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Three Waves of Late Ottoman Historiography, 1950-2007

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Since the middle of the twentieth century there have been three waves of historiography on the late Ottoman world. Each rose to prominence in a different global setting, functioned as a broad intellectual orientation, and was replaced by another somewhat less hegemonic theoretical current after about two decades. The key differences between the three episodes are evident in terms of their thematic priorities, analytical frameworks, and the research designs and methodological choices of scholars.[1] These three waves of Ottoman history writing can be classified as modernization approaches, macro models, and post-structural agendas.

Modernization approaches were influential in understanding top-down political change and state transformation in the late Ottoman context from the 1950s until the 1970s. They set the tone for and confirmed the preeminent position of political, intellectual, and diplomatic history in late Ottoman studies. Focusing on world economy, social class, and resistance, macro models directed Ottoman studies towards dependency and world-systems perspectives and introduced social and economic history to the field. Finally, post-structural agendas took over after the 1990s, substituting the state-centered and structural analysis of the previous waves with institutional and post-colonial analysis, and perhaps most importantly by local history studies.

This paper presents a comparative review of historiographical trends in late Ottoman studies, unpacking each wave with respect to key issues which have served as building blocks for constructing alternative narratives of late Ottoman history. These issues concern locating the macro-historical dynamic (causal mechanism), identifying the key event (turning point), registering the historical tendency (the process), and projecting the ultimate direction (trajectory) in late Ottoman history (Figure 1).

Four caveats are in order. First, I do not intend to evaluate the merits of each wave purely on a theoretical basis. Rather, I will focus on its reflection and application in Ottoman studies. Second, my analysis favors the common ground and/or representative works in each wave, and is neither all-inclusive nor oriented towards a single study. Third, the fact that each wave can be considered hegemonic at a given time does not necessarily mean that studies of the same genre stopped appearing afterwards or lost credibility in a dramatic fashion. Finally, there have always been synthetic works that might fall under more than one label, combining a variety of the approaches and agendas of late Ottoman history writing.[2]

	Modernization Approaches	Macro Models	Post-Structural Agendas
Causal Mechanism	West	World Economy	Imperial Consolidation
Turning Point	Tanzimat	Intro. of Foreign Trade	Negotiated Centralization
Process	Westernization	Economic Incorporation	Domestic Bargaining
Trajectory	Nation-State	Periphery	Indirect Rule

Figure 1: Three Waves of Late Ottoman Historiography, 1950-2007

The paper presents a thematic discussion in chronological order. I start with modernization approaches in the first section, continue with macro models in the second and finish with post-structural agendas in the third. The concluding remarks will sum up the state of the field and propose a regional trajectory framework to replace the dualistic narratives and state-centered imperial accounts of late Ottoman history.

Modernization Approaches

Modernization approaches dominated Ottoman studies after the institutionalization of area studies in post-war America. The two key events that provided the historical background for the rapid rise of the modernization school were the Cold War and decolonization. Both experiences confirmed the universality of the nation-state model and provided ideological impetus to the goal of repeating the experience of the West in the economic, political, and social fields. Similarly, social scientists working on political development and rural communities documented the momentous steps being taken towards national integration, reaffirming the belief that the Western nation-state framework was desirable and was working for the rest of the world. Historians of the Middle East followed suit.

The major impact of the post-war experience on the evaluation of the late Ottoman period was putting the Western experience at the center of the analysis. As Bernard Lewis aptly put it, the story of the Middle East and the Ottoman Empire should be told as the Western impact and the domestic response to it.[3] As such, the main historical dynamic that turned the Ottoman world upside down during the nineteenth century was the economically advanced, technologically superior, and culturally dominant Western world. Yet, unlike the earlier generation of diplomatic historians who were interested in chronicling wars and treaties as testimony to the political decline of the Ottoman Empire, modernization theorists viewed the West as a civilizational resource of universal value, one that could be emulated and drawn upon to arrest imperial collapse.

Taking the West as the causal element in their analyses, modernization authors demarcated late Ottoman history around key turning points which coincided with stages of top-down political transformation. Accordingly, the proclamation of the Tanzimat (1839) has become the most credited event in late Ottoman history.[4] By changing state-society relations, creating a western type of modern bureaucracy, building a new economic framework and strengthening cultural ties with the West, the Tanzimat is seen as the landmark event in the Ottoman embrace of western modernity. Earlier reform

efforts by Selim III and Mahmut II were also noted as key moments of change and expansion of the modernization ideal.[5]

The identification of a reformist thread produced a cyclical understanding of late Ottoman history which operated through a double movement. When the Ottoman state was moving towards progress and civilization at full speed, the undercurrent would be a reactionary backlash. Every major westernizing reform was to be followed by a conservative reaction. The first reformist, Selim III, was killed by a "mob" who opposed his new ways; the Tanzimat era was followed by the reign of absolutist Abdulhamid II; and the Second Constitutional period (1908-1918) was threatened by an Islamic upheaval in the capital city. Presenting late Ottoman history as a struggle between westernizing reformers and conservative forces, first wave authors fully subscribed to the agenda of the reformers.

