

CHAPTER 2

STATE- AND NATION-BUILDING IN EUROPE: THE ROLE OF THE MILITARY

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Terminology

Just as there are four chief divisions of the mass of the population—farmers, mechanics, shopkeepers and day-labourers—so there are four kinds of military forces—cavalry, heavy infantry, light armed troops, and the navy. Where the territory is suitable for the use of cavalry, there is favourable ground for the construction of a strong form of oligarchy: the inhabitants of such a territory need a cavalry force for security, and it is only men of large means who can afford to breed and keep horses. Where territory is suitable for the use of heavy infantry, the next and less exclusive form of oligarchy is natural: service in the heavy infantry is a matter for the well-to-do rather than for the poor. Light armed troops, and the navy are wholly on the side of democracy; and in our days—with light armed troops and naval forces as large as they are—the oligarchical side is generally worsted in any civil dispute . . . (Barker 1946: 271; cf. also 160, 188).

Here Aristotle is linking three variables: social stratification, style-of-rule, and what I shall be calling the *format* of the military forces. The number of variables involved is, in fact, more numerous than this; for instance, the format of the military is determined by technological advances as well as by terrain, and technology takes us into the sphere of the economy as a whole. Above all, the quotation suggests a static relationship between format and the three styles-of-rule. Now one of my objects is to discover what relationship existed between the development of the modern state and the military format. This posits a relationship between two *processes*—the development of the modern state on the one side, the development of military formats on the other.

I must, therefore, say what I mean by a modern state as contrasted

with any other, and presumably, premodern forms; and say something more about this concept of *format*, on the other.

The literature suggests that the term—a “modern” state—can mean rather different things to different authors. Lord Lindsay, for instance, when he writes of *The Modern Democratic State* (Lindsay 1943) appears to be making an implicit distinction between this and the states of classical antiquity. German authors, followed by such scholars as Ernest Barker (Barker 1951: 1–17), evolved however a complex classification of states: the so-called *Ständestaat* of medieval times, then the *Fürstenstaat*, or the Princes’ State of the Renaissance, then the *Hausstaat*, or Dynastic State, and so forth. In this view, a “modern” state is that which emerged after the medieval ones. Meanwhile classical concepts of “the state” such as Weber’s are of little help for this inquiry which is *genetic*. For instance, in Weber’s famous definition, that states are “human associations that successfully claim the monopoly of legitimate use of physical force within a given territory,” every single key word begs the historical question of when, at what particular date, the “state” can be said to have emerged. The degree of success achieved by a government in claiming the legitimate use of physical force; the completeness of its monopoly of this, the assurance of its legitimacy, and the extent of its territorial jurisdiction—every one of these fluctuated during the last millennium, and every one admitted and still admits of *degrees*. And so it becomes almost an arbitrary matter to say, “At this date, the area once known as *Regnum Francorum* can be regarded as a state.”

I propose to regard the modern European states as those that emerged subsequent to the break up of the Roman polity; hence to regard a medieval kingdom as a form of state and to regard the process of state-building as something that took place between an origin in the early Middle Ages and today. In that case, our contemporary states have, since their amorphous beginnings a thousand years ago, acquired five salient characteristics.

1. Like all states by definition, they are *territorially* defined populations each recognizing a common paramount organ of government.

2. This paramount organ of government is subserved by specialized personnel; one, the *civil* service, to carry out decisions, the other—the *military* service to back these by force where necessary

and to protect the association from other similarly constituted associations.

3. This state, so defined and characterized, is recognized by other similarly constituted states as independent in its action upon its territorially defined population, i.e., its subjects. This recognition constitutes its international "sovereignty."

4. Ideally at least, but to a large extent in practice also, the population of a state forms a community of feeling—a *Gemeinschaft*—based on self-consciousness of a common *nationality*.

5. Ideally at least and again to a large extent in practice, the population forms a community in the sense that its members mutually distribute and share duties and benefits.

The medieval forerunners of contemporary Britain, France, Germany, and the like, possessed few or none of these characteristics. But somewhere along the line of the second millennium A.D. each acquired them to an extent which would permit us to assign to them a recognizably *contemporary* form. But here it is desirable to distinguish between the first three and the last two of this set of five characteristics. Albeit in England and, somewhat later, in France the last two characteristics were slowly acquired even in the later Middle Ages, for the most part they are markedly later phenomena, developing fast and far only in the late eighteenth and in the nineteenth centuries. These last two characteristics are the ones typically associated with *nation*-building, whereas the first three are characteristic of *state*-building.

As can be inferred from the first and second characteristics, state-building proper involves two major variables: *territoriality* and *function*. (Item 3 is a derivative from these two.) In both these respects the medieval state is antipodal to the contemporary one. The present territorial entity known as France was in the tenth century a congeries of what at the highest we may style as minor and primitive states, or at the lowest, a welter of competing jurisdictions. Furthermore, whereas today political obedience is a simple function of territorial location in that one owes allegiance to the government of the territory in which one finds oneself, at that time political allegiance was a man-to-man relationship, and obedience might be due, in different circumstances, to several overlords. Nor was there any likelihood that these different claims upon the same individual might not compete. Often, where these lords were in dispute, the

vassal had to make up his own mind as to where his allegiance lay. By the same arrangement of lordship and vassalage what today we call public and private functions were at that time compounded together. As Mosca puts it (Mosca 1939: 81), "by 'feudal state' we mean that type of political organization in which all the executive functions of society—the economic, the judicial, the administrative, the military—are exercised simultaneously by the same individuals, while at the same time the state is made up of small social aggregates each of which possesses all the organs that are required for self sufficiency." A medieval state as compared with a contemporary one, was fragmented into many hands, and it was crisscrossed with overlapping and sometimes conflicting feudal and subfeudal obligations and pockmarked with "liberties" and "immunities." So *territorially*, the medieval state was *differentiated*. By contrast the public and the private *functions* were *consolidated* in one and the same office or individual.

In contrast the contemporary state consists of formerly differentiated territories which have been brought together and whose populations have become *consolidated* under the same common organ of rule—be it prince, or dictator, or parliament. At the same time a distinction has long been drawn between public and private rights and duties, and by that token, between public officers and private individuals. In brief, public and private services have become differentiated, as shown in Figure 2-1.

<i>TERRITORIALLY</i>		<i>FUNCTIONALLY</i>
<i>MEDIAEVAL</i>	DIFFERENTIATED	CONSOLIDATED
<i>CONTEMPORARY</i>	CONSOLIDATED	DIFFERENTIATED

Figure 2-1. Development of the Contemporary State.

The twin process—from consolidated service to differentiated service and from differentiated territory to consolidated territory—is what constitutes *the development of the modern state*.

Not quite the whole of it, however. For if all contemporary states tend to resemble one another in these two major respects, they may differ from one another in their respective *styles-of-rule*. A contemporary state may be autocratic or representative; it may be centralized or decentralized; its laws may be homonomous or heter-

onomous, i.e., divaricated according to areas or to functions within the state. Now whereas the twin movement of state-building—from consolidated to differentiated functions, and from differentiation of territory to its consolidation—whereas this twin movement has been on the whole regular, *linear*, and cumulative over the last thousand years, the styles-of-rule have fluctuated.

Nation-building is not the same as state-building. The two have both historical and logical connections. Populations which have been consolidated under a common organ of government may thereby be assisted in attaining the common consciousness (no matter the sentiments or facts on which this is founded), that is the precondition of being a “nation.” In return, where such common sentiments or facts of life are self-consciously felt by a population, this may be impelled thereby to seek its own individual political organization, i.e., to make its sense of community and its sense of political allegiance coincide. The literature shows that like the “state” concept, the concept of “nation” has been variously interpreted and two common approaches are often used without distinguishing between them. Yet although they are both historically and logically connected, they are distinct. For some, the sense of nationhood is popular participation in matters affecting the whole population on the one side, and on the other, an identity of benefits received from this association. It is in this sense that the Abbé Sieyès defined the nation as being “A body of associates living under *common* laws and represented by the same legislative assembly.” (The emphases are the ones supplied by the Abbé himself—not by me.) This notion contrasts with what some German authors have called the so-called *Ständestaat* or the later “proprietary-territorial state” where the state as such was the “property” not of all, but of its unequal orders (in the former instance) or the prince and his court (in the latter). Here the concept of *nation-state* is the concept of a state of “*all* the state’s population, of the whole *nation*, in the name of natural rights and popular sovereignty.” On the other hand, a nation can and has been defined as a population conscious of its common *nationality*—Englishness, Germanness, and the like. The two concepts—citizenship with its implication of reciprocal rights and duties among the whole body of the associates, or nationality in the sense of a community of *ethnos* and a sense of shared destiny—are mutually compatible and also self-supportive. Furthermore, insofar as the one embodies the notion of the sovereignty of the people and the other, the notion of the par-

ticularity of that people among other peoples, the two notions link up both logically and in historical experience with the great principles of the French Revolution. "Equality" of rights in the common association went hand in hand with "fraternity"—brotherhood in the sense that all were equal parts of the same (and distinctive) human family.

In either meaning, the root condition is *community*. Again in either meaning, nation-building began earlier in England than it did in France, and in France earlier than it did among the scattered territories of the Hohenzollern dynasty into whose hand fate and conubial blisses had by 1618 delivered variegated strips of German-speaking territory which later were to be consolidated and to be known as Brandenburg-Prussia and later, just Prussia. For most of the European continent, the phase of nation-building took its great leap forward with the French Revolution and progressed outward from that focus until today when its immense potentialities for nation-building and, by the same token, for state-splitting have reached outward to encompass hitherto little-known peoples of brown, black, and yellow skins, throughout the former imperial territories of the European great powers.

Let me turn now to the other key concept—that of military *format*. It is to the changes in this format that I shall seek to relate changes in the nature of the state.

The role of the military in the state- and nation-building process is not to be taken as identical with the role of coercion. If it were, we should be engaged in an endless and highly subjective enterprise, for we should be trying to establish what role coercion played as against the other factors—commercial, ethnic, linguistic, legal, cultural, and so forth—that have gone into the making of states. Only minds like those of Marx and Engels, obsessively concerned with conflict could so continuously harp upon the role of armed force as the sole force creating and maintaining the state.

Nor is the role of the military in state- and nation-building to be equated with the role of *warfare*. Warfare would at once embrace too much and too little. War embraces elements with which I do not propose to deal—diplomacy, international relations, the effects of foreign occupation, the tolls of pestilence and famine, and the like. Obviously, the format of the armed forces and the resources they require from their host community will significantly alter if they are at war, and this will be an object of my concern. But it will be the in-

fluence of armed forces in time of war and not war itself with which I shall be concerned. Likewise the equation of the role of the military on state- and nation-building with the role of war would be too narrow; the military format has a domestic role in time of peace.

My purpose is to follow Aristotle and inquire into the relationship between the development of modern states and nations and what I have called the *format* of the armed forces. In its narrow and most explicit definition, format merely signifies the service basis of the forces; i.e., whether they were native or foreign, paid or unpaid, *ad hoc* or permanent. In its more extended definition, I include within the concept, the *size* of the armed forces, the varying composition of its main arms (navy against land forces or artillery components against infantry or cavalry and the like), and I equally include the social stratification of the force. Where necessary, I shall indicate in the text whether I am using the more or the less extended definition of format. On the whole, however, the context will make it clear.

Just as the state has evolved through time, so have the military formats. At any fixed point of time, both have exerted a reciprocal influence on each other. To ascertain the nature of this influence is the object of this essay.

Methodology

This relationship between military format and state-building involves a host of intervening variables as coextensive as the entire field of history itself; which is to say, as coextensive as what Marx very justly defined as "the study of society in motion." At various points of time, we find that we have to explain or understand a development in either of our two key variables by such matters as social stratification, or the condition of the economy, of popular or elite beliefs, or of the role of the ruler (i.e., his ambitions, and his perceptions of risk and opportunity at home as well as abroad).

Some of these variables are more prominent or occur more frequently than others. Additionally some tend to cohere in characteristic clusters, or to speak more precisely, in cycles of mutual interaction. These clusters themselves interact with other characteristic clusters. It will save an infinity of time to identify and then name such clusters, and, in particular, six of the most prominent.

This procedure will not in itself *explain* the data. To put it at its lowest, it will prove a convenient shorthand, where the name of each cluster will resemble a Wagnerian *leit-motiv*, signifying, according

to its nature, the entire history of the Volsung family, for instance, or the birth and death of Siegfried. It should prove capable of something more than this though: each "cycle" is, in fact, a *paradigm*, just as the interrelations of these paradigms in Figure 2-2 are a master-paradigm. The paradigm, Etzioni says,

is more than a perspective but less than a theory. It provides a set of interrelated questions, but no account of validated propositions. It provides a "language," a net of variables, but it does not specify the relationships among those variables. It is less vague than a perspective, providing a systematic, specific, and often logically exhaustive set of foci for research and speculation. A paradigm is often a stage on the way from an old perspective to a new theory. . . . The test of a paradigm is not only that of the validity of the theories constructed through their application, but also its fruitfulness in terms of the spectrum of significant problems whose study is facilitated by it (Etzioni, 1965: 2).

ECONOMY-TECHNOLOGY-FORMAT CYCLE
(BRIEFLY: ECONOMY-TECHNOLOGY CYCLE)




Figure 2-2. The Economy-Technology-Format Cycle

In terms of this "cycle," one can rapidly describe the various factors responsible, for instance, for the introduction of shock-infantry into Europe and the decline of shock-cavalry. The Swiss pike-phalanx outdid the heavy armored shock-cavalry in the course of the fifteenth century. How and why? The French socioeconomic basis was a highly monetized, relatively wealthy, technologically competent society with a large population of at least fifteen million people. Its social stratification was highly unequal as between a warlike and politically and economically privileged class of nobles, and the commoners. These two factors were reflected in the military format

one of whose main components was still circa 1415 (Agincourt) the heavy armored cavalry first introduced in Frankish times. When one reflects that mail armor alone weighed thirty pounds and cost the equivalent of a small farm, and that plate armor weighed some one hundred thirty pounds and was correspondingly more expensive, that a knight required one or two esquires to equip and support him, and mounts for them as well as a charger and possibly a remount for himself, one can see that only a society similar to that of France could have thrown up and supported such a force. It would be like expecting private individuals nowadays to help form the army by bringing to the battlefield their own Centurion or Patton tank, or their own Phantom plane. Switzerland in all these respects was entirely different. It was a league of, for the most part, poverty-stricken rural mountain cantons, much overpopulated, with a prefeudal social structure of free and egalitarian peasants. The terrain made horses and armor an encumbrance rather than the reverse and in any case few if any individuals would have been wealthy enough to support them. Hence these peasants fought with typically peasant weapons—evolvments from the well-known bill: first the halberd, then, in order to keep the enemy Austrian cavalry still further off, longer pikes with four-foot steel heads. The pikes finally reached the length of eighteen feet. At the same time a special tactic of handling these had to be developed, if they were to be effective: the ranks had to be close so as to admit no charging horses into its gaps. So evolved the typical Swiss phalanx—cheap and plebeian—a square of six thousand men which could form a hedgehog against attacking cavalry and which, faced with enemy infantry, could actually *charge* it with all their impetus and weight of six thousand men. This format proved decisive over the heavy feudal cavalry at Grandison and Muret. Henceforth infantry, armed with pike and bow and then pike and shot, became the linchpin of any military force.

THE STRATIFICATION-FORMAT CYCLE
(BRIEFLY: STRATIFICATION CYCLE)

This cycle and its interrelationships can also be illustrated by Figure 2-2, on which it, too, is located. Moreover, the former example of the Swiss infantry can also serve here. That example makes clear the influence upon the typically Swiss format of the egalitarian structure of its society: an egalitarian social structure, hence an egalitarian military format—even to the point of the Swiss electing their

commanders. French social stratification not only perpetuated beyond its useful span the employment of heavy armored shock-cavalry (just as the aristocratic cult of *ye horse* mingled horse cavalry with the tanks in the "Surprise at Cambrai" in 1917); it also made the French cavalry refuse to fraternize with the commoners in their army, whether spearmen or crossbowmen. At Crécy the king of France's reaction to the disorganization of his Genoese crossbowmen was to shout to his knights to "kill me these scoundrels for they block our road."

THE BELIEFS-FORMAT CYCLE (BRIEFLY: BELIEFS CYCLE)




Figure 2-3. The Beliefs-Format Cycle

Once again, the French example cited above can serve to illustrate. Just as society was stratified into noble and commoner, just as the army was similarly stratified, so to the key arm, the shock-cavalry which itself corresponds to a social class, there corresponded a distinct set of beliefs—too inchoate perhaps to be called an ideology. This was the notion of *chivalry*. Knighthood, its duties and also its privileges, incarnated the chivalric ideal. And only knights fought on horseback. Crossbows and the like were *vilain*. Furthermore they threatened the supremacy of the cavalry arm. In this way the chivalric ideals, served to perpetuate an already obsolete mode of fighting.

THE FORMAT-OPTIONS CYCLE (BRIEFLY: FORMAT CYCLE)

It is difficult to reconstruct what prudential considerations went on in the minds of medieval kings in respect to the various options with which their reigns confronted them. It is much clearer after the Renaissance when, even if monarchs did not, albeit obscurely, voice these considerations, publicists and pundits did so on their behalf. So it is that we find Machiavelli, Bodin, Rousseau, Adam Smith, and many others calculatedly balancing up the advantages of using one military format rather than another. Such calculations have continued pretty naturally down to our own era, not to speak of our own day, as I note from a recent publication of the London Institute

of Strategic Studies entitled "Military Manpower and Political Purpose."

The considerations are three. The first is the effectiveness of the force for the purpose in hand. Such a "purpose" and such "effectiveness" are the consequences of ultimately *subjective* appraisals; it can be subsumed under two headings: the ambitions of the rulers and the risk-opportunity as they perceive this. Clearly if a force is designed for defense but is likely to run away at the first menacing shouts of its enemy, there is no point in having it at all. If it is predictably useless, then why spend money on it? But if it is not predictably useless, or need not be under certain conditions, then the next consideration is—can such a force, of such a size be afforded? This is the consideration of its *expense*.

But there is also a third consideration and this is the one that Machiavelli dwelt upon. Given such and such a format, would it be loyal to the ruler? This is the consideration of *loyalty*.

