CHAPTER 3

The Greek Revolution

In contrast to the Serbian revolution, which made little impression on general European diplomacy, the Greek revolt became the main international problem of the 1820s. In fact, outside intervention was to be more influential in determining the final outcome than were the actions of the Greek leaders themselves. In the same manner the subsequent evolution of Greek political life was to remain heavily dependent on the attitude of the great powers.

In addition the extreme social complexity of Greek conditions influenced the course of the revolution there. As we have seen, the Serbian revolt was carried on by a peasant people, fighting what was essentially a guerrilla war under local military leaders. Serbian society was not sophisticated or highly differentiated. Although there was a merchant class and large landowners, they were closely associated with the land and the village. The Greek world, as previously described, introduced other elements into the situation. The first direct steps toward revolution were taken by Greeks living outside of Greece proper—merchants in the cities and trading communities of the Black Sea and the Mediterranean, the Phanariotes of Constantinople, and Greeks living in the Principalities. These groups were joined by some of the notables and upper clergy of Greece proper. Once the revolution was underway in the Peloponnesus and Rumeli (mainland Greece) it involved military men and peasant followers. The essential split between the social and economic groups was reflected in a civil war that was waged parallel with the fight against Ottoman rule. In general, in the land held by the revolutionary forces, the notables of the mainland, the Phanariotes, and the wealthy shipowners found common cause against the military elements with their peasant followers. The situation, however, was never clearcut. Competition between individual military leaders and among the upper group for predominant power in the movement cut across social lines.

Regional differences were also significant. Men from Rumeli, the Peloponnesus, and the islands could compete with each other or form alliances.

Constantly shifting allegiances and the struggle between individuals prevented the rise of a strong leader. In contrast to the Serbian revolt there is no one man who stands out in the Greek revolution. Similarly, the Greeks were unable to form a single stable government to carry through the revolution. Repeated outbreaks of civil war prevented the formation of a united national government until 1827. The regime established at that time fell apart four years later when its president was assassinated. The final victory of the revolutionary movement found the land in a condition of political chaos.

As there was to be no permanent governmental authority, there was also no lasting military command. Individual military leaders, such as Theodore Kolokotrones in the Peloponnesus and George Karaiskakes in Rumeli, directed the operations of their own men. The Greeks fought not as a national army but in guerrilla bands. The geography of the land made this a practical and recommended method of warfare. The negative feature was the damage that these troops often did to their own countryside and their own people. The military commanders also used their troops against each other or against the civilian government. The same problems were to be found in the organization of the navy, which, although it became very effective against Ottoman shipping, was also plagued with problems of insubordination and revolt.

Reflecting well the divisions in the Greek world, the revolution had its origins in two separate spheres: the outer world of the merchant, the Phanariote, and the diaspora, and the inner world of the mainland of Greece with its military elements and its peasant people. The first revolt centered in the Danubian Principalities; the second arose from the conditions in Greece proper and from the attempt of Mahmud II to put down the revolt of Ali Pasha. The first was highly organized with an ideology greatly influenced by western thought; the second, similar to the Serbian revolt, arose on the old basis of the reaction of a Christian Orthodox peasantry against Ottoman misgovernment and general conditions of chaos and lawlessness.

The activities of the Greeks overseas centered in what was perhaps the most remarkable and successful of Balkan revolutionary organizations, the Philike Hetairia, or Society of Friends. Founded by three impoverished Greek merchants in Odessa in 1814, this group enlisted widespread support, particularly among merchant and professional groups on the lower level. Wealthy established merchants and peasants were seldom found among its members. Organized on the model of the Masons and other revolutionary bodies, it had an elaborate ritual and different grades and placed a great emphasis on secrecy and conspiracy.

In 1818 the Hetairia moved its headquarters to Constantinople, which, although it was the Ottoman capital, contained a large Greek population. Serious preparations were then made for revolt. The aim was to be a general Balkan uprising supported by the Russian government.