That broad agenda of westernization/modernization was believed to be the most important historical process in late Ottoman history. Top-down, ever-expanding and bureaucratic in nature, various state-initiated reforms in higher education, the military, and the legal sphere were presented to make the case for the convergence of the imperial experience with the trajectory of the West. Consequently, the grand narrative of late Ottoman history turned into a list of steps toward achieving state-led modernity, giving disproportionate attention to the secularization of education, the modernization of bureaucracy, and the westernization of public life.[6]

Confusing legislation with implementation and state transformation with societal practice, the modernization school found a social actor to serve as the vanguard of westernization in Ottoman history. In keeping with the state-centered nature of the narrative, this was the burgeoning bureaucratic class. Graduating from modern schools, embodying western and statist ideals, and acquiring power through the army and civil bureaucracy, reformist intellectuals and army officers were considered to constitute a distinct class. Larger in number than their Iranian counterparts and enjoying greater access to state institutions than their Russian brethren, the Ottoman reformists were assigned the historic mission of saving the state from political collapse and transforming society via a top-down westernization project.[7]

With a state-centered bureaucratic agent in charge of political affairs, modernization historians were ready to announce that the ultimate trajectory of Ottoman and Turkish history was to reach the level of civilized western nations. This was the main historical outcome of interest. In fact, this is exactly why this type of history writing was not historical but rather theory-driven.[8] The main goal was to explain the successful modernization of the Turkish nation-state as an exemplary case by reconfiguring the Ottoman past. As such, late Ottoman history served an ideological purpose with no independent narrative of its own; that is, it provided a historically selective background for the 'emergence of modern Turkey.'[9]

Nonetheless, the first wave scholarship was fully aware that the westernization project of the bureaucratic class was not the only political agenda in late Ottoman history. Broadly put, there were local, urban, rural, religious and ethnic interest groups along with rival perspectives in both the palace and the Ottoman bureaucracy. The response of the modernization school to the multiplicity of oppositional voices was to lump them together as a unified reactionary force that

allegedly had the common goal of keeping the empire backwards and, perhaps more importantly, blocking the Ottoman path to modernization, progress and civilization. At this point, political opposition and cultural dissent acquired a regime-threatening and a trajectory-shifting character in the modernization discourse.[10]

Political opposition operated at two levels in the analysis. First, top-down reforms create resentment and alienation with the 'ignorant' masses and self-interested provincial elite.[11] Second, ideological rivalries divide the imperial elite in the capital, as reformists battle traditionalists. From the modernization standpoint, the worst case scenario was the confluence of these two forces, with mass mobilization and disunity among the elite destabilizing the state and threatening its westernizing trajectory. The best case scenario would be the elimination of the conservatives at the elite level and the existence of quiescent masses and a trouble-free periphery. Viewed from a broader perspective, then, the success of the first wave studies was to introduce intra-elite tension and center-periphery conflict as key elements of regime change and political crisis in the late Ottoman context, both of which were defined with reference to the scope of westernization.[12]

Overall, first wave modernization accounts provided us with a mono-causal explanation of political change in Ottoman history. Late Ottoman history came into motion with the Western impact and became a derivative story about the defensive modernization of the imperial state.[13] Periodization choices, state-centered analysis, the political agency of the bureaucracy, the discourse on progressives vs. reactionaries and the historical trajectory of becoming a modern western society were based on a selective and ideologically informed reading of Ottoman history. We were told over and over again that top-down modernization is the only successful project for political change and state formation in the Third World, reflecting the teleological vision and the universalizing bias of the modernization school.

Modernization approaches left out a huge portion of late Ottoman history. Even the key story of reforms which was at the heart of the modernization narrative was only covered via legislation attempts in Istanbul, leaving the larger question of state-society relations missing in the analysis. Preoccupied with high politics in the capital city, invested in the bureaucratic class as the agent of change and eager to explain the success of westernization and modernization, there was no room for a spatial perspective in the modernization analysis that could have captured the variety of imperial experiences. The major problem with this approach is that convergence around the modernization of the empire was assumed rather than documented.

Two other points are worth mentioning here, that will open the discussion to the macro models in late Ottoman historiography. The first concerns the content of modernization. By attaching modernization to westernization and Ottoman state practices, first wave authors presented a restricted version of Ottoman modernization during the nineteenth century. Not recognizing a public sphere outside the realm of the state, modernization views were silent about the ways in which social classes, families, religious communities, provincial elites, janissaries, ulema and peasants negotiated with modernity. Second, the impact of the West on the Ottoman experience was discussed primarily as a set of values and novel state practices, while the world economy remained at the sidelines of the modernization story. It is these challenges that the macro models would take as central to understanding the late Ottoman world.

Macro Models

Macro models entered Ottoman studies in a dramatically different global environment between 1970 and 1990. First and foremost, the fracturing of the modernization project in the Third World during the 1970s replaced the idea of progress with structurally generated economic backwardness. Around the same time, political struggles around economic redistribution and radical change were intensified across the globe as the less privileged challenged existing social, economic and international hierarchies via mass mobilizations. Finally, it became clear by the 1980s that the state-centered, elite-ruled, and isolationist developmental regimes had either collapsed or were on the wane throughout the developing world.

