CHAPTER 2

The Serbian Revolution

THE center of the first successful revolt of a Balkan people against Ottoman authority was the pashalik of Belgrade whose administrative problems at the end of the eighteenth century in many ways reflected those of the entire empire under Selim III. Throughout the century this area had been the scene of repeated battles between Austria and the Ottoman Empire. Fighting occurred in 1716–18, 1737–39, and 1788–91. In these years the fate of the Serbian inhabitants had been deeply involved with that of the Habsburg monarchy. The wars and the extreme chaos associated with them had resulted in the emigration of large groups of Serbs into Austrian territory, primarily into southern Hungary. Particularly significant had been the mass migration of about seventy thousand Serbs under Patriarch Arsenije III in 1690. This group made Sremski Karlovci a religious and cultural center for the Serbian people. Thereafter, the Serbs in the monarchy, where conditions were much more favorable, remained in close touch with the events in Serbia proper. They were to have an important influence on the national movement, on cultural development, and on the administration of the Serbian national state in the nineteenth century.

During the wars the Habsburg government was often in administrative control of Serbian lands. Despite the opposition of the population to Ottoman rule, Austrian dominance was not popular, largely because of the activities of the Catholic church. Unlike the Ottoman Empire, which did not actively attempt to gain converts for its faith, the Catholic church, with Habsburg approval, did. Like the Greek experience with Venetian rule, the substitution of a Christian for a Muslim overlord was not attractive nor was it an aim that the Serbian population subsequently sought as a political alternative.

The chief result of these years of frontier warfare for the Serbian population was that it gave them experience in fighting. Serbs served as reg-

ular soldiers in the Habsburg army or as irregular guerrillas. They usually went into combat in their own units under their own officers. During the Austrian occupations Serbs also were given higher offices in the administration of the region than they held under the Ottoman. The experience gained in the war of 1788–91 proved particularly valuable. At this time many Serbs joined the Habsburg Free Corps, and they in fact carried the main burden of the battles. Simultaneously, Koča Andjelković organized an unsuccessful revolt, known as Koča's rebellion. Although no immediate benefits were gained from these actions the Serbian leaders obtained training in military organization and confidence in their own abilities.

The years of cooperation with Austria proved a great disappointment. The Serbs felt that the monarchy had failed to deliver promised supplies, and certainly the peace terms brought Serbia no advantages. Nevertheless, despite the fact that in the future the Serbian leaders were to turn more to Russia for aid, the Austrian frontier remained important because of its proximity. Even when the Habsburg government did not support Serbian actions, supplies and war material constantly crossed the Danube; at the same time refugees from Ottoman persecution continued to move freely into Habsburg territory.

As noted previously, the Peace of Sistova in 1791 and that of Jassy in 1792 gave Selim III a period in which to consider the reform of the empire. His desire for the establishment of peaceful and orderly conditions corresponded exactly with that of his Serbian subjects. After the devastating period of war the Serbs would have continued to accept Ottoman rule in return for the assurance of rights of local self-government and a guarantee of tranquility in the countryside. These conditions, however, could not be controlled by the central Ottoman administration. With the cessation of the fighting the janissaries and the irregular military units found themselves unemployed. They thus turned and preyed on the population. Bands of these men seized villages and their lands and converted the property into their own estates. Others joined rebel *ayan*s or bandit organizations and plundered peaceful Muslims and Christians alike. Under these circumstances the interests of the central government and the Christian population coincided; neither could tolerate a continuation of this situation.

Selim III, well aware of these problems, tried to conciliate the Serbs and alleviate the bad conditions. First, he appointed as local Ottoman administrators men who were directed to work with the people and to suppress the unlawful elements. Second, he issued three firmans (decrees), in 1793, 1794, and 1796, giving the Serbs essentially what they sought. Together these documents defined the relations of the Serbs to the Ottoman government. The Serbs now received much broader rights of local autonomy. They could collect their own taxes, bear arms, and

form a militia. The abuses of the *chiftlik* system were to be corrected. These firmans became the political program of the Serbian leaders in the next years. Had these stipulations been carried out, the Serbian national revolt could probably have been postponed.

Unfortunately, Selim III and his supporters could not execute their own decisions. The problems of the empire in the following years proved too great. Moreover, Constantinople remained a center of traditional intrigue. Repeatedly, able and conciliatory commanders and administrators were removed from their positions by those whose basic interests were threatened by reform and, most important, by those whose religious sensibilities were hurt by concessions to Christians.

