers was being abandoned, they said; "it was a day of weeping for the people of Islam."¹⁷ A few of the young half-westernized efendis took the *hat* cheerfully, and some were reported to rejoice that with the increased mingling of Muslim and non-Muslim in Ottoman society the Muslims would realize an increase in the value of their real estate. But these were exceptions. Turks who were in favor of reform resented not only the foreign dictation but the sweeping nature of the Hatt-ı Hümayun, which was sure to arouse opposition. "I have no patience with the authors of the *Hatt-i-Humayoon*," said one. "We were going on rapidly with our reforms, and now comes this silly false move, and, perhaps, spoils the game of the improvers for twenty years. . . . The people who sent it to us from Paris know nothing of our institutions."¹⁸ From the interior of Anatolia it was reported that "the remaining bigotry of the Musulman race has been aroused by the late *Hatt-i-Humayoon*, and they hate the Europeans to whom they ascribe it, and the Rayas for whose benefit it has been granted. . . ."¹⁹ In Maraş and some Syrian centers there were outbursts.²⁰

Among Christian subjects of the Porte, reaction to the Hatt-ı Hümayun was still mixed, though on the whole more favorable. What the Christians thought depended on their particular situation. Probably the most enthusiastic were the Bulgars, who saw a chance to throw off the detested yoke of the Greek Orthodox hierarchy in the provisions of the *hat* that enjoined a reorganization of the millets and sup-
planted elastic ecclesiastical revenues by fixed salaries for clergy.²¹ Among the ordinary Christians of whatever sect there was approval for the prospect that laymen should have greater voice in the control

¹⁷ Cevdet, *Tezâkir*, pp. 67-68.

¹⁸ Nassau Senior, *A Journal Kept in Turkey and Greece* (London, 1859), p. 72.

¹⁹ Van Lennep, 12 June 1858, #386, ABCFM, Armenian Mission VIII.

²⁰ On Muslim Turkish reactions to the Hatt-ı Hümayun see Cevdet, *Tezâkir*, pp. 66-89, which includes Reşid's lengthy memorandum; Ahmed Refik, "Türkiyede İslahat Fermanı," *Tarih-i osmanî encümeni mecmuası*, 14:81 (1340), 195ff., largely plagiarizing Cevdet's information; Karal, *Nizam-ı cedid ve Tanzimat devirleri*, pp. 258-259; Karal, *İslahat fermanı devri* (Ankara, 1956), pp. 7-11, largely Cevdet simplified; George Hill, *A History of Cyprus* (Cambridge, 1940-1952), IV, 177, 201-203; Andreas D. Mordtmann, *Anatolien; Skizzen und Reisebriefe* (Hannover, 1925), pp. 252, 255-256, 262.

²¹ Alois Hajek, *Bulgarien unter der Türkenherrschaft* (Stuttgart, 1925), p. 188; William W. Hall, *Puritans in the Balkans* (Sofia, 1938), p. 15.

of millet affairs, as well as general enthusiasm for most of the provisions on equality. But they resented the prospect of equality in military service, and it was foolish to suppose that this burden, disliked and evaded when possible by Turks, should be gladly accepted by Christians. The experiment tried during the Crimean War had turned out so badly that the Hatt-ı Hümayun itself had to admit the principle of buying off from military service, which now theoretically was the equal privilege of both Muslim and Christian.²² The higher Christian clergy were generally opposed to the Hatt-ı Hümayun, because it struck at their power over the millets, especially at their ability to fleece their spiritual subjects. The Greek hierarchy, fearing the loss of their primacy among the non-Muslims, disliked not only this invasion of traditional prerogative, but also the general emphasis on equality. "The state puts us together with the Jews," some of the Greeks were reported to have said. "We were content with the superiority of Islam."²³ It is quite probable that the Greek metropolitan of Izmit uttered the wish attributed to him as the Hatt-ı Hümayun was put back into its red satin pouch after the ceremonial reading at the Porte: "İnşallah—God grant that it not be taken out of this bag again."²⁴ The Greeks had good reason to worry about the *hal*'s indication of creeping equality, though, in fact, the precedence of Greek clerics over other non-Muslim ecclesiastics was to some degree preserved throughout the Tanzimat era.²⁵

The promulgation of the Hatt-ı Hümayun was, in sum, a mixed blessing, although it stands as one of the great documents of the Tanzimat period. Âli and Fuad had obviously made the best of a bad job, and had consented to the decree in order to stave off more active for-

²² Prokesch to Buol, #39 A-E, 16 May 1856, HHS, XII/56. Benoît Brunswik, *Etudes pratiques sur la question d'Orient* (Paris, 1869), pp. 148-149, claims that the Porte, fearful of arming Christians, ordered the Christian patriarchs to object to this point. But it is clear that the Christian peoples had their own grounds for objection, and that the patriarchs had independent reasons for disliking the Hatt-ı Hümayun.

²³ Cevdet, *Tezâkir*, p. 68.

²⁴ Engelhardt, *La Turquie*, I, 142; Karal, *Islahat fermamı devri*, p. 11. Karal, in *Nizam-ı cedid ve Tanzimat devirleri*, p. 191, attributes the same remark to the Greek Orthodox patriarch at the reading of the 1839 edict, which is probably an error. See, further, Engelhardt, *La Turquie*, I, 140, 147-148; Senior, *Journal*, p. 152. Cevdet, *Tezâkir*, pp. 82-83, summarizes and quotes from a memorandum by Stephen Vogorides, a Greek completely devoted to the service of the Porte, which argues that the grant of equality is too sudden and runs counter to ancestral customs and values.

²⁵ Cf. Article 2 of 1869 (?) regulations on precedence in provincial councils: *Düstur*, I, 719; Aristarchi, *Législation*, II, 297.

ign intervention and keep the initiative in their own hands.²⁶ The clause in the Paris peace treaty forbidding outside interference seemed to confirm the wisdom of their course.²⁷ But the foreign origin of the Hatt-ı Hümayun was well known; this created not only resentment among Turks, but a tendency among the Christian minorities to look to Europe for support in securing the promised equality rather than to an Ottoman government which had issued the decree only under pressure. The Ottoman ministers tried to explain the Hatt-ı Hümayun as all things to all men: to represent it to the European powers and to their non-Muslim subjects as an important concession, and to their Muslim subjects as containing nothing particularly new or injurious to their prestige.²⁸ It is likely that a series of smaller measures would have accomplished more, and occasioned less resentment, than a Hatt-ı Hümayun issued with such fanfare, for the mere existence of the Hatt-ı Hümayun laid the basis for Muslim complaints about its concessions and Christian and European complaints about nonfulfillment. It remained, nevertheless, a mark to shoot at. It was not self-enforcing, but required future legislation and administrative action.

What success would attend these efforts depended on the improvement of officialdom and of the educational level within the empire—subjects on which the *hat* was largely silent. It depended also on the general climate of opinion in the empire in 1856. “You can give good advice, but not good customs,” says the Turkish proverb. Fuad Paşa, reviewing the accomplishments of the reform program a decade after the Hatt-ı Hümayun, echoed this: “L’on ne saurait improviser la réforme des moeurs.”²⁹ Baron Prokesch, the Austrian internuncio, agreed. It would take time, he said, to change ideas, and then to achieve social changes; reform cannot be rushed.³⁰ What the obstacles to the implementation of the Hatt-ı Hümayun were can be understood only in the light of the situation of the Ottoman Empire and the outlook of its peoples at the end of the Crimean War period.



²⁶ Fuad argued that issuance of the *hat* had prevented the powers from inserting details on Ottoman reform into the peace treaty: Cevdet, *Tezâkir*, p. 85.

²⁷ See appendix A on interpretation of this clause.

