

CHAPTER III

REFORM AND CONSPIRACY, 1856-1861: ALI, FUAD, AND KIBRISLI MEHMED

In the period of slightly more than five years between the proclamation of the Hatt-ı Hümayun and the death of Sultan Abdülmecid there were no far-reaching changes in the administrative structure of the empire. But there were attempts to carry out promises made in the *hat* and to widen the area of effective equality among all Ottoman subjects. These efforts were impeded by a number of provincial disturbances and by the Kuleli affair—an incipient revolt in the capital based on an ill-defined sentiment of objection to Ottoman equality. Political rivalries among leading Ottoman statesmen also interfered with reform. Though there were many contenders for high state office, four men dominated the government during this half decade: Reşid Paşa, Âli Paşa, Fuad Paşa, and Kıbrıslı Mehmed Paşa. They did not represent political parties, of which there were none, but viewpoints and interest groups which contended for control. Kıbrıslı Mehmed was the conservative; the others were more favorable to westernization. But the triumvirate of westernizers split. Âli and Fuad began to prevail over Reşid, and after Reşid's death in 1858 they were left without rivals as reform leaders. By 1861, with the accession of a new sultan, they had emerged supreme in Ottoman politics.

The rivalry between Reşid and his former disciples Âli and Fuad reflected not only a divergence of views on reforms, but also the clash of personalities, the conflict of ambitions, and the direct pressure of foreign ambassadors that characterized Ottoman political life of these years.¹ Âli as grand vezir and Fuad as foreign minister were responsible for the Hatt-ı Hümayun and the Treaty of Paris. Reşid had objections to both. In addition, he was apparently resentful at being eclipsed by his pupils, and was perhaps in need of the financial emoluments of office. But he was unable to oust Âli until November 1, 1856, when Lord Stratford, seeking to thwart the French plan to unite the

¹ Cevdet Paşa was caustic about the politicians of the post-Crimean period working for their personal interests: *Tezâkir* 1-12, ed. Cavid Baysun (Ankara, 1953), p. 87. The rivalry of Reşid and his disciples had begun before the war, and was sharpened at its close: *ibid.*, p. 16; Fatma Aliye, *Ahmed Cevdet Paşa ve zamani* (İstanbul, 1336), pp. 88-90, 109; Ali Fuad, *Rical-i mühimme-i siyasiye* (İstanbul, 1928), pp. 63, 68.

Danubian principalities and highly annoyed at the close relations of Âli and Fuad with the French ambassador Thouvenel, brought his influence to bear on Sultan Abdülmecid. It is more than coincidental that Reşid was appointed to the grand vezirate on the same day that Stratford invested the sultan with the Order of the Garter. British warships were at the same time conspicuous in the harbor of İstanbul.² Fuad resigned, along with Âli, and neither would take a ministry under Reşid, though both accepted nomination to the Supreme Council.³ Reşid's ministerial colleagues were a heterogeneous lot, and the appointment of his own son Ali Gâlib as minister of foreign affairs in the spring of 1857 made the combination even stranger. Since Ali Gâlib was married to the sultan's oldest living daughter, Fatma, and since another of Reşid's sons, Mehmed Cecil, was the Ottoman ambassador in Paris, comment on the family grip on government was aroused. Fuad furnished, as usual, the most biting: "It is clear that we are in the process of becoming Christians. We have the Father Reşid, the Son Ali Gâlib who proceeds from the Father, and Lord Stratford who reveals to us the Holy Spirit through the medium of his first dragoman, M. Revelaki, who is, however, no dove."⁴

Reşid fell from office on July 31, 1857, over the same Roumanian question which had brought him to power. This time it was Thouvenel's pressure on the sultan that caused the change.⁵ Âli now became foreign minister, during the short grand vezirate of Mustafa Naili Paşa, and when Reşid again was reappointed to the highest office on October 22, apparently on the sultan's own initiative, Âli con-

² See, on the change in posts, Harold Temperley, "The Last Phase of Stratford de Redcliffe, 1855-58," *English Historical Review*, 47 (1932), 237-238; W. E. Mosse, "The Return of Reschid Pasha," *English Historical Review*, 68 (1953), 546-573, correcting some errors in Temperley's article; Prokesch to Buol, #83C Vertraulich, 24 October 1856, #84B Vertraulich, 29 October 1856, and #86A-D, 5 November 1856, in HNS, XII/57; A. H. Ongunsu, "Âli Paşa," *İslâm ansiklopedisi*, 1, 337; Ali Fuad, *Rical-i mühimme*, pp. 35-36. T. W. Riker, *The Making of Roumania* (London, 1931), deals with the shift as an incident in the development of Moldavia and Wallachia.

³ Ali Fuad, *Rical-i mühimme*, pp. 71-72, 102-103. Âli Paşa seems to have been quite exercised by Reşid's criticisms.

⁴ L. Thouvenel, *Trois années de la question d'Orient* (Paris, 1897), p. 102; İbnülemin Mahmud Kemal İnal, *Osmanlı devrinde son sadrîâzamlar* (İstanbul, 1940-1953), II, 188, gives a variant of the story.

⁵ İnal, *Son sadrîâzamlar*, I, 17; Temperley, "Last Phase," p. 246; Riker, *Roumania*, p. 127; Ongunsu, "Âli Paşa," p. 337; Ali Fuad, *Rical-i mühimme*, pp. 37-38; Nassau Senior, *A Journal Kept in Turkey and Greece* (London, 1859), pp. 125-126. The question in the principalities this time was the annulment of fraudulent elections which produced a majority opposed to union.

sented to stay on at his post.⁶ But Reşid was nearing his end. On January 7, 1858, he died, not yet sixty years old, in the third month of his sixth grand vezirate.⁷

Reşid, an astute politician, had been the originator of the Tanzimat, and by some was regarded as the elder statesman of the empire, whose advice was to be sought on all major questions.⁸ Yet his death at this point was no great loss to the empire. His energy and mental acuteness declined in his later years, and he was less able to deal with Abdülmecid.⁹ He had made his contribution, which was not only to initiate the reform program of the Gülhane edict, but to raise up a generation of disciples. Reşid seems to have had the quality of attracting to himself young men of ability, and he interested himself in furthering their education and public careers. It is hard to say what the nineteenth-century empire would have been like without Reşid. Among his protégés were men of views as varied as the scholar Ahmed Vefik, the learned member of the ulema Ahmed Cevdet, and Âli and Fuad. It was the latter two who inherited Reşid's political mantle, but by the time of his death the pupils had run before the master. Until Fuad's death in 1869, and Âli's in 1871, they were with brief interruptions the personification of Ottoman administration. One was frequently grand vezir while the other was foreign minister or president of the Tanzimat Council. In these positions they were responsible for foreign relations and for domestic reform. Though quite unlike as persons, they worked well together. Fuad tended to be more advanced and to furnish the éclat; Âli was more conservative, more meticulous, and less obtrusive. Together they sought to stave off European intervention, to preserve Ottoman integrity, to solve each problem as it arose, and gradually to elaborate and introduce reforms. Benevolent critics said that their maxim was

⁶ Temperley, "Last Phase," pp. 249-251; Riker, *Roumania*, p. 150; *Tanzimat*, I (Istanbul, 1940), p. 745.

⁷ Reşid's sudden death was unexpected, and gave rise to suspicions, apparently quite without foundation, that his rivals, perhaps Fuad or Âli or Kibrıslı Mehmed, were implicated in the death. See Frederick Millingen, *La Turquie sous le règne d'Abdul Aziz* (Paris, 1868), pp. 276-278, n.; Lady Hornby, *Constantinople During the Crimean War* (London, 1863), pp. 499-500; C. S. de Gobineau, ed., *Correspondance entre le Comte de Gobineau et le Comte de Prokesch-Osten* (Paris, 1933), p. 169. Physicians of the foreign legations were invited to Reşid's house to establish the fact of death: *Presse d'Orient*, 8 January 1858.

⁸ See the comment of the *şeyhülislâm* Arif Efendi in 1856: Cevdet, *Tezâkir*, p. 72.

⁹ Abdurrahman Şeref, *Tarih musahabeleri* (Istanbul, 1339), p. 107.

"sufficient unto the day is the evil thereof."¹⁰ Opponents charged them with operating on the principle of "après moi, le déluge."¹¹ Their characters and viewpoints set the tone for reform down to 1871.

Mehmed Emin Âli Paşa was forty-three years old at the time of Reşid's death. Of humble origins, Âli had become a government clerk at fifteen, an employee of the translation bureau at eighteen, and then had risen with astonishing rapidity as the result of hard work, native ability, and Reşid's patronage. At twenty-six he had been ambassador to London, at thirty-one foreign minister, and in 1852 for the first time grand vezir, when he was only thirty-seven. He then held two provincial governorships, served as the first president of the Tanzimat Council during the Crimean War, became foreign minister for the third time, and in the spring of 1855 rose for the second time to the grand vezirate. Upon Reşid's death in 1858, Âli was again advanced to the highest administrative post in the empire.

This career had given Âli a fairly good knowledge of Europe, since he had also served in the Vienna embassy as a secretary, had travelled briefly to St. Petersburg, and had been the first Ottoman plenipotentiary at the Paris peace congress of 1856. It had given him also a mastery of Turkish official style and a good knowledge of French. Because his formal education had been slim, Âli owed these achievements to hard work and occasional private lessons. French he studied for long hours in the embassy garden in Vienna. He always regretted that he had never really learned Arabic, though he had studied it with Cevdet Paşa, and even once apologized to Cevdet for writing to him in *kaba Türkçe* ("vulgar Turkish") rather than using Arabic expressions.¹² By 1858 Âli had also the reputation of a first-rate diplomat, though many who knew him, including Fuad, said that his tendency was to avoid or postpone problems instead of forging ahead toward a solution. He had also acquired a reputation for honesty, which went generally unchallenged, although later he was censured by Cevdet for having accepted a sizable gift from the governor of Egypt.¹³

Âli was physically a small, frail man, "so delicate that a piece of

¹⁰ Charles Mismar, *Souvenirs du monde musulman* (Paris, 1892), pp. 192-194.

¹¹ Franz von Werner, *Türkische Skizzen* (Leipzig, 1877), II, 172. Clician Vassif, *Son Altesse Midhat Pacha* (Paris, 1909), p. 17, says this of Âli alone.

¹² Fatma Aliye, *Cevdet*, pp. 91-92 and 97-98. The reference to *kaba Türkçe* is humorous; Âli's style was hardly "boorish."