Dependency school, social history and world-systems perspectives reflected on these contemporary developments and built a strong intellectual base and a theoretical framework alternative to modernization approaches. Despite their differences of opinion on the historical outcomes – which will be made clear throughout the discussion – macro models agreed on capitalism as the causal story, viewed the introduction of foreign trade as the turning point, registered incorporation to the global economy as the major historical process, and presented peripheralization as the ultimate trajectory of late Ottoman history. All in all, macro models provided an economically-based, class-oriented analysis of the late Ottoman scene, attaching imperial processes to global structures of power and inequality.[14]

Global capitalism was the causal mechanism that transformed the Ottoman Empire during the nineteenth century. The Ottoman Empire had seen its provisioning system fall apart; its territories, subjects and state finances put on a bargain; and its economic options severely restricted by Great Power politics. Meanwhile, the capitalist expansion transformed space, social relations, and the economy, creating richer hinterlands, bigger port cities, and a strong merchant class organized around global commodity chains. The entry of capitalism onto Ottoman soil also meant social resistance and intense conflict over resources, worker/artisan rights and trade networks. Linking capitalism to loss of sovereignty, class formation, and bottom-up resistance, these dependency, world-systems and social history perspectives confirmed the constitutive role played by the world economy in the making of the late Ottoman scene.[15]

Macro models identified the Ottoman entry into the world economy as the critical turning point in late Ottoman history. The Dependency school blamed the Anglo-Ottoman free trade treaty (1838) for destroying domestic manufacturing and setting up an unfair trade regime, whereas the world-systems perspective emphasized the end of the Napoleonic wars in Europe (1815) as the start of the new trade framework, downplaying the impact of the treaty.[16] The installation of the Public Debt Administration (PDA) (1881) served as the second junction point in the narrative. Delegated to protect the interests of foreign creditors against a bankrupt Ottoman state, the PDA experience initiated the alliance between imperialism and finance capital, intensified class conflict between the bourgeoisie and the bureaucracy, and accelerated the political decline of the Ottoman state. The common ground in both situations was the decisive impact of global economic-financial structures and events on the broader Ottoman trajectory.

Macro models viewed the incorporation of the Ottoman Empire into the global economy as the main historical process of late Ottoman history. First and foremost, this concerned economic and financial integration developed through trade, investment, and loans. Foreign trade expanded more than ten fold throughout the century based primarily on the exchange of Ottoman agricultural products for British textiles.[17] Foreign direct investment, which was smaller in size when compared to Latin America but larger than compared to Asia, mostly went to infrastructure such as railroads to expand the volume of foreign trade. Loans from Europe came with high interest and commission rates, leading to foreign control over Ottoman finances in the long run. Macro models shared the conclusion that global capitalism exerted a disproportionate influence on the Ottoman economy. [18]

The second aspect of the incorporation narrative was modern class formation. Macro models concurred that the expansion of foreign trade created a new merchant class.[19] The domestic bourgeoisie had three main features: it was urban, non-Muslim and well-connected to the world economy. Despite the disagreements between dependency and world-systems schools over its economic position and political significance, the non-Muslim bourgeoisie thesis shared the idea of an ethnic division of labor between Muslim and non-Muslim communities.[20] Not fully satisfied with tying foreign trade to class formation, landholding became a complementary strategy in framing and analyzing Ottoman class structure. Most of the energy was then spent tracing regional applications of the Ottoman Land Code (1858) to determine the constitutive impact of agrarian relations on class inequalities and regional differences.[21]

Finally, macro models discussed economic restructuring and social resistance as a domestic response to economic incorporation. Disputing the economic decline thesis of the dependency school, second wave economic historians documented dependent development and market integration in the economy, arguing that Ottoman manufacturing survived the European onslaught and even became more competitive in some sectors at the height of the European expansion. The composition of the labor force, cheap import of raw materials, and local preferences in particular helped to secure a domestic manufacturing base.[22] Around the same time, influenced by bottom-up approaches, social historians placed workers and peasants at the center stage of late Ottoman history, describing their economic struggles and showing their decisive role in influencing major political outcomes on the Ottoman scene.[23]

The process of economic incorporation determined the long-term trajectory of the late Ottoman Empire. This was what dependency and world-systems perspectives respectively called colonization or peripheralization of the empire.[24] Despite the differences in theoretical language, there was agreement over the historical outcome. Out of global economic incorporation, a weak Ottoman state emerged. The Ottomans lost their sovereign status when dealing with the European states, gave in to the systemic logic of the global economy, and possessed only limited bargaining power vis-à-vis its own subjects during the nineteenth century. All of this was a consequence of the structural position that the Ottoman Empire occupied within the world economy, which was better than a peripheral/colonial spot, but hardly even a match for the semi-peripheral status of imperial Russia.