Now what was the range of choices from which rulers could choose according to these three considerations? They are basically three, and each can exist in either an *ad hoc* or permanent form. Figure 2-4 shows the basic relationships. Foreign paid volunteers, popularly known as "mercenaries" could be raised *ad hoc* like Swiss pikemen in the fifteenth century, or on a permanent footing like the foreign regiments that had been incorporated into nearly all European standing armies in the eighteenth century. Next reliance could be put on what today we would call "national service," but which admits of many varieties: its basic characteristic is that it is "obligatory." It may be selective. The word "conscription," often used for this kind of service, originally meant merely the common writing down of eligible names for the purposes of a ballot, only the unlucky numbers having to serve. This is, in fact, a kind of "selective service" such as is used in the United States today. In early days, such conscription was highly arbitrary and unfair in its incidence. It was "impressment," in which the weaker, for instance, the unemployed or homeless, were the first to be made to enroll. Alternatively everybody with only relatively insignificant exceptions may be deemed liable; as in Israel today. This is "universal military service." In the feudal period knight service was one component of domestic obligatory service and the *fyrð* or *arrière-ban* its other, and popular, component. But these forces were convened and disbanded *ad hoc*. The permanent or standing version of this format, where a contin-

gent serves in the field and is ready to be supported by a huge reserve of colleagues who have already served, is the most common format in the advanced industrial states of today. Its general introduction dates from the French Revolutionary Wars, and, more generally, from the aftermath of the Franco-Prussian War of 1870; but it had been anteceded in Prussia and the northern states in the seventeenth century, and thence some versions of it were used in France and Savoy. The third format was the domestic paid volunteer troop like the late medieval English "companies" or French *bandes* (in their *ad hoc* form); and of course the regular standing army, typical of the eighteenth century, and still in use in Britain.

In practice few rulers ever used a land or sea force composed of only one of these three major types. Normally they would use a combination. There was a continuous evolution in the preferred formats or combinations of formats during the state- and nation-building period. The main trends will be outlined in the next section "Chronology." Meanwhile let me point out that the choice of the formats was always linked with some of the cycles already discussed: effectiveness with the economy-technology cycle for instance, as well as with the ruler's perceptions of risk-opportunity; loyalty is linked with both the stratification and the belief cycles, and with the state-building cycle itself. And the expense of the armed force is directly related to one of the most visible and (from the state-building point of view) important cycles of all, the *extraction cycle*. Meanwhile Figure 2-4 below indicates in tabular form, the Format-Options Cycle.

	AD HOC	PERMANENT	Consideration
Foreign Paid Volunteers	"Mercenaries"	"Subsidy Troops"	Efficiency
Native Obligatory Service	Feudal Host Popular Militia	Universal Military Service	Expense
Native Paid Volunteers	"Bandes" - Indentured Companies	"Regulars"	Loyalty

Figure 2-4. The Format-Options Cycle

MILITARY FORCES AND STATE-MAKING

THE EXTRACTION-COERCION CYCLE (BRIEFLY: EXTRACTION CYCLE)




Figure 2-5. The Extraction-Coercion Cycle

Military forces call for men, materials, and, once monetization has set in, for money, too. To extract these has often been very difficult. It has become easier and more generally acceptable as the centuries have rolled on. Where populations proved recalcitrant—and, I may add, they were on the whole and in most countries quite extraordinarily recalcitrant up to the nineteenth century, to a degree that makes popular American recalcitrance to the Vietnam War look like a mere gesture—then rulers had only two alternative courses. They could try to coerce or try to persuade. Now coercion presupposes something very similar to the instrument for which the coercion is itself proposed. Troops extract the taxes or the forage or the carts, and this contribution keeps them in being. More troops—more extraction—more troops: so a cycle of this kind could go on widening and deepening. This is precisely what happened in Brandenburg-Prussia from 1653 onward, and in large measure accounts for the state-building process in that country.

On the other hand, the need for coercion diminishes if, as a result of persuasions, the people—in the language of Deborah—“willingly offer themselves.” Religious fervor may provide the incentive sometimes. When the mass hysteria of national sovereignty and national self-determination gripped entire peoples in the nineteenth century, it made possible the provision of armies, navies, matériel, and money on an altogether unprecedented scale—so great a scale indeed that no amount of naked coercion on the part of governments could have extracted a tithe of it. Clearly, it hardly needs saying, this *extraction-persuasion* cycle is linked with the *beliefs* cycle. Beliefs could inspire populations to sacrifices hitherto undreamt of. Hence, it could, and indeed it did become, an object of policy on the part of rulers to substitute beliefs for coercion, and benefits in return for sacrifices, in

order to extract the vast resources needed. This helped forward the extension of citizenship and welfare services in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries; that is to say that the cycle links up, with not just the state-building, but with the *nation-building* process also.

THE STATE-BUILDING CYCLE





Figure 2-6. The State-Building Cycle

The relationship between style-of-rule, territorial consolidation, and the functional diversification processes has already been explained. But Prussia provides a fairly clear-cut illustration of what these terms look like in concrete events and how they interrelate. The ambition of the Great Elector was to maintain his princely territories and make the resources of each pay for the defense of the others. An ambition to become absolute appears unlikely, at the outset, at any rate; but this was the style-of-rule that resulted. For, to realize his ambitions, he required a larger standing army than his noblemen, who dominated the Estates, were voluntarily prepared to pay for. Here the *extraction-coercion* cycle went into operation, and the Estates were compelled to consent by show of force. The extraction machinery which he established, notably the excise taxation system in the towns and the apparatus for supplying and quartering the troops became more or less standardized throughout the diverse territories. In this process an extractive-cum-military officialdom was set up which went far beyond mere extraction, into expanding the very sources of wealth, and thus interfering in domestic and economic affairs. This led to an expanding and deepening cameralism, a set of territories with more or less uniform institutions (consolidation) and a very numerous specialized bureaucracy, both civil and military (differentiation of functions).

When I began to describe these cycles I pointed out that they themselves interlinked with one another. It is possible to indicate the more obvious linkages by Figure 2-7.

Figure 2-7. The Interconnection of the Major Cycles



Chronology

LAND FORMATS AND WARFARE UP TO THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY

With one or two notable idiosyncrasies, military formats went through a roughly uniform evolution among the states with which we are concerned. Five major trends stand out. These are related to three parameters: to innovations in armaments (echo of the economy-technology cycle), to the financial and later the industrial development of the state (a similar echo) and to changes in social stratification.

From Ad Hoc to Permanent (Standing) Forces. The first standing force of an exclusively "national" kind, i.e., conceived as owning unique and perpetual allegiance to the nascent state *via* the person of its ruler(s), was the French *Compagnies d'Ordonnance*, set up by Charles VII in 1445. In the Italian Wars (1494 and later), some of France's *ad hoc bandes* were used so frequently as to become, in effect, standing forces and the nucleus of the (later) four *vieux régiments*. By the 1620s supplementary regiments, raised from and paid for by the king, i.e., the *corps entretenus*, would, on disbandment, throw off a small depot force of picked men. Thenceforward, the number and scale of these "skeleton" regiments increased. It may well be that this depot system had been borrowed from the Spanish experiences of the earlier part of the century; there each *tercio* had its own depot force in Spain which supplied it with its replacements. There was no permanent force in England (I except the trainbands of militia), until the New Model Army of 1645. Thereafter there was always some kind of standing force although at the Restoration, 1660, it consisted of less than 6,000 men. As to Prussia, it is not until the War in the North of 1655-1660 that the former *ad hoc* mercenary troops could be said to have been put on a regular footing. Hitherto, though a small body, in fact, had been retained constantly in service, the army was in theory, at any rate, an *ad hoc* one.

From Unpaid Obligatory ("National") Service to Paid Volunteer. Knight service in kind had been generally commuted for cash payments by about 1294 in England, although the last summons of the feudal host—nominal only—occurred in 1385. But militia service for domestic defense or police duty continued unbroken from Saxon times, surviving the passing of the feudal levy. For overseas service, however, the practice became to array militia men and pick a num-

ber of them to serve for payment. In the fourteenth century the format altered to a semiprivate cash basis: forces were raised at the king's cost by means of an indenture between the king and the gentlemen he had commissioned. Formats in France followed a similar pattern but with a time lapse; the commutation of knight service lagged by as much as a century behind England, but because of the nobleman's contempt for the *roturier* and the dislike of the townsmen for military campaigning, the popular militia had been abandoned by the close of the fourteenth century. The system of indentured *compagnies*, resembling the English in their format, developed in France, after the early disasters in the Hundred Years War. In the fifteenth century kings put on semipermanent contract foreign paid troops, i.e., the mercenaries proper such as the Swiss and the *Landsknechten*. The *soldatesca* of the Hohenzollerns in the Thirty Years War were of this format, the contracts being known as the *Kapitulationen*.

Here one major exception must be made. After the accession of Henry VII in 1485, England reverted to the popular militia, at least, for home defense, whereas France and Spain and the Hohenzollerns came to depend on paid native volunteers or foreign paid volunteers or both, but *not* on popular militias (exception made, in Spain's case, of the *Hermandad* in the early sixteenth century). By the eighteenth century, however, paid volunteer service had become the rule even in England, though there the militia was retained for domestic service, it is true; but it was more as a political balance to the regular standing army than as a serious fighting force until its reform in 1757. France, though Louis XIV had initiated conscription between 1702 and 1713, relied on a large regular force, many of whose regiments were foreigners. Prussia, too, had a regular standing army of paid troops, but after 1732 this was supplemented by the obligatory service of peasants, each "canton" having to provide the replacements for the regiment assigned to it.

From Semiprivate to Public Control and/or Ownership. Under the system of indentured companies, then that of foreign mercenaries, and then of *corps entretenus*, the common assumption was that the king would commission a gentleman to raise, equip, officer, and lead a given force of men: the king paid him, he for his part did the rest, and if any money stuck to his fingers, this was after all his livelihood. From the late sixteenth through the eighteenth century, rulers in-

creasingly encroached upon the privileges of the "colonel" who raised the regiment. Long before the advent of the revolutionary wars the rulers of France and Prussia had arrogated to themselves the right to appoint the junior officers and the most senior officer of the regiments; to regulate their promotion; to recruit the other ranks; to make the commissariat and logistical provision. True, the sale and purchase of the officer's commission endured until the Revolution in France and, under increasingly stringent regulation, until as late as 1872 in England.

Increasing Size. Accurate figures are notoriously hard to come by. The most significant figures are those for the number of troops called out for a campaign rather than those used in a particular battle or as the regular standing nucleus of the army. The Norman troops at Hastings numbered some 6,000 to 8,000 at the most. For a projected French campaign against England in 1327, an optimistic estimate was that 35,000 troops would be used. In the Italian campaign of 1498, there were 65,000 troops. Against Spain in 1635, the campaign troops numbered 155,000. In 1678 the campaign troops reached 279,000; in the 1691 campaign, as many as 440,000. Napoleon mustered 700,000 men for the Russian campaign in 1812.

For England the figures are always smaller. It must be remembered that throughout this entire period France was far and away the most populous state of the West, in population outnumbering the English by some four or five to one at the various dates in the millennium. At Hastings the numbers roughly equaled the Norman ones—perhaps 6,000 to 8,000 men—but the entire Saxon force available had not been called out. In his campaign of 1513 against France, Henry VIII used 27,000 men; in the 1544 campaign, 42,000; in 1712, at the height of the Spanish Succession War, the number of troops reached 75,000; and at the peak of the Napoleonic campaigns, some 250,000.

In Prussia the figures are roughly congruent with the regular army strength: some 4,000 in 1653; 30,000 in 1688; 80,000 in 1740; 160,000 in the Seven Years War; as many as 300,000 in 1814, when "volunteers" and reservists were added.

It will be seen that the sharp increases come, in every case, after the close of the Thirty Years War, in 1648.

From Multinational to National Armies. Here we need only note that as late as the third quarter of the eighteenth century, from one-

half to one-third of the troops of any state would have been foreigners. Over half of Napoleon's *Grande Armée* were not Frenchmen; and over half of Wellington's force at Waterloo (leaving Blücher entirely out of account) were foreigners too. Wholly native armies were a product of the nineteenth century.

THE MILITARY FORMATS AND THE ART OF WAR

From the Age of the Armored Knight to 1300. In "advanced" armies, the principal and necessary arm was the shock-cavalry. Infantry served two different functions. Some were missile infantry, armed with short bows and with the newly resurrected arbalaster, or crossbow. The others, much more numerous, were armed with some type of spear and formed a defensive hedge behind which their cavalry could re-form after an unsuccessful charge.

Three points seem particularly worthy of attention: First, "the fundamental factor in the origin and development of feudal society was the adoption of heavy cavalry by the Franks from the mid-eighth century and the consequent demand for mounted retainers, expensively equipped and elaborately trained to fight on horseback" (Brown 1967: 123). This in turn, as has been demonstrated by Lynn White (White 1962: chap. 1), was due to a simple gadget, equivalent in importance to that later gadget, the bayonet—viz., the iron stirrup. From time immemorial warriors on horseback had ridden up to their enemies and pushed their lance at them with the full strength of their *arm*, i.e., by man power. With a stirrup, the horse and rider were, as it were, glued together. The rider held his long lance under his arm at rest, charged, did not move his arm at all, but, rigidly united to him, it was impelled against the enemy with the full power and momentum of the *horse*. This made the massed charge of heavy mounted cavalry against infantry all but irresistible.

Second, the equipment—a war horse and possibly a remount, two palfreys for esquires to carry the armor to the battlefield and to equip the knight, and the mail armor itself—all these were vastly expensive. A suit of mail cost the price of a small farm at the time of the Third Crusade. Later as plate armor was introduced and the steed had to be the *dextrarius*, a heavier animal altogether, the cost soared still more. In short only very wealthy people could afford to be knights. Alternatively, if a king wanted a particular man or set of men to act as his mounted cavalry, he had to give them the where-

withal. In those nonmonetized days this meant giving a conditional gift of land with peasants to farm it for him. Charles Martel who is credited with introducing the armored cavalry into the West after the battle of Tours in the eighth century appropriated one-third of the lands of the church in order to endow the men whom he wished to serve as his armored cavalry.

Third, as has already been pointed out, this system was like one where a rich man—or a man made rich by government endowment—is expected to contribute to the army his personal tank and its crew, or a Phantom and its crew, and all supporting services. In such circumstances, if the individual renounced his liability, the monarch would have to turn against his tank or his plane, the tanks and planes of those who had decided to honor their pledges. The feudal force was hardly, therefore, a predictably loyal one. Not only that. It was hardly a disciplined force, either. Each tank crew, each Phantom crew, each artillery crew would be an independent entity or, set of entities. Each would have little incentive or inclination to fight under the orders of some common superior. So with the medieval cavalry.

There is a final point. It took a lot of money to equip a knight. Once equipped, however, he had the opportunity for advancement and also for booty. Originally only very rich men could be armed knights. Later, especially on the Continent, where the entire progeny of knights became “noble,” the younger sons who were poor strove very hard to acquire the horse and armor, in order to make military careers and so become wealthy. This gave the *noblesse* as whole a vested interest in retaining the existing military system against the nonnoble remainder of the population. It also gave them the military and economic power to do so.

The Decline of the Feudal Cavalry: 1300-1453. The feudal chivalry was eroded by infantry developments of two quite different sorts and in two quite separated geographical areas: in the Atlantic area where the development of the longbow by the English armies felled the French cavalry, and in Central Europe where the Swiss pikemen smashed the Austrian and Burgundian cavalry. But there was never a European “age of the longbowmen” as there was an “age of the pikemen,” because, if we are to believe Sir Charles Oman, at any rate, no nation in Europe seemed capable of equaling English skill or achievements with the longbow, and the English never exported themselves as mercenary longbowmen to foreign rulers.

Whereas Swabians, Spaniards, and later many other peoples, did manage to trail pikes as well as the Swiss, the era of the longbow was confined to the Anglo-French struggle. But it so happens that during this period, this struggle was the one that held the attention of Europe. Hence it can be dealt with prior to the infantry phalanx invented by the Swiss.

At Halidon (1332) and Dupplin Moor (1333), the English armies defeated the Scots by utilizing a new tactic—dismounted heavy cavalry (an old trick for the English, first used at the Battle of the Standard in 1138) flanked by the newfangled longbowmen whom Edward I had picked up from South Wales and who were thence forward emulated by the English yeomanry. The longbow could get off some ten or twelve shots a minute compared with the crossbow's one or two. Admittedly the shaft was not as heavy; although it could pierce mail well enough, it was not effective against plate; but, of course, it could also be used against the feudal mounts unless these were protected also. The range was impressive also—some three hundred yards; and the accuracy attainable, quite remarkable. The response of cavalymen, notably the French, whose entire social status seemed to them to repose on their primacy on the battlefield, was to use plate armor and to try to protect the horses. These cavalry then became incapable of any but direct charges. The bankruptcy of this military format, whether knights were mounted or dismounted, was attested at Crécy, Poitiers, and Agincourt.

But, toward the end of this period a new missile weapon was creeping in. This was the firearm. Cannon proved critical in the French victories of Castillon (1450) and Formigny (1453) which ejected the English from all France excepting only Calais. And the arquebus, firing a two ounce ball farther than the crossbow's quarrel, was slowly ejecting the bow.

Castillon and Formigny—though this was not realized at the time—expelled England from Europe for good. Thenceforward she did indeed equip expeditionary forces for the Continent; but she did not, like Valois and Hapsburg, indulge in continuous warfare lasting some sixty years. The cockpit of Europe ceased to be France and became Italy, and to some extent Flanders. There new methods of warfare were tried out. In their island the English tenaciously clung to their longbows, the success against the Scots at Flodden (1515) contributing much to its continuing favor. Not until 1585 did a British government reluctantly concede that it need no longer be treated

as an "official" weapon; yet bows were served out to the northern shire levies for service against the Scots as late as 1638!

On the Continent, however, the art of war developed with great innovations. These ushered in the final downfall of not merely the heavy armored cavalry but cavalry as such, as the prime essential of the military format. The pike and the firearm were responsible for this.