¹³ İnal, *Son sadrîâzamlar*, I, 36-37, quoting Cevdet's *Maruzat*.

sponge falling from a shelf would hurt him."¹⁴ He spoke haltingly in a voice that was almost a whisper, his step was hesitant, and only his eyes were lively. But his mind was perpetually alert, seizing upon and storing up information extracted from all whom he met. He could be obsequious and pliant to the sultan, polite but immensely stubborn to all others who crossed him. His self-control was tremendous; his ability to hear the gravest news without a flicker in his expression was well known, as was his capacity for knowing when to keep silent. Some of these qualities are reflected in his admiration for Lord Chesterfield's letters to his son, and in his apparent fondness for Machiavelli's *Prince*. Âli was a firm believer in official formalities, which seem to have been for him not only a refuge but a creed. He demanded obedience from subordinates, required that all their administrative relations with the Palace be channeled through him, and became even more autocratic in manner toward the end of his life. In part, this was calculated policy, for Âli made a determined effort to keep the administrative hierarchy free from interference by the sultan and palace coterie; he was defending the independence of the Sublime Porte. In part, this was Âli's jealousy of his position: he could brook no rivals and trained no successors. Abdülaziz chafed under this curb in the later 1860's, but felt impotent to dismiss the statesman who had made himself indispensable. "Whom will I bring in instead?" asked Abdülaziz of a palace official who urged Âli's dismissal.¹⁵

Âli's split with his patron Reşid, which developed only gradually and involuntarily after Âli first became grand vezir and as malicious tongues tried to set the two men against each other, did not indicate that he abandoned Reşid's reforming ideals. Âli continued to be a conservative reformer, or a moderate liberal. He did not believe in radical departures. While to some of his critics he appeared to be too much of an innovator, to others of his contemporaries, both Turks and Europeans, he seemed reactionary because he made haste slowly. This again was a calculated policy. "Our speed is limited by the fear of making the boilers burst," he said. "Our metamorphosis must be cautious, gradual, internal, and not accomplished by flashes of lightning."¹⁶ He believed that the Ottoman Turks were best fitted to govern the heterogeneous empire and that the prestige of Islam must

¹⁴ Abdurrahman Şeref, *Tarih müşahabeleri*, p. 91.

¹⁵ Inal, *Son sadriâzamlar*, I, 27.

¹⁶ Durand de Fontmagne, *Un séjour à l'ambassade de France* (Paris, 1902), p. 45.

not be undermined by allowing freedom of proselytism throughout the dominions. The Ottomans and Islam were the foundations of government, and Âli was deeply concerned that the prestige of government not be diminished by thoughtless reform or foreign intervention. "To maintain good order in the country," he wrote, "to introduce the necessary reforms, and to assure the prosperity of the subjects, it is necessary above all that the government be feared at the same time as it is respected and loved." Though this was said to influence Thouvenel and to rebuke the French press for stirring up discontent among the minorities of the empire, it was none the less true.¹⁷ Christian minorities, Âli pointed out cogently, were not the only ones who suffered under misrule. Âli also had some doubts as to the wisdom of over-educating an upper class in the then condition of the empire. "What will become of all these people? Will they all become lawyers and idlers as in Greece?"¹⁸ Sometimes Âli appeared to be a Metternich, trying to hold together the empire for the house of Osman, as Metternich tried to prop up his "worm-eaten" Habsburg house. To the editor of *La Turquie* Âli remarked: "All we can do is live from day to day. The future is God's."¹⁹

Despite these doubts and hesitations, Âli was still a reformer, though sometimes it was hard to fathom his real opinions on any given subject; his ability at dissimulation evidently led him to yield to great pressure from Europe for reforms which he deemed as yet inopportune, or to prepare measures which he really approved and to pretend that these were imposed on him by Europe, in order that he might fend off attacks from conservative opinion. He tended also, like Metternich, to be overfond of subtlety and intrigue—to play off foreign embassies against the sultan, the ulema against foreign embassies, and one official against another. But he really believed in a gradual adaptation of western institutions, in small steps instead of sweeping measures, as well as in the traditional reformer's task of putting the Ottoman house in order. He was willing to change established ways in such matters as secularizing the lands which were *vakıf*, "in trust for charitable purposes," or in taking over a degree of secular western justice and instituting mixed nonsectarian courts. These reforms he proposed when again president of the Tanzimat Council in 1859-

¹⁷ Âli to Thouvenel, 25 November 1858, in Thouvenel, *Trois années*, p. 316.

¹⁸ Sommerville Story, ed., *The Memoirs of Ismail Kemal Bey* (London, 1920), p. 57.

¹⁹ Mismar, *Souvenirs*, p. 93.

1860. In the year of Reşid's death he asserted that his object was to inculcate a doctrine of equality and brotherhood of all peoples.²⁰

In the course of time Âli's views on the gradualness of change underwent something of a metamorphosis. What he believed in the last years of his life is best expressed in a remarkable memorandum written in 1867 in Crete, where he was engaged in pacification of a rebellion.²¹ Aroused by the dangers which external intervention and domestic revolt offered to the integrity of the empire, Âli declared that now was no time for half measures, that some cargo must be jettisoned to save the ship. His major proposal was that all public offices be open to all Ottoman subjects, including the Christian minorities. This would arouse Muslim resentment, he conceded, especially since the Christians were often better educated and so better fitted for office than Muslims. Âli emphasized also the need for improved schools to help Turks catch up with Christians as quickly as possible, and for mixed schools in which both Muslim and Christian would study together as Ottomans. This, he felt, should help to prevent the minorities from sending their children to schools in Greece or Russia, where anti-Turkish feelings were inculcated. Finally, a new civil law code on the western model, such as Egypt was inaugurating, should be drawn up, together with plans for more mixed tribunals for mixed cases. This, said Âli, would not contravene the sacred law of Islam.

It is obvious that Âli was pushed to these conclusions by the rush of events, and not by thinking in a vacuum about the virtues of equality for all Ottoman subjects. The first half of his memorandum delineated the internationally isolated and internally dangerous condition of the empire. Âli believed that Ottoman integrity could be preserved only if Christian-Muslim equality were a fact; then the minorities would lose their enthusiasm for separatism. They would no longer heed the siren call of foreign propagandists and, instead, would regard themselves not as held in subjection by a Muslim state, but as subjects of a monarch who protected all equally. Clearly, Âli failed to understand the irrational and emotional character of modern nationalism, which in the end would be satisfied not with mere equality, but with

²⁰ Thouvenel, *Trois années*, p. 316.

²¹ Ali Fuad, *Rical-i mühimme*, pp. 118-127, gives the text. Mahmud Celaledin, *Mirât-i hakikat* (Istanbul, 1326-1327), I, 30, gives a summary. A. D. Mordtmann published a German translation in the *Augsburger Allgemeine Zeitung* of 18 September 1876, and reprinted it in his *Stambul und das moderne Türkenthum* (Leipzig, 1877-1878), I, 75-88.

nothing short of independence. But there can be little question of Âli's sincerity, even though his views on equality were dictated by Ottoman self-interest. It was an enlightened self-interest. Âli's conclusion was this: the only salvation of the empire was the fusion of all its subjects, except in purely religious matters. But, it must be noted, he stopped short of advising parliamentary government, and to this view he adhered until his death, believing that the empire's peoples were insufficiently educated for it. Ottoman equality and brotherhood, yes; constitution, no.²²

Âli's colleague, Keçecizade Mehmed Fuad Paşa, was so unlike him that one may well wonder how they got along together. Yet they complemented each other beautifully, and were recognized as a team by friend and foe alike.²³ Âli was small and frail, Fuad tall and handsome; Âli was self-contained and silent, Fuad expansive and loquacious; Âli was meticulous, Fuad sometimes sloppy in attention to detail; Âli was circumspect and hesitant about new departures. Fuad more enterprising and rather less cautious; Âli was flexible and tact-

²² It is a commentary on the nature of materials for Ottoman history that there is no full-scale biography of a man as prominent as Âli, whose public career approaches those of Bismarck, Thiers, or Disraeli in importance; there is neither an authorized life and letters nor a later scholarly volume. The best picture now is A. H. Ongunsu, "Âli Paşa," *İslâm ansiklopedisi*, I, 335-340; fuller but somewhat old-fashioned biographical portraits are in Ali Fuad, *Rical-i mühimme*, pp. 56-140, and in Inal, *Son sadrâzâmlar*, I, 1-58; an excellent anecdotal account in Abdurrahman Şeref, *Tarih musahabeleri*, pp. 88-97. Cevdet's writings, many still unpublished, are sprinkled with comment on Âli, often unfriendly. Âli's statement on religious toleration and Islam is in his dispatch of 30 November 1864 to Musurus (London), encl. in Morris to Seward, #108, 29 March 1865, USNA, Turkey 18. Sketches of Âli by contemporaries include the following: Mordtmann, *Stambul*, I, 59-71; Werner, *Türkische Skizzen*, II, 156-166; Hermann Vambéry, *Der Islam im neunzehnten Jahrhundert* (Leipzig, 1875), pp. 153-154; Amand von Schweiger-Lerchenfeld, *Serail und Hohe Pforte* (Vienna, 1879), pp. 39-40; L. Raschdau, ed., "Diplomatenleben am Bosphorus," *Deutsche Rundschau*, 138 (1909), 404; Melek-Hanum, *Thirty Years in the Harem* (London, 1872), pp. 165-166, 419; *Levant Herald*, *Levant Times*, and *La Turquie*, each of 7 September 1871; Mismar, *Souvenirs*, pp. 23-27, 53-55; Durand de Fontmagne, *Séjour*, p. 42; Abdolonyme Ubicini, *La Turquie actuelle* (Paris, 1855), pp. 168-170; P. Challemel-Lacour, "Les hommes d'état de la Turquie, Aali Pacha et Fuad Pacha," *Revue des deux mondes*, 2nd series, 73 (15 February 1868), 913-917. The New Ottomans wrote a great deal about Âli, usually in bitter criticism; though what they say is based in truth, their picture of Âli is unfair. See references in chapter VI for New Ottoman sources. Their style of criticism has an echo in some modern criticisms of Âli, as by Afet İnan, *Aperçu général sur l'histoire économique de l'Empire turc-ottoman* (Istanbul, 1941), p. 16, where she refers to Âli's concept of reforms as the jettisoning of cargo to save a ship. Âli's so-called political testament is a doubtful source: see appendix C.

²³ Cevdet called them a "unit," or "one being," in his *Maruzat*, quoted in Mardin, *Cevdet*, p. 88, n.99.

ful before the sultan, Fuad sometimes blunt in his advice or flatly opposed to the imperial desires; Âli was autocratic and jealous of rivals, Fuad less given to holding personal grudges and excluding others from power. Some of the difference between the two was put in capsule form in one of Fuad's witticisms, which for the benefit of Sultan Abdülaziz compared Âli, Fuad himself, and Mütercim Mehmed Rüşdi Paşa, who was often associated with the other two. "When we come to the edge of a river and want to cross," said Fuad, "if I have seen a bridge I throw myself on it at once. Âli Paşa begins to investigate whether or not the bridge is sound, and looks for a ford. Rüşdi Paşa won't set foot on the bridge until after a regiment of troops has crossed it."²⁴ Cevdet Paşa somewhat more acrimoniously described Fuad as "a man who in all matters likes invention and innovation."²⁵ Fuad was more western in his personal habits than Âli, and more given to westernization. This tendency showed up not only in affairs of state, but in small matters; Fuad, for instance, flouted Muslim custom by having statuary in his garden. It was quite proper that he should be called the *gâvur* pasha more commonly than was Âli.