²⁸ See Fuad Paşa's rather specious argument—but one justified by the literal text of the Hatt-ı Hümayun—to Muslims, that the *hat* did not really say Christians would be members of the Supreme Council, but only that they should be summoned to its discussions: Cevdet, *Tezâkir*, p. 71.

²⁹ *Considérations sur l'exécution du Firman Impérial du 18 février 1856*, in Aristarchi, *Législation*, II, 26.

³⁰ Prokesch to Buol, #41C, 20 May 1856, HHS XII/56.

In 1856 the Ottoman Empire was still a sprawling conglomeration of territories, which any government could have administered only with difficulty. To introduce effective reform over such an area would be harder yet. Serbia, Moldavia, Wallachia, Egypt, and Tunis enjoyed varying degrees of autonomy; except for Tunis, which in the succeeding two decades snuggled closer to the Porte in an attempt to ward off French domination, all were moving rapidly in the direction of independence. The control of the central government over the Arab provinces in Asia, though firmer than it had been fifty years before, was still tenuous. Tribal groups frequently escaped the Porte's control almost completely. Often the central government not only had little control over some areas, but little knowledge about many regions. A discussion in the Crimean War period of regrouping villages on the Greek frontier revealed, on Sultan Abdülmeçid's questioning, that there was no map of the region. At the end of the Tanzimat period the Turks still needed to buy maps of their own Balkan territories from the Austro-Hungarian general staff.⁸¹

Something like thirty-six million people lived in the empire.⁸² Muslims were an absolute majority, numbering about twenty-one million, but the Turks were a minority of perhaps ten to twelve million. Only in Anatolia did they live in a compact mass. The other principal elements in the empire were some six million Slavs, including the Bulgars, two million Greeks, four million Roumanians, two and a half million Armenians, perhaps six to eight million Arabs, a million and a half Albanians, and a million Kurds. Jews and other peoples formed smaller groups. Except for the Armenians, most of whom were in the Gregorian church, the bulk of the non-Muslims were Greek Orthodox. This heterogeneity presented the reformers with a formidable task in their efforts to knit together a reorganized empire based on Osmanlılık. It is true that over the centuries there had been various types of racial mixtures, and a remarkable degree of religious syncretism among the common people of all creeds. But the millet bar-

⁸¹ Cevdet, *Tezâkir*, pp. 50-51; Alexander Novotny, *Quellen und Studien zur Geschichte des Berliner Kongresses 1878*, 1 (Graz-Köln, 1957), 183. On the geographical work done in this period, most of it by Europeans, see İ. H. Aykol, "Tanzimat devrinde bizde coğrafya ve jeoloji," *Tanzimat*, 1, 527-548.

⁸² The most problematic figures here are for Arabs and Turks. Ubcini counts only 4,700,000 Arabs, including those in Egypt and Tunis. This seems low, but Egypt toward the end of Mehmed Ali's rule had only a little over 2,000,000 people: Helen Rivlin, *The Agricultural Policy of Muhammad 'Ali in Egypt* (Cambridge, Mass., 1961), pp. 263, 278-280. See Appendix B on census and population sources.

riers still remained, reinforced by the interests of their respective ecclesiastical hierarchies. The millets emphasized not only the distinction between Muslim and non-Muslim, but the antagonisms among non-Muslim sects, which in the nineteenth century caused the Porte endless trouble: Christian contempt for Jew, Greek opposition to Armenian, and the squabbles of Gregorian, Roman, and Protestant Armenians. It was true also that there was a partial linguistic amalgam of the peoples in the empire. Many Greeks and Armenians did not know their national languages and spoke Turkish alone, though they wrote it in Greek and Armenian characters.⁸³ But by mid-century the western concept of nationalism was becoming stronger among the minority peoples, who put greater emphasis on their vernaculars. They were driven toward separatism rather than Ottomanism. Serbs, Roumanians, and Greeks were already infected; Bulgarians and Armenians were beginning to be. Turks and Arabs were the last of the Ottoman peoples to turn into the path of nationalism.

Over this *mélange* the Turk still ruled. He was the mediator among the diverse peoples, best fitted for the job by temperament and situation, as Turkish ministers liked to point out to Europeans.⁸⁴ The symbol of Turkish government was the Turkish soldier stationed at the Church of the Holy Sepulchre in Jerusalem to keep order among the quarreling Christians. The Turk, though his government might be inefficient and corrupt, also had considerable ability as a governor. Thundering condemnations of the Turk as an untutored barbarian, unfit for administration, which issued from Europe in mid-century must be taken as symptoms of a bad case of moral superiority.

But in fact there was no such person as "the Turk." There was the ruling Ottoman group, now largely concentrated in the bureaucracy centered on the Sublime Porte, and the mass of the people, mostly peasants. The *efendi* looked down on "the Turk," which was a term of opprobrium indicating boorishness, and preferred to think of himself as an *Osmanli*. His country was not Turkey, but the Ottoman State.⁸⁵ His language was also "Ottoman"; though he might also call

⁸³ An American missionary working among them estimated that "fully half" of the Greeks and Armenians did not know their own tongues: ABCFM, Western Turkey Mission III, #21, 11 August 1874.

⁸⁴ Cf. Fuad to a French visitor: P. Challemeil-Lacour, "Les hommes d'état de la Turquie," *Revue des deux mondes*, 2nd period, 73 (15 February 1868), 922.

⁸⁵ Many terms were used to designate the Ottoman Empire, but "Turkey" was not among them, until Turkish national consciousness began to develop later in the

it "Turkish," in such a case he distinguished it from *kaba türkçe*, or coarse Turkish, the common speech. His writing included a minimum of Turkish words, except for particles and auxiliary verbs. The maligned Turkish peasant, at the other end of the social scale, was generally no better off than the ordinary non-Muslim and as much oppressed by maladministration. In addition, the ordinary Turk had to bear the burden of the five-year military service instituted after 1839. He was as much in need of reformed government as the Christian, but he had neither treaty, foreign power, nor patriarch to protect him, and his lot was generally unknown to Europe.

The line of basic demarcation ran, therefore, not between Muslim and Christian, Turk and non-Turk, but between ruler and ruled, oppressor and oppressed.³⁶ Those on top—whether Ottoman civil servants or army officers, Greek or Armenian bankers or merchants or higher ecclesiastics—looked down on the masses.³⁷ Sometimes this scorn represented the opposition of urban populations to the provincials or peasantry. But, though there is truth in this dichotomy, the mass of townsmen were ruled, not ruling; the line still ran between rulers and ruled. There was no extensive urban middle class to bridge the gap, particularly among the Turks, since so many of the businessmen were non-Muslims. The artisan guilds (*esnaf's*) were feebler in the nineteenth century than before, and although they exerted influence toward reform in some of the millets, especially among Bulgars and Armenians, they did not constitute a national middle class.³⁸ In

century. *Memalik-i osmaniye, devlet-i aliye, devlet-i osmaniye* were among the more common terms. The 1876 constitution used *Memalik-i Devlet-i Osmaniye*.

³⁶ Mustafa Fazıl Paşa pointed this out forcefully in his *Lettre adressée à S. M. le Sultan* (n.p., n.d., but Paris either late 1866 or early 1867).

³⁷ Melek-Hanum, *Thirty Years in the Harem* (London, 1872), provides a good, because apparently unconscious, composite example. She was a Levantine—half French, one quarter Greek, and one quarter Armenian—married to Kıbrıslı Mehmed Paşa, an important Turkish statesman. Throughout her autobiography she exhibits occasional sympathy for peasants, but a general attitude of looking down her nose at the ruled.