The Age of Pike and Handgun: 1450-1550. Armaments developed rapidly. Heavy artillery for siege, and somewhat lighter though very ponderous guns for battle were fast coming into general use. And so also were handguns. By 1450 the primitive fire tube of 1400 had become the spring-trigger operated harquebus, where a lighted fuse ignited the powder in the pan. Its range was twice that of the cross-bow, and its missile very heavy. To counter the new artillery, the tall, thin walls of the medieval castle had to be replaced or girdled by low and thick ones, forerunners of the bastion. In the Italian Wars all manner of combinations of field weapons were tried out with inconclusive results: infantry phalanxes, harquebusiers, the heavy French cavalry—all had their decisive moment, in one or other of the battles. But one fact stood out, one indispensable element. Indeed, the principal and the necessary one was now *infantry*. The Swiss phalanx, perfected from the trial runs of Morgarten (1351) and Sempach (1386), had now become a square of 6,000 men, the front four ranks of which, in elbow close order, wielded eighteen-foot pikes with spearheads four feet long. The rear ranks wielded halberds whose hooks could drag horsemen from the saddle while their blades could lop off the spearheads of enemy infantry. The pike order held off cavalry attacks. The halberd order held off infantry attacks. In revenge, this phalanx, the men holding their pikes over their heads, would trot for a mile and then hurl itself at the enemy infantry shattering it with a shock far greater than that of the feudal cavalry. This formation, after smashingly defeating Charles the Bold at Grandison and Muret, became the favorite of continental Europe. It was copied by the Swabian Germans who called themselves *Landsknechten*. In 1480 *Landsknechten* proved decisive in defeating Louis XI of France at the Battle of Guinegate. Thereupon he took 6,000 Swiss pikemen into his service on contract; and for the next half century French foot armies were always composed of two elements, either Swiss or *Landsknechten*, and native

mercenary *bandes*. But, from his own experiences of the Italian wars against the French, the *Gran Capitan* of Spain, Gonzalvo de Córdoba evolved a more flexible infantry formation. This was the *tercio*. It consisted of three, not six thousand men, divided into three colonelcies (or *coronélias*). At first the armament comprised the indispensable pike, the crossbowman, and sword-and-buckler men. The latter were soon discarded. By about 1540 it had reached its "normal" form—a hollow square, its sides made up of deep formations of harquebusiers, later replaced by the Spanish improvement on this weapon, namely the much heavier musket. As the rate of fire of the handguns increased, so did the proportion of shot to pike. In 1530 it was one shot to two pikes; by the end of the century more like one to one.

The *tercio* became the standard formation of Europe. Its supremacy and prestige did not end until it was shattered by Condé at the Battle of Rocroi in 1643.

The Military Revolution: 1550-1660. Meanwhile the art of fortification, making advances, began to bog down armies into siege and manoeuvre warfare. Field artillery was still too cumbersome to be shifted about a battlefield; it had to be positioned once and for all. As for cavalry, since a use for it had to be found apart from scouting and pursuit—it was adapted to mounted pistoleers who rode to the enemy lines, hastily fired off, and raced back again: the so-called *caracole*.

But the basic element of battle was the infantry square, half shot and half pike. The troublesome problem for the commander was how best to combine these two elements; since the musketeer needed the protection of the pikemen against enemy cavalry or infantry, while the pikemen needed the musketeer's protection too. In this respect quite new tactics were invented by Maurice of Nassau. In the first place, realizing that the Dutch militia were no match for the Spaniards in the open field, he replaced them by a paid volunteer force. These he drilled continually until they could adopt the most diverse formations with great rapidity. The great solid masses of the *tercio* he abandoned for small units, the smallest being only thirty men strong; and these combined with others into larger units, he moved against his enemy in the chequer board formation recommended in the classical *Tactics of Aelius*, the book which served as his constant inspiration.

The principle of manoeuvrability was carried further by the great Gustavus Adolphus of Sweden. Gustavus, unlike Maurice, was also a very considerable military innovator. He invented a cartridge which much increased the rapidity of fire, he lightened the weight of the musket so that it could be used without a crutch, he invented a leather sheathed copper-tubed artillery—a portable field gun which two men could carry about the battlefield. He abandoned the *caracole* and taught his cavalry to charge home with the saber. And with these improvements, he arranged his troops, with the cavalry on the wings and field guns defended by pike and musket in front of each infantry formation; these formations themselves consisted of pikemen on flank and musketeers in the middle. But, owing to the new rapidity of fire, he could now thin the depth of his musketry formation, since the drill was for the front ranks to fire, and then to file to the rear, to reload, and so forth. With the new speed of fire he had attained, Gustavus could reduce the depth of his formations to eight ranks. Thus from the square he was evolving the infantry into an oblong formation, far longer on its front than in its depth.

From the Battalion Formation to Line, to Manoeuvre, and to Siege. It is now necessary to distinguish even more sharply than ever between grand strategy and tactics. On the battlefield, the movement from square into oblong continued until the oblong became a very long line of some five miles perhaps, but only four or three ranks deep. And this development was consequent upon two prime inventions, gadgets again, in the field of weaponry. The first was the replacement of the matchlock by the flintlock. By 1689 this weapon was standard throughout the French armies and by 1700 throughout Europe. It vastly increased the rate of fire. It could get off a round a minute with an effective range (against a man's body) of some eighty yards. By 1740 the Prussian fusiliers had achieved the rate of three rounds a minute. So the depth of the firing line decreased, and the Prussian fusiliers could safely form in three ranks only. Likewise, since the ranks were thinned, it was possible to extend the troops sideways, and highly desirable too, since this avoided turning of their flanks. So came about the long thin lines of strictly positioned infantry, highly drilled for these complex manoeuvres of getting to and keeping their dressing on the battlefield, and once in position all but impossible to move about quickly.

At almost the same time a second gadget was introduced. This was the simple expedient of fitting a sword blade to the muzzle of the musket. At first (circa 1660) this sword was plugged in, a highly dangerous expedient as was to be shown by the massacre of English soldiers thus equipped, by Highlanders, who swooped out of the mist at Killlicrankie in 1689. Instead the socket bayonet which was invented by Vauban in 1680 was widely and rapidly adopted. With this the infantryman became two types of infantry in one person, at once the pikeman, but also the musketeer. He was a missile *and* a shock infantry as desired. This absurdly simple invention was to dominate infantry tactics well past the age of Napoleon up to the eve of the Austro-Prussian War of 1866. The tactic of the eighteenth century was to form the thin line, to advance through the smoke of the field artillery, to pour a curtain of fire in the advance, and then—at about twenty feet from the enemy—to charge home with the bayonet. The cavalry came in to hold, or to overwhelm, or to pursue.

But while this became the set arrangement for the field of *battle*, developments elsewhere were slowing down the pace of *war*. For from the age of Maurice and of Gustavus we have now reached the era of Vauban and Louvois, or Marlborough and Villars. This was the age of sieges, artillery, and above all, of fortification: the perfected asterisk-like bastions of Vauban, and the correspondingly geometrically predictable reduction of similarly constructed fortresses by the lines of circumvallation and approach which Vauban designed. It is the age of “lines” like the lines of the Schellenburg which Marlborough stormed on his way to Blenheim or the *ne plus ultra* lines that Villars threw up and which it took Marlborough an entire campaign season to penetrate. For wars of this kind, evolved to take a strong place here and cut the enemy’s communications there, it was necessary to construct magazines, map out forage areas, lay down lines of advance, and see that the extensive transportation was available. In short, the age of logistics had arrived. And it was in logistics, *par excellence*, that Louis’s ministers, Le Tellier and Louvois were such remarkable administrators.

By 1713, after the War of the Spanish Succession, the pattern of warfare had been set for the rest of the century until the combination of the notions of Guibert and the extremities of the volunteer soldiers of the French Revolution introduced an entirely different pattern. To that we shall return when we come to “The Napoleonic Watershed.”

State and Form in England to 1714

I have suggested that state-building consisted of twin processes: the consolidation together under a common superior of the populations of hitherto disparate territories; and the differentiation between the public and private sectors, and hence between public officials and private individuals. Though the processes are visibly common to England, France, and Brandenburg-Prussia, they occurred in each instance with significant differences in timing, in degree, and above all, in the third aspect of state-building, in style-of-rule. In Brandenburg-Prussia, the outcome was a monarchy even more absolute than that of contemporary France, depending even more than France (where Louis XIV's cannon bore the motto *ultima ratio regum*) upon the support of a docile standing army. But the English outcome was entirely different. There the monarchy had been all but qualified away by an aristocratic-mercantile patriciate, with its central organizational focus in Parliament and effective local ones in the Quarter Sessions. Not only that. The nature of state-building in England smacks far more of a general and relatively rapid reception of common laws and lawcourts than submission to the decisions of specialized executive officers. The administrative and judicial were, for the most part, combined—the most significant illustration being the vast corpus of administrative decision carried out by the Quarter Sessions in judicial form and definitionally by a judicial body. Control of the subject until well into the nineteenth century was on the whole judicial and not administrative. Of course, the laws had, in the last resort, to be enforced. But a verdict was entrusted in the first instance to officers of the court; the police was still an obligatory unspecialized civic force of laymen. Only in the last resort did the public forces in the shape of militia (another civic force) and finally the regular army, intervene to support the verdicts. In short, whereas France and Brandenburg were stuffed with enforcement officers, these were relatively rare in England.

There are further remarkable differences. The processes of state-building are quite visible in the tenth century in England, whereas one must look to the period between the reign of Philippe-Auguste and Philippe le Bel, i.e., the thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries for this to become as prominent in French territory, and the process was incomplete until the second half of the seventeenth. As for Brandenburg-Prussia the processes are entirely a product of the seven-

teenth and early eighteenth centuries. By that time England, France, Holland, Sweden, Spain, and many other states were in existence to serve, however unconsciously, as a model to the Great Elector and his successors. These had something visible to strive for. By contrast it could be said that the Normans and the Plantagenets, the Capetians, and the Valois were lines of monarchs—each one of whom was setting out on his own individual adventure in self-aggrandizement, a kind of blind progress which only we, with our hindsight recognize as constituting successive milestones in state-building.

Again in each of the three cases, different pockets of territory had to be welded together under a common superior before what we today call England, or France, or Prussia began to exist as such. In the English case, this was the heptarchy of Saxon kingdoms. But these were contiguous, the language spoken in them was cognate where it was not the same, and, above all, they were subjugated by common dynasties, whether of Wessex, of Denmark, or of the Wessex line again, at a time when their own native administrative and political institutions were so weak and amorphous as to dissolve into a common form with infinitely less difficulty than was true of the French duchies and counties. There, across the Channel, the territories were too numerous, the distances too great, and the local institutions too well structured by the time they came to have to recognize a common master. As for Brandenburg-Prussia the name speaks volumes. The territories, which were fortuitously brought under the common rule of the Hohenzollern line in 1618 had their own quite separate histories. The economic and social differences between the Rhine areas and the central and eastern ones were very great, and the lands were not even physically contiguous. They did not even speak a common tongue—at least, many districts of the Duchy of Prussia did not (some spoke a Slav dialect up to 1919). All they had in common was the Hohenzollerns.

Next we must bear in mind the demographic and economic differences among the three. In the seventeenth century the English and French economies were completely monetized with rich agricultural and mercantile resources. The population of the one was some five million, that of the other some twenty million. In contrast Brandenburg-Prussia was a thinly populated poverty-stricken sandbox, its capital town having only fifteen thousand people and its total population not exceeding half a million.

Finally social structure was dissimilar. The French *noblesse*, even under the absolute monarchy of the *Ancien Régime* was a highly complex caste admitting of perhaps six subgradations. Also there were thriving commercial, professional, literary, and artistic classes, as well as numerous sections and corporations among the townsfolk, and there were variegations of condition among the peasantry. Not only that. From its inception and markedly as the centuries passed on, the central government of England had been constricted by rival, even if legally subordinate institutions—the courts of law, the magistrates' benches, not to speak of Parliament itself; and each one of these could and did provide an organizational focus for discontents. This was partially true even of France of the *Ancien Régime* where there were the Parlements and (in the *pays d'états*) the Estates, as well as the powerful guilds and corporations. But in Brandenburg-Prussia at the opening of the eighteenth century, there were but two major classes—noble and peasant, lord and serf; the townsfolk, apart from the Königsbergers were of small account; and whereas until the reign of the Great Elector political power had lain with the noble-dominated Estates, at the close of his reign it resided in his hands alone.

Let us then turn to the specific case of England. Here three preliminary points stand out.

The first is to reiterate the early unification. The second has had an important bearing on the military format in the medieval period. On the one hand, we find the use of paid troops and native militia-men side by side with the feudality, on the other a more open-ended, less privileged and caste-like order of nobility. As a consequence of these factors, as well as the early unification, the crown usually had forces on which it could rely apart from the feudality while the state did not suffer as deeply as French territory from a deep-rooted provincial particularism, nor from the strategic and military status inside such provinces which the French *noblesse* enjoyed down to the middle of the seventeenth century. Parenthetically, it may be added that the open-ended character of the English nobility, its descent by primogeniture and not to the entire progeny, the absence of laws of *dérogeance* in cases where the nobleman should pursue some non-noble occupation, and its lack of fiscal immunity—all these, conjoined with the absence of provincial representative bodies which could compete with the central Parliament (as in France), removed

from the development of the English Parliament as a tax-granting assembly many of the obstacles which stood in the way of the French Estates-General.

The third factor is that of geographical location. It is not just that by comparison with the area of modern France, England is a small country—half the size in fact. It is that the land frontiers of England marched with neighbors which were very weak. Wales and Scotland are not to be compared with Burgundy or the Hapsburg dominions. Wales was so weak as to be unable to resist English arms by the close of the thirteenth century, and so inchoate as to be absorbed bag and baggage into the English governmental system by the middle of the sixteenth. Scotland was never strong enough to do more than preserve her separate existence as a state. Insofar as there existed menaces to the continuance of the English state, these lay across the Channel, and until the end of the fifteenth century, the lands across this waterway were as much a prize or an opportunity as they were a threat. It was not until the reaggregation of French territories under Charles VII and Louis IX, and effectively not until the accession of Francis I of France and Charles V of Spain and the Hapsburg dominions in Europe that the formerly rich prizes across the sea turned into deadly threats. If at that time the English southern and southeastern frontiers had been land frontiers, it is impossible to visualize an English monarchy that relied only on an ill-trained militia equipped with the longbow for its defense. As it was, providing that the coast lines were fortified in the new traditions, and a navy created, the militia format might be deemed adequate, if a monarch were sufficiently optimistic. This reliance on the militia under the Tudors and early Stuarts was, however, to have the most profound constitutional consequences. And this is, as demonstrated, conditioned by the geographical location of the English state. At an early era, before the concept had been invented, England had on her vulnerable southern and southeastern corners a *natural frontier*.

Five phases may be discerned in the development of the English military (land) format. The first, which for brevity rather than exactness may be styled the feudal, lasted from the Conquest until the early fourteenth century; moved—rather earlier than in France—into a semifeudal phase in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries when service in kind was being commuted for cash payments. The third phase, that of the Hundred Years War—the fourteenth and most of the fifteenth centuries—is best described as semiprivate—

the era of the indentured companies of which we have already spoken. But whereas in continental Europe this phase was generally succeeded by the era of foreign mercenaries and the nuclei of regular native forces, England reverted to her native militia tradition. This did not end until the middle of the seventeenth century. It was then succeeded by the introduction of a regular standing army; but one which, unlike its counterparts on the Continent, was hardly capable, save in its very earliest phases (until the end of the seventeenth century), of posing any threat to the oligarchic parliamentary regime, or presenting any opportunity for the creation of an absolute monarchy.

By the death of Edgar in 975, England, in stark contrast to France, was recognized at that time by its ruling strata, if not by its population, as a single *regnum*. With the exceptions of Cumberland and Northumbria, the frontiers were much as we know them today. Thenceforward aristocratic reaction against the crown was to seek privileges or to command the whole, but *not* to return to the Heptarchy. Then the Conquest set the seal on such sentiment and provided new sinews of unification. For in the words of Helen Cam,

the strategic advantage given by the fact of conquest is only fully recognized if we compare the nation-wide extension of the machinery controlled by William with the strict localization of that at the disposal of the kings of France. Only a small region round Paris was administered by officials under their orders. The great duchies and counties of France were governed, like Normandy, by the agents of the dukes and counts not the kings' and to build up a national monarchy the French kings had to pursue a century-long policy of piecemeal annexation resulting in the survival to our days of deeply-rooted provincialism (Cam 1961: 74).

Alongside the Anglo-Saxon militiamen, the *fyrð*, the Norman kings established a feudal host of armored cavalry; some eighteen hundred knights bringing with them their own retainers. At this point we discern a glimpse of the relationship between format and state-building. This feudal host was in military terms more than the match for the Saxon militia's infantry format, as was proved at Hastings even against the trained housecarles of Harold. It was infinitely more expensive, hence the expropriation by and reallocation to the Norman adventurers of the forfeited lands of Saxons. But its politi-

cal loyalty was questionable. Once the last embers of the Saxon resistance had been stamped out, William I and his successors were plagued by the all too common feudal revolts. At the death of Henry I, the pretext for such revolt was more colorable than ever before—the rival claims of Stephen and Matilda; and so, as William of Newbury's *History* has it, *regnum Angliae scissum in duo*.

But if the Norman monarchs succeeded in repressing such revolts and in creating what is called a "strong monarchy," this was due to the format of the armies. For in practice the feudal cavalymen were not called out often (perhaps never, it is now thought) to go overseas; and even at home the kings tended to rely very heavily on paid mercenary troops and the Saxon militia who proved consistently loyal to them and hostile to the Norman barons. Rufus, in particular, used mercenaries to such an extent that the exactions to raise the monies for their pay caused him to be execrated by the chroniclers. No doubt these worthy divines thought he did it for his own amusement rather than to get professional and hence reliable military service.

Military feudalism as it had been known was a clumsy expedient invented in the West by Charles Martel who, in order to utilize the expensive services of a novel shock cavalry without having any currency or indeed other resources with which to do so, stole one third of the lands of the church and put it and its peasants at the service of the cavalymen. For a like reason the Teutonic Knights adapted the same system when they colonized Prussia in the fourteenth century, and so did Hernán Cortes when he and his *conquistadores* had conquered Mexico in the sixteenth century. It was a barbarous expedient and very unmilitary. The knight would keep the field only forty days. The obligation left him with no discretion as to whether he wanted to serve or not. The individual independence of each knight and his retainers made for indiscipline in the field.

Cash service was clearly much better for both parties: for the king because he could pick, choose his troops, and keep them in the field for as long as his money lasted and get them to serve in the garrisons or theaters of war that he selected; for the feudatories because it was up to them whether they served in person or not.

The twelfth and thirteenth centuries saw the transition from unpaid obligatory service to commutation by means of cash. By the end of the thirteenth century, few knights, if any, were serving in kind. They served for the cash raised by the scutages and also by the pro-

ceeds of other taxes such as the extraordinary subsidies voted by the nascent Parliament or from the new customs on wool.

This variation in format, slight as it may seem, was not without a profound significance for state-building. For, from the time of Richard and of John, knights had become increasingly reluctant to serve overseas, and indeed to serve in the old feudal way at all. Scutages or fines were levied on them if they defaulted; alternatively, efforts might be made such as Richard made, to induce a proportion of knights to serve, waiving the remainder of the service owed. Two reasons appear to have been responsible for this. The increasing subdivision of the knight's fees owing to the effects of inheritance by females, and the vastly increasing cost of heavier armor and hence the heavier *dextrarius* horses needed to carry the ironclad knight. Furthermore, it was at the time of Richard and John that the kings of France began their long pressure against the English domains on the Continent that were to end, in 1453, in the English expulsion from Europe. The campaigns became more continuous, and permanent garrisons were required for the castles. The traditional forty days service did not provide what was needed—armies and garrisons that were perhaps smaller, but which were semipermanent. So, as service became commuted for cash, quarrels blew up between the king and his feudatories as to a "fair" scutage. The tug of war thus resolved itself by the thirteenth century into a battle over *taxation*. This battle and the origins and development of Parliament are directly associated.