Much of the difference between Âli and Fuad can be explained only in the imponderable terms of personality. But there were other significant differences in their backgrounds. Âli was the son of an unprosperous tradesman and doorkeeper in one of Istanbul's bazaars. Fuad came from a well-known family, was the son of the famous poet Keçecizade İzzet Molla, and was privileged to have more formal education than Âli, since he did not have to start work so young. It is noteworthy too that while Âli had the advantage of learning French and western ideas in the translation bureau and in European diplomatic posts, Fuad had this and more. He was the product of all three of the important educational processes of the time which led to a knowledge of the West. He had studied at the medical school in Istanbul, where instruction was in French and the scientific slant was now western. He had then shifted from medicine to diplomacy, entered the translation bureau in his early twenties, and rose to be first dragoman of the Sublime Porte. And he also served in diplomatic missions to European powers. He was for three years a secretary in the London embassy, headed a special mission to Spain, negotiated successfully in

²⁴ Abdurrahman Şeref, *Tarih musahabeleri*, p. 102. Cevdet called these three statesmen a trinity: *Tezâkir*, p. 16.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 67.

St. Petersburg on the question of the 1849 Hungarian refugees, went on a mission to Egypt, and in 1858 represented the Porte at the Paris conference on the Danubian principalities. His first term as foreign minister, a post which he was to occupy five times, was in 1852, when he was thirty-seven years old. That year marked the first time when Âli and Fuad worked together as grand vezir and foreign minister.

This career had given Fuad his westernisms and his French, which language he commanded so fluently that his *bons mots* became famous in the capital and in diplomatic circles throughout Europe. He could use his French wit to crushing effect. When an Englishwoman badgered him with questions about the number of wives which he as a Muslim had, he replied, "The same as your husband—two, only he conceals one and I don't."²⁶ This career had inculcated also a certain catholicity of view and lack of prejudice, and had apparently destroyed some of Fuad's roots in the past. Fuad was, like Âli, a Freemason. Islam meant less to Fuad than to Âli. "Islam was for centuries, in its environment, a wonderful instrument of progress," he said to the editor of *La Turquie*. "Today it is a clock which is behind time and must be set."²⁷ To some, including westerners, such attitudes on Fuad's part seemed the mark of superficiality and dilettantism. Reşid used to complain that Fuad was changeable.²⁸ But though Fuad might be more superficial and more modernist or even secular in his religion than Âli or most other Ottoman statesmen, he was no less devoted to the service and preservation of the state. "The first and most important task of a Government is to look to its own preservation," he instructed Ottoman diplomats.²⁹

This, Fuad believed, had to be accomplished through effective application of the doctrine of Ottoman equality. The grant of liberties to the non-Muslims would, he thought, keep them from thinking nationalistic thoughts.³⁰ Fuad recognized fully the contagious effect of the western concept of national self-determination now operating in the empire's Balkan provinces. His remedy was to counteract this

²⁶ Henry Drummond Wolff, *Rambling Recollections* (London, 1908), I, 261-262.

²⁷ Mismar, *Souvenirs*, p. 110.

²⁸ Cevdet, *Tezâkir*, part 15, quoted in Mardin, *Cevdet*, p. 172, n.136; cf. Fatma Aliye, *Cevdet*, p. 109.

²⁹ Austria, *Auswärtige Angelegenheiten, Correspondenzen des Kaiserlich-königlichen Ministerium des Äusseren* (Vienna, 1866-1874), I (1867) 98, Fuad's circular of 20 June 1867.

³⁰ Orhan F. Köprülü, "Fuad Paşa," *İslâm ansiklopedisi*, IV, 679, citing the holographic draft of a memorandum by Fuad.

sort of subversion with equality for all subjects without exception.³¹ But Fuad did not intend, really, that Muslim Turks should give up their dominant position. He had earlier remarked that the Ottoman Empire was built on four bases: the Muslim millet, Turkish state, Ottoman sultans, and Istanbul as capital.³² These indispensable bases would continue along with equal treatment for all subjects. In these views he paralleled Âli. He also was as intent as Âli on trying to keep the council of ministers free from interference by the sultan and the Palace. Fuad went beyond Âli in his apparent inclination toward a national parliament, though whether he regarded its establishment as feasible is not clear.³³ But, at least so far as Balkan peoples were concerned, Fuad qualified the principle of popular sovereignty as "excessive" and "mischievous."³⁴ His parliament, had he actually established one, would presumably not have had strong control over the ministry or sultan.

Though Fuad's power of resistance to monetary gifts was not above suspicion, especially when gifts were offered by the governor of Egypt, he labored as vigorously as Âli to keep the empire together, and actually lost his second grand vezirate by refusing to let Sultan Abdülaziz marry a daughter of the khedive Ismail—a union which would have given the Egyptian governor greater influence in the palace.³⁵ In acting to repress the Lebanese revolt of 1860 and to keep foreign intervention at a minimum, Fuad was so severe as to get the local nickname of "father of the cord."³⁶

The neatest summary of Fuad's views on Ottoman politics and reform is his "political testament," a letter purportedly written to Abdülaziz by Fuad from his deathbed in Nice in 1869.³⁷ In part, it deals

³¹ Cf. his letter of resignation from the grand vezirate in 1863: Mehmed Memduh, *Mirât-ı şuunat* (İzmir, 1328), pp. 127-133, giving the text, though evidently misdated. Cf. also Ali Fuad, *Rical-i mühimme*, pp. 163-164.

³² Cevdet, *Tezâkir*, p. 85.

³³ E. Z. Karal, *Islahat fermânı devri, 1861-1876* (Ankara, 1956), pp. 143-144; cf. Bernard Lewis, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey* (London, 1961), pp. 371, 374. On parliament: Ali Fuad, *Rical-i mühimme*, pp. 173-174.

³⁴ Mehmed Memduh, *Mirât-ı şuunat*, p. 130.

³⁵ Aspersions on Fuad's honesty in Morris to Seward, confidential and private, 12 February 1868, USNA, Turkey 20; Millingen, *La Turquie*, pp. 280-283, 324-326, with a bias against Fuad; Edward Dicey, *The Story of the Khedivate* (London, 1902), p. 58; N. P. Ignatyev, "Zapiski Grapha N. P. Ignatyeva," *Isvestiia Ministerstva Inostrannykh Del*, 1914, 1, 130; Köprülü, "Fuad Paşa," p. 675.

³⁶ J. F. Scheltema, ed., *The Lebanon in Turmoil* (New Haven, 1920), p. 38.

³⁷ For texts and discussion of authenticity see R. H. Davison, "The Question of Fuad Paşa's 'Political Testament,'" *Belleten*, 23:89 (January 1959), 119-136.

with the foreign policy which Fuad believed the Porte should follow. It sets forth also Fuad's premise on reform: that the empire is in danger and that its only salvation is progress rapid enough to keep pace with England, France, and Russia. To do this "we must change all our institutions—political and civil." Such change does not contravene religious principles. Islam, as the sum of all truth, is not a closed system, but can accept new truths even if they are developed in Europe. The aim of the Ottoman administration should be the absolute equality and fusion of all races. The state should be placed above religious questions. Separatisms based on religious differences should be stifled. To achieve effective equality it will be necessary to institute a new system of justice, a new system of public instruction, and to build roads and railroads. The leader in this, said the dying Fuad, should be Âli, "whose friend and brother I have always been."⁸⁸

Whether or not Fuad actually wrote the "political testament" attributed to him, it did reflect his views. These were remarkably parallel to the opinions Âli expressed in his memorandum of 1867. The fact that the two men could agree on so much, and could work effectively together, gave the Ottoman government a greater stability than it had enjoyed for some time or was to enjoy after their passing. Both Europe and the peoples of the empire knew with whom they had to deal. The collaboration of Âli and Fuad, and their long tenure of office, meant also that the promises of the Hatt-ı Hümayun might really be fulfilled. Though parts of that document were destined to remain paper promises only, it was usually not for want of effort on the part of Âli and Fuad, nor for want of good laws, but a result of the familiar difficulties: the climate of opinion, the lack of first-rate personnel, haphazard execution of law, and foreign complications. Changes were slow, but they came. Beginnings were made. In 1856, the year of issue of the Hatt-ı Hümayun, attention was first turned to the status of non-Muslims in the empire. It was entirely natural that this should

⁸⁸ Fuad, like Âli, lacks a solid biography. Orhan Köprülü, "Fuad Paşa," *İslâm ansiklopedisi*, IV, 672-681, is exceptionally full and soundly based; Ali Fuad, *Rical-i mühimme*, pp. 141-171, is a reasonably good sketch; İnal, *Son sadriâzamlar*, I-II, 149-195, is less scholarly than Köprülü, but informative; Abdurrahman Şeref, *Tarih musahabeleri*, pp. 98-104, is a short life with anecdotes. Portraits by contemporaries are in Werner, *Türkische Skizzen*, II, 166-171; Mordtmann, *Stambul*, I, 25-26, and II, 143-150; *Augsburger Allgemeine Zeitung*, 9 May 1855, Beilage; L. Raschdau, "Diplomatenleben," pp. 402-403; Mismar, *Souvenirs*, pp. 13-16; Millingen, *La Turquie*, pp. 272-284; Ubcini, *Turquie actuelle*, pp. 177-184; *Levant Herald*, 27 November 1861; Morris to Seward, #301, 17 February 1869, USNA, Turkey 20; Challemeil-Lacour, "Les hommes d'état," pp. 917-923.

be the first of the reforms to be considered, since the European powers had insisted on Christian rights, and this insistence had provided them with a pretext for interference in Ottoman affairs. Further, if egalitarian Ottomanism were to be achieved, this was the necessary point of departure.



Three months after the Hatt-ı Hümayun was proclaimed, the first Christian delegates were appointed to sit on the Supreme Council of Judicial Ordinances. Thus for the first time in Ottoman history an organ of central government was affected by the representative principle, as the provincial councils had been earlier. Whether the members appointed in May 1856 were actually representative in any sense except that they were members of important non-Muslim millets is open to serious doubt. They were not elected by their communities, but named by governmental fiat. They were, further, chosen from among prominent families of İstanbul whose interests attached them closely to the Ottoman Porte. The Gregorian Armenian member was Ohannes Dadian, of the family which provided directors for the imperial powder works; Ohannes had the farm of the İzmir and Beirut customs. The Armenian Catholic member was Mihran Düzian, director of the imperial mint. The Jewish representative was Halim the younger, a wealthy banker. Stephen Vogorides (İstefanaki Bey), also an officeholder and strong supporter of the Ottoman government, sat for the Greek millet. These non-Muslims were, further, to sit and vote only when matters of general concern to all Ottoman subjects were debated—a regulation which justified Fuad Paşa's explanation to Muslims of the significance of this promise in the Hatt-ı Hümayun.³⁹ How much influence such a small group of non-Muslims would have is problematical. Yet at the beginning no more could be expected. By 1867 the non-Muslim members of the council held their seats just like their Muslim colleagues, on a permanent rather than a provisional basis.⁴⁰ When the Supreme Council was transformed in 1868 into the Council of State, the non-Muslim membership was expanded, and the

³⁹ Thomas X. Bianchi, *Khatıhty Humaïoun ou charte impériale* (Paris, 1856), pp. 21-22 n.; Prokesch to Buol, #39A-E, 16 May 1856, HHS, XII/56; Edouard Engelhardt, *La Turquie et le Tanzimat* (Paris, 1882-1884), I, 145; Thouvenel, *Trois années*, p. 355; Cevdet, *Tezâkir*, pp. 166, 177; Y. G. Çark, *Türk devleti hizmetinde Ermeniler* (İstanbul, 1953), pp. 62-65, 78-79.