With waves of anti-imperialism and Third Worldism growing stronger during the 1970s, Turkish historiography was intellectually and politically ready to show the end of the drama: that European

economic domination and peripheralization of the Ottoman state was dismantled and reversed at the closing years of the Ottoman Empire by the Turkish revolution. Focusing on the war decade (1912-1922), dependency authors documented in detail how Turkish nationalist economic policies during World War One terminated European privileges in foreign trade and in the urban economy that had been secured through capitulations.[25] Favoring a vanguard agency explanation, the idea was to put economic independence inflected with anti-imperialism at the center of Turkish state formation.[26]

In sum, macro models operated through a conflict paradigm which viewed late Ottoman history as a site for two-fold struggle between the Ottoman Empire and the West on the one side, and the non-Muslim bourgeoisie and the Ottoman bureaucracy on the other. This reading was supported by an economy-centered, class-based approach that put the world economy at the heart of the analysis. As such, global capitalism acquired a revolutionary character in transforming late Ottoman history. Nonetheless, macro positions differed in interpretation: dependency approaches argued for economic decline and loss of sovereignty, while economic and social historians documented dependent development, economic restructuring and resistance to the global economy. Finally, the world-systems perspective traced the rise of an autonomous bourgeoisie in conflict with European traders and the Ottoman bureaucracy.[27]

The two major problems of macro models were their mono-causal and structural approaches. The former meant granting the world economy full authority to determine historical processes, turning points, and long term outcomes. The latter missed the opportunity to view social classes, economic incorporation, and class conflict as networked processes that need to be produced and remade. Finally, by restricting the debate to economy and class and distancing themselves from the state-centered agenda of modernization approaches, macro models overlooked a major Ottoman development. This was the often slow, always uneven, and largely negotiated process of imperial consolidation. By shifting the focus to state-society relations, it was the post-structural agendas that would raise up local voices from the distant imperial lands and bring the way Ottoman institutions interacted with them to the center of late Ottoman history writing.

Post-Structural Agendas

The rise of post-structural agendas in Ottoman history was influenced by global changes that took place after the 1990s. The most critical process in this regard was the decline of the nation-state framework. It shattered the top-down, elite-centered political regimes, made class politics less of a viable option with the collapse of the Soviet Union, and elevated domestic institutional practices to a central position in evaluating economic performance and good governance. Commodity flows, identity politics, and non-territorial networks that expanded dramatically with globalization further revealed the limits of the nation-state experience. Meanwhile, in conjunction with globalization and the demise of the nation-state framework, the Western-oriented modernization project lost its universal appeal, giving momentum to alternative cultural and regional trajectories in the rest of the world. The Middle East proved to be no exception.

Global developments had their influence on late Ottoman studies. As revisioning the impact of the West became more pronounced,[28] modernization approaches and macro models lost most of

their intellectual charm and were superseded by narratives that give active agency to the Ottoman state and to local actors in the making of the modern Middle East. Subsequently, Ottoman imperial consolidation emerged as the new intellectual vista in the field. Local history studies, institutional analyses, and post-colonial approaches have produced processual accounts which approach Ottoman state formation as a domestic negotiation between the Ottoman Empire and its imperial subjects. In line with this perspective, third wave historiography charged imperial consolidation with the primary role in reorganizing the Ottoman world during the nineteenth century, departing from earlier schools' emphasis on the West and the world economy.[29] Modern Ottoman state-formation had three main features: (1) administrative centralization that destroyed the unchallenged status of local notables via coercion; (2) political participation that guaranteed the survival of the Ottoman state and consolidated the local elite around bureaucratic posts; and (3) ideological hegemony that produced overarching imperial ideologies such as Ottomanism and pan-Islamism to win consent from the public. By documenting the multi-faceted nature of state-building, third wave research was able to account for the long term stability of the Ottoman regime, whose 'overdue survival' was attributed to Great Power rivalry and the rapid westernization of the Ottoman state.

The turning points of late Ottoman history reflect the negotiated character of imperial consolidation. The decentralized eighteenth century and the reign of Abdulhamid II (1876-1909) received credit in this regard for keeping ideological unity and extensive bargaining in place between the central state and the local elite.[30] The Tanzimat and Young Turks eras represented the other side of the coin where top-down reform, centralization, and Turkish nationalism reversed the path of negotiation and destroyed the center-periphery symbiosis. From a post-structural perspective, then, imperial legitimacy, political stability, and federative state formation ultimately collapsed when the Ottoman bureaucratic class with its modernist and orientalist ideology took over the political field and accelerated the fall of the empire.[31]

Viewing Ottoman state-building as a brokered operation, post-structural agendas stress domestic negotiation as the key historical process that characterized the late Ottoman period. Bargains between the Ottoman state and society were most effective in three areas: institution-building, resource-sharing and the diffusion of the state ideology. The local dynamic played a key role in Ottoman institutions by filling the bureaucratic spots and determining the degree of bureaucratic efficiency on the ground. Accordingly, while provincial interests controlled local bureaucratic sites, Ottoman capabilities in governance, judicial matters, land registration, and population censuses remained contingent upon the active cooperation of the local elite.

Third-wave literature also documented political bargains over economic resources. This occurred over taxation of agricultural production, rural and urban property, and poorly regulated commodity movements in the border provinces. Four patterns emerge from current research: first, the central state left a considerable amount of the surplus in the provinces; second, tax-farming was the main mechanism that tied local interests to the center; third, there was strong affinity between Ottoman centralization and the expansion of urban interests; and fourth, business partnerships materialized between the bureaucrats and the local elite.[32] The broader effort is then to go beyond state-society duality and center-periphery models, to examine the categories of the local elite and the state as networked interest groups.