By the beginning of the fourteenth century, all service was paid service; but the system of raising, leading, and equipping the armies that fought in France now becomes something quite different. It was the system of "indentured" companies, bands of fighting men raised by contract between the king as the purchaser, and gentlemen whom he commissioned as the captains and leaders of these companies. The armament and technique of fighting had changed into that combination of dismounted cavalymen and longbowmen which shattered the feudal horsemen of France at Crécy, Poitiers, and Agincourt. One effect of these victories was the emergence in England of a military-commercial complex, a war party which for a half-century defied the efforts of monarchs like Richard II to make peace when the war was going badly. This party was made up of great magnates with the companies they raised and the lesser gentry—the knights—bannerets who became the folk heroes of contemporary England,

both of these two classes avid for glory, for command, and for the rich ransoms to be got; of traders and contractors of all kinds who supplied the armies with their equipment; and of the wool merchants who needed to see Flanders guaranteed to them. But the principal effect of this type of format was above all political. It reflected and also reinforced a recrudescence of a "feudal" relationship between nobles and the crown, but without the loyalty implicit in the notion of feudality and homage to a feudality, in fact, based on the cash nexus. For in the fourteenth and still more in the fifteenth centuries feudal loyalties had sharply declined. Money commutation of feudal obligations had become universal, and oaths of fealty lost what importance they had ever had. A money and trading economy came in with a vengeance, with the rise of the wool industry which encouraged landlords to turn from arable to pasture.

This was reflected in the indenture system and the rise of the bannerets, men who brought at least ten "lances" to the army. By the time of Richard II, the retained troops of the magnates, sometimes called "affinities," existed on a great scale. The Duke of Lancaster, admittedly the richest man in England at that time, brought 600 cavalrymen and 9,000 archers to the Scottish War, under his own banner. By 1403 the marches of Scotland and Wales could be raised in arms by means of these great "liveries." Under Henry VI the process had spread much more widely and the magnates with their private armies were able to exercise extensive political and judicial influence in their own territories, territories which, for their part, had become extended and consolidated by the kings declining to exercise the right to interfere with politically injudicious marriages between their feudatories as they had done under the Normans and the Angevins. At first decisive only in local politics, there came a point where, given the insanity of Henry VI and the struggle to secure control of his person and his policies, these local dynasties became embroiled in the struggle to control the central government itself. It was the indentured liveries, led by local dynasts with their blood ties or blood claims on the throne, that fuelled the Wars of the Roses. (Both sides, alternately and simultaneously, called out the shirelevies, however, throughout the wars.)

But with the Battle of Bosworth Field, gained by Henry Tudor with the aid of numerous foreign mercenaries, a format that became increasingly commonly used in the progress of the civil wars, a dramatic change came over the English military format. On the one

hand, Henry not only dismissed his mercenaries, but from thenceforth, with an exception in the reign of Edward VI, they were never again used for domestic purposes on British soil—only collected for foreign expeditions. In short, of two possible formats, foreign paid volunteers (i.e., mercenaries) and domestic paid volunteers (i.e., indentured companies), Henry had reverted to the third and very old English alternative: the shire militia. There was one significant difference between the new Commissions of Array which summoned them, and the old ones of Edward I's time, and it reflected the process of functional diversification that had occurred during the intervening centuries. In the olden days, the "Commissioners" of Array would be local magnates. Now though they might indeed include one or two such, the commissions always included the sheriffs, assisted by the Justices of the Peace, the king's own officers, albeit unpaid, in the localities. (After the accession of Edward VI, Lord Lieutenants were instituted in each county to take the musters and reviews, and generally act as the chief of these Commissioners.)

The militia was certainly cheap. In this respect it answered to Henry VII's very acute sense of economizing. The militia was, by the new continental standards, very inefficient. But then it was meant for home defense. For foreign expeditions, troops were hired—both native and foreign. And the sea lay between, as we have seen. Remained the final consideration: Would a militia be more politically reliable to the new dynasty than the indentured companies or foreign mercenaries? Certainly the loyalty of the officers was a question never far removed from the considerations of the Tudors and the Stuarts, as the choice of gentlemen, of Protestant persuasion, and possessing land and status in the counties amply testifies; nor the efforts to store firearms away from the common folk, in special armories (cf. Boynton 1967; Western 1965). In the end, the answer was to be "No." But that was in 1638 where the disaffected northern militia was in no heart to meet the Scots army, and in 1642 where the London-trained bands turned out to bar the route to the capital against Charles. Some of the shire-levies turned out to be obstinately royalist; others, just as obdurately parliamentarian. And both of them, with the exception of the London-trained bands, turned out to be so incompetent that the opposing sides rapidly turned to impressment and volunteers for their forces. For nearly a century and a half before that time, however, the monarchs had governed a highly turbulent people with no firmer support than the militia. (The

exception is the use of 1,000 Italian and German mercenaries to suppress the various rebellions of the year 1549.) During this period, the shire-levies were loyal against antitax rebellions like those of 1489 or 1497; they were less reliable in the religious risings, like the Pilgrimage of Grace in 1536, and it took Henry VIII a good deal of double-dealing before he was in a position to quell this formidable rising; but when it was done, it was militiamen who did it for him. That this reliance on a militia set limits to the powers of the crown is surely attested by the fate of Wolsey's "Amicable Grant" of 1526, a proposal which led to a widespread "tax strike," and which both Wolsey and the king therefore hastily withdrew. The most interesting cases are those where the dynasty was threatened; in all but one, the shire-levies proved loyal. Militiamen defeated Martin Swart's German mercenaries and the Irish kerns at Stoke in 1487; the population rejected Warbeck at Deal in 1489, and the levies defeated him in the West in 1497. As Warwick pursued Queen Mary in 1558, his militiamen deserted him along the route while the queen was able to rally the levies of the shires she passed through. The wretched Northern Earls, in their rising of 1569, after leading their retinues south a little way, retreated in the face of the advancing levies and finally disbanded their followers. Only Wyatt's rebellion against the Spanish Match provides a partial exception to the rule.

On a closer examination, however, this loyalty of the militia seems to owe most to the *stratification* of the force. To begin with, it must be noted that not all the shire-levies were wholly reliable the whole of the time. Not by any means. The Duke of Norfolk forbore to give battle to the Pilgrims in 1536 because "some of my troops thought and think their (the rebels') quarrel to be good and godly." In 1549 the levies in the West and in East Anglia were judged too unreliable to take on the rebels, and the decisive factor in their defeat was the mercenary forces of Germans and Italians who had been brought in, some two years earlier, to fight in the Scots wars.

In the event, the prevailing loyalty of the militia forces turned on three factors: the officering of the levies, the persistence of noble retinues and followings until late in the seventeenth century, and, exceptionally, in 1549, the use of foreign mercenaries. As to the first factor, Boynton shows (Boynton 1967) that Elizabeth took the greatest care to choose the captains of the militia bands from among the substantial, the Protestant, and the well-effected families of the countryside. Efficiency was set lower than these political virtues, so

that the training of the bands was put in the hands of paid and professional muster-masters, standing in the same relationship to the young captains as a regimental sergeant major might to a green second lieutenant. The Pilgrimage of Grace of 1536 was so dangerous because so many local gentry permitted themselves to be "pressed" into leading the rebels. From the beginning of the period in 1485 right through to the civil wars, it should be taken as read that the arraying or mustering or reviewing or leading the militia was in the hands of the noblemen and gentry; and as the civil wars were to show, there was a long and compulsive tradition that the commoners followed where "the gentlemen" of the shire decided. The loyalty of the militia turns out to be, for the most part, the loyalty of the noblemen and gentry. This is why the political and religious alienation of some half of these persons from the court of Charles I destroyed the only land forces, albeit decrepit ones, in his possession, and made the outcome of the Great Rebellion a contingent thing instead of a military walkover.

Nor was the military potential of the magnates and gentry limited to their officership of the militia. Until the "pacification" of the magnates at the beginning of the seventeenth century (of which more later), one of the most impressive, and perhaps the only truly effective component of the royal forces continued to be the private retinues and followings of the magnates. Henry VII had acted firmly against these private armies, and his successors followed his policy of strictly licensing and controlling them; but they proved indispensable for conducting foreign expeditions and repressing internal disorders. When Henry VII prepared to meet Simnel before the battle of Stoke (1487), he certainly "ordered musters" of the shire-levies in the Southeast and Northwest; but, so Francis Bacon informs us, he was reinforced by "the Earl of Shrewsbury and Lord Strange, of the nobility, and of knights and gentlemen to the number of at least threescore and ten persons, with their companies; making in the whole, at least six thousand fighting men" (Spedding 1963: 57). In 1549, says Bruce Wernham (Wernham 1966: 189), "it was the gentlemen and nobles with their retinues, and foreign mercenaries, who had to crush the rebellion." In the invasion year of 1588, the army, especially intended for the defense of the queen's person with a paper strength of some 45,000 men, drew over one-third of that number from the private retainers of the nobility, the court officials, and the prelates (Boynton 1967).

The third element mentioned was the foreign mercenaries. Henry VII had gathered some three to four thousand Germans and Italians for service in the Scottish campaign at the end of his reign and, in 1549, providentially for the government of Edward VI, some three thousand of them were in camp at Hounslow. It was detachments of this force that proved decisive in defeating the Western Rising, and the rebellion of Kett in East Anglia.

Tudor and early Stuart England was still a hierarchical society where the concept of "degree" commanded widespread acceptance; the commoners looked to the gentlemen and the nobility as their natural leaders (cf. Tillyard 1962: 10-20, on "The Elizabethan World Order," and his references to contemporary sources such as the *Book of Homilies*, and Higden's *Polychronicon*). Furthermore, there continued to persist, through the civil wars and into the eighteenth century a quasi-feudal link between landlord and tenant. The tenant expected to ride with his lord; indeed, up to the middle of the eighteenth century, on the Border, this was often inscribed into the lease as one of the tenant's obligations.

Thus the nobility and gentry with their companies afforded the militia as well as commanded it. That these conditions did not perpetuate the chronic disorders of the Wars of the Roses was due to a consistent and cumulative royal policy of strict license and control, their progressive disarmament of the private stores of weapons, and of an all but total restriction on private fortification. It was due too, to the mutual destruction of the greatest of the magnate families during the Wars of the Roses; to the progressive reduction in the size of individual estates; and to a very rapid decline in the nobles' experience of taste for warfare which set in at the end of Elizabeth's reign and during the first forty years of the seventeenth century. Lawrence Stone has shown that in 1559, out of sixty-two families, eighteen possessed over seventy manors apiece; but that in 1641, out of one hundred twenty-one families, only six did so. Again he states that in the 1540s, three-quarters of the Peers had participated in battle; in 1576 only one-quarter; in the early seventeenth century a mere one-fifth; and by the time of the civil wars, even less (Stone 1967: 96-134). In France the situation during this period was far different as will be seen. The king's command over the contingents of his regular standing forces was, indeed, as in England, in the hands of the local nobility and the gentry; and as in England the magnates could and did call out their tenants to ride with them. But these

were a very different kind of nobleman from the English, in two major respects. First, they had been engaged in warfare almost constantly from the first invasion of Italy in 1494. Second, there remained magnates on a medieval scale, for example, Montmorency who in 1559 owned over six hundred manors.

The Tudor monarch then was limited, limited by the disposition of the militiamen to follow their officers (the magnates and the gentry) in an unpopular cause, but limited again, and more strictly, by the disposition of these magnates and gentry to follow or not follow the royal policy. The magnates and gentry were a tax-paying class. Also, they were the unpaid agents of the crown in everything that was going on in the administration of the shires. And they had a focus in Parliament and in the Quarter Sessions. These strategic positions—over the armed forces, over local administration, and over the tax granting authority, i.e., Parliament—all reinforced each other; and they checked the disposition of any monarch to replace their services by paid soldiers and paid administrators, because they were in a position to deny him the finance required to do so.

When this same militia format was carried over to the early Stuarts, the nature of this limiting power became more obvious. If Charles I did not care to believe that his sovereignty was limited, events taught him otherwise. With a standing army the result could have been very different. This is shown by the very opposite experience of the Protectorate. When, with fifteen hundred men at the back, each major general could rule his portion of the Commonwealth, taxation was *five* times greater than it had been under Charles. If a citizen did not care to pay, then a Colonel and a troop of horses could and did make him. The standing army completed the extraction-coercion cycle, and it buttressed the new style-of-rule absolutism. The interlude ended after the death of Cromwell; and the crisis that led to the fall of the experiment was typically enough provoked by a tax strike of the City of London. A situation which in 1638–1642 had led to defection from the king now led to the opposite result: defection from the Protectorate.

With the Restoration occurred another radical transformation in the military format: the germ of the regular standing army of native paid volunteers. The militia was indeed retained but with significant modifications in its officers corps. Under Charles II the regular army was at first a mere 4,500 men. But James II raised it to some 30,000. A force of this size was ample to suppress uprisings as it did Mon-

mouth's Rebellion. It was expensive, but the sharply increased yield from the customs, which had been voted to James for his reign, saw to the expense. It was also far more efficient than a militia. But how politically reliable was it? It is a common assumption that standing armies are not just a necessary, but a sufficient prop for absolute rule. Yet the defection of Charles I's standing *navy* to the Parliament casts doubts on this, so does the defection of General Monck; and so, certainly does James II's experience. It is here that the belief-cycle enters the calculus. Had James II been a loyal Protestant, he might have gone far to realize his pretensions to absolutism, at least to asserting much greater power for the crown. But when his Twelfth Foot openly refused to accept his Declaration of Indulgence, when troops cheered the acquittal of the Seven Bishops, these were indications that a standing army itself may well have limits of loyalty, equally with a civic militia. The principal commanders went over to a Dutchman (and Holland was not popular with Englishmen) and to his mercenary troops. This was far more than the shire-levies had done when they supported Henry VII against Germans and Irishmen at the Battle of Stoke. In 1688 the commanders of the regular force threw its corporate future as well as that of the monarchy itself into the hands of a Parliament dominated by the greater and the lesser landed families.

Therein lies the key to what, with some reversals and vicissitudes, became the Settlement of 1688 and of 1714.

With the wars against Louis XIV the British military effort took on unprecedented dimensions. Extraction occurred on a vast scale. At one point the British army reached 75,000 men, while the navy had some 200 ships. For this, great sums were necessary. Whereas, before 1688, annual revenue had run at some two million pounds, it amounted to seventy-two million pounds between 1689 and 1702, and to ninety-nine million pounds between 1702 and 1711. Of this 40 percent went to the army and 35 percent to the navy. Part of this sum was met by greatly increased taxation. Between 1688 and 1697 revenue doubled, and it doubled again between then and 1714. Even this did not suffice and the deficit was met by public loans. In the Spanish Succession War thirty-five million pounds was borrowed to cover the gap. The technique of the money market had been mastered, and with the assistance of the recently founded Bank of England, government annuities and other interest-bearing stocks were issued on a considerable scale. Furthermore, these public loans were

guaranteed by Parliament, a move that at one and the same time, stabilized public credit, attached the lenders to the 1688 Settlement, and thus stabilized the political situation.

This attests a certain reconciliation to the new fact in national development: a standing army. That this was so is explicable only within the framework of the political settlements. First, Parliament had not only achieved supremacy but the initiative. It could, as Blackstone was to attest, "regulate the succession to the Throne," and by doing it made William III and George I dependent on Parliament for their very titles. The monarch did indeed command the armed forces, as is still true to this day, but his ability to use this as an instrument of personal despotism was limited in four major ways.

In the first place, any such attempt on their part could have brought them into collision with the law courts, since the Bill of Rights declared that the maintenance of a standing army in peacetime without the assent of Parliament was illegal, while the Mutiny Acts, which alone permitted military offenses against discipline to be tried by courts martial, was passed for six monthly or annual intervals.

Second, the attempt would have brought them into collision with Parliament. For the vast sums required to maintain the land and sea forces were specifically appropriated for these uses by Parliament.

Third, the attempt could hardly have found any social support: the settlement confirmed the greater landlords in the possession of Parliament and the squires of the administration of the counties. Whig landlords and their associates in the Bank of England and the mercantile classes favored land as well as sea warfare; many squires and "country party" favored the traditional sea policy only. So many Tory gentlemen hated the standing army, feared it, and seized every opportunity to try to disband it and rely on the fleet and the militia. Now commissions were purchased, and the officers came, for the most part from the younger sons of Whiggishly inclined families. These, affiliated by kinship or class ties with Peers and MP's, were hardly likely to assist the crown to overturn the very settlement of which they were the chief beneficiaries, while the "country party" who detested the standing army, had little influence inside it, and was even less likely to wish to use it to reintroduce despotism. In short the *stratification* cycle now played a decisive part in ensuring the political reliability of the standing army. For it was officered and commanded by an extension of the very same families who con-

trolled Parliament. It was this aristocratic complexion of both which provided the social checks and balances which gave reality to the legal enactments governing the status of the armed forces.

Fourth and finally, the militia had been reestablished in 1660. Two conceptions of its role began to emerge: the militia as the "people in arms," as a counterbalance to the small regular forces; and a select and well-trained militia, to serve as an auxiliary to these regular forces. The first conception, the militia as the people at large, prevailed at first. Used for internal repression against the surviving republicans and against the sectaries, the revived militia rapidly degenerated after about 1670, and was all but ineffectual as a fighting force. But, insofar as it was an armed force at all, it was controlled by officers, from the lords lieutenant downward, who were magnates or gentlemen, i.e., the men of property in the shires. The militia was remodeled in 1757, in the face of yet another invasion scare; this time according to the second conception, of a trained and select auxiliary force. Significantly, this act laid down an explicit set of property qualifications for the officers. A colonel had to possess an income from real estate of at least 400 pounds per annum, a lieutenant colonel and major an income from the same source of 300 pounds, a captain 200 pounds, a lieutenant 100 pounds, and an ensign 50 pounds. This reproduced the social hierarchy of the country landowners. The militia was neither a popular force, nor a royalist one. Militarily it was not very efficient. Costwise it was cheap. Its political loyalty went to the parliamentary settlement.

Thus, this complex combination of arms and format—a powerful standing navy, a tiny peacetime regular army only reluctantly expanded for expeditions to Europe and the colonies, and an aristocratically controlled militia—was linked *via* the social stratification cycle to the political arrangements, i.e., to the style-of-rule. This was rule by the "Venetian Oligarchy" with an aristocratized monarchy; and this itself, reflecting as it did the real sources of wealth in society, was linked to the condition of the economy; and this in turn was linked to the extraction cycle, which, in these circumstances was therefore able to pour out the great sums required for eighteenth-century warfare.