⁴⁰ Fuad's memorandum of 1867 in Abdolonyme Ubicini and Pavet de Courteille, *Etat présent de l'Empire ottoman* (Paris, 1876), p. 253.

now-established principle that all millets be represented in the central lawmaking body received further confirmation in the first parliament elected under the 1876 constitution.

Equality of all Ottomans in military service had also been promised in the *hat*, and was confirmed by government action within the year. The question was still as touchy as it had been after the Hatt-ı Şerif of Gülhane or during the Crimean War, when the attempt to introduce equal military service remained abortive. Muslims wanted their non-Muslim brethren to share in the burdens of defending the empire, but naturally did not want to serve under native Christian officers or to arm Christians who might revolt. Although the Ottoman Christians may have wanted equality in theory, they preferred in practice to pay a tax and so gain exemption from five years of service and possible death, and to devote their time to trade or agriculture. When the question was debated in the government councils,⁴¹ it was decided to proceed to a census of all non-Muslims eligible for military service, who on the basis of available figures were believed to number about two million. Officials and priests cooperated in drawing up the lists. It was further decided that, because of opposition to the measure and because of the practical difficulties involved if suddenly a full quota of untrained non-Muslims were to be introduced into a battle-hardened Muslim army, the entrance of non-Muslims into the army would be staggered. Of a presumed first contingent of sixteen thousand eligible non-Muslim recruits, only four thousand would be taken the first year. In fact, not even this was done. The Hatt-ı Hümayun had admitted the principle of buying off from military service, and this was reintroduced with a new tax, the *bedel-i askerî*, a contribution for exemption which was essentially the old *cizye*.⁴² Theoretical equality was maintained in principle, because Muslims too were allowed to buy exemption. Equality was, however, denied in fact, since Muslims had to pay a much greater sum.⁴³

⁴¹ Bianchi, *Khaththy-Humaïoun*, n. 2, says it was in the Supreme Council with its new non-Muslim members; Siddik Sami Onar, "Bedel-i askerî," *İslâm ansiklopedisi*, II, 439, says it was in the Tanzimat Council.

⁴² At first called the *iane-i askeriye*. The *bedel* continued to be regarded by non-Muslims as nothing but the old capitation tax, still referred to in some quarters as *haraç*: G. Muir MacKenzie and A. P. Irby, *Travels in the Slavonic Provinces of Turkey-in-Europe* (London, 1866), p. 20 and n. Cf. above, chapter 1, n. 80, and chapter II, n. 6.

⁴³ Cf. A. Heidborn, *Manuel de droit public et administratif de l'Empire Ottoman* (Vienna, 1908-1912), II, 155-157, for explanation of the amount of the tax; also Young, *Corps de droit*, v, 275-276.

Eventually the whole matter of non-Muslim military service was buried, to the general satisfaction of both Christians and Muslims, by a special commission appointed to sit on the question. The non-Muslims continued to pay the *bedel-i askerî*, collected at first by government officials, then by the millet hierarchies. It is probable, though not certain, that this theoretical equality and practical discrimination was the best solution obtainable at the time.⁴⁴ But with this sort of temporization a chance to increase effective Ottomanism was lost. Some, including the commander in chief Ömer Paşa, believed that equal service in mixed, rather than separate, units was quite possible.⁴⁵ Muslims continued to complain that for a small payment the non-Muslims escaped sharing in the blood tax that should fall equally on all Ottoman subjects.⁴⁶ Although there is some suspicion that the Phanariote aristocracy of İstanbul tried to preserve its own dwindling influence by discouraging any enthusiasm for military service among the Greek Orthodox of the empire, there was no discernible desire among non-Muslims generally to assume the burden. Instead, many of them profited by the absence of their Turkish compatriots on military service to get control of lands and trade.⁴⁷ When the question again arose in the parliaments of 1877 and 1878, only a few Christian voices were raised in favor of equal military service. Most of the Christian deputies balked at the prospect, and Turkish deputies showed more enthusiasm for equality than they.⁴⁸

⁴⁴ A very revealing report by Âli, revised by Reşid, on a special session on this question, gives arguments for and against Christian military service: Mehmed Selâheddin, *Bir türk diplomatının evrak-ı siyasiyesi* (İstanbul, 1306), pp. 144-49. Undated, probably 1856 or 1857.

⁴⁵ Dr. K. (Josef Koetschet), *Erinnerungen aus dem Leben des Serdar Ekrem Omer Pascha* (Sarajevo, 1885), p. 252, who blames the Palace, and battle-shy Armenians, for the failure to realize it. Cf. Antonio Gallenga, *Two Years of the Eastern Question* (London, 1877), I, 184-197.

⁴⁶ Mithat Cemal Kuntay, *Namık Kemal* (İstanbul, 1944-1956), I, 185; Felix Kanitz, *Donau-Bulgarien und der Balkan* (Leipzig, 1875-1879), III, 151; G. G. B. St. Clair and C. A. Brophy, *Twelve Years' Study of the Eastern Question* (London, 1877), pp. 125-134, a Turcophil discussion.

⁴⁷ Great Britain, *Parliamentary Papers*, 1861, vol. 67, *Accounts and Papers*, vol. 34, "Reports . . . Condition of Christians in Turkey," #8, encl. 2.

⁴⁸ Hakkı Tarık Us, *Meclis-i meb'usan 1293:1877 zabıt ceridesi* (İstanbul, 1940-1954), I, 323-324, and II, 64, cited in Robert Devereux, *A Study of the First Ottoman Parliament, 1877-1878* (George Washington University, unpublished M.A. thesis, 1956), pp. 111-113. On the question of non-Muslim military service see, in addition to the sources cited in preceding notes, Koetschet, *Erinnerungen*, p. 47 (Ömer was a member of the special commission on the question); Engelhardt, *La Turquie*, I, 141-142, 145-146; Andreas D. Mordtmann, *Anatolien, Skizzen und Reisebriefe* (Hannover, 1925), pp. 254-256; Paul Fesch, *Constantinople aux derniers jours*

In other ways the years after 1856 gave evidence of a slow but continued trend toward Ottoman equality, until the Muslim reaction of the 1870's, and of more effective protection extended by government to Ottomans of all creeds. The Porte continued to give assurances and to issue orders on equal treatment for all.⁴⁹ More important, local officials began to echo these principles, and sometimes to act on them. The secretary of the governor of Erzurum in 1858 announced, in dealing with a sectarian dispute, that the government "looks upon all the nations of the Empire in the same light."⁵⁰ A classic pronouncement was delivered by the governor of Ankara in 1865, who caused a herald to cry publicly, "It is commanded by the ruling authorities that all subjects cease to deride one another as Moslems and Rayahs, as Armenians and Protestants, since all are equally the dependent subjects of the royal government, and it is further commanded that mutually respecting and honoring one another, all shall dwell together in brotherly love."⁵¹ In its way this pithy proclamation was a masterly summary of the official policy of equality among adherents of all religions, of the concept of Ottoman citizenship, and of the antidefamation clause of the Hatt-ı Hümayun, revealing that the governor understood perfectly what the Porte had announced. That the civil authority should command all men to live together in brotherly love

d'Abdul Hamid (Paris, 1907), pp. 247-266; Karal, *Islahat fermamı devri*, pp. 181-183; Prokesch to Buol, #39A-E, 16 May 1856, HHS, XII/56, who makes a connection between the appointment of the first Christians to the Supreme Council and the need of the Porte to supplement its Muslim military strength from the Christian millets. Some Christians, graduates of the military medical school, had apparently served in the army with officer rank, beginning in 1841: Osman Ergin, *Türkiye maarif tarihi* (İstanbul, 1939-1943), II, 626. Discussions in government commissions in 1856 and again in 1861 envisioned the admission of thirty-odd Christian officer-candidates in various military schools: *ibid.*, pp. 606-607; Mehmed Selâheddin, *Bir türk diplomatının evrak-ı siyasiyesi*, pp. 144-149. In 1864 thirty-five Christian students were admitted to the officers' training school: Morris to Seward, #81, 3 March 1864, USNA, Turkey 18. Whether they were ever commissioned, or served, the author does not know. Fuad Paşa in his 1867 review of the Hatt-ı Hümayun's execution reported it had been necessary to limit the number of Christian officers until more Christian soldiers should be enrolled, but gave no figures and did not indicate whether any native Christian officers were actually serving. He pointed out that, despite the lack of equality in military service (for which he blamed the non-Muslims "almost exclusively"), there were Christians serving in two mixed Cossack regiments in the Ottoman army: text of his memorandum in Ubicini and Pavet de Courteille, *Etat présent*, pp. 249-250, 251-252.

⁴⁹ As in a circular of 1858 to provincial governors: Halil İnalçık, "Tanzimat nedir?" *Tarih araştırmaları*, I (1940-1941), 257.

⁵⁰ ABCFM, *Trowbridge's Diary*, p. 51.

⁵¹ *Ibid.*, vol. 284, #331, 21 September 1865.

was undoubtedly as commendable as it was unenforceable. But in this instance the dispute was between Gregorian and Protestant Armenians; local officials surely enforced equality with greater conviction and delight in such cases than when Muslims were involved. But even where Muslims were involved, there was a change in official attitudes. In one of the rare instances of apostasy of a Turkish Muslim family to Christianity the Porte investigated, found no compulsion, and gave protection to the converts, saying that "the Musselman is now as free to become a Christian as the Christian is free to become a Musselman. The government will know no difference in the two cases."⁵² But public opinion was aroused, so that the converted family fled for safety despite the Porte's protection.⁵³ In matters apart from the delicate question of apostasy there was uneven progress. Christian testimony was accepted in mixed courts and occasionally in Muslim courts.⁵⁴ More non-Muslims were given official posts of some importance, although it was apparently only in 1868 that the first non-Muslim, Krikor Agaton, achieved full ministerial rank as minister of public works.⁵⁵ In this sporadic progress toward a more genuine equality there was a triple dichotomy: the Porte was ahead of Muslim opinion; the capital was ahead of the provinces; and while some non-Muslim Ottomans improved their status and advanced in official positions, many of their brethren went the opposite way toward separatist nationalism.⁵⁶

The Hatt-ı Hümayun had also promised that penal and commercial law, and procedural law for mixed tribunals, would be codified as soon as possible. This was actually done within a few years. The reform here was twofold: codification, which was badly needed, and also a considerable borrowing from western secular law, which gave greater impetus to the extension of the principle of Ottoman equality. Although various European codes were consulted, it was

⁵² *Ibid.*, Armenian Mission v, #276, 5 September 1857.

⁵³ *Ibid.*, Armenian Mission v, #277, 21 September 1857.