The final negotiation between the Ottoman society and the state was over ideology. The novelty of third-wave research has been to classify Ottoman ideological currents based on their local reception rather than elitist and western credentials.[33] Formulated by Abdulhamid II to protect the territorial integrity of the empire, pan-Islamic Ottomanism took the center stage in the narrative because it was able to connect with the local elite and gain support from the wider public, especially in the Arab provinces.[34] A similar process of Ottomanization was noted for state-sponsored imperial education with its unifying Islamic content.[35] The current debate is now centered upon the Ottomanism of the Tanzimat, the Second Constitutional period, and the Committee of Union and Progress, which are considered by most to be top-down, ephemeral and (Turkish) nationalist respectively.[36]

Having discussed domestic bargaining and negotiation at every step of Ottoman state-building, post-structural agendas were in agreement over the ultimate trajectory of the late Ottoman period: indirect rule via intermediaries.[37] Fiscal and economic resources were shared between the center and the provinces; local administrative politics was dominated by the provincial elite; justice and education were still under the helm of communal forces; and even the Ottoman army in the frontiers recruited from and consisted largely of irregular forces. By focusing on the question of domestic rule and governance, this type of Ottoman history reading deviated from the observations of modernization approaches and macro models that respectively suggested bureaucratic restoration and peripheralization of the empire under the decisive impact of the West and the world economy.

In sum, the current success of the third-wave school has to do with shifting the intellectual focus to imperial state-building where interactive state-society relations stay at the center of the narrative. Negotiation and bargaining are documented through process-based analysis and a spatial approach. Post-structural agendas diverge from within: local history studies emphasize the local dynamic and negotiation, whereas institutional analyses point to the decline of the center-periphery symbiosis as the root cause for the fall of the Ottomans.[38] Post-colonialist scholars arguing from intellectual history and cultural studies positions, charge the Ottoman state with too much power at the center, and critically appraise its social Darwinist ideology, its religious orthodoxy, and its Turkish-dominated bureaucratic class, all of which symbolize a colonizing and homogenizing attitude towards minorities, local elites, and the frontiers.[39]

Third wave research has three major weaknesses. First, there is the issue of scale. Local history studies concentrated most of their energy on the local unit and underestimated the constitutive impact of the imperial and global factors. Second, current research emerging from post-colonialist positions equated the sociological imagination of the bureaucratic class with the reality on the ground, assuming an Ottoman state with instrumental rationality and extensive capabilities. And third, the institutional analysis credited tax-farming with positive social and political outcomes, failing to report its spatial and temporal limitations and overlooking its negative impact on state formation.

Concluding Remarks

Viewed from a long-term perspective, the state of the field is promising. Old-fashioned political history is increasingly dominated by post-colonial and institutional questions; social history gave its bottom-up approach and agency perspectives to local history; economic history leaned towards global comparisons; and the world-systems research became more process-oriented. Nevertheless,

key questions remain unresolved in the historiography, which blocks further progress in the late Ottoman field and Middle Eastern studies. I will identify two of the main problems here as I sum up the discussion below.

The most critical finding of this review is that late Ottoman studies have been dominated by mono-causal approaches and by "propensity accounts," which explain events as resulting from an individual actor's motivation or consciousness, or a collective or institutional actor's organization or need. While the former traced the constitutive impact of a single global dynamic over the Ottoman social formation, the latter emphasized the purposeful actions of the Ottoman state and the local elite. Accordingly, the division between structure and agency became the intellectual marker for different waves of Ottoman inquiry, separating modernization and macro models from third wave research. The other consequence of the paradigmatic divide has been to keep analytical dualities intact in the field. Hence, binary oppositions such as center vs. periphery, macro vs. micro, global vs. domestic, and structure vs. agency survived the changing historiographical trends in the literature.

By way of conclusion, I would argue that the analysis of regional trajectories may hold the promise of going beyond dualistic narratives and state-centered imperial accounts. We would do better with a framework that emphasizes spatial, institutional and comparative dynamics. Such an approach can allow us to capture intra-empire variation by tracing different routes to state-society and global-local relations. Accordingly, we can identify different Ottoman trajectories that represent distinct methods of rule, economic networks, demographic realities, religious ecologies, forms of legitimacy, and repertoires of contention.[40] Can the coastal, interior, and frontier paths accomplish this task and set new directions for the historiography of the late Ottoman Middle East?[41] It is a wonderful time to rethink our conventional models, integrate more firmly with global history debates, and benefit from fresh approaches in the social sciences and humanities.

End Notes

¹For a three-wave periodization of African historiography emphasizing political structure, economy, and culture respectively, see Frederick Cooper, "Decolonizing Situations: the Rise, Fall and Rise of Colonial Studies, 1951-2001," *French Politics, Culture and Society* vol. 20(2) (2002), pp. 47-76.

²Donald Quataert, *The Ottoman Empire, 1700-1922* Second Edition (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005); Erik Jan Zürcher, T*urkey: a Modern History*, Third Edition (London: I.B. Tauris, 2004); Feroz Ahmad, *Turkey: the Quest for Identity* (Oxford: Oneworld, 2003).