The chief problem in the pashalik of Belgrade remained the janissaries. One of Selim's orders in 1791 had been to forbid their return to Belgrade, a measure that these soldiers chose to resist. Their defiance of the central government was made easier by the parallel action of other, similar rebellious groups and of Pasvanoglu. The janissaries now made common cause with those who would not accept the authority of the Porte. To balance the military strength of this opposition, the Ottoman authorities were forced to call for Serbian assistance. The policy of relying on the Serbs and of granting them concessions was associated in particular with the governor of Belgrade, Hadji Mustafa Pasha, known as the "mother of the Serbs."

Within the Balkans at this time the major problem was that of controlling Pasvanoglu. Not content with the rule of extensive Bulgarian territories, he also wished to establish his friends the janissaries in Belgrade. Selim was now determined to act decisively. The Serbs were given new privileges and allowed to raise their own army under their own leaders. The population was thus fully armed. The alliance of official Ottoman forces with the Christians was successful. Pasvanoglu suffered repeated defeats until finally he retreated to his fortress at Vidin, which was placed under siege. Once again, however, general world conditions hindered Ottoman efforts. In 1798 Napoleon entered Egypt. The Porte was compelled to strip the Balkans of regular troops to meet the foreign invasion. Simultaneously pressures mounted in Constantinople. The policy of arming Christians against Muslims continued to offend deeply conservative opinion.

The new combination of circumstances proved disastrous for Serbian interests. Unable to press his military action, Selim was forced to pardon the janissaries and allow them to return to Belgrade on the condition that they promised to obey Hadji Mustafa Pasha. At the same time the sultan was also compelled to compromise with Pasvanoglu. Once back in a strong position, the janissaries returned to their old ways. They revolted against Hadji Mustafa and killed him. The balance of power thus

shifted to the janissaries and Pasvanoglu at the expense of the central authority and the Serbs.

After a period of conflict and instability, during which the janissaries fought among themselves, four janissary officers, called *dahi* from their rank in the corps, emerged on top in 1802. The result of this seizure of power for the Serbs was immediately apparent; their autonomous rights were ended. The janissaries again terrorized the countryside. The events of the past repeated themselves. Large numbers of Serbs fled into the hills where they joined existing irregular bands or formed new ones. Throughout Serbia military units once more appeared. The most important area for the resistance was to be the hilly forest region of the Šumadija. Here a local notable, Karadjordje Petrović, was able to assemble by the spring of 1804 as many as thirty thousand armed men. Other centers under other local leaders were similarly organized throughout the pashalik.

These military bands were soon to be needed. At the beginning of 1804 the Serbs were faced with the fact that they would have to defend themselves or see their leadership literally destroyed. In January and February the janissaries began what was planned to be a massacre of the Serbian notables. In two months between 70 and 150 were killed. The entire province reacted. Aware of the obvious need for coordinated action and direction, about three hundred Serbian notables met at Orašac in the Šumadija in February and named Karadjordje as their commander. The Serbian revolution had begun. It now had a leader and a cause for which to fight.

The role of Karadjordje is so important in the revolution and in the first political organization of the Serbian state that a short summary of his career is in order. We know little about his early life. In fact, even the date of his birth is uncertain although it was probably 1768. His parents were poor, and the family was forced to move often in search of a livelihood. Karadjordje worked for a number of landlords before 1787 when his family left the Šumadija, perhaps because of his activities against the janissaries, and moved to the Vojvodina. There they became attached to the monastery at Krušedol. When the Austro-Turkish war broke out, Karadjordje joined the Free Corps and took part in the campaigns in western Serbia, where he gained invaluable military experience and learned Austrian military methods. After the Peace of Sistova he settled in Topola in the Šumadija where he became a livestock merchant trading with Austria. This business brought him in touch with many of his compatriots; these connections were later to prove invaluable. In addition he became a *buljukbaša* (the head of a military unit of about one hundred men) in the Serbian national militia which had been authorized by Selim III. In this capacity he cooperated with Hadji Mustafa against

the janissaries and thus gained experience in Ottoman military organization. When the janissaries returned in 1801, Karadjordje, like many Serbs, foresaw that some measures of defense would have to be taken against these violent and undisciplined forces. With his military experience, Karadjordje's background was typical of many of his countrymen.