⁵⁴ Cf. George Hill, *A History of Cyprus* (Cambridge, 1940-1952), IV, 209-210, 213.

⁵⁵ Esat Uras, *Tarihte Ermeniler ve ermeni meselesi* (Ankara, 1950), p. 186; Çark, *Ermeniler*, pp. 199-201. Cf. Cyrus Hamlin, *Among the Turks* (New York, 1878), pp. 371-375, listing Christian officials.

⁵⁶ There is continuing evidence of the lack of absolute equality, but also of the advance of Porte-appointed officials over local Muslim sentiment. See, for example, Mackenzie and Irby, *Travels*, passim; and on the question of nonadmission of Christian testimony against Muslims, *ibid.*, pp. 178, 263, 396.

French law which provided the basic model. This was true of the penal code which was promulgated in 1858; it represented, after the commercial code of 1850, the second code that borrowed extensively from the West.⁵⁷ The chairman of the drafting commission, significantly, and the man principally responsible for the code, was Ahmed Cevdet Efendi. Cevdet was the member of the ulema furnished by the *şeyh-ülislâm* when Reşid Paşa had asked for a man well versed in Muslim law, but conscious also of the necessities of modern life. The code which he worked out superseded the previous penal code of 1840 and its successor of 1851, which were not western-inspired. The product of 1858 endured, with some alterations, until the Kemalist regime. Though it was crude and somewhat inelastic, it was "based on principles of common sense, common morality, and common justice," and as such represented "a very 'workable' piece of legislation."⁵⁸ It not only carried out the promises of 1856 by providing penalties for graft among officials, for molesting the worship of any sect, and so forth; it also reflected the new age of westernization in its provisions about tampering with telegraph lines or setting up an unauthorized press. Although an outstanding member of the ulema had prepared the code, and although it contained recognition of the şariat and the religious courts, there was a rather vague opposition to its application—an opposition which seems, however, to have been born of ignorance and resentment against innovation rather than of fanatic religious defense of the holy law. Fuad Paşa admitted in 1867 that application of the new code was imperfect, owing to the ignorance and inexperience of judges trained in an older law.⁵⁹ Yet by 1878 it was estimated that, as far in the interior as Kayseri, nine tenths of the cases were tried under the new code.⁶⁰ Codes of procedure for mixed commercial courts

⁵⁷ Texts of the code in *Düstur*, I (Istanbul, 1289), 537-596; George Young, *Corps de droit ottoman* (Oxford, 1905-1906), VII, 1-54; Grégoire Aristarchi, *Législation ottomane* (Constantinople, 1873-1888), II, 212-268; Charles G. Walpole, *The Ottoman Penal Code 28 Zilhidje 1274* (London, 1888); Erich Nord, *Das türkische Strafgesetzbuch vom 28. Zilhidje 1274* (Berlin, 1912), with the 1911 additions.

⁵⁸ Walpole, *Penal Code*, p.v. Walpole was an English judge in Cyprus who actually administered the provisions of the code in his court.

⁵⁹ Fuad's memorandum of 1867, Ubcini, *Etat présent*, p. 247.

⁶⁰ Hamlin, *Among the Turks*, p. 367. On the penal code see, further, Ebül'ulâ Mardin, "Development of the Shari'a Under the Ottoman Empire," in Majid Khadduri and Herbert J. Liebesny, eds., *Law in the Middle East*, I (Washington, 1956), 285-289; Tahir Taner, "Tanzimat devrinde ceza hukuku," in *Tanzimat*, I (Istanbul, 1940), 230-232.

and of maritime commerce followed in 1861 and 1863 respectively; in each case French law was the basic source.⁶¹

This was not true of the code of land law, promulgated also in 1858. The same commission worked on this code as on the penal law, but its effort here was not to introduce western principles. Instead, the object was a classification and regularization of the customary forms of tenure of land (principally state land) which had grown out of the practices of the Ottoman sultans from earliest times, the collection and codification of provisions of scattered *kanun*'s, and the bringing up to date of rules and terminology outmoded since the demise of the fief system. A further aim was the registration of titles in the names of individuals whom the state could then hold directly responsible for the pertinent taxes.⁶² The further illegal conversion of state-owned land (*mîrî*) into freehold property (*mülk*), and then into *vakıf*, could also be prevented by proper registration. The land code represented also an effort to increase the power of the central government by decreasing the influence of large landowners in the provinces—those tribal *şeyh*'s, *âyan*'s, and others who had acquired extensive properties and commensurate local political and economic domination. It was especially provided that one individual could not hold the lands of an entire village.⁶³ But, in actual fact, the code, both because of its provisions and the haphazard method of its application, failed to achieve the desired ends. The code did not deal with all aspects of land law, but referred to the classical religious lawbooks on some matters. Nor, in practice, did it succeed in establishing clear individual title and so creating a greater equality among individual Ottoman subjects. The code took no account of the collective ownership and share tenancy forms of land tenure which were common in many parts of the empire; the individuals involved in these systems, long-established by custom, thus failed to gain legal recognition or protection of their rights. Further, when registration of titles was carried out, many a peasant registered his lands in the name of someone else, often a local *şeyh* or large landowner, because he feared that the land census was

⁶¹ Texts in *Düstur*, I, 780-810 and 466-536; also Young, *Corps de droit*, VII, 155-170 and 103-154; Aristarchi, *Législation*, II, 374-400, and I, 344-419.

⁶² The question of land registration and taxation had already been discussed by a general assembly during the Crimean War. It had been decided to use the districts of İzmir and Salonika as pilot projects: Cevdet, *Tezâkir*, p. 50.

⁶³ Texts of land law in *Düstur*, I, 165-199; Young, *Corps de droit*, VI, 45-83; Aristarchi, *Législation*, I, 57-170.

only preliminary to the familiar state demands for more taxes and military recruits. Thus the man with the legal title-deed (*sened tapu*) was often someone quite other than the actual cultivator who had customary rights of tenure, which the cultivator could not now defend at law. And the state, although it established tax responsibility, failed to reduce the power of large landholders, many of whom now had proper legal tenure of state (*mirî*) land, including the former fief lands, which they were able to treat effectively as outright freehold property (*mülk*).⁶⁴



As the drive to import European ideas and to extend effective Ottoman equality gathered momentum during Âli Paşa's grand vezirate, which extended from January 1858 to October 1859, an important although somewhat inchoate opposition began to develop. Based on a rather widespread dissatisfaction with the government, the opposition finally took shape in the conspiracy of 1859, known to Turks as the Kuleli incident.⁶⁵ The conspiracy has frequently been hailed as the first rising in Ottoman history aimed at securing constitutional government.⁶⁶ Although some of the conspirators may have been infected by western ideas, the bulk of them undoubtedly were not.⁶⁷ In fact,

⁶⁴ Ömer Lütfi Barkan, in *Tanzimat*, I, 369-421; Hıfzı Veldet in *Tanzimat*, I, 180-187; Mardin, "Development of the Shari'a," pp. 285-288; Doreen Warriner, *Land and Poverty in the Middle East* (London, 1948), pp. 15-18; Halil İnalcık, "Land Problems in Turkish History," *Muslim World*, 45 (July 1955), 226; R. C. Tute, *The Ottoman Land Laws* (n.p., n.d.—Jerusalem, 1927?), passim; W. Padel and L. Steeg, *De la législation foncière ottomane* (Paris, 1904), passim. The last two works provide references to supplementary regulations on registration and other land regulations to 1876 and beyond: Padel, pp. 6-7; Tute, pp. 129ff.

⁶⁵ From the fact that the conspirators, when apprehended, were confined and interrogated in the Kuleli barracks on the Asiatic shore of the Bosphorus.

⁶⁶ For example, by Nicholas Jorga, *Geschichte des osmanischen Reiches* (Gotha, 1908-1913), v, 517; by Thouvenel, *Trois années*, p. 354, n., seeing here a precedent for the New Ottomans; by Engelhardt, *La Turquie*, I, 158; by Millingen, *La Turquie*, p. 159; by Ahmed Rasim, *İstibdaddan hakimiyeti milliyeye* (Istanbul, 1342), II, 56; by Ahmed Bedevi Kuran, *İnkılâp tarihimiz ve Jön Türkler* (Istanbul, 1945), pp. 7-8, cited in Recai G. Okandan, *Umumî âmele hukukumuzun ana hatları* (Istanbul, 1948), pp. 75-76 and n.24; by Wanda, *Souvenirs anecdotiques de la Turquie* (Paris, 1884), pp. 69-76.

⁶⁷ Some of the army officers in the plot probably imbibed political ideas from Polish or Hungarian colleagues. This is most likely to be true of General Hüseyin Dâim Paşa, a Circassian who had European friends: Millingen, *La Turquie*, p. 159; Wanda, *Souvenirs*, pp. 69-76; Hermann Vambéry, *His Life and Adventures* (New York, 1883), pp. 22-24; Walter Thornbury, *Turkish Life and Character* (London, 1860), I, 62; Thouvenel to Walewski, #68, 28 September 1859, AAE, Turquie 341. Possibly it is true also of Cafer Dem Paşa, an Albanian officer, who had English friends.

the basic motif of the conspirators was opposition to westernization. Their general dissatisfaction with the government may have arisen from many sources—from the excessive spending of Sultan Abdülmecid, from the fact that army pay was in arrears, from a generally difficult economic and financial situation—but it crystallized as a defense of the şariat, a resentment against the government's edicts according equality and various specific privileges to non-Muslims, and anger at the European pressures behind these edicts. Overzealous foreign humanitarians had, in fact, printed and circulated copies of the *Hatt-ı Hümayun*, leading the native Christians to expect more than was really possible.⁶⁸ The moving spirit in the conspiracy was one Şeyh Ahmed, a teacher in the medrese attached to the Sultan Beyazid mosque, who had been voicing such sentiments. He indicated that he regarded the great reform decrees of 1839 and 1856 as contraventions of Muslim law because they accorded Christians equal rights with Muslims. A good many ulema, including theological students, were involved in the conspiracy, as well as army officers and others. These men took an oath to support Şeyh Ahmed and to sacrifice themselves. Beyond these generalizations, in the present state of knowledge, it is impossible to be more precise on the ideology of the conspiracy, and the fuzziness of some of the conspirators' concepts leads to the suspicion that there may have been no precise formulation. Their immediate object was to get rid of Abdülmecid and, presumably, his current ministers, and to raise Abdülaziz to the throne. The latter, however, was not privy to the plot.