³Bernard Lewis, *What Went Wrong?: Western Impact and Middle Eastern Response* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002); Roderic H. Davison, *Essays in Ottoman and Turkish History, 1774-1923: the Impact of the West* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1990).

⁴Roderic H. Davison, *Reform in the Ottoman Empire, 1856-1876* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963).

⁵Stanford J. Shaw, *Between Old and New: the Ottoman Empire under Sultan Selim III, 1789-1807* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971).

⁶Stanford J. Shaw and Ezel K. Shaw, *History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey*, Vol. 2 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977); İlber Ortaylı, *İmparatorluğun En Uzun Yüzyılı* (Istanbul: Hil, 1983); Carter V. Findley, *Bureaucratic Reform in the Ottoman Empire*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980).

⁷Bernard Lewis, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey* (London: Oxford University Press, 1961).

⁸Charles Ragin, *The Comparative Method: Moving beyond Qualitative and Quantitative Strategies* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987).

⁹Geoffrey L. Lewis, *Turkey* (New York: Praeger, 1955); Richard D. Robinson, *The First Turkish Republic* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1963).

¹⁰Niyazi Berkes, *The Development of Secularism in Turkey* (Montréal: McGill University Press, 1964).

¹¹The resistance of provincial households to Tanzimat is argued by Moshe Ma'oz, *Ottoman Reform in Syria and Palestine, 1840-1861: the Impact of the Tanzimat on Politics and Society* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1968).

¹²For the classical statement on the subject, see Şerif Mardin, "Center-Periphery: a Key to Turkish Politics," *Deadalus* 102 (1973), 169-190.

¹³There are intellectual companions from imperial Russian and Chinese histories. Nicholas V. Riasanovsky, *A History of Russia* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1963); Jonathan D. Spence, *The Search for Modern China* (New York: Norton, 1990).

¹⁴For the best formulation, see Çağlar Keyder, *State and Class in Turkey: a Study in Capitalist Development* (London: Verso, 1987).

[15]Huri İslamoğlu-İnan (ed.), *The Ottoman Empire and the World-Economy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987).

[16]The two positions are respectively in Orhan Kurmuş, *Emperyalizmin Türkiye'ye Girişi* (Istanbul: Bilim Yayınları, 1974) and *New Perspectives on Turkey*, "The 1838 Convention and Its Impact," Special Issue No. 7 (Spring 1992).

[17]Nonetheless, the Ottoman route to world economic integration was distinct because of scarcity of agricultural labor, the strength of middle peasantry and the political independence of the Ottoman Empire. Şevket Pamuk, *The Ottoman Empire and European Capitalism, 1820-1913: Trade, Investment and Production* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987).

[18]Roger Owen, *The Middle East in the World Economy 1800-1914* (London: Methuen, 1981).

[19]The rise of non-Muslim merchants in Western Anatolia is well-documented in the field. Reşat Kasaba, *The Ottoman Empire and the World Economy – The Nineteenth Century* (Albany: SUNY Press, 1988); Elena Frangakis-Syrett, "The Economic Activities of the Greek Community of Izmir in the Second Half of the Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Centuries," Dimitri Gondicas and Charles Issawi (eds.) *Ottoman Greeks in the Age of Nationalism* (Princeton, NJ: The Darwin Press, 1999), 17-44.

[20]For the ethnic division of labor idea and its positive impact on the non-Muslim communities of the Middle East, see Charles Issawi, "Introduction," Dimitri Gondicas & Charles Issawi (eds.) *Ottoman Greeks in the Age of Nationalism* (Princeton, NJ: The Darwin Press, 1999), 1-16; A. J. Sussnitzki, "Zur Gliederung Wirtschaftslicher Arbeit nach Nationalitaten in der Türkei," Charles Issawi (ed.) *The Economic History of the Middle East 1800-1914* (Chicago & London: The University of Chicago Press, 1966), 114-125. This reading of economic entrepreneurship was based on a supply-side approach which credited cultural traits and yet omitted a demand-side perspective which can explain the rise of a non-Muslim merchant class based on institutional and ecological factors. For a theoretical introduction to the debate, see Patricia H. Thornton, "The Sociology of Entrepreneurship," *Annual Review of Sociology*, Vol. 25 (1999), pp. 19-46.

[21]Landholding patterns shaped power relations at the local level, created long-term political consequences and yet played a limited role on the early wave of incorporation of the Ottoman Empire to the world economy. Haim Gerber, *Social Origins of the Modern Middle East* (Boulder, CO: L. Rienner, 1987); Çağlar Keyder and Faruk Tabak (eds.) *Landholding and Commercial Agriculture in the Middle East* (New York: SUNY Press, 1991); Roger Owen (ed.) *New Perspectives on Property and Land on the Middle East* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2000); Tarif Khalidi (ed.) *Land Tenure and Social Transformation in the Middle East* (Beirut: AUB, 1984).