³⁸ On background of guilds see Gibb and Bowen, *Islamic Society*, I, part 1, 288-299. For the nineteenth century: H. G. O. Dwight, *Christianity Revived in the East* (New York, 1850), pp. 184-185; Salaheddin, *La Turquie à l'exposition universelle* (Paris, 1867), pp. 163-168; Great Britain, *Parliamentary Papers*, 1870, vol. 66, *Accounts and Papers*, vol. 26, pp. 231-235, 247, and 1871, vol. 68, *Accounts and Papers*, vol. 32, pp. 729, 766-770, 826-827. Süleyman Paşa, ardent reformer of 1876, discounted the *esnaf's* of Istanbul as having neither interest in, nor effect on, political reform: *Süleyman Paşa muhakemesi* (Istanbul, 1328), p. 76. On Armenian guildsmen see below, chapter IV; on Bulgar guilds, C. E. Black, *The Establishment of Constitutional Government in Bulgaria* (Princeton, 1943), pp. 13-15.

the provinces the gap between large landowners and the peasantry continued to exist. The provincial notables did not fill the role of a progressive rural middle class, as had the smaller landed gentry in some other societies, but they resisted reform, because they profited from disorganization and inefficiency in the central government to maintain their political and financial control. Among the notables were Christians as well as Muslims; both oppressed the peasantry.³⁹ These social and economic gaps in Ottoman society, as well as the religious and linguistic differences, were serious obstacles to any reform program that aimed at equality of rights, security of all life and property and honor, and representative political institutions.

Given this situation as it existed in 1856, and the lack of organized pressures from below, the ruling group had to be the reforming group. But the ruling group was far from united on either objectives or methods of reform, and some were opponents of any change in the status quo. There were important men—true and intelligent conservatives—who conscientiously opposed any radical break with the past. They wanted to reform abuses, perhaps to change things slowly, but to continue to serve faith and state much as their forefathers had done. There were also those who were conservative solely because of vested interest in what the status quo gave them, who were less interested in serving faith and state than in serving themselves. There were also those of the *efendis*, described in the preceding chapter, whose superficial westernisms did not make them serious reformers. In time there came to be radical reformers as well—young men in a hurry, who were influenced by their knowledge of western intellectual, political, and economic patterns, as well as by their interpretation of Islam, who spent most of their energies criticizing the government of the day.⁴⁰ Thus there was only a comparative handful of men among the ruling

³⁹ On the dominant position of provincial notables and depression of peasantry see especially Halil İnalcık, *Tanzimat ve Bulgar meselesi* (Ankara, 1943), passim, and, in particular, pp. 10-11, 75-81, 135-142; *idem*, "Tanzimat nedir?" *Tarih araştırmaları*, 1940-1941 (İstanbul, 1941), pp. 245-251, 259-260; Abdolonyme Ubicini, *Letters on Turkey*, trans. by Lady Easthope (London, 1856), I, 266-283, on the taxes imposed on the peasantry; Black, *Constitutional Government in Bulgaria*, pp. 10-12, on the local *çorbacı's* or Bulgar notables; T. W. Riker, *The Making of Roumania* (London, 1931), pp. 3-7, 292-294, on parallel conditions in Moldavia and Wallachia; Wayne S. Vucinich, "The Yugoslav Lands in the Ottoman Period," *Journal of Modern History*, 27:3 (September 1955), pp. 287-305, on a number of significant recent studies on this question by Yugoslav scholars, in particular by Bogičević, Hadžibegić, Elezović, and Djurdjev.

⁴⁰ Principally the New Ottomans; see below, chapter vi.

group who were seriously interested in carrying out the promises of the Tanzimat—individuals of the cast of Âli and Fuad, with a sense of urgency born of external and internal pressures, dedicated to preservation of the state, with the vision to walk toward distant goals by a succession of small steps, with some knowledge of western ways and the demands of modern life, and with an appreciation of the past and a sense of responsibility in government. These men also had their flaws, among them vanity, the love of high office, and at times a too-casual disregard for the Islamic past, but they were the leaders in reform. The obstacles they faced were imposing.

Among the obstacles was the all-enveloping effect of traditional Islam. Turkish Muslims were generally tolerant of adherents of other revealed religions; they were not given to persecution of Christians and Jews, and were quite likely to say to them, "Your faith is a faith, and my faith is a faith." But there did remain among Muslim Turks an intensity of feeling which, at times of political crisis, was capable of producing fanatic outbursts. Even more important as an obstacle to reform based on equality of all Ottoman subjects was the innate pride, the conviction of superiority, which Muslim Turks possessed. They assumed without question that they were the ruling millet (*millet-i hâkime*).⁴¹ The pride was evident among the most learned of the ulema.⁴² It was evident also among the mass of Turks who, whatever the degree of pagan or mystic sufi admixture in their beliefs, still conceived of Islam as the true faith. Christianity and Judaism were partial revelations of the truth, not the whole. Therefore, Christians and Jews were inevitably considered second-class citizens in the light of religious revelation, as well as by reason of the plain fact that they had been conquered and were ruled by the Ottomans. The common term for the infidel, *gâvur*, carried this implication of Muslim superiority.

Islam embodied also a strong prejudice against innovation (*bid'at*). Reform along the lines of Osmanlılık might encounter this prejudice not only among Muslim theologians and among those of the ruling group who still conscientiously served faith as well as state, but also

⁴¹ Count Léon Ostrorog, one of the most knowledgeable westerners, observed simply, "Islam is not fanatical, it is proud." *The Turkish Problem*, trans. by Winifred Stephens (London, 1919), p. 17.

⁴² See Cevdet Paşa's account of his conversation on Islam and Christianity with M. Mottier, the French ambassador, in Ebül'ulâ Mardin, *Medenî hukuk cephesinden Ahmed Cevdet Paşa* (Istanbul, 1946), pp. 291-294; cf. also Cevdet, *Tezâkir*, p. 79.

THE HATT-I HÜMAYUN OF 1856

in the popular mind, which would assimilate the religious suspicion of innovation to the usual conservatism of inertia. It is true that Muslim doctrine included also the concept of "good" or acceptable innovation, as well as of *ijma*, or consensus, which modernists attempt to use in justification of accepting changes in institutions and customs. But the doctrine of consensus was meant to note common acceptance of a change already made and to link it with the past, rather than to create innovation. *Ijma* could with difficulty cover broad reform. The fundamental conservatism of Islam and its prejudice against innovation were particularly important in the Tanzimat period in the field of law. Since Islam was not only a way of worship, but a way of life prescribing man's relations to man and to the state, as well as to God, the sacred law stood as the basis for society and for government, even though it was an ideal, not a law code, and actually covered few aspects of public law. Ottoman sultans had never hesitated to legislate in their own right, but the *şeriat* and the religious courts still stood alongside the sultan's *kanun*'s and his secular courts. Western law had by 1856 started to come into the Ottoman Empire through commercial law, and its reception grew with time. But the *şeriat* principles remained dominant in some fields of law until the twentieth century, notably in family and inheritance law. The sacred law had grown inflexible after the Gate of Interpretation was shut following the tenth century; the rigidity was not absolute, particularly in the Ottoman Empire, but was characteristic.⁴³ The *şeriat* remained also a symbol or shibboleth, by which new measures should be tested. Ottoman reformers had to build, in fact, on the traditional legislative powers of the sultan, but to convince their critics that proposed measures were in conformity with, or at least not in contravention of, the sacred law. Even under the constitution of 1876, the regulations of the senate gave to that body the duty of seeing that all legislation conformed to the *şeriat*.⁴⁴ It may have been to their advantage that some of the Tanzimat statesmen were, in the words of a modern critic, "unbelievably ignorant of the juridical traditions of the country,"⁴⁵ and so unconscious of contravening Islamic law in some of their measures.