Russian assistance was central in the plans of the society. In fact, its leaders in arguing for their program gave every hint that Russian backing was assured. They spoke of a mysterious *arche* at the head of the society who might be Tsar Alexander I himself. In the past the Russian government had indeed shown an interest in Balkan resistance to the Ottoman Empire. In 1770 the Russian government had given encouragement to the ill-fated revolt in the Peloponnesus. In subsequent treaties Russia had extended at least a claim to be the protector of Balkan Orthodoxy and to have special rights to speak for the Serbs and Romanians. Moreover, many of the Russian consuls in the Balkans, who were mostly Greek, were members of the Hetairia; other Russian officials also knew of the society and its goals.

In preparation for the revolution the society needed a leader with prestige. The obvious first choice was John Capodistrias, a Greek from the Ionian Islands who was then Russian foreign minister. Although he declined, another Greek in Russian service accepted. Alexander Ypsilantes, the son of a former *hospodar* of Wallachia, and at the time an aide-de-camp of the tsar, now took charge of the organization of the revolt. Other influential Greeks in Greece proper were also recruited. Particularly important were Theodore Kolokotrones, Petrobey Mavromichales, an important notable in Mani in the Peloponnesus, and Germanos, the Bishop of Patras. Agents of the society combed Greece to gain converts and establish cells. Since the ideal of the society initially was a general Balkan uprising, attempts were made to enlist other nationalities. Here, too, much success was achieved; Bulgars, Romanians, and Serbs joined as well as Greeks. In time the society had hundreds of branches and a large membership.

Initially, the society planned that the first actions should be undertaken simultaneously in Serbia and in the Peloponnesus. Unfortunately, conditions in Serbia were not favorable for such an event. The Hetairia was successful in recruiting Karadjordje, who had been living in exile but who in 1817 returned to Serbia to present the Greek plans. The whole idea of an uprising, however, was in contradiction to the basic ideas of Miloš on how Serbia should act. Whereas Karadjordje favored revolutionary tactics, Miloš believed that Serbia could best gain her goals through evolutionary means and by cooperating with the sultan. Moreover, Miloš was at this time engaged in negotiations with the Porte on gaining the title of hereditary prince. He did not want these discussions interrupted, and he did not think that his country was prepared for another conflict. The entire issue also became involved in Serbian inter-

nal politics. Karadjordje had become a political rival; some of Miloš's other opponents, such as Stojković, had joined the society. The execution of Karadjordje in 1817 ended any possibility that Serbia might join in the plans for a general revolution.

The Danubian Principalities were finally chosen as an alternative. Although these lands were predominantly Romanian, there was a great deal of logic in this decision. First, it must be remembered that the Hetairia saw itself as leading a general Balkan uprising. The Principalities had become a center for Serbian and Bulgarian refugees. In addition, within Moldavia and Wallachia the chief political influence was Greek; the Phanariote regimes controlled the administration of both provinces. Michael Suțu (Soutsos), the *hospodar* of Moldavia, was a member of the Hetairia. Support was also to be expected from the Romanian upper clergy, which was Greek-dominated, and the large landowners, many of whom were Greek or had close ties with the Phanariote regime. Most important was to be the initial cooperation of Tudor Vladimirescu, who now emerged as the leader of a Romanian national movement based on the peasants and the small landowners. A member of the Hetairia, Vladimirescu at first joined in the Greek plans.

The choice of the Principalities was also determined by the weakness of the Ottoman forces stationed there. The few Ottoman soldiers in the land were concentrated in the Danubian forts. There were no Ottoman officials in the countryside where the local militia was in the hands of men whom the Hetairia considered dependable supporters.

Despite the favorable situation in the Romanian provinces Russian support was recognized as essential for success. The Hetairia expected that Russia would be forced to intervene should the revolt break out in the Romanian lands because she had exerted such great political influence there in the past. According to an agreement reached between Russia and the Porte in 1802, Ottoman troops could not be sent into the Principalities without Russian consent. The revolutionary leaders could well expect that the tsarist government would either send in troops itself or that it would prevent the entrance of Ottoman forces.