The conspiracy was betrayed to the government by an army officer who had been asked to join, and in mid-September of 1859 some forty-odd ringleaders were arrested. In İstanbul the news of the arrests provoked the usual rumors that a massacre of Christians was, or was not, in prospect; that from five thousand to fourteen thousand soldiers were involved; that the conspirators wanted, or did not want, increased westernization in the empire. It seems certain that many more persons than those arrested were prepared to support a revolt, had it actually occurred; various *şeyh*'s promised the aid of several thousand disciples, and presumably soldiers could have been rallied too. A good deal of opinion in the capital seems to have supported the conspirators. Arrests were hindered, and theological students who had not been

⁶⁸ Great Britain, *Parliamentary Papers*, 1861, vol. 67, *Accounts and Papers*, vol. 36, "Reforms in Turkey," #9, Bulwer to Russell, 26 July 1859.

arrested put up posters appealing to the Muslim public to save their brethren at Kuleli in the name of religion and patriotism. Âli Paşa's administration evidently tried to play down the whole affair and to pass it off as the action of a few discontented Circassians and Kurds, but it took measures to limit the number of theological students in the capital, packing a good many off to the provinces; it also imposed a tax on the property of mosques and dervish tekkes, to curb somewhat the influence of the professional men of religion. The Porte also took the precaution of distributing to the garrison in the capital three months' back pay. With the arrests, the conspiracy fell to pieces. The leaders were interrogated by a government commission of the highest officials under Âli's chairmanship, and the future grand vezir Midhat Paşa, then second secretary of the Supreme Council, took part in the investigation. The conspirators were sentenced to varying punishments, principally imprisonment or exile in provincial spots. The few death sentences were commuted. Thus the abortive conspiracy left behind it only a tradition and an example for the future. This was not an example of revolt for parliamentary or constitutional government, but it was an example of a plot to overturn the government, and one which counted on a rather widespread public support. As such, it served as a precedent for the abortive New Ottoman plans of 1867, and for the successful coup of 1876. There is no directly traceable connection between the conspiracy of 1859 and either of the later incidents, though in all three cases some of the antigovernment feeling was fairly conservative and Islamic in nature.⁶⁹

⁶⁹ The best study of the conspiracy of 1859 is Uluğ İğdemir, *Kuleli Vak'ası hakkında bir araştırma* (Ankara, 1937). Foreign embassies were generally well informed, though they received conflicting reports: cf. Thouvenel to Walewski, #65 and encl. and #68, of 21 and 28 September 1859, AAE, Turquie 341; Bulwer to Russell, #164 and encl., and #179, of 20 and 27 September 1859, FO 78/1435; Collett to Manderström, #12 and #14, of 20 and 30 September 1859, SRA, Depescher från Svenska Beskickningen i Konstantinopel; Williams to Cass, #53 and #54 with encl. of Istanbul press of 20 and 28 September 1859, USNA, Turkey 16; also Schauflier to Anderson, #92, 12 December 1859, ABCFM, Armenian Mission VIII. İÜ. A. Petrosian, "*Novye Osmany*" i bor'ba za konstitutsiû (Moscow, 1958), p. 25, though he has used Russian archives, cites none on this incident. In addition to the accounts cited in notes 66 and 67 see Abdurrahman Şeref, *Tarih musahabeleri*, p. 172; Ahmed Midhat, *Üss-i inkılâb*, I, 75 n.; *idem*, *Kâinat*, IV (İstanbul, 1298), 548-549; Halûk Y. Şehsuvaroğlu, *Sultan Aziz* (İstanbul, 1949), pp. 9-15; Tarik Z. Tunaya, *Türkiyede siyasi partiler* (İstanbul, 1952), pp. 89-90; Ahmed Rasim, *İstibdaddan hakimiyeti milliyeye*, II, 56-60; Kuntay, *Namık Kemal*, I, 89, n.12, and 597, n.3, and II, part I, 513 and n.5; Thornbury, *Turkish Life*, I, 37-40, 54-68, which reproduces (Anon.), "The Late Insurrection in Turkey," *Chamber's Journal*, 12:326 (31 March 1860), 193-197; Millingen, *Turquie*, pp. 235-236; *idem*, *Les imams et les derviches*

REFORM AND CONSPIRACY, 1856-1861

Although the conspirators had been unable to depose Abdülmeçid, a part of their objective was attained a month after the Kuleli affair broke, when Âli Paşa was replaced as grand vezir by the more conservative Kıbrıslı Mehmed Emin Paşa. Mehmed, a native of Cyprus as his nickname indicated, was actually a product of the old education and the new. He had been one of the last students of the old palace school, in the time of Mahmud II. Thereafter he had entered the new army which Mahmud created after the destruction of the Janissaries, and rose to the rank of general. His early military training was completed by several years' study in Paris and in Metz, and service with the French dragoons. Since he knew French, as well as Greek and Turkish, Kıbrıslı Mehmed not only filled a half dozen provincial governorships before the Crimean War, but was also for a brief period ambassador to the Court of St. James and went on a mission to St. Petersburg at the time of Alexander II's accession. On his second tour of duty in Paris Kıbrıslı Mehmed had met and married the widow of Dr. Millingen, Byron's physician. Melek Hanım was half French, one quarter Greek, and one quarter Armenian, and a curious person by her own account, not above using her position for shady financial gain. Kıbrıslı Mehmed managed to survive the wave of scandal caused by his domestic life, his divorce from Melek, her reversion to Catholicism, and the conversion of his daughter to the same faith. He first became grand vezir for six months in 1854, and at the end of the Crimean War was acting grand vezir while Âli was at the Paris peace congress; thus he had presided at the ceremony of proclamation of the Hatt-ı Hümayun in 1856.

Despite his considerable knowledge of Europe, his early association with Reşid, and his later cooperation with Âli and Fuad, Kıbrıslı Mehmed never developed into a convinced westernizer. Indeed, it was exactly because he was not known as a westernizer that he, instead of Fuad, was chosen as acting grand vezir when the Hatt-ı Hümayun was proclaimed, so that he might act as a shield against Muslim curses.⁷⁰ He became, along with Âli and Fuad, a political rival of Reşid, but then broke with the other two as well. His estranged wife later wrote that his western education was "a thin surface of knowledge veneered over a thick mass of ignorance" and that he had "preserved

(Paris, 1881), pp. 204-205; Adolphe d'Avril, *Négociations relatives au Traité de Berlin* (Paris, 1886), pp. 55-59.

⁷⁰ Cevdet, *Texâkir*, p. 66.

below the varnish of civilization the stamp of the old Turk."⁷¹ Her judgment was harsh and biased, but it was true that Kıbrıslı Mehmed leaned more to the old than did Âli or Fuad. He was, however, an honest and energetic public servant, dedicated to improvement and the rooting out of abuses. Fuad is supposed to have remarked that, while Âli was all head, Kıbrıslı Mehmed was all legs. Certainly Mehmed was less thoughtful and less hesitant than Âli, more straightforward and more inclined to act. "An impatient man," Cevdet called him, "not given to long thinking."⁷² His most significant action as grand vezir came in the field of provincial administration, which was now crying for attention.⁷³

Although the Hatt-ı Hümayun had promised a reform of the provincial councils, as well as measures to improve communications, agriculture, and the system of tax collection, nothing along these lines had been effected by 1859. Instead, it became obvious that discontent and disorder in various provinces of the empire were in no way diminished. The preceding year had witnessed a rebellion in Crete occasioned by the tax system, a rising of Christian peasants in Bosnia against oppression by Muslim landlords, a renewal of Bulgarian agitation for bishops of their own people to replace the domineering Greek hierarchy, and a Montenegrin attack on the borders of Herzegovina. In some places Christians complained of Muslims; in other places Muslims complained of Christians. A fanatic mob in Jidda murdered the French and English consuls. Arab, Kurd, and Yezidi tribes ravaged the Mosul district in 1859. These provincial disturbances had several important consequences. To these problems the Porte had to devote money, men, and attention which might better have been spent in

⁷¹ Melek Hanum, *Thirty Years in the Harem* (London, 1872), pp. 277-278.

⁷² *Tezâkir*, p. 88.

⁷³ Kıbrıslı Mehmed Paşa, like other Ottoman statesmen, lacks a biographer. The best portrait is in Werner, *Türkische Skizzen*, II, 172-182. İnal, *Son sadrâzâmlar*, I, 83-100, is more informative on some points but a hodgepodge of quotations, largely from Cevdet. Melek Hanum, *Thirty Years*, is quite informative though biased; her *Six Years in Europe* (London, 1873) has less information about her ex-husband. Melek's son, Frederick Millingen (Osman-Bey) defends her throughout his *Les Anglais en Orient* (Paris, 1877). See also Ubcini, *Turquie actuelle*, pp. 173-177; Barnette Miller, *The Palace School of Muhammad the Conqueror* (Cambridge, Mass., 1941), p. 7; Drummond Wolff, *Rambling Recollections*, II, 4-5; *Tezâkir-i Cevdet*, #5, quoted in Mardin, *Cevdet*, p. 51, n.81; *La Turquie*, 9 September 1871. HHS XII/58 (Varia), p. 75, contains an anonymous letter of 25 October 1856 to Cevdet, a sample of the slander to which Mehmed was subject. His honesty may be suspect from Melek Hanum's accounts, but is generally defended by other contemporaries. İnal, *Son sadrâzâmlar*, I, 37, recounts that he rejected a large gift offered by the khedive, whereas Âli accepted.

working out basic reforms. Further, the authority of the Porte over the empire was more shaken by such disturbances than it would have been before the increased centralization of governmental authority under Mahmud II. Also, provincial unrest provided the European powers with an excuse for intervention, which the Porte always feared would result only in a process of separation from its control such as was now in full swing in the Danubian principalities. The ambassadors of the powers at Istanbul did, in fact, present the Porte on October 5, 1859, a memorandum urging immediate fulfillment of the promises of the Hatt-ı Hümayun. Russia pressed especially for an international inquest on conditions in the Balkans.⁷⁴ It is probable that the fall of Âli from the grand vezirate was in part occasioned by the powers' representations, as well as by the Kuleli incident of three weeks before and by Âli's disputes with Abdülmecid over the latter's spendthrift habits. Kıbrıslı Mehmed was thus faced with the provincial problem as soon as he took office. Although he was out again in two months, he was back as grand vezir in May of 1860, and this time remained in the post until August 1861. Provincial administration continued to occupy his attention.

Kıbrıslı Mehmed attempted no immediate reorganization of provincial government. Instead, he fell quite naturally into the time-honored method of sending out commissioners on inspection.⁷⁵ In the late spring of 1860 he himself left Istanbul on an inspection tour as head of a commission composed of some of the best men of the empire: three Turks in addition to himself—Cevdet Efendi, Afif Bey, and Besim Bey; two Armenians—Artin Dadian and Kabriel Efendi; and two Greeks—Musurus and Photiades.⁷⁶ The commission spent four months in and around the cities of Ruschuk (Ruşuk, Ruse), Shumla (Şumla, Shumen, Kolarovgrad), Vidin, Nish (Niş, Niş), Prishtina (Priştine, Priştina), Scopia (Üsküb, Skopje), Monastir (Manastır, Bitola), and Salonika (Selânik, Thessalonike). Its methods were characteristic of Kıbrıslı Mehmed, who received countless petitions in person and dispensed justice on the spot himself, or through ad hoc

⁷⁴ Engelhardt, *La Turquie*, I, 161-163. Another Russian note of 23 April 1860 stressed the problem: *Archives diplomatiques*, I (1861), 113-115.

⁷⁵ See above, pp. 27, 47-48.