It was possible to argue that Islam was no barrier to modernization, westernization, equality, and representative government. Such

⁴³ See Léon Ostrorog, *The Angora Reform* (London, 1927), chapters 1 and 2.

⁴⁴ Aristarchi, *Législation*, v, 313.

⁴⁵ Fuad Köprülü, "L'institution du Vakouf," *Vakıflar dergisi*, II (1942), 32.

arguments were advanced in the Tanzimat period, both by Turks and by foreigners. Ubcini maintained at mid-century that in the teachings of the Koran were to be found "all the essentials of modern democracy."⁴⁶ Within a few years the New Ottomans, and then Midhat Paşa, were to argue the fundamental democracy of Islam, that the Muslim community was originally a sort of republic, and that the elective principle was basic in the faith. This is not the place to begin an investigation of what political views can or cannot be justified on the basis of Koranic texts, the traditions of the Prophet, and early Muslim practice, but it is important to note that in the Tanzimat period such modernist arguments did not represent the view of Muslim teaching and tradition common among Ottoman Turks. They were conditioned to regard the sacred law, as they knew it, as supreme and to regard the sultan also as caliph; they were unconcerned with historical debate about the validity or invalidity of his using such a title.

Muslim tradition and Muslim learning were upheld by the ulema, who naturally supported the system which was their life and bread. As a class, the ulema were conservative and an obstacle to reform, though there were individual exceptions. It is difficult to describe the ulema as fanatic, though they retained the capacity to inspire fanatic sentiment among the population if times of stress presented the appropriate occasion. Many of the ulema apparently put on a show of fanatic devoutness for the sake of maintaining influence among the faithful and of inspiring donations from the wealthy.⁴⁷ A few among them, on the other hand, read the Christian scriptures and inquired into Christianity. Despite the lack of open fanaticism, however, the ulema as a group maintained an innate pride in their faith, as well as a pride in their position in the society established in that faith, and knew no other way except that of defending established tradition. Thus they opposed innovation. Cevdet Efendi (later Paşa), who began to learn French in 1846, had to do so secretly for fear of criticism; to learn such a language was considered incompatible with his character as one of the ulema.⁴⁸ Selim Sabit Efendi, another member of

⁴⁶ *Letters*, I, 57. Cf. p. 132, where he maintains that Islamic law "formally sets forth the sovereignty of the nation, universal suffrage, the principle of election extended to all, even to the governing power, equality between all members of the body politic. . . ."

⁴⁷ Henry J. Van Lennep, *Travels in Little-Known Parts of Asia Minor* (London, 1870), I, 118-119.

⁴⁸ Fatma Aliye, *Cevdet Paşa*, pp. 33-34.

the ulema, who had had the unusual advantage of a stay in Paris, was vigorously opposed by his colleagues when he tried to introduce into a school in İstanbul such modern aids as maps; such practices were incompatible with faith and religion, they charged.⁴⁹ Of course, the ulema also opposed innovations by the civilian bureaucrats, as, for instance, the adoption of any principles of non-Muslim law.⁵⁰

Related to the opposition to innovation, and probably more important than this blind stubbornness as a bar to progress, was the ignorance of the majority of the ulema. In the eighteenth century apparently there had been a perceptible decline in their learning and integrity.⁵¹ In the nineteenth century most of the ulema were not really learned in Islam and knew even less of the outside world. "Seek knowledge even in China" was generally accepted as one of the sayings of the Prophet, but the majority of the ulema knew nothing of China or even of the Europe of which the Ottoman Empire was physically a part. "Why," asked a molla within Moltke's hearing, "should even today ten thousand Osmanlis not rise and with firm belief in Allah and sharp swords ride to Moscow?"⁵² These were the men who were the teachers in Ottoman schools. Since the educational reforms begun in the 1840's had by 1856 borne little fruit, the ulema still taught the bulk of those Muslim Turks who had any schooling, whether in the traditional grammar school or in the medrese.⁵³ The subject matter of instruction had changed little for centuries. In the earliest years reading, calligraphy, arithmetic, the Koran, and the principles of religion and morality were taught. Higher education resembled, in many respects, the medieval trivium and quadrivium,

⁴⁹ Osman Ergin, *Türkiye maarif tarihi* (İstanbul, 1939-1943), II, 384. Significantly, the *seyhülislâm* supported the ulema's protests, while the ministry of education allowed Selim Efendi to introduce such changes provided they be gradual and with due regard for public opinion.

⁵⁰ Cevdet, *Tezâkir*, p. 63. A new school to train kadıs, established in 1854, and granting its first diplomas in the year of the Hatt-ı Hümayun, evidently touched on western-influenced law only slightly. After 1869 elements of the newly codified civil law, the Mecelle, were studied there. But the Mecelle was religious law except in its classification principles, and the major study of western-influenced law had to be carried on in a separate law school set up in 1869: Ergin, *Maarif tarihi*, I, 135.

⁵¹ Gibb and Bowen, *Islamic Society*, I, part 2 (London, 1957), 104-113.

⁵² "Why not," answered a Turkish army officer, "if their passports are visaed by the Russian legation?" But the officer was European in education, and he replied in French: Helmuth von Moltke, *Briefe über Zustände und Begebenheiten in der Türkei*, 3rd ed. (Berlin, 1877), pp. 313-314.

⁵³ Ergin, *Maarif tarihi*, II, 383ff., on grammar schools and ignorance of the teachers.

within an Islamic framework.⁵⁴ Most Turks, of course, had little or no schooling. Ziya Bey in 1868 estimated that only about two per cent of the Muslim population were literate.⁵⁵ Ahmed Midhat, writing at the close of the Tanzimat period, thought that illiteracy ran from ninety to ninety-five per cent, and lamented that the rest were "without pen and without tongue."⁵⁶ Süleyman Paşa at the same period guessed that in the capital itself only twenty thousand Muslims could read a newspaper.⁵⁷ And even literate Turks of the higher classes spent their early years in the harem where, despite the fact that some upper-class women enjoyed considerable acquaintance with the arts and with French culture, ignorance and superstition also made their home. Thus the generally low educational level of the Turks of the empire and the traditional attitudes of Islam must be considered along with the extent of the empire, its heterogeneity, and its social structure as important obstacles to reform based on egalitarian Ottomanism.

To these considerations must be added another which, especially in the period after the Crimean War and the Hatt-ı Hümayun, assumed added importance—the impression made on the Turks by Christian Europe. Since many of the reforms were borrowed or adapted from the West, the reception accorded them would depend in part on the nature of the contacts with Europe. By 1856, and continuing in the years following, these contacts were greatly increased. Western influence was observable in the advent of telegraphic connection between İstanbul and western Europe; the first message to Paris and London announced the entry of the Allied forces into Sebastopol in 1855.⁵⁸ The age of concessions for railway-building in the empire started with the war, while European shipping interests helped to prompt the construction of the first series of modern lighthouses along the Ottoman coasts. In more superficial matters western influence was immediately felt—as shown, for instance, by the startling increase in the use of knives, forks, chairs, and bedsteads in the seaboard cities. Parisian or *alafranga* modes and manners, which had already found imitators before the Crimean War, now caught on more rapidly. Such imitation did not necessarily indicate any increased un-

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, I, 82-102, 115-117; Ubicini, *Letters*, I, letter 9; Arminius Vambéry, *Sittenbilder aus dem Morgenlande* (Berlin, 1876), pp. 120-127; Gibb and Bowen, *Islamic Society*, I, part 2, chapter 11.

⁵⁵ *Hürriyet*, #5, quoted in *Tanzimat*, I, 841.

⁵⁶ *Üss-i inkılâb* (İstanbul, 1294-1295), I, 122.