In the spring of 1821 the Hetairia commenced the revolt under the direction of Ypsilantes. The assured support of Vladimirescu and the fact that Ottoman forces were tied up with the suppression of Ali Pasha in Greece were factors in the determination of the time for action. The Hetairia kept in close touch with events in Greece proper, where it was expected that a similar revolt would soon break out.

From the beginning the revolution in the Principalities was a disaster. No general Balkan uprising followed; during the entire period Serbia did not move to hinder or embarrass the Porte. More important, not only did Russia not give assistance, but the tsar denounced the entire action. Alexander I was at the Congress of Laibach, which had been called to

discuss the revolutionary movements in Italy and Spain, when he received word of the revolt. Under the influence of the Austrian minister Prince Metternich and the spirit of the Holy Alliance, the tsar saw this uprising as another instance of a general European conspiracy. He disavowed the revolt and did not move to prevent the entrance of Ottoman troops into the provinces.

The revolutionary movement also met severe reversals within the Principalities. When Russian intervention did not occur, the relations between the Greeks and Romanians began to deteriorate. The majority of Romanians, regardless of social strata, disliked the rule of the Phanariotes. The Hetairia was essentially a Greek nationalistic organization; there was no basic Romanian interest in a great Greek victory. Even more serious, under Tudor Vladimirescu the movement soon acquired a strong social character. Peasants throughout the country used the opportunity to rise against their landowners. Vladimirescu himself was in a very difficult position. Finally, realizing that the revolt would not succeed, he tried to save himself by initiating negotiations with the Ottoman authorities. The Hetairia, aware of this, kidnapped him. Ypsilantes then had him executed on May 27. With his death any hope of a united Romanian support behind the Hetairia died.

Meanwhile the Ottoman troops had entered the Principalities. At the beginning of the movement Greek forces had massacred the Ottoman populations of Jassy and Galaţi. Reprisals were to be expected. Ypsilantes and the "Sacred Battalion," as the strongest Greek unit was called, were decisively defeated at the Battle of Dragaşani. In June Ypsilantes fled to Austria where he was imprisoned for the next nine years. The revolution in the Principalities was at an end.

Although the Hetairia had failed in the Romanian lands, by the summer of 1821 a similar revolt was well underway in Greece proper. Here the entire situation was to prove much more favorable, and conditions more closely resembled those in Serbia with the armed peasant population and the experienced military men. The Hetairia had, of course, been extremely active here, and preparations for revolution had been discussed. The involvement of Greek bands against Ottoman troops first occurred when Mahmud II decided to settle the problem of Ali Pasha. A situation soon arose that resembled Selim III's attempt to suppress the janissaries in Serbia.

Faced with a determined Ottoman army in 1819 and 1820, Ali Pasha found himself in a dangerous position. Although he relied on Muslim support and despite the fact that he had previously denounced the Hetairia to the Porte, Ali was forced to seek Greek and Albanian aid. He tried to make himself popular in the Christian villages through the reduction of taxes and labor dues. He appealed in particular to the *Kape-*

tanioi (captains, military men) of Rumeli to join him against the Ottoman forces.

At first Ali failed to gain Greek support. In August, 1820, Mahmud's troops began to move rapidly forward. Ali was finally forced to withdraw into the fortress of Janina with about two thousand supporters. Although the Ottoman army held the surrounding land, Ali was able to defend himself in the city. During these operations Greek military men had first fought with the Ottoman soldiers. When these forces began to ravage the land, however, the Greeks changed sides. By early 1821 some five to seven thousand Greek mountain fighters had joined Ali. The Ottoman army now found itself in the weaker position.

While Greeks were fighting Ottoman soldiers in northern Greece, the Peloponnesus became the center of what was to be the main Greek revolt. Although the Hetairia had a network in Greece, the movement here was not coordinated closely with that in the Principalities. By the time the news of Ypsilantes' crossing of the Pruth reached Greece, the events leading to the revolution were well underway.