⁷⁶ The Russians claimed that they provoked the tour: Ignatyev, "Zapiski Grapha N. P. Ignatyeva," *Izvestiia Ministerstva Inostrannykh Del*, 1914, I, 103; the French claimed that their ambassador suggested the trip: d'Avril, *Négociations*, p. 63. British backing helped the Porte evade the Russian demand for an international commission.

mixed courts. The number of individual petitions received was extraordinary—some four thousand in the province of Nish alone. Most of them dealt with disputes between individuals, which reflected laxity or corruption in the administration of justice, and the exclusion of Christian testimony in the courts. Some of the petitions were spurious, prepared by agitators who had their own ends in view. Some Christians were obviously afraid to enter complaints, but many were not. In October 1860 the inspection tour was cut short by the Druze-Maronite feud in the Lebanon, which made imperative Kibrıslı Mehmed's return to the capital. But the four months in the field were sufficient to expose the conditions of local government, to re-establish the formula of checking on provincial administration by inspection tours, and to lay the basis for the vilayet experiment of 1864.⁷⁷

Despite Russian claims that the commission did not admit the true extent of misgovernment and oppression, the revelations of its report seem to be fairly accurate.⁷⁸ Six conclusions were reached, and some of these were acted upon on the spot. The first was that there was no systematic oppression of Christians by Muslims, officially or unofficially, but that Christians could justly complain that their testimony was often refused in court. The second was that the Greek hierarchy was frequently tyrannical and unjust—the archbishop of Şarköy, for instance, was convicted of extortion and of the violation of a Bulgarian girl. Thirdly, the commission found malfeasance in office among a number of Turkish officials. The governor of Nish and some underlings were convicted of accepting bribes, removed from office, and

⁷⁷ Great Britain, *Parliamentary Papers*, 1861, vol. 67, *Accounts and Papers*, vol. 34, "Reports . . . Condition of Christians in Turkey, 1860," includes considerable information from British consuls who watched the commission in action. #6, Mayers to Green, Ruschuk, 18 July 1860, encl. 2, gives a French translation of Kibrıslı Mehmed's temporary instructions to provincial governors; *ibid.*, "Papers . . . Administrative and Financial Reforms in Turkey, 1858-1861," #40, Âli to Musurus, 21 November 1860, gives a French translation of Kibrıslı Mehmed's report to the sultan. Ahmed Rasim, *İstibdadın hakimiyeti milliyeye*, II, 52-54, discusses tour and report. See also *Journal de Constantinople*, 14 June and 15 October 1860; Kanitz, *Donau-Bulgarien*, I, 102-112; Moustapha Djelaleddin, *Les Turcs anciens et modernes* (Paris, 1870), p. 177.

⁷⁸ The Russian government issued a memorandum of 4 January 1861 belittling the results of the tour and containing some just criticisms: *Archives diplomatiques*, II (1861), 220-233. The Porte refuted this in an undated memoir of February 1861: *ibid.*, pp. 107-114. The truth lay between the two statements, but the Russian seems more overdrawn. The British reports cited above generally parallel the Turkish, and are often somewhat Turcophil in this period.

imprisoned; it does not appear that they were simply sacrificed as scapegoats to appease local and foreign opinion. Some of the local meclises also were dissolved and reconstituted. The commission was, fourthly, dissatisfied with the tax-farming system; some of the *iltizamcı*'s were imprisoned for bribery and extortion, and the accountant-general (*muhasebeci*) of Nish was imprisoned for accepting a bribe from a Jewish tax farmer. Kıbrıslı Mehmed tried to curb extortion by ordering that a committee of local notables control the assessments made by the *iltizamcı* on the produce of each individual. The commission decided, fifthly, that the local roads needed improvement, and, finally, that the police system had to be strengthened.

From 1860 until 1864 the Porte regularly used the system of imperial inspectors to supplement the normal eyalet government. The *müfettiş* (inspector) became a familiar figure in the Balkans and Anatolia, though he was not a regular visitor to the Arab provinces. Among the men sent out on inspection were some of the most able and intelligent of the empire. Ahmed Vefik Efendi covered western Anatolia; Bursalı Ali Rıza Efendi was in northeastern Anatolia; Abdüllâtif Subhi Bey, known as a numismatist and a man learned in western science, went to Bulgaria; and Ziya Bey, the writer and palace secretary and later New Ottoman leader, went to Bosnia. Cevdet was appointed head of a special office in the Sublime Porte to coordinate the reports sent in by the inspectors and to see that they were acted upon. The system of provincial inspection was admittedly a palliative, not a solution, for the problems of provincial government. Fuad Paşa remarked that each of the four inspectors interpreted his instructions differently and acted as an individual.⁷⁹ Ziya turned out to be poor at his job, and had to be replaced by Cevdet himself. Ahmed Vefik acted in so highhanded and arbitrary a manner that the complaints of the citizens of Bursa led to his recall. Yet, on the whole, the system seems to have provided an effective and recurring check on provincial officials, on tax farmers, and on local councils in the eyalets, and to have rendered the administration of justice more equitable. The inspectors did not hesitate to fire corrupt officials. It is reported that Subhi Bey "lacked neither energy to punish nor shrewdness to detect" and that only one mayor (*müdüür*) in his area could boast of having passed the inspection with spotless hands.⁸⁰ Provincial governors were

⁷⁹ İnal, *Son sadrîâzamlar*, II, 188.

⁸⁰ Mackenzie and Irby, *Travels*, pp. 78-80.

inspired to clean house by the impending arrival of inspectors, and at least one of them emulated the grand vezir, on a smaller scale, by touring his own province with a commission of Muslims and Christians.⁸¹

The Porte also, in some instances, followed the time-honored practice of sending out commissioners with extraordinary powers, often both civil and military, as trouble shooters to provinces affected by active discontent or genuine revolt. In this period, for example, Fuad Paşa went to Syria with extraordinary powers to deal with the Druze massacre of Maronites, and Cevdet was sent to Scutari (İşkodra, Shköder) to suppress a rebellion. The Syrian outbreak in particular showed how sensitive to provincial disturbances the Porte was: its concern was not only to get rid of the French military expedition to pacify Syria, which Fuad succeeded in doing, but also to fend off any resultant disorders in İstanbul which might shake the government. In August 1860 there was real fear in the capital, and the Porte forbade inhabitants to speak of Syria on the streets.⁸² The long-run result of such special missions was to encourage the further sending of regular inspectors. This system in its turn produced an increased central control over the provinces and a check on the wider powers accorded provincial governors by the ferman of 1852. It also gave the Porte greater familiarity with provincial conditions, provided the basis for sending out the capable Midhat Paşa to be governor of Nish in 1861, and laid the groundwork for the reform of provincial administration by the vilayet law of 1864. The Syrian disorders led to a special constitution for the Lebanon which also influenced the later vilayet law.⁸³



⁸¹ Hüseyin Hüsni Paşa in Salonika: *Journal de Constantinople*, 14 January 1861. On the inspection system in this period see: Mordtmann, *Stambul*, I, 170, and II, 10-11; Kanitz, *Donau-Bulgarien*, II, 111-112; *Journal de Constantinople*, 13 August 1864, giving the grand vezir's official report for 1863-1864; Karl Ritter von Sax, *Geschichte des Machtverfalls der Türkei*, 2nd ed. (Vienna, 1913), pp. 372-373; Abdurrahman Şeref, *Tarih musahabeleri*, pp. 223-224; Mardin, *Cevdet*, pp. 53-55 and n.85-87; Ali Ölmezöğlü, "Cevdet Paşa," *İslâm ansiklopedisi*, III, 116; A. H. Tanpınar, "Ahmed Vefik Paşa," *ibid.*, I, 208; Hill, *Cyprus*, IV, 229, where he reports a travesty on the inspection system; *Smyrna Mail*, 1 September and 1 October 1863.

⁸² Williams to Cass, #89, 7 August 1860, USNA, Turkey 16; Schaffler to Anderson, #9, 21 August 1860, ABCFM, Western Turkey Mission IV.

⁸³ See below, chapter V. Despite the vilayet law, both the special commissioner and the regular inspector were used again. See instructions for a new wave of inspectors in 1871, in *La Turquie*, 30 October and 27 December 1871. The investigation commission was also used at times as a delaying move to ward off foreign intervention or separatism: see Âli's proposals on such a commission in the Principalities in 1861: Riker, *Roumania*, p. 312.

In the midst of this chaotic period Sultan Abdülmecid died, on June 25, 1861. His passing seemed to be an unmixed blessing for the empire. His youthful enthusiasm for reform, exemplified by the backing he had given to Resid's projects, had waned. Palace expenditures had mounted steeply in his later years; Abdülmecid had spent lavishly for new palaces and other construction, and this contributed to his growing unpopularity with the public. But Abdülmecid had been a mild and humane sultan, who usually did not dominate his government. The significance of the change in monarchs would become apparent only when the character of Abdülaziz should become known. At the time of his accession, after an abortive move to bypass him for his nephew Murad, Abdülaziz was quite an unknown quantity. Both conservatives and reformers counted on him to strengthen their hands; if anything, the conservatives hoped for more from him, as it was generally rumored that he was an "Old Turk." Abdülaziz had passed his thirty-one years apart from the public gaze, although he had enjoyed more freedom in his confinement than any prince in two and a half centuries, having been allowed to marry and have a son even before his accession. His brother Abdülmecid had, however, been suspicious of him in the last few years, thought once of sending him away to Tripoli in Africa, and required him to live with his mother Pertevniyal. As sultan-mother, Pertevniyal was to have a strong influence on Abdülaziz; what this might portend was unknown. It was known only that Abdülaziz had had a simple Muslim education, was strong, handsome, and healthy in contrast to his brother, and loved wrestling and the chase.⁸⁴

⁸⁴ On the change in monarchs and on Abdülaziz in 1861 see Şehsuvaroğlu, *Sultan Aziz*, pp. 15-24; *Augsburger Allgemeine Zeitung*, 7 July 1861, Beilage; Melek Hanum, *Thirty Years*, pp. 265-268; Millingen, *La Turquie*, pp. 251-253, 262-263; Ubicini, *Turquie actuelle*, p. 136; A. D. Alderson, *The Structure of the Ottoman Dynasty* (Oxford, 1956), pp. 21, 35; A. H. Ongunsu, "Abdülaziz," *İslâm ansiklopedisi*, 1, 57-58; Count Greppi, "Souvenirs d'un diplomate italien à Constantinople," *Revue d'histoire diplomatique*, 24 (July 1910), 372, 379-383. The move to put Murad on the throne was apparently a bit of personal politics on the part of Rıza Paşa, enemy of Abdülaziz's brother-in-law Damad Mehmed Ali Paşa, but was generally thought to have French backing also: Mehmed Memduh, *Mirât-ı şumut*, p. 29; Anton Graf Prokesch-Osten, "Erinnerungen aus Konstantinopel," *Deutsche Rundschau*, IV (1880), 70-72; L. Raschdau, ed., "Diplomatenleben am Bosphorus," *Deutsche Rundschau*, 138 (1909), 386; Bamberg, *Geschichte*, p. 458; Brown to Seward, #8, 26 June 1861, USNA, Turkey 17. But the French ambassador of two years before, at the time of the Kuleli incident, had said that Abdülaziz should make a better sultan than the dissipated Murad: Thouvenel to Walewski, #65, 21 September 1859, AAE, Turkey 341. The author does not know what influence the reported Bektashi affiliations of Pertevniyal may have had: J. K. Birge, *The Bektashi Order of Dervishes* (London, 1937), p. 81.