⁵⁷ *Süleyman Paşa muhakemesi*, p. 76.

⁵⁸ Young, *Corps de droit*, IV, 345.

derstanding of the West, or any predisposition to reform. Some of the most intelligent reformers were, in fact, antagonistic to *alafranga* costume and manners.⁵⁹ But the western influences increased apace. Symbolic of the times was the precedent-shattering attendance of Sultan Abdülmeceid at a ball given by Lord Stratford in Istanbul. The grand vezir, the Christian patriarchs, and the grand rabbi also graced this western gathering with their presence, though the *şeyhülislâm* made his excuses.⁶⁰ Aside from the temporary presence of allied soldiers, the channels of communication were the traditional ones: diplomats, travelers, businessmen, missionaries, adventurers, students, refugees, and native Christians of the empire. The volume of communication was now sharply increased in the numbers of Europeans coming to the Ottoman Empire.⁶¹ The total impact of Europe on the Ottoman Turks was obviously not uniformly good. At best, it was mixed.

This was true in the case of those Turks who went to Europe, either in the diplomatic service or as civilian or military students. They learned French and acquired new ideas. Some, like Ibrahim Şinasi Efendi, who had been to Paris even before the Crimean War, became well acquainted with French literature.⁶² Others, like some of those who had gone to Europe before the war, returned discouraged or embittered by the contrasts they found. İngiliz Mehmed Said Paşa, an army officer who owed his nickname to his education in Edinburgh, said later, "I had lived abroad till I fancied I had made myself a man, and when I came back to my country I saw about me merely brutes. . . ."⁶³ Still others acquired only western manners and sometimes debauched habits.⁶⁴

⁵⁹ Süleyman Paşa, *Hiss-i inkişâb* (Istanbul, 1326), p. 11; Ziya Paşa in *Hürriyet*, #35, quoted in *Tanzimat*, 1, 815. On the spread of European modes and manners see, further, ABCFM, Armenian Mission VIII, #394, 2 September 1857; Spence to Marcy, 28 November 1856, USNA, Turkey 14. As usual, the Christians in the empire adopted these fashions more quickly. But just before the Crimean War French modes had affected upper-class women in Istanbul and even penetrated the palace, a process assisted by an influx of free-spending members of the Egyptian ruling family: Fatma Aliye, *Cevdet*, p. 84; Cevdet, *Tezâkir*, p. 20. The fork and the individual dinner plate came into use in the palace about 1860; Leila Hanoum, *Le Harem impérial* (Paris, 1925), p. 139. On the 1860's see Dumont, *Le Balkan*, pp. 120ff.

⁶⁰ Cevdet, *Tezâkir*, pp. 61-62.

⁶¹ Cevdet makes a particular point of increased trade and the results for Ottoman law: *Tezâkir*, pp. 63-64.

⁶² On Şinasi see below, chapter VI. The new literary movement which he began was in the end the most important result of these mid-century contacts.

⁶³ Antonio Gallenga, *Two Years of the Eastern Question* (London, 1877), I, 134.

⁶⁴ For various examples see Vambéry, *Der Islam*, pp. 100, 108-109; Durand de Fontmagne, *Un séjour à l'ambassade de France* (Paris, 1902), p. 305; Dumont, *Le*

Most of the contacts flowed the other way. Among the Europeans in the empire, diplomats were the most prominent. Russian diplomats were in a category apart, generally suspect to Turks because of their demands for special privileges for the Balkan Slavs, which would in the end lead to a partition of the empire; Ottoman literature on this period is full of complaints about Russian intrigues. But even French and English diplomats, who represented powers that had just sustained the Ottoman Empire in war, were often disliked because of their frequent and highhanded interference in Ottoman affairs. They used Turks as pawns in their own diplomatic games, and sometimes made and unmade grand vezirs. If Britain supported Reşid, France supported Âli and Fuad.⁶⁵ The British ambassador in 1856, Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, had in many ways done great service for the Ottoman Empire, but Âli three times asked London to recall him. Stratford would not allow the sultan to reign as coequal with himself, the British ambassador, charged Âli; further, said Âli, Stratford demanded influence for himself "so paramount and notorious" that the Porte lost prestige in the eyes of its own public.⁶⁶ Years later Âli still spoke of Stratford with real hatred.⁶⁷ Fuad, whose easy European manners put him on good terms with foreign diplomats, nevertheless voiced almost the identical criticism of a sympathetic French ambassador, M. Bourée, because "the French will never be satisfied with giving friendly advice in an unassuming way; . . . whatever good thing was done must be advertised as a benefit conferred by France. . . ."⁶⁸ Aside from the natural resentment of Ottoman statesmen at

Balkan, pp. 57-58; Hoskiær, *Et Besøg-i Grækenland, Ægypten og Tyrkiet* (Copenhagen, 1879), p. 116. It is hard to determine in what numbers Turks went to Europe. From 1855 to 1874 the Porte maintained a small school in Paris for about sixty Ottoman military students: Ergin, *Maarif tarihi*, II, 379-381. In 1856 ten government clerks were to be sent to Europe to study sciences: Cevdet, *Tezâkir*, p. 62. In 1857 about two hundred young Turks went to Paris, as well as a number of Ottoman Greeks and Armenians: ABCFM, *Armenian Mission v*, #269, n.d., 1857. The *Levant Herald*, 17 September 1862, mentions fifteen technical students going to Paris. The biographical dictionaries mention periods of service abroad in sketches of a fair number of Ottoman statesmen.

⁶⁵ Cf. the comments by İbnülemin Mahmud Kemal İnal, *Osmanlı devrinde son sadriâzamlar* (İstanbul, 1940-1953), I, 15.

⁶⁶ Clarendon to Stratford, 4 January 1856, Private Stratford Mss., FO 352/44, quoted in Temperley, "The Last Phase of Stratford," p. 218. Âli at this period, of course, resented the interference even more because his own backing was French; that of his rival Reşid, English.

⁶⁷ L. Raschdau, ed., "Diplomatenleben am Bosphorus. Aus dem literarischen Nachlass . . . Dr. Busch," *Deutsche Rundschau*, 138 (1909), 384.

⁶⁸ Elliot to Stanley, #68 confidential, 17 December 1867, FO 78/1965.

outside interference, accompanied though it might be by valid suggestions on reform, the consequent debasement of the Porte in the eyes of its own subjects presented a significant obstacle to general acceptance of a government-ordered reform program. "The foreigners, after having rendered the Turkish Government hateful, try to render it contemptible," said an Armenian resident of Istanbul in 1857.⁶⁹ The Tanzimat statesmen were acutely aware of this. "The Porte considers itself a great Power," wrote the Austrian internuncio, "and in their confidential effusions the Turkish ministers complain that the Powers who claim to be interested in its consolidation reduce it to the level of a second-rate state."⁷⁰ Leading Turks also complained that the diplomats who pressed advice on them did not really know Turkey. Cevdet Paşa told a French ambassador: "You have been living in Beyoğlu [i.e., Pera, the most Europeanized quarter of the capital, where the embassies were]. You have not learned properly the spirit of the Ottoman state or even the circumstances of Istanbul. Beyoğlu is an isthmus between Europe and the Islamic world. From there you see Istanbul through a telescope."⁷¹

The conduct of foreign consuls was likely to make an even worse impression on the Turks. They tended to quarrel endlessly with the local Turkish governors, to drag national honor into their personal arguments with Turks, and often to conduct themselves like little lords. "The consuls in each region became independent rulers," said Süleyman Paşa.⁷² A good many consular agents were not nationals of the countries they represented, but Levantines, who put on airs and grew rich on fees charged to those who sought their protection. Sometimes they used their privileges to personal advantage in shady transactions.⁷³

Interference by diplomats and consuls rankled particularly when it

⁶⁹ Senior, *Journal*, p. 152.