[22]This thesis has been fully developed and documented for Anatolia by Quataert during the 1990s, see Donald Quataert, "The Age of Reforms, 1812-1914," Halil İnalcık and Donald Quataert (eds.) An Economic and Social History of the Ottoman Empire Vol. 2 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 761-943.

[23]The resistance of peasants in the countryside, worker struggles in the cities and the political alliances between Young Turks and urban guilds are discussed in Donald Quataert, *Social Disintegration*

and Popular Resistance in the Ottoman Empire, 1881-1908: Reactions to European Economic Penetration (New York: NYU Press, 1983); Donald Quataert and Erik Jan Zürcher (eds.) *Workers and the Working Class in the Ottoman Empire and the Turkish Republic, 1839-1950* (London: Tauris, 1995).

[24]For a theoretical statement about the earlier origins of Ottoman incorporation, see Reşat Kasaba and Immanuel Wallerstein, "Incorporation into the World-Economy: Change in the Structure of the Ottoman Empire, 1750-1839," (Binghamton: Fernand Braudel Center, 1980).

[25]On the economic vision and policies of Young Turks, see Zafer Toprak, *Türkiye'de Milli iktisat, 1908-1918* (Ankara: Yurt Yayınları, 1982). Also, see the wonderful collection of essays by Ökçün that explores the making of the national economy during the war decade at the local level, A. Gündüz Ökçün, *İktisat Tarihi Yazıları* (Ankara: Sermaye Piyasası Kurulu, 1997).

[26]Feroz Ahmad, "Vanguard of a Nascent Bourgeoisie: the Social and Economic Policy of the Young Turks," Osman Okyar and Halil İnalcık (eds.) *Social and Economic History of Turkey* (Ankara: Meteksan, 1980), 329-350.

[27] Çağlar Keyder, "Bureaucracy and Bourgeoisie: Reform and Revolution in the Age of Imperialism," *Review* 11 (2) (1988), 151-165; Çağlar Keyder, "The Ottoman Empire," Karen Barkey and Mark von Hagen (eds.) *After Empire – Multiethnic Societies and Nation-Building* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1997), 30-44.

[28]Kenneth Pomeranz, *The Great Divergence: Europe, China and the Making of the Modern World Economy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000); Roy B. Wong, *China Transformed and the Limits of European Experience* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1997); Jack A. Goldstone, "Whose Measure of Reality," *American Historical Review*, Vol. 105 (2) (2000), 501-508.

[29]Strong social ties between the imperial center and the provinces are confirmed in this literature. Hasan Kayalı, *Arabs and Young Turks- Ottomanism, Arabism and Islamism in the Ottoman Empire, 1908-1918* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997); Jens Hanssen, *Fin de Siécle Beirut: the Making of an Ottoman Provincial Capital* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2005); Frederick F. Anscombe, *The Ottoman Gulf: the Creation of Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and Qatar* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1997); Gökhan Çetinsaya, "The Caliph and the Shaykhs: Abdülhamid II's Policy towards the Qaditiyya of Mosul," Itzchak Weismann and Fruma Zachs (eds.) *Ottoman Reform and Muslim Regeneration* (London, New York: I.B. Tauris, 2005), 97-107; Dina Rizk Khoury, *State and Provincial Society in the Ottoman Empire: Mosul, 1540-1834* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997); Keith David Watenpaugh, *Being Modern in the Middle East* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006).

[30] For the centrality of tax-farming, see Ariel Salzmann, *Tocqueville in the Ottoman Empire: Rival Paths to the Modern State* (Leiden: Brill, 2004). Center-periphery symbiosis is well-articulated in Rifaat Ali Abou-El-Haj, *Formation of the Modern State – The Ottoman Empire, Sixteenth to Eighteenth Centuries*, Second Edition (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 2005).

[31]Makdisi directs attention to the domestic aspect of the Ottoman modernization project where the sociological imagination of the Ottoman bureaucratic class produced a backward east which

increasingly coincided with distinct religious (non-orthodox Islam), ethnic (Arab) and spatial (Western Asia) identities. Ussama Makdisi, "Ottoman Orientalism," *American Historical Review* 107 (3) (2002), 768-796; for the widening mental gap between the bureaucratic class and imperial subjects, see also Selim Deringil, "'They Live in a State of Nomadism and Savagery': the Late Ottoman Empire and the Post-Colonial Debate," *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 45 (2) (2003), 311-342.

[32]The resilience and pragmatic nature of local economic actors are described in various contexts. Eugene L. Rogan, *Frontiers of the State in Late Ottoman Empire: Transjordan 1850-1921* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999); Sarah Shields, *Mosul before Iraq: Like Bees Making Five-Sided Cells* (Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 2000); Hala Fattah, *The Politics of Regional Trade in Iraq, Arabia and the Gulf, 1745-1900* (Albany, NY:SUNY Press, 1997); Isa Blumi, "Thwarting the Ottoman Empire: Smuggling through the Empire's New Frontiers in Yemen and Albania, 1878-1910," *International Journal of Turkish Studies* 9 (1) (2003), 255-274.