REFORM AND CONSPIRACY, 1856-1861

Abdülaziz's accession *had* shed no particular light on his future course. It confirmed the reform decrees of 1839 and 1856, and stressed the equality of all Ottoman subjects, but seemed also to lay unusual emphasis on conformity with the holy law of Islam.⁸⁵ As it turned out, the new sultan was unable to make his full influence felt in the affairs of government for ten years after his accession, and his personal proclivities became decisively important only in 1871. This was so because at the very beginning of his reign Âli and Fuad secured their dominant position and maintained it for a decade. Although the conservative Kıbrıslı Mehmed had been confirmed in office as grand vezir by Abdülaziz on his accession, six weeks later Âli Paşa had the job. From August 6, 1861, until Âli died on September 6, 1871, either he or Fuad was grand vezir, with only two brief interludes which totalled thirteen months. During the same time span one or the other was foreign minister, with no interruptions at all. Though the duumvirate aroused bitter opposition among rival statesmen and in some segments of public opinion, it ruled. Abdülaziz ruled only when both were dead.⁸⁶

Abdülaziz had succeeded to the throne at a time when two crises threatened the empire. One was a rising of Christian peasants in the Herzegovina, which attracted the armed support of Montenegro in 1862. A successful military campaign under Ömer Paşa put a temporary end to these outbreaks, though it brought no solution to the fundamental problems involved. Even more serious than the Christian risings was the financial crisis of the Porte, which in 1861 became acute. The Ottoman ministers were gratified that Abdülaziz at once pledged economy in the palace, broke up Abdülmecid's large and expensive harem, and declared that he would be satisfied with one wife only. Yet these measures were insufficient. On December 11 there seemed

⁸⁵ Texts in *Das Staatsarchiv*, I (1861), 97-99; *Archives diplomatiques*, III (1861), 318-320; *Düstur*, I, 14-15; Ahmed Midhat, *Üss-i inkılâb*, I, 294-296.

⁸⁶ Grand vezirates in this period: Âli, 6 August-22 November 1861; Fuad, 22 November 1861-2 January 1863; Yusuf Kâmil, 5 January 1863-1 June 1863; Fuad, 1 June 1863-5 June 1866; Mütercim Mehmed Rüşdi, 5 June 1866-11 February 1867; Âli, 11 February 1867-6 September 1871. Foreign ministries: Fuad, 6 August 1861-22 November 1861; Âli, 22 November 1861-11 February 1867; Fuad, 11 February 1867-12 February 1869 (died); Âli (who now took the foreign ministry while keeping the grand vezirate), 12 February 1869-6 September 1871 (died). Âli was continuously in one of these two offices, without breaks. Fuad was more likely to fall out of the sultan's good graces and to vault back in; in addition to these two offices, he was for brief periods in early 1863 president of the Supreme Council and minister of war, and was out of office for eight months in 1866-1867.

to be danger of revolution in the capital. On that day the only circulatory medium in Istanbul, paper money known as the *kaime*, which was already heavily discounted in terms of gold, sank one hundred per cent in value on the Galata exchange. Merchants refused to accept it, business stood still, mobs formed, bakeries were sacked. Quick action by Fuad's government to support the *kaime* brought temporary relief. Revolt might otherwise have spread to the provinces, where the soldiers' pay was in arrears just as it had been at the time of the 1859 conspiracy.⁸⁷

The immediate origin of the crisis was clear: it stemmed from the unbalanced condition of the treasury, a want of confidence in the government's ability to repay heavy short-term advances by local Galata bankers, and a complete distrust of the paper money. This situation, in turn, was the product of the hopeless muddle of state finances coupled with general economic underdevelopment and an unfavorable balance of trade. The Crimean War had imposed a heavy burden on the treasury, which was increased thereafter by the expense of other military expeditions to rebellious provinces. Abdülmeçid's heavy spending was added to the deficit. Treasury receipts, on the other hand, were decimated by the graft of officials and tax farmers. That there was not more taxable land and produce was due in part to the generally backward condition of agriculture, of industry, and of means of communication and transport. It was due in part also to the fact that perhaps three fourths of the arable land of the empire had been transformed, legally or illegally, into *vakıf* property, which was partially tax-exempt and which often was not kept up or cultivated as adequately as it should have been. The state *evkaf* ministry, created by Mahmud II to supervise and administer the properties of the charitable endowments, was a drain on the treasury because the expenses of administration and upkeep usually ran ahead of receipts.⁸⁸ Customs revenues were low largely because trade treaties with the European nations imposed a uniform ad valorem import duty of five per cent, which the Porte could not unilaterally raise. To get revenue, then, it imposed on domestic products an export duty of twelve per cent. There was also an internal tariff on the transportation of goods

⁸⁷ Morris to Seward, unnumbered, 18 December 1861, USNA, Turkey 17.

⁸⁸ Fuad Köprülü, defending the institution of *vakıf*, points out that Fuad dipped into *evkaf* funds to rectify treasury deficits, and so helped further to undermine the institution and depreciate the properties: "L'institution du Vakouf," *Vakıflar dergisi*, 11 (1948), 32-33.

from place to place within the empire. Native industry was naturally discouraged by such practices. Bursa, under such conditions, was full of Bursa towels made in Manchester.⁸⁹

To offset the lack of sufficient revenue the Porte had resorted to three expedients. The first was the issue of the *kaime*, unnumbered so that the public could not know in what quantities, and of other sorts of interest-bearing paper which covered annual deficits. The second was short-term borrowing from local bankers. The third was borrowing in Europe—a method which the Crimean War had made possible and which by 1860 had resulted in four large loans.⁹⁰ All three methods proved ruinous. The paper money was issued in large quantities and was easy to counterfeit. The local rates in Galata were steep. When interest and amortization on the European loans were added, the annual service of the Ottoman public debt was such as to leave insufficient funds for the business of government. Therefore, further deficits were incurred. The European loan of 1860, moreover, had failed of complete subscription; this initiated the crisis that came to a head in 1861.

In the face of these difficulties, the grand vezir Fuad took over personal supervision of treasury affairs and submitted to Abdülaziz plans for retiring the *kaime*, cutting expenses, and increasing revenue. A permanent finance council which included an Austrian, a Frenchman, and an Englishman was established by the Porte. This council with great difficulty drew up a first budget for 1863-1864 and proposed changes in the tax system; the European members complained, however, of a lack of power. With aid from Britain and France the Porte finally succeeded in converting the Galata loans that fell due and in creating the Imperial Ottoman Bank, which was backed by some of the largest European financial houses. The founders of the bank negotiated for the Porte in 1862 a loan which was subscribed four times over and was used to retire the paper money, although holders received only forty per cent in specie and the remainder in government obligations. Public joy was reflected in a chronogram, the last line of which, with the numerical value of 1279 (A.D. 1862 corre-

⁸⁹ Hamlin, *Among the Turks*, p. 59. Ömer Cejel Sarç surveys the weakness of Ottoman industry in *Tanzimat*, I, 424-440.

⁹⁰ European loans had been considered just before the Crimean War, but vetoed by Abdülmeçid. Damad Fethi Paşa predicted: "If this state borrows five piasters it will sink. For if once a loan is taken, there will be no end to it. It [the state] will sink overwhelmed in debt." Cevdet, *Tezâkir*, p. 22, and Fatma Aliye, *Cevdet*, p. 87.

sponded to A. H. 1279), said "the name *kaiime* has been banished from the world." New commercial treaties which were negotiated in 1861 raised the import duty to eight per cent and provided for the gradual reduction of the export duty to one per cent.⁹¹

For the moment the credit of the empire was saved, and public confidence was restored. The fundamental difficulties, however, were not solved. Mustafa Fazıl Paşa,⁹² minister of finance in 1863-1864, found many obstacles in his path as he tried to work out a rational financial system. In the ensuing decade more internal and external debts were contracted, Abdülaziz's good intentions on economy vanished as his harem and his love of ironclad warships increased, corruption continued, and budgets were disregarded. Despite the fundamental weakness of the financial structure, to which Âli and Fuad contributed in so far as they satisfied various of the sultan's wishes in order to stay in office, no new acute crisis intervened until 1875. The Tanzimat ministers were thus able to give more attention to fundamental administrative reorganization, which had been in abeyance since 1856. Two projects, the reorganization of the non-Muslim millets and of the provincial administration, were already under consideration.

⁹¹ One gets the impression from many authors, both Turkish and western, that Ottoman history from 1856 to 1876 was nothing but one long crisis of provincial rebellion and financial catastrophe. Almost all Turkish memoirs of the period, and later accounts, include substantial sections, frequently in very general terms, on palace expenditures, corruption, and the European loans. For this period of financial crisis the most useful is A. Du Velay, *Essai sur l'histoire financière de la Turquie* (Paris, 1903), pp. 130-196 and 260-264. This work has recently been translated into Turkish as "Türkiye malî tarihi," *Maliye mecmuası*, #12 (1939) and following issues. Charles Morawitz, *Die Türkei im Spiegel ihrer Finanzen*, trans. by Georg Schweitzer (Berlin, 1903), pp. 20-44, and Grégoire Poulgy, *Les emprunts de l'état ottoman* (Paris, 1915), pp. 41-54, are sketchier and add little. Ahmed Rasim, *Istibdâdan hakimiyeti milliyeye*, II, 63-73, and Refii Şükrü Suvla in *Tanzimat*, I, 270-275, analyze the loans. Abdolonyme Ubcini, *Letters on Turkey*, trans. by Lady Easthope (London, 1856), I, 254-358, gives background on general economy. Cevdet, *Tezâkir*, pp. 20-23, and Fatma Aliye, *Cevdet*, pp. 84-87, are useful on this subject though relating to 1851-1852. Ali Fuad, *Rical-i mühimme*, pp. 72-74, deals with financial troubles in 1858-1859. On the *kaiime* see Şükrü Baban in *Tanzimat*, I, 246-257, and J. H. Mordtmann in *İslâm ansiklopedisi*, VI, 106-107. Documents on the 1860-1861 crisis from English, Turkish, and French sources are in *Das Staatsarchiv*, I (1861), 317-341. English reports are in Great Britain, *Parliamentary Papers*, 1861, vol. 67, *Accounts and Papers*, vol. 34, "Papers Relating to Administrative and Financial Reforms in Turkey, 1858-1861"; *ibid.*, 1862, vol. 64, *Accounts and Papers*, vol. 36, the report of the English commissioners; and *ibid.*, 1875, vol. 83, *Accounts and Papers*, vol. 42, "Turkey No. 1, 2, 3, 6," on the 1862 loan. Du Velay contains the essence of these. Chronogram in *Zeitschrift der Deutschen Morgenländischen Gesellschaft*, 17:3/4 (1863), 712.

⁹² On him see below, chapter VI.