⁷⁰ Prokesch to Buol, #41B, 30 May 1856, HHS, XII/56.

⁷¹ Quoted in Mardin, *Cevdet Paşa*, p. 294. Süleyman Paşa criticized the Europeans of Beyoğlu for associating only with Greeks and Armenians, not with Turks: *Hiss-i inkılâb*, p. 5.

⁷² *Ibid.*, p. 4.

⁷³ See examples in Bulwer to Russell, #177, 27 September 1859, enclosing Bulwer to C. Alison of same date, FO 78/1435; Edmund Hornby, *Autobiography* (London, 1928), pp. 97-100, 131-139; Dr. K. [Joseph Koetschet], *Erinnerungen aus dem Leben des Serdar Ekrem Omer Pascha* (Sarajevo, 1885), pp. 69-71; Hill, *History of Cyprus*, IV, 62, n.2. The New Ottomans of the 1860's complained much about diplomatic and consular interference of all sorts: see, for example, Ziya in *Hürriyet*, #48, quoted in *Tanzimat*, I, 787-789.

was based on the extraterritorial rights secured to individual foreigners under the capitulations. The special privileges accorded the foreign national in Turkish courts, the benefit of consular courts, and the various sorts of tax exemption were stretched and abused by the representatives of the great powers.⁷⁴ Among the greatest abuses was the extension of protection to thousands, largely Ottoman Christians, who had never left the empire and had never seen the protecting country. Numbers of these protégés were given not only berats of protection, but even foreign nationality and foreign passports. The capitulatory privileges helped them to a new prosperity in business. Also among the protégés were many who came from outside the Ottoman dominions, but were only pseudo-westerners: Maltese and Ionian Greeks under British protection, Algerians under the French, Croats and Dalmatians under the Austrian. Especially during and just after the Crimean War the major seacoast cities of the empire were filled with this rabble, often of a shady or even criminal type. Many of these, together with a number of genuine nationals of western European countries, were engaged in the concessions racket, again profiting by the protection of the capitulations. They sought concessions ostensibly to develop Turkish economic resources—mines, agricultural products, or communications. But the real object was to turn a quick profit through commissions, guarantees, operations on European stock markets, or litigation against the Porte. The respectable Europeans in the empire were ashamed of a situation that caused the West to stink in Turkish nostrils, but the embassies continued to accord protection to all manner of people for the sake of their prestige in the East. If such persons were, after the Crimean War, numerically the most representative of the West, western-rooted reform was hardly likely to find a favorable reception. Baron Prokesch was cynical in his comment: "There are no respectable people, at least in appearance, except the Turks, whom we are going to civilize and initiate into the mysteries of our progress."⁷⁵

⁷⁴ On capitulatory privileges see especially G. Pelissié de Rausas, *Le régime des capitulations dans l'Empire ottoman*, 2 vols. (Paris, 1902-1905); Young, *Corps de droit ottoman*, I, 251-278; P. M. Brown, *Foreigners in Turkey: their juridical status* (Princeton, 1914); Nasim Sousa, *The Capitulatory Regime of Turkey* (Baltimore, 1933).

⁷⁵ Prokesch to Buol, 10 January 1856, HHS, XII/56. On the system of protection see Brown, *Foreigners*, pp. 93-95; Sousa, *Capitulatory Regime*, pp. 89-101; E. C. Grenville Murray, *Turkey*, rev. ed. (London, 1877), pp. 353-359; Hornby, *Autobiography*, pp. 92-94, where he estimates that the number of "so-called British pro-

There were, of course, some respectable westerners in the Ottoman Empire. Their conduct might elicit Turkish approval, but might also arouse resentment. Missionaries were prominent among them. Both Roman and Protestant missions from France, England, Germany, Italy, and America were fairly widely distributed over the empire.⁷⁶ Although the missionaries were moral and God-fearing people, and might be respected as individuals by the Turks, their evangelistic activities could easily cause trouble. In the view of a British consular court judge, missionaries were, "next to habitual criminals, the most troublesome people in the world to deal with." He cited the extreme case of two English missionaries who one day affixed a poster to the mosque of St. Sophia advertising that on the morrow from its steps they would denounce the prophet Muhammad as an impostor.⁷⁷ Although in the post-Crimean period a few Turks were converted from Islam to Christianity,⁷⁸ most of the missionary work was among the native Christians of the empire. Even so, by encouraging sectarianism and helping such peoples as Bulgars, Arabs, and Armenians regain their vernacular and national consciousness, the missionary labors often

tected subjects" about 1856 was "I should think little short of a million" (p. 93); Senior, *Journal*, pp. 42, 46-50, 113, 119, 131; Charles T. Newton, *Travels and Discoveries in the Levant* (London, 1865), I, 76ff.; Spence to Marcy, #50, 15 October 1857, USNA, Turkey 14; Williams to Cass, #98, 17 September 1860, USNA, Turkey 16, estimating the number of Ottoman-born subjects in Istanbul actually enjoying foreign nationality as fifty thousand; Morris to Seward, #74, 7 January 1864, USNA, Turkey 18, with a list of American protégés; Bulwer to Russell, #222, enclosing Dalzell (Erzurum) to Bulwer, #16, 30 September 1859, FO 78/1436, on Russian sale of passports to Ottoman Armenians. Some of the protégés were, of course, legitimate employees of foreign embassies, like the dragomans: Franz von Werner, *Türkische Skizzen* (Leipzig, 1877), I, 74-75.

On the crime among the Istanbul rabble see Prokesch to Buol, #56 B, 25 July 1856, HHS, XII/57; Senior, *Journal*, pp. 72-73; *Augsburger Allgemeine Zeitung*, 27 May 1857 (Ausserord. Beilage); (Marco Antonio) Canini, *Vingt ans d'exil* (Paris, 1868), pp. 111-142, a picture of Galata and Pera by a political refugee who was there; Lady Hornby, *Constantinople During the Crimean War* (London, 1863), pp. 92, 118-119.

On concessions see Hornby, *Autobiography*, pp. 113-114; Mordtmann, *Anatolien*, pp. 521-525; Charles Mismar, *Souvenirs du monde musulman* (Paris, 1892), pp. 98-100; Prokesch to Buol, 10 January 1856, HHS/56. The quest for concessions led also to bribing of Ottoman civil servants: Mardin, *Cevdet Paşa*, pp. 88-89, n.99.

⁷⁶ Noel Verney and George Dambmann, *Les puissances étrangères dans le Levant* (Paris, 1900), pp. 31-145, assesses European influences of all sorts in Turkey. The ABCFM records indicate the wide activities of the American Congregationalists. Ubicini, *Letters*, II, 206-208; Ergin, *Maarif tarihi*, II, 637-648; Hilaire, *La France Catholique en Orient* (Paris, 1902), passim, deal with Catholic schools.

⁷⁷ Hornby, *Autobiography*, pp. 124-125.