Karadjordje now became and remained the leader of the first Serbian insurrection, largely because of his personal abilities. As an outstanding military leader, he was attractive to the Serbs; he was brave, firm, and resolute. He was to show considerable good sense and judgment in handling the complex international situation during the Napoleonic period. Under his guidance the Serbian question was raised from an internal Ottoman problem to a matter of international concern. In domestic politics he was a skillful enough politician to judge accurately the mood of most of his countrymen and to hold the revolutionary movement together in face of innumerable conflicting forces and interests.

In fact, his abilities in domestic affairs were probably decisive in maintaining his leadership. Almost from the beginning of the revolution Karadjordje's authority was challenged by others. As was typical in the Ottoman system, political power lay in the individual villages and districts; there was no *Serbian* central authority for the pashalik. Even the reforms of the 1790s had not altered this situation. Consequently, each area had its own leaders and spokemen. In 1804 Karadjordje was well known and respected only in his district in the Šumadija. In the western part of the country Jakov Nenadović was the principal figure; in the eastern section Milenko Stojković and Peter Dobrnjac held a similar position. Soon sharp conflict broke out between these men with their followers and Karadjordje supported by his friends. Jealous of their position and anxious to profit from the situation, the opposition leaders fought all attempts to create a strong centralized national government for the Serbs. They did not wish to see their power in their individual localities weakened. They would agree to cooperate with a central authority only to the end of defeating the Turkish forces. As will be shown, they also attempted to enlist the support of the Russian government against Karadjordje.

In fighting his domestic opponents Karadjordje had to consider not only his personal interests, but also the obvious fact that a centralized regime with real power was necessary in a revolutionary period. Moreover, certain internal problems, such as the distribution of former Ottoman lands, taxation, and justice, had to be settled for the entire pashalik. Despite the undoubted need for a united leadership Karadjordje's rivals throughout the revolution kept up a constant pressure of criticism. They asserted that no Russian aid would be forthcoming unless he were replaced; they attacked his personal life and morals; they claimed he

used excessive brutality, that he enriched himself from Turkish property, and that he was involved in various intrigues and acts of violence against other Serbs. Despite these unrelenting attacks Karadjordje, until his final military defeat, was able to maintain his personal position at the head of the first revolution. The centralization of leadership was an advantage enjoyed by the Serbian revolutionaries which was not to be shared by the Greeks later.

The divisive aspects of the Serbian internal scene were not apparent during the first days of the revolt. The sudden action of the janissaries in January of 1804 had produced a spontaneous national reaction for survival. At the meeting at Orašac in February, Karadjordje was chosen the supreme leader without opposition. At this time all of the Serbs recognized that a single strong executive authority was necessary. After May, 1804, Karadjordje was able to sign his orders and proclamations under such titles as "Supreme Vojvoda" (duke), "Commander of Serbia," and "Leader."

At first there was a unity not only in the leadership, but also in the goal to be achieved. It is most important to note that at this stage the aim of the revolt was not independence; rather it was directed against the janissary rule and toward the restoration of the autonomous rights already agreed upon by the Ottoman government. At this time representatives of the revolutionaries and the Porte were in regular communication on what the Serbs wished. Throughout the negotiations the Serbian purpose was to secure terms that would give them a position of autonomy within the Ottoman Empire. The immediate demand was the removal of the *dahi*s and a full pardon for the Serbian rebels. The Serbs further wished the Porte to recognize their own head of state, a supreme *knez* (elder or chieftain), who would have authority over the Serbian population of the pashalik and who would be responsible for tax payments. He would also represent his people before the Ottoman government. The desire was also expressed that the tribute and taxes be set and that no arbitrary increases be made. In addition janissaries were to be forbidden to hold rural property, and the right of Muslims to reside in Serbian towns was to be controlled. Freedom of religion, trade, and communication were also to be guaranteed. While negotiating these points, the Serbian leaders turned to both the Habsburg and Russian governments for support.