[33]The idea here is to see imperial ideology as a new layer of inclusive social identity which in most cases did not contradict with local, ethnic and religious affiliations of the social actors involved. This dimension of late Ottoman rule and its demise during the early Turkish Republic has been captured in two recent articles, Reşat Kasaba, "Dreams of Empire, Dreams of Nations," Joseph W. Esherick, Hasan Kayalı, Eric Van Young (eds.) *Empire to Nation – Historical Perspectives om the Making of the Modern World* (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2006), 198-225; Faruk Birtek, "Greek Bull in the China Shop of Ottoman 'Grand Illusion': Greece in the Making of Modern Turkey," Faruk Birtek and Thanos Dragonas (eds.) *Citizenship and the Nation-State in Greece and Turkey* (London: Routledge, 2005), 37-48.

[34]On Hamidian vision and its success on the cultural realm, see Selim Deringil, *The Well-Protected Domains: Ideology and Legitimation of Power in the Ottoman Empire, 1876-1909* (London & New York: I.B. Tauris, 1998); Stefan Weber, "Images of Imagined World," Jens Hanssen, Thomas Philipp and Stefan Weber (eds.) *The Empire in the City- Arab Provincial Capitals in the Late Ottoman Empire* (Beirut: Orient Institute, 2002), 145-171.

[35]Eugene L. Rogan, "The Political Significance of an Ottoman Education: Maktab 'Anbar Revisited", Thomas Philipp and Christoph Schumann (eds.) *From the Syrian Land to the States of Syria and Lebanon* (Beirut: Orient Institute, 2004), 77-94; Benjamin C. Fortna, *Imperial Classroom: Islam, Education and the State in the Late Ottoman Empire* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002); Ruth Roded, "Social Patterns among the Urban Elite of Syria during the Late Ottoman Period, 1876-1918", David Kushner (ed.) *Palestine in the Late Ottoman Period* (Leiden: E.J. Brill,1986), 146-171.

[36]The last point will be critical to assess the rise of Muslim nationalisms in the Middle East and the Balkans in the early twentieth century. For the history and actors of Kurdish, Arab and Albanian nationalisms, see Hakan Özoğlu, *Kurdish Notables and the Ottoman State: Evolving Identities, Competing Loyalties and Shifting Boundaries* (Albany: SUNY Press, 2004); Rashid Khalidi (ed.), *The Origins of Arab Nationalism* (New York: Columbia, 1991); George Walter Gawrych, *The Crescent and the Eagle: Ottoman Rule, Islam and the Albanians* (London: I.B. Tauris, 2006).

[37]The power of local agents is well-documented for the Arab provinces. See Beshara Doumani, *Rediscovering Palestine: Merchants and Peasants in Jabal Nablus, 1700-1900* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995); James A. Reilly, *A Small Town in Syria: Ottoman Hama in the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries* (Oxford, New York: P. Lang, 2002); Mahmoud Yazbak, *Haifa in the Late Ottoman Period, 1864-1914: A Muslim Town in Transition* (Leiden: Brill, 1998). Also see the classic work of Khoury on Damascus. Philip S. Khoury, *Urban Notables and Arab Nationalism: the Politics of Damascus, 1860-1920* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983).

[38]Ariel Salzmann, "An Ancien Régime Revisited: "Privatization" and Political Economy in Eighteenth Century Ottoman Empire," *Politics & Society* 21 (1993), 393-423; Karen Barkey, "A Perspective on Ottoman Decline," Jonathan Friedman and Christopher Chase-Dunn (eds.) *Hegemonic Decline: Present and Past* (Boulder, CO: Paradigm, 2005), 135-151.

[39]For the early nationalist, elite-centered and colonial visions of Young Turks, see respectively M. Şükrü Hanioğlu, "Turkism and the Young Turks," Hans-Lukas Kieser (ed.) *Turkey beyond Nationalism: towards Post-Nationalist Identities* (London: I.B. Tauris, 2006), 3-19; Renee Worringer, ""Sick Man of Europe or Japan of the Near East"?: Constructing Ottoman Modernity in the Hamidan and Young Turk Eras," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 36 (2) (2004), 207-230; Thomas Kühn, "An Imperial Borderland as Colony: Knowledge Production and the Elaboration of Difference in Ottoman Yemen, 1872-1918," *The MIT Electronic Journal of Middle East Studies* Vol. 3 (Spring 2003), 5-17; for a contrasting view that approaches Young Turks as a middle class movement that cut across ethnic and religious lines, see Aykut Kansu, *The Revolution of 1908 in Turkey* (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1997); Aykut Kansu, *Politics in Post-Revolutionary Turkey, 1908-1913* (Leiden: Brill, 2000).

[40]This is a path-dependent institutional argument. On the idea of path-dependency, see Paul Pierson, "Increasing Returns, Path-Dependence, and the Study of Politics," *The American Political Science Review* Vol. 94(2) (2000), pp. 251-267. For the application of the path-dependency idea to politics and history, see James Mahoney, *Legacies of Liberalism: Path Dependence and Political Regimes in Central America* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2001); Thomas Ertman, *The Birth of the Leviathan: Building States and Regimes in Medieval and Early Modern Europe* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997).

[41]Cem Emrence, *The Great Divergence in the Ottoman Middle East, 1820-1908* (Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, Department of Sociology, SUNY-Binghamton, 2008).