⁷⁸ ABCFM, Armenian Mission VIII, #56, 12 February 1857; #79, 11 March 1859; #82, 9 April 1859; #87, 31 October 1859.

went counter to Ottoman interests. The mission-founded schools were frequented mostly by Christians, and affected the Muslims only later. Perhaps the chief immediate profit derived by Muslims from the missionaries was in matters of technology rather than religion. The Yankee ingenuity of Cyrus Hamlin, for instance, contrived a tin shop, a steam bakery, and a laundry in İstanbul at the time of the Crimean War.⁷⁹ American missionaries in Syria introduced the potato, kerosene lamps, wire nails, sewing machines, and similar useful gadgets.⁸⁰

Other Europeans were distributed over the empire, usually in the cities; most were merchants, skilled workmen, or experts in the employ of the Porte. Some of them obviously were respected by Muslims. It is reported, for example, that when a Muslim of Beirut wanted to use an oath stronger than "by the beard of Muhammad," he swore "by the word of Black, the Englishman," who was a Beirut merchant.⁸¹ Dr. Josef Koetschet, a Swiss physician, spent his entire adult life in Turkish service, and obviously enjoyed the confidence of most Turks.⁸² There were a good many such individuals. But it is hard to assess their influence as a group on the Turks; most of the merchants lived somewhat apart in Europeanized suburbs, and often dealt more closely with Levantines, sometimes intermarrying, so that the ordinary Turk may have assimilated them to Levantines in his thinking. There were also small colonies of Europeans in various places. One in Ankara, composed of English, French, and Dutch merchants, had existed from 1650 to 1800 but had left no trace of influence fifty years later.⁸³ At one point during the reign of Abdülaziz there was a colony of some four hundred English workmen at the Hasköy dockyards; they taught the Turks some skills, but lived generally apart.⁸⁴ In Amasya a fair-sized colony of German Swiss worked in a silk factory owned by a Strasbourg entrepreneur named Metz. Metz was also an idealist who thought to spread Protestantism among the Turks. As an influence among Turks the Amasya colony was not a success, religiously or otherwise, probably because the Swiss considered themselves better than the native inhabitants and failed to understand their

⁷⁹ Cyrus Hamlin, *Among the Turks* (New York, 1878), pp. 212-243.

⁸⁰ Henry Harris Jessup, *Fifty-three Years in Syria* (New York, 1910), I, 360-361.

⁸¹ *Ibid.*, I, 49; II, 465.

⁸² Cf. his works cited in the bibliography, and his biography in the preface to *Aus Bosniens letzter Türkenzeit* (Vienna, 1905), pp. v-vii.

⁸³ Van Lennep, *Travels*, II, 177-178.

⁸⁴ Gallenga, *Two Years*, II, 247-252.

customs.⁸⁵ Some Turkish officials were eager for European colonists in order to raise the economic level of the country, and at the end of the Crimean War an edict was issued, promising to prospective colonists free lands and six to twelve years' exemption from taxes and military service.⁸⁶ Abdülmecid and Reşid Paşa provided funds for the founding of a Polish colony at the foot of Mount Olympus in Thessaly immediately after the Crimean War, but epidemic and emigration destroyed the community within two years.⁸⁷ A more successful Polish colony had been established in the 1840's on the Asiatic side of the Bosphorus by Prince Adam Czartoryski, but again it is hard to discover how great an influence it exerted on the surrounding population.⁸⁸

The Polish and Hungarian refugees who came into the Ottoman Empire in considerable numbers after the revolutions of 1830, 1848, and 1863 were undoubtedly more favorably viewed by Turks in general than were other westerners. Because of their bitterness against Russia, the Poles and Hungarians were often more Turkish than the Turks.⁸⁹ A number of them, for various personal or political reasons, adopted Islam, took Turkish names, and married Turkish wives. As a group they served no great power, although hoping for the restoration of freedom to their own countries. Among them were many with a professional education, who entered the employ of the Porte as doctors, engineers, and army officers. They helped to build roads,

⁸⁵ Van Lennep, *Travels*, I, 94-102; Mordtmann, *Anatolien*, pp. 94, 472, 559, n.65; ABCFM, Western Turkey Mission II, #301, 17 September 1861; Great Britain, *Parliamentary Papers*, 1871, vol. 68, *Accounts and Papers*, vol. 32, p. 733.

⁸⁶ Text in B. C. Collas, *La Turquie en 1864* (Paris, 1864), pp. 456-458. See also expressions of local officials in Mordtmann, *Anatolien*, pp. 512, 539. Edhem Paşa, foreign minister in 1857, tried with no success to attract German, Irish, and Scandinavian immigrants: Mordtmann, *Stambul*, II, 310.

⁸⁷ Adam Lewak, *Dzieje emigracji polskiej w Turcji (1831-1878)* (Warsaw, 1935), pp. 144-145.

⁸⁸ Lewak, *Emigracji polskiej*, pp. 50-51, describes the colony, which served also as an asylum for Polish nationalist agents and was protected by the French consul. Various referred to as "Adampol" and "Adamköy," the Turks call the settlement "Polonezköy." Cf. also Ubcini, *Letters*, I, 325.

⁸⁹ Particularly in the view of Balkan Slavs, who could regard Russia as a liberator rather than an oppressor: G. Muir Mackenzie and A. P. Irby, *Travels in the Slavonic Provinces of Turkey in Europe* (London, 1866), pp. 236-237. On the anti-Russian policy of the Polish exiles see Marcell Handelsman, *Czartoryski, Nicolas Ier et la question du Proche-Orient* (Paris, 1934), passim; and M. Kukiel, *Czartoryski and European Unity, 1770-1861* (Princeton, 1955), pp. 229-250, 273-305. On Kosuth's somewhat parallel, and also anti-Austrian, efforts see Dénes Jánossy, "Die ungarische Emigration und der Krieg im Orient," *Archivum Europae Centro-Orientalis*, V:1-4 (1939), 113-275.

railroads, forts, telegraph lines, and to man the telegraph offices.⁹⁰ "Here in Turkey we enjoy the greatest freedom that a political emigrant can have," wrote one of the Poles, "and at the same time we have access to everything. We are valued here as useful and superior beings."⁹¹ One of the most remarkable individuals of this sort was an Austrian Croat, Michel Lattas, who as Ömer Lûtfi Paşa achieved a distinguished career as army officer and provincial governor and became commander in chief of the Turkish armies. Sometimes known as "Macar" or as "Frenk" Ömer Paşa, his foreign origin was not forgotten, and yet the impression he made on Turks was generally of the best.⁹² It was characteristic that, as governor of Baghdad in 1857, Ömer had on his staff five Poles, one Hungarian, and two Croats.⁹³

Given this background of contact with westerners, the reception accorded western ideas and institutions was bound to be mixed. The mass of Turks had, of course, occasional rather than sustained contact with westerners, even though the number who visited the empire was greatly increased after 1856 through tourist travel, as well as in other ways.⁹⁴ To ordinary Turks such travellers might be the objects of curiosity or suspicion—even regarded as sorcerers.⁹⁵ Some peasants feared westerners as intolerant and conquerors; some believed them to be tolerant and just.⁹⁶ The western technology which began to ap-

⁹⁰ Lewak, *Emigracji polskiej*, chapter 4 and pp. 86-88 on Poles in the Turkish army; *ibid.*, pp. 108, 190-192, on other professional men and technicians. Jánossy, "Die ungarische Emigration," pp. 260-263, gives an Austrian list from 1854 of over a hundred Magyars in the Ottoman Empire, with their occupations. There were two Polish regiments in the Ottoman army in 1854: Werner (Murad), *Skizzen*, II, 125-127. "Murad" was a member of one of them. See also, for instance, references to Poles and Hungarians in Ottoman service in Fred Burnaby, *On Horseback Through Asia Minor* (London, 1877), I, 180, and II, 120, 169, 231, 262; Avram Galanti (Bodrumlu), *Türkler ve Yahudiler* (İstanbul, 1947), p. 129. Âli Paşa seems to have used some of the Poles as agents to watch pan-Slavic activity: Josef Koetschet, *Osman Pascha* (Sarajevo, 1909), pp. 50-51.

⁹¹ Lewak, *Emigracji polskiej*, p. 191.