State and Format in France to 1715

The way and the sequence in which the territorial entity we now know as France was created was such that there would be deep

durable separatism in its component parts. Second, the early petrification of nobility into a privileged stratum, without counterpart in England, created a different relationship between the king and his nobles. Consequent upon these two factors, vast territorial entities persisted under the control of local grandee families who assumed, albeit in the king's name, influence or control over his civil and, above all, his military servants. In France a specialized civil bureaucracy developed to such a degree that by the time of Charles I in England, who had some two thousand officers, there were four thousand in the Province of Normandy alone. For 1562 (some half a century anterior to this), a conservative estimate puts the number of officials in France as a whole at over 43,000. Since then the creation of new posts had proceeded with increasing rapidity. (Certainly, if one compared senior ranks of *central* bureaucracies there was not a wide discrepancy: the vast expansion in France took place in *local* servants of the king—all but unknown in England.)

Furthermore France had the first corps of a regular standing army as early as 1445. Its effects were to help expand the territorial frontier to something like its present dimensions by the first decades of the eighteenth century, to create an enormous fiscal burden, unequally shared but which, by the expedient of the venality of offices contributed a vast pseudobureaucratization. These two factors, combined with the privileged status of the nobility, placed obstacles in the path of turning the Estates-General into a body similar to the English Parliament. Most importantly, until the reign of Louis XIV, the military establishment of France, irrespective of its format—feudal, semifeudal, semiprivate, or the regular standing army—not only never excluded the disaggregation of the France created in preceding centuries, but at times positively assisted this process.

First, while England in 975 was a unified kingdom, whose permanent frontiers were still unfixed only in the far north, France was a number of autonomous counties and duchies, of vast size and strength, like Normandy, Brittany, Burgundy, Gascony, Aquitaine, and the like, owing only a nominal subordination to the suzerain, the king of France, who effectively controlled through his own royal officers, only a small strip of demesne around Paris. While the Danish kings, then the English line, and finally the Norman kings were gradually effacing the political and administrative particularism of the old heptarchy on French territory, as fast as the Capetian kings extended their personal sway through their own officers in the

county of Francia, equally so did the counts and dukes in the peripheral counties and duchies. There was a race toward centralization. So by the time when the kings were powerful enough, from the end of the twelfth through the early fourteenth centuries, to impose a real suzerainty over their nominal vassals, they could at best *superimpose* their control over a number of political entities whose institutions were well entrenched. In short, they could aggregate a kingdom of the Franks rather than homogenize a "France." By the end of the reign of Philippe le Bel, on the eve of the Hundred Years War, some two thirds of the territory of present-day France had been brought together in this way.

Second, by this date, after the process commencing in the middle of the twelfth century, it was feudal law that unless the King willed otherwise, only those whose father or grandfather in the male line had been knights could themselves become knights; that the privileges of *noblesse* attached to all the progeny of a noble family not just to the eldest son as in England.

If one adds to the particularism of the French kingdom these privileges of the hereditary caste of the nobility, one has the key to the role of the military in state-building. The process that the school history books talk of as "centralizing" resided essentially in the king having his services rendered him in the localities by his own officers, not *via* the intermediation of the local grandees. In practice, up to the personal rule of Louis XIV, the grandees managed after a lapse of time to acquire or at least to control these "royal" offices. The *baillies* and *seneschaux*, appointed by Philippe Auguste as his personal representatives, had suffered such a fate by the middle of the fourteenth century. Thenceforward, they were, from time to time, superseded by extraordinary lieutenants general. It was they who took over the collection of taxes, and the mustering and disposition of the royal forces. But these, we find, were invariably great magnates, very often princes of blood. By the sixteenth century these, now styled governors, were a permanent institution. Francis I tried to curtail their powers and confine the office only to the militarily threatened border provinces, but in vain. In the Wars of Religion both sides appointed their own local governors in the places they occupied. Richelieu, when he took office in 1624, described all the governors as "great lords." He involved himself in local financial activities by sending out his own royal commissioners, the origins of

the *intendants* developed by Mazarin and then by Louis XIV. Only then, at the office of *intendant*, does this progressive relapse of royal offices into the maw of the local magnate come to a stop; and only then does the process of centralization become continuous and cumulative.

Thus in the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, in each of the historic provinces, a governor, nominally a king's officer, but in practice a great noble, like the Condés and the Guise, these and their lessers, held the governorships and with them a certain control over local finance and the disposition of the troops. Not only that. The great historic controlling officers of the armed forces, the constable, the admirals, the marshals, were nearly always drawn from one of these great families also. And below them, the field officers were all noble, admittedly many from poor country gentry, but noble nonetheless. In the sixteenth century only about one in ten was a commoner.

Now after the Hundred Years War, while the British military effort went into decline, the French effort greatly increased and was to do so continuously until the Battle of Waterloo. One reason was the extraction-coercion cycle in France. For a number of reasons the Estates-General had failed to make good a claim like the English Parliament's, to control taxation; in the closing years of the Hundred Years War money had been raised, for instance by the Constable de Richemont, by military execution, and folk had got used to this; the Estates had in 1439 voted Charles VII the *taille*, and he acted as though this was for his entire reign; the Estates of Charles VIII had in 1484 given him enough to go on his Italian campaign but he too continued to raise it on his own authority; in any case, it was the numerous local assemblies and Estates who were responsible for agreeing to pay taxes and decide the amount and these undercut the power and prestige of the Estates-General; in sum there was no central constitutional organ of opposition to taxation by *fiat* similar to England's and consequently money for the wars could be found more easily in France than across the Channel. If the taxpayer resisted, the troops would make short work of that.

The *stratification cycle* also had its role. The French nobility, owing to the laws of derogation, had usually no other activity, apart from farming, than warfare. They were always at the ready to urge their monarchs on. The kings for their part were vainglorious: hence

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the Italian wars. Finally, with the sudden rise of Hapsburg power there arose a genuine threat to the French southern, eastern, and northeastern frontiers.

The effects of the royal and noble perception of risk-opportunity was to add a new twist to the extraction-coercion spiral, already severely deepened by Louis XI. And this cycle has an important side effect, on state-building, in that it vastly speeded up functional differentiation, as well as helping to hold or expand the territorial limits.

The fiscal burden has been estimated by Nef, in his *Industry and Government in France and England* (Nef 1940: 126-129) as follows:

<i>Period</i>	<i>France</i>	<i>England</i>
1537-1546	£ 800,000	£ 200,000
1603-1612	3,600,000	275,000
1636-1642	9,000,000	660,000

Since the population of France was four times greater than England's the real burden per capita, after starting equal, had risen to five times the English rate; and if we accept the estimates of Gregory King that the French per capita national income was half that of England, then the extraction of resources in France was *ten times* heavier than that in England.

To raise money kings of France resorted increasingly to the practice of selling offices; then to creating offices in order to sell them; then, by *la Paulette* of 1604, to imposing a tax on the private right to resell or otherwise transmit this office. An office usually brought tax exemption—it proved a source of investment; often too it carried fees or a salary with it; and sometimes it brought ennoblement. So grew up the *noblesse de robe* who staffed the sovereign law courts, among other great organs of the state. The effects of *vénalité* were to expand the bureaucracy far beyond the requirements of French society. Desmarets, Comptroller of Finance to Louis XIV, once brought his master a list of offices which he proposed to create for sale. Louis expressed astonishment at anybody wishing to purchase such absurd offices to which his comptroller replied: "Sire when the King of France creates an office, God immediately creates an idiot to buy it."

The third and very clear effect of the wars was to expand French territory, but for all that and what the legists proclaimed under Francis I, the realm was not homogenized; it was still a patchwork,

an aggregate, a mosaic. The latent centrifugal forces broke out after the Peace of Cateau-Cambrésis of 1559, a peace forced on both Valois and Hapsburg by the simultaneous exhaustion of all their ready sources of war finance, and by their bankruptcy. One immediate effect was the restlessness of warlike nobility, Huguenot and Catholic alike, without warlike occupation. The other was the creation of a veritable set of states inside the state as the Calvinist local organizations sprouted upward into provincial federations. France exploded into the Wars of Religion. In these once more are displayed those two historic factors: the rivalry of great houses—in this case, notably, Guise, Bourbon, and Montmorency; and the particularism of the provinces in which they and their *grandes clientèles* held sway—in Lorraine, in Champagne, in Dauphiny, and in Languedoc particularly—of which they were the governors. The royal army—a standing army—split its allegiance just as the English militia was to do, later; thus, the supposed instrument of royal power and centralization, split into factions, each following its local magnates.

But there was, after all, an alternative format available to the king: foreign mercenary troops. Why, it may be asked, did he not opt for this format? The short answer is that the kings or regents did do so; but so did their Huguenot opponents! The war was fought at first by rival sections of the regular army, then by those afforded by volunteer militias; but all the time, each side called in foreign mercenaries to redress a military balance. In brief, up to this point neither the standing army nor the grossly overswollen bureaucracy was an effective instrument of unification.

The events from the death of Henry IV (1610) to the end of *La Fronde* (1653) confirm these hypotheses. In this half century, the interlinkage of the most important of the cycles is prominent and clear. Style-of-rule, together with state-building, is linked, as before, with the persistence of local particularism via the magnates, many of them the Princes of the Blood; this cycle is linked with the beliefs cycle since the legacy of the Wars was the confirmation of the Huguenots in their possession of a hundred towns and strong places, together with their own troops paid for the public Exchequer, and led by the section of Protestant noblemen whose leader was de Rohan. The beliefs cycle thus strengthened already existant particularism. Both it and the state-building cycle continued to link with the stratification cycle—the continuing political and military power of the Houses, of

Montmorency, Orleans, or Bourbon, or Vendôme, especially. And this was associated with revolt in the name of reduced taxation, i.e., of the extraction cycle, and this again with the military format of the time.

The kernel of the army was the group of *vieux régiments*: permanent troops, dependent on the king. When further troops were raised, this was in the form of the *corps entretenus*: the king commissioning their recruitment by a nobleman and paying their keep (nominally at least), but the magnate appointing the officers, and generally leading "His" regiment.

With the onset of the Thirty Years War, the upkeep of such troops increased steeply. Between 1607 and 1622 the expense of the army increased from four and one half million livres to twenty-two million. Where did the extra taxes come from? Not from direct taxes which hardly rose in this period, nor indirect ones which rose only from five to eight million livres nor from the extraordinary income, mostly *rentes*. The bulk of the new taxes came from forced loans, special taxes on officials' fees, or from the sale of new (and competing) offices. Thus it hit especially hard at the office holders, the people who had bought their offices as an investment. Thus the military format, the extraction, and the stratification cycles all link up. The official classes, led by the Gentlemen of the Robe (who, it will be remembered formed the lawyer class and staffed the great Sovereign Parlements) therefore became very prominent in leading social unrest. This is most obvious in the case of the first, the so-called Parliamentary Fronde. For this was sparked off when Mazarin, anxious to raise money for the Spanish War, demanded the *petit bénéfice du roi*. This was a plan by which officers (the Parlementaires of Paris sagely excepted) were to forego *four years receipt* of their salaries. In fact, the Parlement, took the lead of the officers who were hit by the plan; and their demands on the court are significant. No new offices were to be created (which would have made the bureaucracy a closed hereditary caste); the Parlement must "register" all new taxes; but, also, the new-fangled *intendants*, who were eroding the power of the local finance "officers" were to be abolished.

The people of Paris were induced to throw in their lot with their *Parlement*. Then the princes threw in their lot for or against *Parlement* and for some four years the tragic-comedy of the Fronde convulsed France. A comedy because it was a Feydeau farce version of the parliamentary struggle then taking place in England; and

a tragedy in that it signified, in Lavissee's terms *L'inachèvement de la France*. The king, he pointed out, was saved only "by the loyalty of a few unknown officers of the *vieux régiments*." But also, it must be observed, he was saved by the money power of Mazarin who on one occasion succoured the Court at the head of some 6,000 mercenaries from Germany, and on another occasion was able to intercept and buy off the advance of the Duke of Lorraine and his mercenaries while they were on the march to join his enemies.

Lavissee, in the same passage, described how it was that a prince like Condé could enjoy this formidable power; and it provides a fitting commentary and also an epilogue for all that I have said so far, in respect to the marriage between French local particularism and the French *noblesse*.

The Princes and the magnates were the patrons of clientèles. Condé had his vassals and subjects in his duchies of Enghien, Chateauroux, Montmorency, Albert and Fronsac. He had his own regiments whose loyalty lay solely to him. In September 1651 these regiments lay on the frontier of Picardy, facing the Spaniards but separated from the other forces. On Condé's orders they left their posts and marched up the Loire to fight the king's army. The officers commanding the fortresses of which he was Governor, Dijon, Bellegarde in Burgundy, Clermont, Janetz, and Stenai in Lorraine, Montrond in the Bourbonnais took orders only from him. His authority was great in the Provinces which he governed in the name of the King. Furthermore great personages were linked to him by commitments and Governors of Provinces like the Comte d'Aubernon who was a Marshal of France, or Tavannes who was an army commander. These personages formed the *grande clientèle* of the Prince. The petty clientèle was extremely numerous. Condé then had all the means of making war. His quality as Prince of the Blood gave him almost the right to do so. . . .

If 1653 saw the triumph Mazarin and the crown over the princes and the *Parlements*, together with the reinstatement and reinforcement of the *intendants* and the consolidation of royal control, then 1661—the personal rule of Louis XIV—saw the triumph, not just of the crown but of the king: the king in his own person. Louis decided to govern personally and without a first minister, and the secular alternation between royal control and aristocratic reaction swung, irrev-

ocably until the pre-Revolution, against the aristocracy. Under Louis's personal direction all the conditions which had established the situation in the previous centuries were done away with. The pomp of the ancient nobility was exaggerated, but its political and administrative and military functions whittled away; the functions were taken over by those of middling rank personally selected by Louis. The provinces came under his own *intendants*. The army came under his own war minister and later on, himself. In St.-Simon's bitter words, it was the advent of the reign of the *vile bourgeoisie*.

Here the technology cycle and the extraction cycle interlink and react on each, and both interact with the gradual style-of-rule.

The style-of-rule was a reflection of Louis's personal ambitions. They were to become absolute, and to seek *la gloire*. He immediately excluded the Princes of the Blood from their traditional place on the Council, even shutting out his brother, the Dauphin. Instead he relied on his own middle rankers: men like Colbert, Le Tellier (and later his son Louvois) and de Lionne. The magnates were extruded from their provincial commands. In his *Mémoires* he relates how he downgraded the governorships:

What had hitherto made the Governors (of the frontier fortresses) so absolute in their strongholds, was the freedom which had been given them to handle tax funds during the war, (the pretext having been to maintain the security and the good repair of these strongholds) but which in so far as they amounted to enormous sums in the hands of individuals, made them too powerful and too absolute. In addition, they were free to make up their garrisons from troops who were their dependents. I therefore resolved to take from them by stealth, both the former power and the latter. From one day to another I so arranged things that only troops of soldiers who depended on me alone should garrison all the important towns. . . . In this way, something that no-one would ever have dreamed of proposing a few years before was accomplished without any difficulty or fuss—with everybody simply waiting upon my orders and, indeed receiving more legitimate rewards from me for carrying out his duties (*Mémoires de Louis XIV*, ed. Charles Dreyss, 1860: vol. II, 402).

As the office of governor was eroded in this way, so in each fiscal *généralité* (at the end of the century there would be twenty-four), there was now an *intendant* (who would be a gentleman of the robe), as the king's personal representative in the locality who, with a growing staff of police, administrative and financial *subdélégués*, asserted royal authority. And this office of *intendant* was not purchasable; and, furthermore, it was revocable by the king.

At the same time he excluded the magnates from their military control. But this deliberate act was made not only possible but desirable by the new twist in the technological cycle. Louis's wars were frequent and on a larger scale than ever before: the War of Devolution, 1666-1668, the Dutch War, 1672-1678, the Nine Years War, 1688-1697, and the Spanish Succession War, 1702-1713. In the first of these, Louis deployed 70,000 troops; in the last, some 400,000. War was now a protracted matter, not turning on the outcome of one set battle. In winter troops went into quarters where they trained, while recruiting officers scoured the country for replacements. In spring, when forage was available and the roads passable, the campaign resumed. War had become a thing of siege and fortifications, lines of communication and marches of manoeuvre. It now depended critically on equipment, forage, rolling stock, quarters. In sum, it had become based on *logistics*. At the same time the French fought in a number of theaters simultaneously: in Flanders, on the Rhine, in Spain, for instance. Many armies took the field at once and had to be provisioned and also manoeuvred simultaneously. In short, something like what we today think of as a general staff had become an operational necessity. This direction was in fact provided by Le Tellier, then Louvois, together with the king himself.

Now the necessity for such a remote control in itself would have reduced the former independence of commanders in the field. But this tendency was quite in harmony with the personal intentions of the monarch. The result was the "civilianization" of the army. The office of constable was abolished; so was the office of colonel of infantry. The office of marshal was downgraded by increasing the number of marshals from one or two to twelve. While the purchase of colonelcies and captaincies was not abolished, a number of intermediate ranks like lieutenant, captain, major, were created whose commissioning lay solely with the crown. Thus the number of officers directly dependent on him enormously increased, and it is sig-

nificant that in 1702 Louis should have created no less than 7,000 commissions as rewards for the aristocracy. Finally, the operations in the field were made directly dependent on the orders of the office at Versailles. In vain did first Condé and then Turenne protest against this control in 1673. They were told to obey. In vain did General Belmost, a lesser light, protest; Louis threatened to dismiss him.

And so the army, hitherto the preserve of the *grande*s of each province, became, like the provinces themselves, the docile servants of the king at Versailles. For the first time the theory of the style-of-rule came to correspond more or less closely with the actuality: absolute monarchy.

This had its effects on the extraction cycle. The wars bled France white in money and also in men. To make up the gaps in the ranks, the king ordained the militia (by ballot) between 1702 and 1713. Naturally, there were anticonscription riots. Likewise for taxation. The war budget of 1683 was 38 million livres. In 1706 it was 100 million and if we include fortification, artillery, and provisions, it was 145 million. Between 1700 and 1706 the cost was 1,100 million livres. Some of this was brought in by public loans. Some came through debasement of the currency. A good deal was made on the creation and sale of new public offices. For all that taxation increased very sharply indeed. Unequally distributed it had always fallen with undue severity on the poor. In these years, poor harvests increased the popular misery. The last years of the reign were plagued by anti-taxation riots. But the situation no longer resembled the one after the death of Henry IV or the days of the Fronde. The *intendants* called in the troops and the troops came. By 1715 *format*, i.e., the (regular standing army), extraction, and style-of-rule (absolutism)—all mutually supported one another. And so with some vicissitudes they were to continue to do so until the crippling expenses of the American war led to another financial crisis. Then the gentlemen of the robe would see fit to exploit the popular grievances. The last aristocratic *fronde* would begin with different consequences. Not just king, but aristocracy and the entire constitutional fabric would totter and dissolve away.