The new situation found the Ottoman government faced with the now familiar problem. The janissaries were again technically in rebellion, but the forces against a reliance on the Christians were still strong. At first Selim III had no desire to take a stand against the Serbs. He therefore sent the popular vezir of Bosnia, Abu Bekir Pasha, who had previously negotiated successfully with the Serbian leaders, to Belgrade to put down the janissaries. By August, 1804, the *dahi*s had been defeated;

again it appeared as though the janissary forces had been subdued. The situation, however, was not stable. Rebellious Muslim factions were still strong. Moreover, the Serbs now insisted upon some sort of foreign guarantee for the terms of their autonomy, a concession that the Ottoman government was loath to grant. In order to obtain outside support the Serbian government despatched a delegation, which included the prominent religious leader Matija Nenadović, to Russia. The group was received by the foreign minister Adam Czartoryski in November, 1804. Since Russia was now cooperating in foreign affairs with the Ottoman Empire against Napoleon, the Russian minister advised the Serbs to deal directly with the Porte.

The conditions in Serbia thus remained fluid. In preparation for possible future action the Serbian leaders now sought links with Christian groups in Bosnia and Hercegovina, with Greek *klepht* bands, and with the governors of Moldavia and Wallachia. On the opposing side the janissary and outlaw bands similarly organized to regain their position. In the winter and spring of 1805 they again moved into the countryside; once more chaos, terror, and anarchy prevailed. The Ottoman officials were too weak to control their own lawless elements. Under considerable pressure, Selim shifted his position. By the spring of 1805 he had come to regard the Serbs as rebels. Abandoning a policy of conciliation, he appointed the Pasha of Niš, Hafiz Pasha, as the new governor of Belgrade and sent him with an army to deal with the Serbs. Hafiz's forces were defeated in the first major clash between Serbian and Ottoman troops at Ivankovo in August, 1805. With this victory the Serbian forces proceeded to take full military control of the pashalik. Smederovo was captured in November and became the first capital of the new government. Belgrade fell at the end of the following year.

Meanwhile an important change had occurred on the international scene. Although the Ottoman Empire had at first been allied with Britain and Russia against France, French prestige in Constantinople rose sharply after the victories of Austerlitz and Jena in 1805 and 1806. Napoleon also sent an astute diplomat, General François H. B. Sebastiani, to gain an agreement with the Porte. As a result the Ottoman Empire now shifted its alliances and joined France. In the summer of 1806 fighting broke out between Russia and the Porte. This conflict was to have a decisive effect on the fate of the first Serbian revolution.

The Ottoman government, faced with Serbian forces in control of the pashalik and with renewed warfare, naturally wished to settle the Serbian question by negotiation and was willing to grant wide concessions. The new situation, however, changed both the Serbian and the Russian attitude. At war with the Ottoman Empire, the Russian government, of course, had an interest in the continuation of the revolt. For its part the

Serbian regime, having achieved success on the battlefield, was attracted to the idea that it could gain independence. The Porte had appeared prepared to give the Serbs a large measure of autonomy. The question was now whether more could be obtained and whether the Porte could be trusted to abide by its agreements and to enforce them. Under the circumstances the temptation to continue the rebellion with the objective of real independence was strong. The final decision was certainly influenced by Russian actions. Henceforth the attitude taken by the Russian government or its agents was to have a determining effect on the future of the Serbian national state.

In the summer of 1807 Colonel F. O. Paulucci arrived in Serbia to assess the political and military situation. He was to determine what assistance Serbia needed and what aid she could give Russia in the common war against the Ottoman Empire, but he was not authorized to make a binding agreement. From the evidence now available it appears that the Serbian authorities were not aware of the limited extent of this emissary's powers. On July 10 an understanding, commonly known as the Paulucci-Karadjordje Convention, was concluded. This agreement called for, among other stipulations, the appointment of Russian administrators in the Serbian lands, the establishment of Russian military garrisons in the towns, and the sending of Russian military and economic aid. Believing that he had firm assurances of effective Russian backing, Kardjordje now adopted a policy aimed at Serbian independence rather than autonomy under the Ottoman Empire. This decision was a grievous error. Between July 7 and 9 Alexander I and Napoleon met and signed the Treaty of Tilsit. One of the provisions of this pact was that France would attempt to negotiate a peace between the Russian and Ottoman empires.

The shift of the Russian attitude toward Napoleon was to have immediate disastrous consequences for Serbia. In line with the new Russian policies, the government concluded the armistice of Slobozia with the Porte in August. Although the Russian representatives to the negotiations had been instructed not to abandon the Serbs, the signature of the agreement and the end of the hostilities left the Serbian forces in an exposed military position. Meanwhile the hostility of the Ottoman government toward the Serbian rebels, of course, increased.