⁹² Cf. biographies in Abdurrahman Şeref, *Tarih musahabeleri*, pp. 235-237, Mehmed Süreyya, *Sicill-i osmani* (İstanbul, 1308-1311), III, 602-603, and İbrahim A. Gövsa, *Türk meşhurları ansiklopedisi* (İstanbul, 1946), p. 301; also Koetschet, *Erinnerungen aus dem Leben des Serdar Ekrem Omer Pascha* (Sarajevo, 1885), and J. F. Scheltema, ed., *The Lebanon in Turmoil* (New Haven, 1920), p. 21 and n.32.

⁹³ Koetschet, *Erinnerungen*, pp. 51-54.

⁹⁴ Tours to the Holy Land especially became fashionable. Cook's tourists became familiar to the Arabs as "Kukiyye." Lesley Blanch, *The Wilder Shores of Love* (New York, 1954), p. 71.

⁹⁵ F. W. Hasluck, *Christianity and Islam Under the Sultans* (London, 1929), II, 641-645.

⁹⁶ Melek Hanum, *Thirty Years*, pp. 263-264.

pear, especially through the telegraph and a few small railroad lines, in the post-1856 period was greeted with as much superstitious criticism as with favor. Mechanical skill and invention sometimes aroused fear and were typically attributed to Satan. Cyrus Hamlin, who understood and propagated such things, was introduced by one Turk to another as "the most *Satanic* man in the empire."⁹⁷ Even road building appeared to many Turks not so much a useful economic device as a path for tax collectors, invading armies, foreign spies, or just an aid to Christian merchants.⁹⁸ A small group of educated Turks, of course, understood the usefulness if not the scientific basis of such improvements, but even in this group knowledge of western ways was limited. To take a small example, when in the 1877 parliament it was proposed that sessions begin at 11 a.m., western time, in order to avoid the vagaries of Turkish time, the idea was rejected on the argument that most of the deputies did not understand western time and owned no watches.⁹⁹ It is also obvious that western vices spread in equal measure with more acceptable western ways.¹⁰⁰

Though western technology might meet with fear, superstition, or ignorance, longer acquaintance with it could remove the Turkish suspicion. This was not so easy in the case of the fundamental aims of the Tanzimat, which dealt with political institutions and public philosophy. Changes in this realm ran into the imponderable but immense opposition to change, to hurry, to abandoning the ways of the forefathers. Hurry was a characteristic of the devil. Dignity was the characteristic of the Ottoman Turks: their proverbs commonly accorded wealth to India, intelligence to the West, but dignity or majesty to the family of Osman.¹⁰¹ Dignity and revulsion against hurry and change shaded off into passiveness and fatalism. In a sense

⁹⁷ Hamlin, *Among the Turks*, p. 58. Hamlin says the term was used seriously, and demonstrated superstition. But it can also mean "ingenious, cunning, devilishly clever." Cf. also on superstitious reactions Mordtmann, *Anatolien*, p. 383; Van Lennep, *Travels*, I, 85.

⁹⁸ Dumont, *Le Balkan*, pp. 262-264.

⁹⁹ Hakkı Tarık Us, *Meclis-i meb'usân 1293:1877 zabıt ceridesi* (İstanbul, 1940-1954), II, 40, cited in Robert Devereux, *A Study of the First Ottoman Parliament of 1877-1878* (George Washington University, unpublished M.A. thesis, 1956), p. 120. Turkish time varied according to the hour of sunrise and sunset.

¹⁰⁰ Cf. Jessup, *Fifty-three Years*, I, 234-235; *idem*, *The Women of the Arabs* (New York, 1873), pp. 191-195; G. G. B. St. Clair and C. A. Brophy, *Twelve Years' Study of the Eastern Question in Bulgaria* (London, 1877), pp. 183-193.

¹⁰¹ Hammer, *Staatsverfassung*, II, 431; David Urquhart, *Fragments on Politeness* (London, 1870), p. 2.

this was the strength of the Muslim Turk, giving him patience to endure almost any tribulation. But reform ran head on into this imponderable too.¹⁰² The psychological block to change in the Tanzimat period came not only from the natural aversion to change, plus the natural reluctance to admit defects in the Turkish way of life and to copy the institutions of an alien western society; it came also from the practical fact that this meant also copying the ways of the second-class subjects of the empire, the Christian minorities, who because of their religious and commercial affiliations with the West were sometimes ahead of Turks in their assimilation of western ideas and patterns of life, even if much of this assimilation was superficial only. Religious belief, the simple pride in Islam, reinforced this reluctance to change. The proposed reforms of the Tanzimat period, therefore, represented a threat to the established order, to the Muslim way, and to the integrity and cohesiveness of Turkish society. The challenge was especially strong if the doctrine of equality, or *Osmanlılık*, were to be worked out in practical political institutions. Even many of the most advanced Turks were only half-convinced of the desirability of the changes they professed to sponsor.

If this was the climate of opinion in the empire after the Crimean War, complete success for the measures proposed in the Hatt-ı Hümayun could hardly be expected, except over a long period of slow change. Immediate success could not even be contemplated. Yet the situation of the empire demanded immediate action, and so did some of the European diplomats who had fathered the Hatt-ı Hümayun. "Admitting that the whole scheme of reform could not be accomplished in a week," said Stratford, "I urged the rapid movement of human society in the present age, the favouring circumstances of the time. . . ."¹⁰³ But Stratford was urging the impossible. Fuad Paşa some years later put the difficulty concisely, even though his memorandum was a justification and an apology:

"The execution of so complex a program, embracing all the branches of administration and touching the largest problems of the social order, presented difficulties of various kinds, of which the most serious lay in the national prejudices and in the condition of public mores.

¹⁰² Cf. Gibb and Bowen, *Islamic Society*, 1, part 2, 205-206, who blame sufi and dervish influence.

¹⁰³ Great Britain, *Parliamentary Papers*, 1856, vol. 61, *Accounts and Papers*, vol. 24, Eastern Papers (part 18), #34, Stratford to Clarendon, 9 January 1856.

THE HATT-I HÜMAYUN OF 1856

Each one of the reforms thus required a double effort commensurate with the double obstacle to be surmounted."¹⁰⁴

Application of the Hatt-ı Hümayun was made no easier by the general situation of the empire after the Crimean War. There was physical as well as mental uneasiness. Minor incidents of Muslim fanaticism occurred in Anatolia and the Arab provinces, and instances of Christian provocation in the Balkans. There was ephemeral rising or disorder in Kurdistan, Bosnia, Herzegovina, Albania, and Tripoli in Africa. Border clashes occurred over territorial disputes with Montenegro. Six thousand Tatar refugees fled Russian dominion and required settlement in the empire. More serious were the deeds of violence and theft perpetrated not only by the western-protected rabble in the cities, but by soldiers mustered out of the Ottoman army, especially irregulars who had been attached to English units. These men, whose pay was often grossly in arrears, were given a few piasters and left to beg or rob their way home. Deserters, of whom there were many, dared not settle down for fear of detection, and so lived by plunder. The war had also dislocated Ottoman economy, fields had remained untilled, and in some regions the price level was by 1856 triple that of two years before.¹⁰⁵

Though the obstacles appeared formidable, changes were made in the half decade following the Crimean War. It was a period of groping. But out of it emerged a new political leadership—the team of Âli Paşa and Fuad Paşa.

¹⁰⁴ Fuad's memorandum of 1867, in Ubicini, *Etat présent*, p. 244.

¹⁰⁵ The conditions of 1856 are described in Prokesch's despatches to Buol in HHS XII/56 and XII/57 throughout the year; in ABCFM, Armenian Mission VIII, #386, 12 June 1856, #390, 2 February 1857, #393, 21 June 1857. On soldiers see also Senior, *Journal*, pp. 140-141, and Mordtmann, *Anatolien*, p. 432.