State and Format in Brandenburg-Prussia to 1740

In 1619 there was no *state* of Prussia. There was a clutch of distinct territories—states if one wishes—which had all come, by the

accident of hereditary descent, under the dominion of George William of the ruling line of the Hohenzollerns. On the lower Rhine, adjacent to Holland lay diminutive Clèves. Roman Catholic by faith, its nobles paid taxes, its peasants were freemen. It was dominated by its powerful Estates. So too was the very different Duchy of Prussia far to the east on the borders of Poland to whom its Duke, George William, owed fealty. This area was a once Slav land, conquered by the German Teutonic Order of Knights in the fourteenth century. They held down the native Slavs, while introducing German peasants from the west to colonize the land. The order had been dissolved when its last grand master turned Protestant in 1525, becoming, with the king of Poland's collusion, the duke of Prussia. Apart from Königsberg, Prussia was a poor agricultural economy, where monetization had still not made great strides. Power resided in the hands of the Estates, dominated by the nobles, who, for their part, could always play off the demands of the duke by turning for aid to his suzerain, the king of Poland. The central territory was Brandenburg, a mark originally set up to guard Charlemagne's eastern frontier against the Slavs, and which, like Prussia, had been colonized by Germans from further west. This too was poor agricultural territory, dominated by the nobles in the Estates which, like those of Prussia had by now succeeded in exercising control over all extraordinary taxation (i.e., taxation proper, other than the proceeds from the ruler's own domains which were, however, extensive), over foreign policy, and even over the raising and administration of troops.

In the Thirty Years War, Brandenburg was occupied by Swedish troops who levied taxes without the sanction of the Estates, thereby habituating the peasant population to military exaction. Its only troops were some ten thousand ruffian and inefficient mercenaries who seem to have been more a menace to the native populations than to the enemy. But with peace restored and the territories (apart from Pomerania) back in his possession a new Elector, Frederick William, who had succeeded in 1640, having decided that these territories formed an indissoluble patrimony and that the resources of the one ought to be put to the assistance of the others, tried to get the Estates of Brandenburg to grant him money to raise more mercenaries than the mere 1,300 which he had at the time of the peace. From this starting point we see emerge a state—i.e., a consolidated

territory, ruled firmly by a common superior, via a specialized bureaucracy.

By 1740 apart from relatively minor peculiarities in the Rhenish provinces, the territories had a common administrative structure, a population of some 3,000,000, and an army of 80,000; the ruler, now a king, was absolute, with a bureaucracy that was the most numerous per head of population in Europe. At the center of this evolution lay the extraction-coercion cycle. A set of officials, to control the logistics of the expanding army on the one side, and to extract revenue for it on the other, commingled to form a dense, hard-working excessively regulated and regulatory bureaucracy; and this formed the spinal column of a *state*. It must be noted too, however, that the stratification cycle also played an important part; it determined the format of the army, and gave a distinctive stamp to the Prussian form of absolutism.

Frederick William, the Great Elector, convened the Estates of Brandenburg in 1650, in the hope that they would provide him with additional taxes, so as to raise the number of his troops which at that time were barely requisite for garrison duty. Now the standard tax was the *contribution*, a land tax. In the towns, however, it was a gross tax fixed at a traditional rate, while in the rural countryside it was apportioned among themselves by the local nobles in each *Kreis*, who appointed one of their number as *Kreisdirektor*. The nobles themselves paid no tax; it was their peasants who paid. The Elector desired to replace this system by a general excise such as the Dutch were using. The nobility refused. Such a tax, they argued, would bear on them equally with the commoners. Finally, they agreed to grant the Elector half a million thalers over the next six years in return for the most far-reaching social concessions. The excise plan was to be abandoned forever. In addition, the noblemen's lands were protected from falling into nonnoble hands except in very special circumstances. Most important of all, the onus of proof as to whether a peasant were free or servile was now shifted to the peasant. In practice this meant the widespread extension and consolidation of the institution of serfdom throughout Brandenburg. This ratification of the division of the population into (apart from the as yet unimportant towns) lord and serf, noble and commoner was to have the most far-reaching consequences for the future polity and to set a distinctive stamp upon the military format until the defeat at Jena

in 1806, and in many respects well into the third quarter of the nineteenth century.

This solution is known as the Recess of 1653. With the new taxes, the Elector raised the number of his soldiers—all mercenaries—to 4,000. But in 1655 war broke out between Brandenburg's powerful neighbors, Sweden and Poland; and in this the Elector decided to play a part. He requested more money. He was refused. Why for example, should the Estates of Brandenburg or of Clèves pay for the ambitions of their prince in respect of his Duchy of Prussia? The Elector resorted to collecting the taxes willy-nilly by military execution. The peasants tried to resist; the troops enforced payment. Many peasants emigrated. But in two years alone Frederick William already had raised the half million thalers which the Estates had granted him for the period of an entire six years; and the extraction continued in proportion while the number of troops increased throughout the war period to the peace, in 1660, by which time, from a war strength of 22,000, they remained on a permanent standing basis of 10,000.

In 1666 the Elector convened the Estates and once again tried to introduce the general excise. Again the nobles refused. Frederick William now sanctioned the continuation of the land tax in the rural areas while permitting such towns as desired it to use the excise. In order to assist in the adjudication of the disputes in which this tax frequently involved the town councils, the Elector appointed officials known as *Steuerräte*. The "permissive" excise did not prove very satisfactory. In 1680 the Elector made it compulsory in the towns, while retaining the land tax in the country; thus permanently sanctioning the division of the tax system into the town and rural system; excise on the one hand and *Kontribution* on the other. The former being administered by the Elector's own paid officials, the *Steuerräte*, the latter by the nobles and their *Kreisdirektor*, who was nominated by his fellows but appointed by the Elector as his local representative and agent.

An excise is an interfering kind of tax: it requires location and control of the flows of merchandise, their prices, weights, and the like. In a very poor country with a ruler determined to husband his most minute resources, the supervision of the *Steuerräte* soon extended into the minutiae of municipal life. Within a few decades the locally appointed mayors and elected councils had disappeared and

municipal affairs lay solely in the hands of the *Steuerräte*: important officers, controlling some ten or twelve towns, and with a numerous petty bureaucracy working under them. The Decree of 1689 specified their duties. They included the control of food prices, weights and measures, house-building, fire precautions, the regulation of streets and rivers, the opening of markets, as well as a large number of functions designed to promote and expand the trade on which the yield of the tax was based.

Not only did the introduction of the excise erode and then destroy municipal self-government, it led to the euthanasia of the Estates. For, this tax being indefinitely expansible, the Elector no longer needed to call the Estates together for further increases in taxation. With the new revenue, the bureaucracy, the standing army, the eclipse of the Estates and the extinction of local self-government, the Elector found himself absolute!

But this was merely in the Mark of Brandenburg. The Elector had wanted the same excise system elsewhere. The Estates of Cleves objected to further taxation. The Elector's troops overawed them. Thereafter, in return for a generous recognition of their privileges, these Estates began the practice of making handsome revenue grants. The result was the persistence of their Estates as a working body well into the eighteenth century. Not so in the Duchy of Prussia. There a constitutional quarrel supervened on the Elector's demands for more money and the introduction of the excise. As a result of his alliance with the King of Poland in the 1655-1660 war, the Duke was now recognized by the King of Poland as sovereign. This undercut the position of the pro-Polish faction in Prussia who had hitherto relied on the Polish King to support them against their Duke. They demanded that their assent be purchased at the price of very considerable concessions. Finally, in exasperation, the Elector quartered some 2,000 troops in Prussia in 1663. He got his money, after confirming the privileges of the Estates and promising to reconvene them in six years time. In 1669 the pro-Polish resistance broke out afresh. This time the Elector sought out the heads of the faction. Its leader was hunted down, brought to Brandenburg, and finally, executed. With this the resistance of the Prussian Diet ended. Its strength had been further undermined by the Elector fixing the excise as the local tax for Königsberg, while leaving the rural nobility with their tax exempt status under the traditional land tax arrangement in the countryside. This split the material interests of the

Estates into those of townsfolk and nobility. After 1715 the Prussian Estates met only for ceremonial occasions.

So, by the 1670s, there were three sets of local officers collecting revenue. First, the *Kreisdirektor* for the land tax. Next, the *Steuer-räte* for the excise in the towns; third, the *Amtskammers*, working upward to the central *Hofkammer*, and responsible for farming and managing the prince's extensive estates, which alone provided about half the total revenue.

It is necessary to stress yet again: the extensive tax-gathering machinery had been devised and expanded solely in order to expand and maintain a permanent force of troops. But the troops had other military and administrative needs as well. Here *format* interlinks with the extraction-coercion cycle in the following way.

The troops were paid volunteers, some native and some foreign. In the Thirty Years War the Electors had followed the prevalent continental pattern: they commissioned colonels to raise, equip, appoint officers to, and supply a fighting force for their services. The arrangement was governed by a contract, *Kapitulation*. This was supervised by an official, the *Kriegskommissar*, who checked the arrangements and fulfillment of the contract, and administered the oath of allegiance. Between the Recess of 1653 and the end of the Great Elector's reign in 1688, the number of permanently retained troops rose from 4,000 to 30,000. With this degree of permanency, the office of *Kriegskommissar* became permanent also, and similar degrees of permanency began to attach to other parts of the arrangements for the troops. The Elector drew the contracts in vaguer ways allowing him more scope for interference in the colonels' arrangements; he took up the right to veto the appointments of the junior officers; and his *Kriegskommissar*—a local one in the districts supervised by the *Oberkriegskommissar* of each province—took over the logistical functions: forage, billets, transportation, and supplies. In a non-monetized economy, such services bulked large. Thus the office of war commissar began to interfere very widely with the social and economic life of the district. The War of 1655–1660 brought a temporary expansion of such interference; a field marshal was appointed to command the troops in *all* the territories of the Elector; and a supreme council was established to control and coordinate the work of the provincial *Oberkriegskommissars*. This council was the *General War Commissariat*. Its functions and staff were reduced in the peace after 1660, but when war broke out again in 1679, both

expanded fast and far. Thus had arisen a military-administrative command, with the General War Commissariat at Berlin, working down to the provincial war commissars, and these again to the local ones; and these were very often the local *Kreisdirektors*. Elsewhere, in the towns, they worked down to the *Steuerräte*. In this way the revenue-bureaucracy and the military bureaucracy was fused at the local and the provincial level, and as this occurred, so they were fused at the central level. The General War Commissariat became the administrative organ of *general* administration and control responsible not only for the supply of the army, and the strategic direction of the army, but also for revenue (apart from the Elector's own domains) and for administration *generally*.

In 1640 the total revenue had been one million thalers, half of it from the Elector's own estates. In 1688 it was 3.3 mills, some half coming from his estates. Of this total, it is estimated that between one half and five-sevenths went to service the army. The per capita taxation of this impoverished country was twice that of contemporary France, itself heavily taxed by comparison with England. Observe: in England, 1640 had seen the Parliament assert itself against its king and in 1688, the Glorious Revolution put the seal upon its triumph. In Brandenburg-Prussia in 1640 the noble-dominated Estates had ruled the roost, and the powers of the Elector, had reached their nadir. But in 1688 this same Elector saw his Estates broken, as in Clèves, or extinguished, as in Brandenburg and Prussia; he had a permanent force of 30,000 men; to pay for it and extract services in kind, he had an elaborate paid body of officials, controlled by his General War Commissariat working down to Provincial War Commissariats, which in their own turn worked down to the nobles who provided the service and logistical supports in the countryside, and to the *Steuerräte* who in the towns had by now taken over control of the entire taxation, administration, and economic life. In short, the Elector was absolute and this result had been brought about by the linkage of format, extraction, and state-building culminating in a style-of-rule utterly antipodal to the English monarchy of William III.

Frederick William's successor, Frederick III, had no taste for things military, and there was a pause in this cyclical progression. It is to be noted, however, that from this time the Electors exchanged their title for that of King in Prussia. But under his succes-

sor, Frederick William I (1713–1740) and later still, under Frederick II, the Great (1740–1786), the cycles were deepened, and the extraction-coercion cycle in particular given a new twist.

It was typical of the pietistic psalm-singing Frederick William I, who had campaigned under Marlborough, that he should describe himself as “Chief of General Staff and Minister of Finance to the King of Prussia.” This was the ruler who so doted on his army that he created the Potsdam Grenadier Regiment, every man of which had to be at least six feet tall, and who were recruited or kidnapped for his service from all over Europe. His first act on accession was to pare to bare essentials the court budget in order to spend more on his army; and he altered the table of precedence so that the former court functionaries were replaced by the Field Marshal.

Frederick William also modified the format. He raised the size of the army from 30,000 to 80,000. This created a most serious extraction problem not only in respect to taxes, but also in respect to manpower. Second, he ended the contract system. The *Kapitulationen* disappeared as such. He—or, if one likes, the state—now became responsible for recruitment and for the appointment of the officers. These two changes reacted upon the administrative arrangement that he had inherited.

First, who were to be the officers? Hitherto the native nobility had been averse to serving. Frederick William I made them send their younger sons to his *Kadettenhaus* (established 1722). If they resisted he sent police to fetch the young men. But at the same time he offered inducements: the alterations in the table of precedence which so greatly enhanced the prestige of the officer, the royal custom of wearing always the ordinary uniform of the rest of the officer and cadet corps without distinctive insignia of rank, and above all the regular employment, and the not inconsiderable rates of pay which were attached to an officer’s commission. By the end of his reign, the nobility had not been merely won over; they had become enthusiasts for the King and nine tenths of the officers were the sons of nobles; which is the same as saying, they were sons of individuals who acted as *Kreisdirectors* (since 1702 known as the *Landräte*), who organized the logistics and services of the troops in the rural area, who exacted the *Kontribution* from the peasants, and who ran their estates and governed their serfs in a most arbitrary and absolute way (appointing their pastors, and later on, their schoolmasters,

exacting feudal services from them, and judging criminal and civil cases in which they were involved with the power to inflict penalties that excluded only the power of life or death). This was to have a vital bearing on the other extraction problem: how to supply the recruits for this almost trebled military force.

Only the scum, or most helpless of Europe's population would voluntarily join an army in those days. The King of Prussia had a thousand recruiting officers scouring not only his own lands, but also those of his neighbors to persuade, to con, or even to kidnap "volunteers." It did not suffice. In Prussia the inherent universal obligation to defend with the native territory, such as had endured in England, and with vicissitudes in France, seems to have fallen into oblivion, but Frederick William's Decree of 1713, implied that it existed. In 1732-1733 another decree made it explicit and established a form of military recruitment that would endure down to the defeat at Jena. It was ordained that the territories would be divided into cantons, each capable of supplying the replacements for a regiment of infantry, or of cavalry as the case might be; five thousand families for the former, twelve hundred for the latter. In each, a regimental recruiting officer was to superintend the supply of recruits. Every male birth was notified to him (he was the son of a nobleman, let us remember again) by the local pastors. The recruiting officer would visit and inspect these young male children when they were ten years old. If passed fit, they would wear a red tie to signify that they were destined for the army. The list of exemptions, however, was such that virtually the entire burden fell upon the peasant, which is to say, upon the serf. In short, the noblemen who were the officers of the army, or whose sons were, provided their own serfs and led them into the field for military service; trained them; and controlled them. Yet the needs of the nobleman's farms must not be neglected either. So, after some two years' induction and training under the control of his noble landlord, the serf was returned to the farm to work for that same noble landlord and provide his serf services for some ten months of the year. Then, when spring came, he would don uniform and be led out by his landlord for the spring manoeuvres. Only in wartime, or during these two months of the year, was the Prussian army at full strength. But by the same token the stratification of the army reflected the stratification of the countryside. This was what had been implicit in the Recess of 1653.

But money also was required. This gave another turn to the extraction-coercion cycle. The General War Commissariat consisted of three divisions: for the army, for taxation, and for general administration. But its local officers were always colliding with those other, royal officers, viz. the ones responsible for enhancing the yield of the king's domains. Their constant bickering, especially in the royal courts at the royal expense, led Frederick William I to a final step: merge the two revenue-raising circuits at both the local and the supreme level. Locally, the Domain Chambers were merged with the *Steuer-räte* into the War and Domains Chambers; at the top, the General War Commissariat now took the title of the General-Supreme-Finance-War-and-Domains-Directory. This was broken into four geographical sections; the staff of each met the king personally on its own allocated day of the week. In this way the former War Commissariat had absorbed *all* the administrative jurisdictions in the state!

Not only was this bureaucratic apparatus intensive. It was extensive also. The king transferred it to all the territories—to Prussia, to Pomerania, and, with some modification, to the Rhenish territories. In this way a consolidation of the territories under one common superior occurred, albeit they were geographically separated. They now had common institutions. And finally, the king, who personally controlled the precise machinery which provided one official for every four hundred and fifty inhabitants, was absolute; but absolute in a way which went far beyond that of his contemporary, Louis XV of France. The special style-of-rule in Prussia in 1740 has been perceptively captured by Seeley, in his great *Life of Stein*. This is how he saw it:

Let us then compare the army of Frederick William 1st with other continental armies. It was nearly equal to that of Austria which had a population perhaps about six times as great. It was half as large as that of France whose population was about nine times as great. But if we wish to estimate correctly the effect which this incredible military force must have had upon the state which maintained it, we must take several other facts into consideration. We shall find that both as increasing the absolute power of the Government and as a burden upon the people, the army of Frederick William was much more formidable than

could be inferred from its greater proportionate numbers. For about one third of it consisted of foreign mercenaries, and of the rest the rank and file consisted not in any degree of the educated classes who might be capable of some regard for liberty and some jealousy of arbitrary power, but of agricultural serfs, who even in their own homes lived under a subjection as complete as in the camp. Moreover, overwhelming as is the force which a vast unintelligent standing army gives to a government even at the present day, there are now in every state counteracting influences, some shadow of a Parliament, some pretence at a free press. In Prussia the local Parliaments had almost everywhere passed into insignificance—there was no Mutiny Bill—and in the time of Frederick William the press had no freedom. Nothing counteracted the brute force of this mass of armed slaves, ruled with iron severity and officered by their hereditary masters, the noblesse, who had made themselves in turn, as it were, serfs to their King and Commander-in-Chief, for the Articles of War bound the officer to obedience “even against his own honour.” If we reflect on all this we shall still recognize that Frederick William when he organized the army, achieved a work no less important politically than in a military sense. He created not only a new Great Power in Europe but also a new form of government. For in resting it so mainly on his army and drawing from it such unlimited power he contrived a new variety of monarchy so that the Prussian State from this time does not resemble the model of the France of Louis XV but anticipates modern military bureaucracies, and furnishes a model to Napoleon (Seeley 1968: 172).