Despite the extreme difficulty of the situation the Serbian forces were nevertheless able to maintain control of the Serbian countryside. Their final fate would obviously depend on the evolution of world affairs. Meantime in Constantinople the crisis that resulted in the overthrow of Selim III and the eventual succession of Mahmud II was taking place. With the center of the Ottoman government paralyzed, the Serbian government was in a better position. Not only was the Porte unable to

launch a major military campaign against the rebels, but it was more favorable to a negotiated settlement. Although discussions were held, it was still difficult to determine boundaries for the Serbian state.

Throughout this crucial period Karadjordje continued to face domestic opposition to his rule. In 1805 a council was established; in theory it was to be a check on his power. In 1808, however, he declared himself the hereditary supreme leader of the country, although he agreed to act in cooperation with a governing council, which was also to be the supreme court of the country. When the opposition intrigued with the Russian representative, Constantine Rodofinikin, who had arrived in August, 1807, Karadjordje sought assistance in France and Austria. The struggle over the authority to be allowed the council was not settled satisfactorily during this revolutionary period. Karadjordje, in general, was highly successful in maintaining his supreme control.

Despite his difficulties with the Russian representative Karadjordje recognized the unity of interest that bound Serbia to Russia. When fighting broke out again in 1809 between Russia and the Ottoman Empire, he was prepared to support the tsarist armies. Cooperation between and coordination of the two forces was not, however, effective. Although Karadjordje launched a successful offensive in Novi Pazar, he was subsequently severely defeated at Niš. The Ottoman troops then marched on Belgrade. In August, 1809, there occurred another mass flight of Serbs across the Danube, which included Rodofinikin. Although Serbia had not been completely reconquered, a turning point had been reached in the rebellion. Henceforth the Serbian forces were to remain on the defensive; the goal was simply to hold on to the territories that they still controlled.

In June, 1810, Russian troops arrived in Serbia for a second time. Some military cooperation followed; weapons, ammunition, and medical supplies were sent. Marshal M. I. Kutuzov, the great Russian military commander, participated in some of the planning for the joint actions. An air of optimism prevailed in the Serbian camp. With Russian assistance victory seemed at hand. But once again events in Europe intervened to destroy Serbian hopes.

Faced with the imminence of a French invasion, Alexander I now wished to sign a definitive peace treaty with the Porte in order to free his troops to meet the new attack. Again, as at the armistice of Slobozia, the Russian government acted against the interest of its ally. The Serbs were not even informed of the negotiations; they learned the final terms from the Ottoman government. The second Russian withdrawal came at a time when Serbian expectations were rising and Karadjordje had reached the height of his personal power.

In the negotiations that led to the Treaty of Bucharest of May, 1812, the Russian representatives once more attempted to do something for

their former allies. Article 8 dealt with Serbia. Here it was agreed that the fortifications built by the Serbs during the revolt were to be destroyed unless they were of value to the Ottoman government. Ottoman installations that had existed before 1804 were to be reoccupied and garrisoned by Ottoman forces. In return the Porte promised a general amnesty in Serbia and certain autonomous rights. The Serbs were to control "the administration of their own affairs" and the collection and delivery of the tribute, which was to be fixed.

The reaction in Serbia was strong. Ottoman reoccupation of fortresses and cities caused particular concern. Fearful reprisals were expected. Moreover, the Serbian government had no guarantee that the Porte would implement Article 8. The Russian government instructed the Serbs to negotiate directly with Constantinople concerning the arrangements to be made, stating that Russian diplomatic support would be given. This assurance gave small comfort, particularly when it became apparent that Russian troops would not only be withdrawn from Serbia, but also from Moldavia and Wallachia. Once these armies returned to their own country, the Serbian apprehensions were fully confirmed. The Ottoman Empire was now at peace so its forces could concentrate on Serbia. The previous nine years of warfare had drained Serbian resources and manpower. Three Ottoman armies combined in the attack. In July, 1813, Karadjordje and many of the Serbian leaders crossed the Danube into Austrian territory. Ottoman armies re-entered Belgrade, a city that they had been forced to abandon in 1806. Severe reprisals were inflicted on the population. With these actions the first Serbian revolution ended.