The Napoleonic Watershed

With the French Revolution and its Napoleonic aftermath, state-building received a new emphasis while the concept of the nation and of the nation-state became full blown both in the sense of a shared community of purposes, privileges, and benefits, and in the sense of a “peculiar people” exercising its right of self-determination. Certainly, the relationship between rulers and subjects was never quite the same and often significantly different at the close of this episode, from what it had been at its outset, while the notion of national particularity, already quite consciously held by the English for many centuries, and to a degree by the French also, now became

a political dogma that was self-consciously grasped and philosophically elaborated and embellished.

The principal difficulty in assessing this period is to decide what was due to military format and its exigencies, and what was due to the Revolutionary ideas of nationality and citizenship. But three truths stand out. First, it is indisputable that these ideas inhered in the French Revolutionary armies and were carried by them among the peoples they conquered, setting up either a hostile but popular reaction, nationalistic in its feeling, as in Spain, or the Kingdom of Naples, or in Russia, or for that matter in Britain; or else producing some simulacrum of these ideas as a kind of inoculation with which the better to resist the French armies—as in Prussia after 1806. Second, the effects of the events of this period were markedly different in the three countries with which we are here concerned—France itself, Britain, and Prussia. Third, the effects on state-building of the strictly military aspects of these events were relatively restricted, but their prefigurements for state-and-nation-building for the century ahead were enormous.

Let me somewhat expand this last point—as to the immediate effects on state-building of the military formats. In France, the principal effect is in style-of-rule: first, in that for the first time in Europe, with the extraordinary exception of England, 1645–1660, the military emerges as a corporate factor playing its own autonomous role in deciding the succession; second, in the creation of a new type of absolutism, i.e., the military dictatorship of our contemporary model; and third, an altogether excessive degree of centralization of authority. The remainder—the fraternity of social classes, the career open to the talents, the experiments in price control, and acquisition of the “natural” frontiers of France—all turned out to be highly ephemeral. As to England, the principal effect was not upon the style-of-rule, which not only continued unaltered for a decade and a half after the peace and in that period was actively reinforced, but in one of the twin aspects of state-building, an impulsion to the differentiation of functions the “economical reform,” which, adumbrated by Burke in 1780 (as a result, be it noted, of the misadventures of the American War), achieved great impetus during the wars, especially in the administration of the finances. In Prussia the events wrought havoc and dislocation, and led to a partial revolution, but typically from above. The administration was made less Kafkaesque and somewhat more related to popular feelings, the network of military

recruitment was thrown far wider, and socially the fabric was a trifle less oligarchical; but these modifications in the Prussian state were partial, and followed a reaction after 1819.

If, on the other hand, we look at the period as a prefigurement of the future in the light of the immediate past century, i.e., of the *Ancien Régime*, then its significance is profound in the extreme, and it amply merits the title of a "watershed." The 1914-1945 period witnessed strictly national armies; war *à outrance* and the total mobilization of the entire resources of a country, i.e., extraction on its most extensive scale and industrialized logistics. On the social and political fronts, it saw the completion of the developments in citizenship, popular participation, and of the notion of equality as the social and political counterparts of these; and also, if not democratic forms of rule, then ones that were "populist" in the sense of at least appearing to do something to cater for the needs of the masses. Finally, turning strictly to the military, it saw the wide spreading of the divergence between loyalty to the format (i.e., the corporate interest of the military) and the loyalty to the regime—the precondition of military intervention or takeover of government.

In all these respects, the contrast with the *Ancien Régime* is very great indeed. That was an age of multinational armies; of limited dynastic wars fought for colonies and provinces; and with logistics that were primitive and cumbersome. It was an age too of increasingly oligarchic rule coupled with the oligarchies' lack of interest in making social provision for the subjects they administered. And it was an age where, as we have stressed, in each of our three countries, the loyalty to the format had been assimilated to loyalty to the regime—an age where the military forces had been rendered docile instruments of the public authorities whether Britain's Parliament, or the kings of France or of Prussia.

Yet few of these features were seriously modified in the period under review. Armies were still multinational; for the Wagram campaign of 1809, Napoleon raised 300,000 men but half were foreigners. In the 700,000 strong *Grande Armée*, only 300,000 were Frenchmen. War, despite appearances, was not fought *à outrance*. Only 40 percent of the eligible male Frenchmen were called up, in Prussia the total mobilized in 1813-1814 was only 6 percent of the total population; and the proportion was far less in England. As to logistics, Napoleon's were notoriously improvised; and they were inadequate except for lightning campaigns. As to the social and political innova-

tions, it is certainly true that the notion and practice of citizen equality had appeared in France, but it was the precondition of the military formats, not the result; in Prussia and Britain it was not even that. Nor, aside from the Jacobin interlude in France were governments yet populist. The one major respect in which this period innovated is that it saw, in France, the divergence between format-loyalty and regime-loyalty and hence the succession of military interventions in politics that culminated in Napoleon's *coup d'état*.

What then were the chief characteristics of this period? First of all, it is an *irruption*: a period of incessant war, war in twenty-four out of its twenty-six years, which saw the aggression of an army belonging to the most populous state of Western Europe, of France, with its 28 million people, which levied war at once *ideological*, resembling the seventeenth but not the eighteenth century; popular, in which it was quite novel; and *predatory*, in which, once again, it resembled not the *Ancien Régime*, but the seventeenth-century wars. But these innovations did not outlast 1815. The wars of the nineteenth century were not ideological, popular, or predatory; though perhaps motivated by nationalism, they were limited wars with confined objectives. Let us look at this characterization then, first with respect to the formats, the belief and the stratification cycles in France and their interaction, and then at the format options posed by the successful French format, in Prussia and Britain with respect to the efficiency, the expense, and the political loyalty of the alternatives between which they could make their choice. Finally, in the light of the whole, let us try to assess the effects on state-building.

The French army adopted a new format and fought a new kind of war. This was a conjuncture both of military doctrine and of necessity. Probably necessity had more to do with it than the theories of Guibert, whose *Essai sur la Tactique* of 1770 Napoleon and many of those who fought under him had studied. But it is necessary to quote from Guibert because he so adeptly prefigures, whether by the power of his doctrine or the then situation of the French armies, the kind of war those armies were indeed to fight:

Another truth which we may draw from the study of the wars of Rome a truth of which the results are in every way in contrast with our present systems of supply, is that armies lived in and at the expense of the country. "War must support war," said Cato in the Senate, and this maxim of Cato was among the Ro-

mans a maxim of state. As soon as an army had set foot in an enemy's country, it was for the general who commanded it to enable it to subsist and that general had most usefully served the Republic who, while conducting the most glorious campaign, had best supplied his army and at the close of the campaign brought the most money to the public treasury.

It is astonishing how much a good military administration can extract from the resources of a country. I speak of a populous and fertile country such as Flanders and the greater part of Germany. I am not exclusive nor excessive in my opinions, I will not say to an army "have no supply trains, no magazines, no transport; always live on the country; advance if needs be into the deserts of the Ukraine: Providence will feed you." I want an army to have provision wagons but as few as possible, proportionate to its force, to the nature of the country in which it is to operate, and to the means required in ordinary operations. If it starts from a river or frontier let it have on this base magazines and dépôts well situated with a view to their defence and to the plan of operations. But if it is necessary to undertake a bold operation and forced marches the army must be able to discard the precise methods of routine. The enemy I will assume takes an unexpected position in which I cannot and will not attack him; I am sure to dislodge him or to take him in rear if I march towards his flank. According to our actual routine I shall require for this change of direction to form new dépôts and new rayons of communication. I shall be asked for fifteen days to reform these new magazines. What I want to avoid is that my supplies should command me. It is in this case my movement that is the main thing; all other combinations are accessory and I must try to make them subordinate to the movements. The enemy must see me marching when he supposes me fettered by the calculation of my supplies; this new king of war must astonish him, must nowhere leave him time to breathe . . ." (Wilkinson 1915: 78-79).

In addition to his strategic doctrine Guibert had a tactical doctrine also. He had become somewhat disenchanted with the *ordre mince* introduced by the Prussians and everywhere copied. These five-mile-long thin lines of musketeers armed with flintlock and

bayonet were difficult to move once disposed upon the battlefield. Instead Guibert canvassed the possibilities of the *ordre épais*, i.e., the column: not strictly a column since it was some three hundred men across and some twenty-eight ranks in depth. Its advantage was its ability to march right up to the point of action and to attack from there. Its disadvantage was that in so doing only the first two ranks could fire, while they stood to bear the entire volley of the long extended line of the *ordre mince* which faced them.

In practice the necessities of the Republic forced the tactics of the column upon the new French armies, while the ardor but also the material poverty of these armies forced their generals into the strategic doctrine of Guibert. Both these tendencies were incorporated by Napoleon into his own distinctive style of making war.

As to tactics, at the outbreak of the Revolution the officer corps numbered nearly 10,000 of whom some two-thirds were noble, the commoners being for the most part in the technical arms and the artillery. Under the pressure of the Revolutionary extremism, more and more of the noble officers fled the country, until only one-third of them remained. This defection of about half of the trained officers generated confusion in the tactics of the regiments of the line which was not immediately made good by the well-meaning ardor but the all too frequent incompetence of the *sous-officiers* and warrant officers promoted to fill their places. In addition, the aggressiveness of the Brissotins, and their manoeuvres which proved only too successful, to push France into a war, led to a situation which called for far more men than in the standing army. At first the need was met by one-year Volunteers. By the end of the first year many had returned home; while the fact that one could volunteer in the Volunteers for only one year's service drained off recruits to the regular army, which was a long-term engagement. In 1793, when the military situation was desperate and the Jacobins came to power to form the Committee of Public Safety, the *levée en masse* was decreed. This was a piece of Revolutionary rhetoric, but it was accompanied by a hard fact; the introduction of selective service, i.e., the conscription ballot. This immediately produced 300,000 men. Still the difficulties of the armies were not overcome; for the Jacobins feared the royalist proclivities of the regiments of the line and refused at first to permit the volunteers or the conscripts to mingle with them; these latter were regarded as the pure milk of the Revolution, which must not

be tainted by the supposedly royalist regiments. In 1794, however, the compromise of the *amalgame* was adopted; to each battalion of former regulars two battalions of the conscripts were attached.

This initial confusion and the enormous dilution of the armies allowed no time for that rigorous training and drill which alone made the thin battle line and set-piece manoeuvring possible. Instead, at first, individual warriors of the Republic, more intrepid than the rest, tended to run forward and fire off against the enemy as had the Americans in the American War of Independence. These were, in fact, skirmishers. Behind them, the other infantrymen tended to come forward in a bunch, and from both of these was rapidly systematized the skirmishing order supported by the column, which Guibert had suggested could in certain situations prove advantageous. Two considerations gave initial victories to this new tactic: the ardor of the troops which surprised the crowned heads of Europe and their generals, and the really vast numbers (proportionate to the time) which the French rulers were prepared to throw against them. Hitherto an infantryman, difficult to recruit and long to train, had been regarded as a precious asset not to be squandered. But the French were willing to take vast casualties: and as Napoleon was to tell Metternich in 1805: "I can afford to expend thirty thousand men a month." The Jourdain conscription law of 1789 set the seal on the extraction of military manpower. It permitted the government to conscript by ballot from all fit males between the ages of 20 to 25 with a number of exemptions, e.g., for married men. So it was that Napoleon, by 1813, had been able to call up some 1,300,000 Frenchmen: a huge number in the perspective of the *Ancien Régime*.

Equally did necessity impose upon the Revolutionary armies the Guibertain tactic of striking rapidly and living off the enemy. Supply for these vast armies far outran the logistical base that even France could provide. The currency and, still more, public credit was in a mess. The *assignats*, issued against the confiscated *biens nationaux* were printed in even larger quantity, so that inflation was rampant. Yet the armies had to be supplied. The bankers, such as Ouvrard, were prepared (for high interest rates and even higher risk) to advance money against the future proceeds of taxes and to discount the *assignats*. It did not suffice and the materials which the *fournisseurs* supplied were supplemented by requisitioned guns and transport, and by the Jacobin establishment of armament factories. Even so, the armies could only be kept going by exacting formal tributes or

indemnities from the conquered territories and by seizing supplies from their cities and their farms; forage, remounts, food, treasure—and even men in the shape of allied regiments—were extracted from the conquered territories.

So much for the new format. But this was also linked up, not merely with the exigencies of the military situation itself, but also with the belief cycle and the stratification cycle. The ideology of the Revolution was one of social equality, of the career open to the talents, and of nationalism. The result expressed itself in *sansculottisme* and “missionary zeal.” Hence the volunteers, the national guardsmen, and—up to the 1813–1814 campaigns when the country began to see that the Empire meant perpetual war—a not altogether unfavorable acceptance of the conscription. It would be unwise to exaggerate the proportion of defaulters and recalcitrants who, up to that time, did not exceed some 3 percent. At the same time the Revolution had for the first time opened up promotion to officership, and inside the officer corps, to merit. The army therefore became a great avenue of social mobility attracting some of the best of France. All this linked up with and assisted the development of the new format.

But in turn, this ideology and this change in social stratification alone made possible the vast extractions of men, of material, and of money which the format demanded. One million three hundred thousand Frenchmen had been conscripted by 1813; and in the 1813–1814 campaigns Napoleon raised another million. As to taxes, the inflation, the “rescriptions,” which the bankers accepted and discounted, all created a situation that bore progressively on the poorer classes who possessed no property whose value would float upward with the inflation. Indirect taxation had been so unpopular under the *Ancien Régime* that the Revolutionary governments had done their best to dispense with it. Even Napoleon, hard put to finance the Marengo campaign of 1800 had not dared increase it. But the extraction-coercion cycle had its own logic: where money was indispensable for the upkeep of the army, as it was for the 1805 campaign, then the army itself must guarantee the supply of the money. By 1805 Napoleon felt well enough entrenched to use his power to make people pay indirect taxation. “Do I not,” he inquired, “have my gendarmes, my Prefects, and my priests? If any one should revolt, I will have five or six rebels hanged and *everyone else will pay!*” (Lefebvre 1969: 186–187). Far otherwise was it in 1813, when the general feeling was that Napoleon and with him the agent of extrac-

tion, the army, were about to be defeated. The population ignored the requisition notices, and did not pay their taxes; and the Prefects, not sure of who their next master was to be, did little or nothing to compel them. In the interim up to that date, extraction at home had been lightened by extractions from the foreigner. This had begun under the Republic. As Lefebvre writes, the Directory permitted the spoliation of Holland, of Switzerland, of Italy. It was the only mode of financing the armies in the field. "The army, and even the state, lived on war; this was the origin of a war party whose incarnation was Napoleon" (Lefebvre 1969: 36).

Napoleon was the Chaka Zulu of Europe. Like his African contemporary, he adopted a novel and startling tactic, and extreme rapidity of movement; he went for annihilating the enemy army, not taking a few hostages; he recruited his defeated enemies into his own forces and his own empire, so that it grew greater and greater as his enemies grew weaker and weaker; like Chaka he appropriated all the enemy "cattle." And as for the Zulu nation, the crunch came when other peoples awakened to the new Zulu tactic and format, and adapted it against the Zulu themselves.

Interestingly, however, this is not what Britain did. Initially, her rulers stuck to the preferred tradition: a huge fleet, a tiny expeditionary force in Europe with the bulk of the fighting done by her paid allies; and for the rest, *forays* into the colonies. But this tradition had to be abandoned under the threat of invasion after 1804. Thenceforward Britain accumulated larger and larger regular volunteer forces. They were paid, and it was by increasingly sharp pay rates that, given the poverty-stricken conditions of the southern agricultural laborers and the periodic bouts of unemployment in the industries of the north, the ranks were filled. The militia continued with its "Home Guard" role, but in time of emergency (e.g., 1806) Parliament was induced to allow some of its contingents to serve with the regulars overseas, as in Spain. The army was built up, and by 1814 it numbered a quarter of a million. The costs were enormous. In 1780-1789 total expenditure was nearly 22 million pounds of which military expenditure was 53 percent. By the decade of 1810-1819, total expenditure had reached 81.3 million pounds of which military expenditure accounted for 58 percent. The national debt which stood at 244 million pounds in the 1780-1790 decade, had reached 844 million pounds in the decade of 1810-1819. But public credit was good, and the industrialization of Britain, proceeding

rapidly, was able to make available the basis for the increased extraction.

Despite—or perhaps one should say because of—this format did not significantly alter. England had a huge regular army, but it was still officered by gentlemen many of whom were MPs. It was regimental in make up, hence anarchic and noncorporative. The officers had all purchased their commissions. Brave men, no doubt of it; but most had had no formal education since they left school at 15. It often proved a serious trial for them to draft or to read dispatches. The British army won because its troops, who were the so-called scum of the earth, were stolid infantry, very well drilled in eighteenth-century thin line tactics, and ably commanded by Wellington who made great play with the tactical possibilities of terrain. The result, in 1815, was perhaps a little unfortunate. England was left with an army which admittedly was no threat to the constitution because it was so much part and parcel of the governing order—its aristocratic element in Parliament and the countryside; but at the same time, it was an obsolete army, and its victory merely confirmed British ruling-class complacency which was to last for another three generations.

Quite different was the Prussian experience. There the defeat at Jena was traumatic. A state that had had to act simply as supply magazine and hinterland to an army quartered on it, saw this *raison d'être* pulverized. The state itself lost half its provinces. It had to pay a huge indemnity and ally itself with the enemy that had defeated it.

Yet the population accepted this situation with fatalism. They had always been kept out of things. They were still out of things. It was in these circumstances that Stein, Hardenburg, and Scharnost perceived that unless some of the sense and the realities of citizen participation were introduced into the Prussian order, then the state would disappear, or alternatively that they would be imposed by revolution from below. Against the vacillation of their king and against the inclinations of a large body of the noblemen, they sketched the outlines of a massive regenerative effort from above. To begin with the serfs were emancipated; municipal government was restored; the Provincial War and Domain Chambers were replaced by Provincial Diets. The army was backed up by a force of conscripts. The first *Landwehr* was backed up by a second *Landwehr*, and in the last resort by the entire remaining male population, the *Landsturm*.