Despite the final failure Serbia had achieved a great deal under the leadership of Karadjordje. A rebellion had been organized and the first separate national government established. International attention, particularly Russian, had been drawn to the Serbian question. Some attempt had been made to answer what was to become the great political question: whether a centralized regime or a government where the real power lay with the local communities was more advantageous. Great internal changes had been accomplished. Much Ottoman property—including land, houses, stores, and warehouses—fell into Serbian hands. It had, however, been made abundantly clear that the future of the country depended on the attitude of Russia and on the willingness of that power to back Serbian autonomy.

After the French invasion of Russia in June, 1812, the eyes of the Porte and of all of Europe remained focused on that area, next on the battles in Central Europe, and finally on the defeat of Napoleon and the occupation of France. During this period the Ottoman authorities wanted peace in their own lands and so again adopted a policy of conciliation. At the end of October, 1813, they declared a general amnesty.

Many Serbian leaders, including the head of the next phase of the Serbian national movement, Miloš Obrenović, took advantage of the offer and in return were confirmed in local positions of authority. As the Serbs returned to their homes, the Ottoman soldiers and many Muslims left the countryside. The Serbs were still armed, and the number of their potential opponents had decreased.

Despite the conciliatory actions of the Ottoman administration bad feeling continued to exist between the Christians and Muslims. As in previous situations nothing had been really decided. In 1814 a local revolt broke out. Miloš Obrenović, now the *oborknez* of Rudnik, offered to put it down on the condition that the rebels received amnesty. Although the governor of Belgrade, Suleiman Pasha, had given this assurance, many of the participants were massacred following the suppression of the rebellion. Again Serbian fears were aroused; some Serbs fled; others prepared for revolt. In April, 1815, Miloš abandoned his policy of cooperation with the Porte and this time headed the rebellion. Both domestic and world conditions now turned in favor of the Serbs. First, the Serbs had a decisive advantage numerically in comparison with the Ottoman forces. Second, the great period of warfare was ending in Europe; the Battle of Waterloo in June marked the final defeat of Napoleon. The Porte did not want a major uprising.

With the Porte in a passive mood and with Miloš also desiring negotiations, both sides could come to an agreement. Serbian delegates now went to Constantinople where they declared that their rebellion had been against Suleiman's misrule and not against the Porte itself. The Serbs were strengthened by Russian representations in their favor. The Russian government in fact warned the Porte that it should come to an agreement or Russia would bring up the question of the enforcement of Article 8 of the Treaty of Bucharest. Suleiman was removed and replaced by Maraşli Ali Pasha.

A final oral understanding was reached between Miloš and Maraşli Ali Pasha in November, 1815. Miloš now asked for the terms that the Ottoman government had accepted in 1807, but that Karadjordje had subsequently rejected when he decided to fight for independence. It was agreed that Miloš would be recognized as "supreme *knez* of Serbia," that in each province both Serbian and Ottoman officials would serve as judges in cases involving Serbs, and that a national chancery would be set up in Belgrade to act as the highest court in the land. Serbian officials were to collect the taxes, and land payments were to be settled by an official firman. Three months later Mahmud II issued a firman confirming the spirit of this arrangement. The Serbs were also given favorable tariff and trading privileges, and janissary families were excluded from owning land. A Serbian and an Ottoman official were to serve together in

charge of towns and military installations. A full amnesty was also granted.

These terms did not make Serbia a truly autonomous state within the empire. Full autonomy was not achieved until 1830, but the period of active revolt and military conflict had been brought to a close. The next steps were to be achieved by diplomatic negotiations and by Russian pressure on the Porte. A Serbian administration, however, ran the country and there was a recognized national leader. A strong basis had been set for future national development.

The head of the new government was not, of course, the revolutionary hero Karadjordje, but Miloš who had excelled in negotiation rather than in fighting. Like his predecessor, Miloš soon faced opposition within the state, much of it coming from supporters of Karadjordje. In 1817 Karadjordje returned to Serbia to seek support for a planned Greek insurrection. Fearing his political strength, Miloš had him murdered and sent his head to Maraşli, who had it stuffed and presented to the sultan. The subsequent feud between the Obrenović and Karadjordjević dynasties, which colored so much of later Serbian history, arose from this event.