But let us beware. Each one of the reforms was in practice a shadow of what was intended, and a curiously grim parody of the French Revolutionary ideal. True the serfs were emancipated: which merely meant that they could move if they chose. For the rest the noble could still exact services from them (unless the peasant paid a quit rent), the noble's exemption from the land tax survived until 1861, his police authority in his district until 1872, and even his domestic jurisdiction over his own peasants until 1848. The municipal reform did indeed begin a new era; but it was only a start. As for the reformed army, its hard core was still the regular army of volunteers, but supplemented by men of the first reserve. It was not long before this force, whose political loyalty was suspect to the king, came under the effective control of the regular army officers. These were still, in their great proportion, noblemen. When 1848 came, the army, at Berlin, far from being the welcome and popular defense force that the reforms had worked for, had regained its reputation of being the police agent of the Junkers and the court. But in one respect a vital move had been made. The format, hitherto a standing army of paid volunteers, had been significantly shifted toward a conscript army, based not just on volunteers, but on the obligatory services of all the male population. This format endured after 1815, unlike in France, where despite the formal application of the 1789 conscription law, the purchase of exemptions turned the army into something much more like a regular army of paid volunteers. In Prussia this conscript force and its organization were to be elaborated and to form the force which in the decade of the 1860's was to score three successive victories; and with it become the model format for all the states in Europe and indeed the world, with the exceptions of the Anglo-Saxon powers.

Finally, what was the contribution of this great irruption to state-building in the three states? In England, virtually none except the important advances in fiscal and revenue administration. In Prussia the limited administrative forms that we have noted, but together with an altogether perfervid nationalism that was increasingly to dominate the state in the next decade and that in alliance with the new military format was to unite the minor states of Germany under Prussian hegemony. But in France some effects were enduring and notably the increased homogenization of the polity. The historic provinces were simply scrapped. In addition their control was enormously centralized. Two situations accounted for that: the social un-

rest, almost civil war, that afflicted the country from the outbreak of the Revolution to as late as the end of the campaign of Marengo in 1800; and the effort required to keep the armies in the field. Throughout the period, from the earliest days when decentralization had been vogue, there was a steady encroachment on the new-found liberties of the departments and communes. It so happened that this tendency, which had been somewhat relaxed under the Directory, fitted in with the personal predilection of Napoleon himself. So came about the consummation of what had been a secular tendency since the days of the Carolingians, the homogenization of the territories under standard and uniform laws, and their control by agents directly dependent on the central power. What Louis XIV had partly achieved through suppressing the *gouverneurs* with his *intendants*, Napoleon now achieved by replacing the *intendants* with his prefects. The result has endured to this very day.

One final point must be made. It prefigures the next century and total war. The notion which the French had generated: sacrifice, hence equality of sacrifice since the fatherland was a common patrimony—this notion was destined to drive on. In the end it brought its obvious counterpart. Equality of sacrifice, equality of benefits. In the Swedish expression, “one soldier, one rifle, one vote.”

Nationalism and Industrialism: 1815-1945

Between 1815 and 1914, the economy-technology cycle, in conjunction with the beliefs cycle dictated the all but universal adoption—save for the Anglo-Saxon countries—of one specific format: the one evolved by Prussia after 1814. The format options in so far as they concerned the *efficiency* of the land forces were based on the Prussian success in 1870. In so far as *political loyalty* was concerned however, the choice was not so simple. A collision occurred between the logic of the beliefs cycle in the European states—with which was associated a corresponding ideal type-of-rule—and the stratification cycle, whereby in all three states concerned, the officer corps remained the appurtenance of, for the most part, the nobility. In other words the stratification and beliefs of the officer corps became increasingly incongruent with the stratification and beliefs of society at large. Finally, in so far as the format choice involves the consideration of *expense*, this new format eventuated in the need for an *unlimited* degree of extraction. This occurred, but it was made possible not by the exercise of coercion, but by the exercise of *persuasion*,

i.e., by the utilization of popular beliefs and the granting of social benefits. It is here that once again, the beliefs cycle is linked in, and its principal effect was to convert the extraction-coercion cycle into an extraction-persuasion cycle.

The consequences are to be found adumbrated in 1914–1918, and pursued to a logical conclusion after that date to the Second World War. They are respectively: the pitting of format loyalty against regime loyalty; the trends in military format, outlined on page 99, up to the opening of the eighteenth century were extrapolated to their ultimate limit; while as for state-building, the twin processes of consolidation of territory and the expansion of bureaucracy were accompanied by a bureaucratization of social beliefs—the logical extension of nation-building—to produce states which we describe as “totalitarian.”

The first linkage to be examined in this period is that between the economy cycle, the stratification cycle, and the military formats. As to the first, the economy-technology cycle, three great trends stand out. The first was the great demographic advance in Europe, from a population of some 188 million to some 600 million in the 1960s. Such vast populations were a precondition of the mass armies that came into being at the close of this period.

The second trend was technological. From about midway through the last century, a host of relatively minor inventions in armament succeeded each other. By 1860 the rifled percussion musket had come into use, its rate of fire being some seven rounds a minute, while its range was some eight hundred yards, about ten times that of the old smooth bore. Rifled breech loading artillery, with longer range, greater rate of fire, and much greater accuracy had also been invented. On the sea, the steam-powered armored warship was coming into common use. In a later wave of inventions between 1880 and 1900, the magazine rifle and smokeless powder had further increased both the rate and the accuracy of fire; so, to a far greater extent, had the *mitrailleuse*, invented in 1870 and subsequently perfected into the machine gun that was to become a commonplace after 1914. Langlois invented his quick-firing field gun in 1891: it outranged the rifles and added a new dimension to the artillery arm.

Third, the extensive industrialization of Western Europe had three military consequences. First, transport and communications were transformed. The telegraph was first used to convey commands from a distant headquarters to the field army during the Crimean

War. From 1859 onward the European states planned extensive railway networks so as to deploy vast numbers of troops toward any threatened frontier in a minimum of time. Second, arms could now be manufactured in great quantities, and as fire power increased and manpower also—both of them tendencies just noticed—so, of course did the needs for material. In the First World War, for instance, it has been calculated that the French and British armies together used in one single month more than twice the ammunition used in the entire four years of the Civil War by the Union Armies. Finally, it brought about a new logistical system, the staged-resupply, or *etappen*, system of Prussia. Magazines were brought to depots behind the armies; thence a shuttle service took them to the troops. As the armies advanced the railhead was advanced behind them. This plan did sacrifice mobility, but it gave great power and great range to the armies.

Fourth, the stratification patterns of the armies were markedly diverging from those of society at large. The latter was marked by the expansion of an industrial working class, and of an industrial middle class. To each corresponded the characteristic ideologies of socialism and liberalism, respectively. These were at loggerheads; but both, in their different ways were antithetical to the patrimonial-dynastic-autocratic ideology, to the classes that continued to uphold it, and to the systems embodied by it. On the other hand, the stratification of the army was still, by and large, one that opposed plebeian rank and file to a largely aristocratic officer corps. Admittedly, in Prussia for instance, one-half of the officers were not now of noble origin; but in being selected for commissioning, accepted by the commanding officer of the regiment to which they were assigned, and in their new officers' mess, they were expected to and joyfully did—accept the aristocratic traditions and outlook of that corps. In any case the senior posts were held in their vast majority, by the nobility. In France, while the latter did not hold true, the younger sons of the rural *noblesse* began to turn to the army in much larger numbers after 1870, and this aristocratization accounts for its increasing alienation from the Republic which was to culminate in the Dreyfus affair and later in the *affaire des fiches*. In England, it would not be correct to talk of an aristocratic officer corps; but perfectly so to talk of an "upper class" one.

One other factor is very important: the increasing professionalization of the officer corps throughout the nineteenth century. In prin-

principle, at least, the aristocratic perquisites to officers' commissions were abandoned or relaxed, in favor of educational and training standards: Sandhurst and Woolwich, St. Cyr and the Polytechnique, the *Kadettenschulen* of Germany, began to mold a profession; examinations and career led to officers corps which, by 1914, were universally imbued with highly conservative social values together with very strong corporate loyalties. These were brought into the open by the Curragh in Britain, the Dreyfus affair in France, and the Zabern incident in Germany.

In this way a chasm opened between the beliefs, structures, and expectations of wide sectors of society at large, and those of the officer corps, with the support of other, conservative sectors.

Turning now, from the economic-technological cycle, from the stratification and beliefs cycles to the third and linking element in all these, we come to the *format* which at once stimulated and was a consequence of these cycles.

The first issue was whether the armies were to be regular or conscript. This involved the familiar considerations of cost, efficiency, and political loyalty. In Britain cost proved the governing consideration. Huge amounts were spent on the fleet. This was supposed to act as a shield behind which the small volunteer regular army could expand. Conscript was shunned partly because of its oppressive nature, its interference with liberties, but also because it was held to disrupt economic life. Hence the small trained regular army remained the format until 1916. In Prussia, at the outset, when the *Landwehr* was introduced by Boyen, the king and many noblemen objected on the grounds that it was not possible to train a soldier in a mere two years and then send him to reserve, and that the political loyalties of the popular *Landwehr* were highly suspect. So began the process by which the *Landwehr's* autonomy as originally conceived by Boyen was eroded, and it became the ancillary of the regular forces and particularly of the officer corps. In France until 1870 the army was effectively a regular force of men serving a seven-year spell. Even after the defeat of 1870, Thiers and many others resisted its replacement by a conscript army on the grounds that it would not be possible to train the men to the required pitch of efficiency. Hence the compromise law of 1872 where the contingent was divided into two groups, one of which served a five-year term and the other half for two years. Pressure from the egalitarian forces in French politics at last brought in the 1889 law of universal military

service for two years, after which one served in the reserve. (Later, as the German population outstripped the French, the period of service was lengthened to three years.) It must be noted, however, that though the German and French armies could now be described as conscript ones, based on the universal obligation to serve the state, this conscription signally differed from the early experiments in the late seventeenth, in the eighteenth centuries, and during the Revolution and Empire. Napoleon never gave his new conscripts more than eight days drilling. After that they were expected to pick up their soldiering on the way to the battlefield. These new conscript armies insisted on a long and rigorous training of the conscript and constant retraining all the time they were on reserve.

Their size rapidly increased. The wars, up to and including the Franco-Prussian War of 1870, did not produce armies particularly large by Napoleonic standards. For instance, in 1870 some 250,000 Frenchmen faced some 320,000 Prussians. But as conscript armies were later developed, the numbers increased vastly. In 1874 Germany had 1,300,000 men in the field or in reserve and France had 1,750,000. In 1897 the former had 3,400,000 trained effectives and France 3,500,000.

Meanwhile the great increase in fire power, due to the new weaponry, had made the old Napoleonic tactics obsolete. Close order, with the advance of the line ending up with the bayonet charge became suicidal where a field of fire extended to 800 yards. So also did frontal attacks. Henceforth manoeuvre and flank attacks became essential. Instead of the old line formation, skirmishing and column formations became general. As to cavalry attack, the last successful one made against the new rifles was in 1870, and there was only one such in the entire campaign. Meanwhile, as infantrymen had found in the American Civil War, when faced by enemy rapid-rifle fire the thing to do was to dig a hole and get in it or shelter behind some barricade. The breast-work and trench became a standard feature of the new tactics. Meanwhile the quick-firing field gun was beginning to outrange the rifles; this led to the advent of the artillery barrage which could prevent the enemy from even coming up to their own front line! Later the development of the heavy caliber piece and the howitzer made this tactic even more potent. By 1914 artillery of these types had become the key arm on the battlefield: it dominated the infantry. Altogether the defensive had grown stronger and stronger. The oddest phenomenon is that this lesson, evident from

the American Civil War, the Franco-Prussian War, and the Russo-Japanese War, was lost sight of at the beginning of the twentieth century. Instead the infantry manuals began once again to lay down the doctrines of the offensive and of the frontal charge, finished off with the bayonet attack. It was in response to these tactical manuals that the first troops were flung into the mutual massacres of the First World War.

With this review of the linkage between the cycles: between the economy-technology cycle, the stratification and belief cycles, and the military formats, it is possible to proceed to examine three consequences. The first is the collision of format loyalty and regime loyalty. The second is the extraction-coercion cycle in the new setting. And the third and final one, the state-building cycle.

We have already sketched out the conditions through which a gap opened between the stratification and ideology of the officer corps and that of the population as a whole. This led to a series of collisions. In Prussia the friction was continual throughout the century. Between 1819 and 1847 a gap opened between the army and the artisans, and also the peasantry who were repressed in the so called Potato War of 1847; in 1848 the army was regarded by the Berliners as a reactionary police force and was forced initially to withdraw from the capital; there followed between 1858 and 1866 the collisions between the army high command and the Diet, resolved by Bismarck in an overriding of the legislature's claim to vote the budget. In the *Kaiserreich* that followed 1870 there was constant bickering and tension between the Kaiser with his military cabinet and the Reichstag over the war credits; and so one could continue through the war dictatorship of Ludendorff and Hindenburg, to the role of the *Reichswehr* in the Weimar Republic which it hated and in 1932 chose to destroy. In France the military came on the streets for the June Days of Cavaignac in 1848 and then put themselves behind Napoleon's *coup d'état* of 1851; under him they played the role of the *grande muette* and then, under the Republic when the regime moved leftward and the officer corps once again became aristocratized, opened the series of collisions, the Dreyfus crisis and the *affaire des fiches*. Even Britain was not entirely immune, though the Curragh of 1913 was a pale reflection of the tensions on the Continent; but enough to show how severely an upperclass cavalry-bred corps of officers could feel about the orders of civilians of a liberal complexion.

The extraction-coercion cycle now took on a remarkable dimension. The mass army format, based on a universal obligation to serve, required either massive coercion or alternatively some form of mass persuasion. It is here that the belief-cycle played a decisive role. For, through the nineteenth century and never more strongly than from the opening of the twentieth century to 1945, the ideologies of nationalism and popular sovereignty worked rapidly. Nationalism reached the pitch of desiring to commit politicide against one's enemy nation-state and fearing it for one's own. Popular sovereignty made unquestioned and unquestionable the legitimacy of majorities and of representatives. Out of the amalgamation of the two sprang the possibility of unlimited extraction. Let the First World War serve as a paradigm. It originated as a war of movement—the great sweep of Von Kluck's armies down and across Paris. Then it bogged down, and defensive power had time to catch up with the attack. After six weeks what began as movement ended with a race to entrench two hostile lines of armies from the Juras to the Channel; and on each side some two million men lay staring at each other, while the artillery now took over the offensive and counteroffensive role out of their hands. Thus arose its second stage: from the war of movement to the war of manpower. If two million men could not break the enemy trenches, then see what even more men could do. From this it moved rapidly into its third phase; since all this, and particularly the new use of the mass artillery barrage, required expenditures of matériel vaster than had ever been envisaged. So from the balance of manpower, the war moved to the balance of matériel. Hence the shell shortage that hit all the belligerents. At Hooze in 1915 the British used 18,000 shells; at First Somme, 1916, 2 million shells; at Arras, 1917, 2 million shells; at Third Ypres, 4,300,000. And the cost of these shells was 22 million pounds, which was the total cost of the home army for 1913.

Even more matériel failed to break the deadlock, and so the war moved into its final phase. It became a ghastly exaggerated travesty of those sieges of the eighteenth century except that now, not cities, but entire states were besieged. Blockade warfare had begun, in order to deny the enemy the use of the natural resources on which his matériel relied. So was initiated unrestricted submarine warfare, the blockade of food and materials, and as soon as aerial warfare permitted it, the destruction of the enemy's civilians, since they pro-

vided the manpower that manufactured the matériel for the armies. Hence the apotheosis of extraction: 10 million soldiers dead, 20 million wounded, and some 20 million civilians dead of famine and disease. The total costs were some \$338,000 million of which \$186,000 million were direct costs. The staggering increase can be seen in the English figures alone. Military expenditure in 1890–1899 was 36.4 million pounds; in 1900–1909 it was no less than 876.1 million pounds, a tenfold increase. Similarly with the national debt. In 1890–1899 it was 598.7 million pounds; in 1900–1909 7.6 million pounds; while in 1910–1919 it reached 7460.4 million pounds!

As a result of this gigantic extractive effort; as a result of its buttressing by a new set of beliefs which made populations actually *anxious* to go to the battlefield and sacrifice their material wealth, as a result of these, the trends in the development of military format reached their completion by 1945. First, the increase in size: from the 6,000 at Hastings to the 3,000,000 French in the battle line of 1918. Next permanency: not only this had been achieved—now the entire male population underwent peacetime training, and then became a permanent reserve. Third, the trend away from universal military service to volunteer service and then back again to universal service had been sharply reinforced, so that now every person in the country, whether in the armed forces or not, was expected to subserve the war effort. Fourth, the move from semiprivate enterprises to state enterprises was now carried to an extreme point. Up to Napoleonic times, the states had just managed to achieve control over recruitment and the appointment of the officers. Only in Prussia had it acquired the handling of logistics. Napoleon's logistics were left to monopolies handed out to various private *fournisseurs*. Now not only were the standard logistical requirements of armies catered for by the army or the state; the state went further: it nationalized the economy, it took technology into its own service, and it even took in *ideology*—in great lie-factories that turned out war-propaganda. *All* was now swallowed up in the extraction-persuasion cycle: not just the entire economy, but the press and the mass media.

Finally, what of the effects on state- and nation-building? The first was the completion of a transition which had admittedly begun in England and France many centuries before, from a simple state-association, the state as a *Gesellschaft* to the state as a community, a community of a nationality, a *Gemeinschaft*. Next the completion of a trend from oligarchic and at best paternalistic control of subjects,

to states which, even if they did not freely dispense citizen participation in political matters, liberally dispensed welfare benefits. And, finally, the completion of that twin movement of the consolidation of the populations under a common superior and the differentiation of state functions. Under the exigencies of the new formats and the new warfare, these reached grotesque excesses in the Soviet Union, in Germany, and in Italy. There, with a state ideology created and propagated to justify (ostensibly) the defense of the territory, we see the culmination of these trends; by the myths of either the proletarian revolution, or of brotherhood in the nation, the "national" consciousness of community was pushed to its last fanatical degree. Homogenization of populations could hardly have gone further; not only were the laws and the institutions now standardized, so also were to be the ways of thought and feeling of each private individual! And, second, the bureaucratization was pushed to its outer limits where every enterprise was, if not directed by the state's special employees, at least controlled by them and ready to fall under direct bureaucratic control the moment the military situation should prove this desirable. The developments of the modern state here reached its term, and the result, coupled with a style-of-rule of an absolute kind, was to produce the totalitarian regime. Against this the liberal and less state-controlled society of France collapsed; the English, given a breathing spell, put themselves and their goods at the disposal of a state economy. So was reached the penultimate, if not the ultimate, in the development of the nation and the state.

It had been interwoven, over a period of over nine hundred years, with perpetual and cumulative escalation of the military instrument and the uses—that is to say the wars—to which it had been put.