Like the Danubian Principalities, the Peloponnesus was a logical place for the organization of Greek resistance. The area enjoyed at this time a type of political autonomy that was very similar to what the Serbs had sought and finally won only after years of fighting and negotiations. In each local community Greek officials were in control. Moreover, there were executive and legislative organs for the entire region. Each community elected representatives to a provincial body, which in turn chose members for the Peloponnesian Senate. This chamber had virtual control over administration and taxation of the area. In addition, the Greeks chose two representatives to sit with two Muslims to form the permanent council of the vezir of the Peloponnesus. The territory also had the right to send representatives directly to the Porte to discuss demands and grievances.

Although Greek nationals thus controlled the local government, the assemblies were in practice dominated by the large landowners. These notables, together with the higher clergy, were not under all circumstances interested in revolt against Ottoman authority. They were a part of the existing order, and they had vested interests in protecting the Ottoman regime. The clergy were also divided in their attitude. The revolutionary doctrines of groups like the Philike Hetairia could be in direct opposition to the tenets of Orthodox Christianity. In the past the church had not only cooperated in the Ottoman political system, but it had firmly resisted influences from the West. The secular and rational leanings of the revolutionary ideology were more of a threat to the power of the church than was the increasingly feeble Ottoman rule.

The hand of these groups was, however, forced by events. Because of

rumors of impending revolt, as a test of loyalty the Ottoman authorities in March summoned the notables of the Peloponnesus to a meeting at Tripolitsa. A large number complied and were held hostage once the revolt broke out. Others, particularly those from the northern part of the peninsula, resisted. The revolution was officially proclaimed almost concurrently, around April 6, by Bishop Germanos in Patras and by Petrobey of Mani in Kalamata. It will be noticed that the movement in Greece proper thus contrasts with that in the Principalities. There was not a centrally organized and planned rising in the Peloponnesus. Agents of the Philike Hetairia had pressed circumstances to the point that some notables were so compromised that they had to proclaim the revolt. Others joined because of Ottoman measures. As in Serbia, the Greeks reacted to events; the first fighting was done by military groups and by peasant bands under local leaders. This pattern was to be maintained throughout the revolt.

The Ottoman reaction to the Greek defiance was at first weak. The authorities had already more than they could handle with the uprising in the Principalities, the problem of Ali Pasha, and a war with Persia which was also in progress. They were, however, forced to take some action. As in the Principalities, wholesale massacres of Muslim civilians had been among the initial acts of the Greek rebels. The destruction of the Muslim population of Tripolitsa in October, 1821, was particularly bloody. Ottoman reprisals followed a similar line. On Easter eve, before the first sizeable Greek massacres of Muslims in insurgent Greece, a group of janissaries hanged the patriarch of Constantinople and some of his bishops in front of their church. Greeks in the Ottoman capital and elsewhere were attacked and killed. Throughout the revolution both sides repeatedly committed atrocities; mutual reprisal and massacres were weapons in the type of guerrilla war waged. It was the Ottoman acts, however, and not the Greek, that received publicity and attention in Europe, including Russia. This fact was to influence strongly European public opinion and to be a cause of European intervention. The Ottoman massacre of an estimated three thousand inhabitants of the island of Chios in April, 1822, was to make a particularly strong impression.

Although the Ottoman forces did suppress the revolt in the Principalities, they were at first able to make little headway against the movement in Greece. Until Ali Pasha was finally defeated and died in February, 1822, the Porte did not have an army available. The war in the Greek lands was also very difficult to conduct; the Greeks were fighting on their own territory, and the terrain was ideal for guerrilla tactics. The Ottoman troops simply could not stamp out bands operating in inaccessible mountains. Moreover, the rebels early established a firm base of operations. By the summer of 1822 they held the Peloponnesus and many islands. The most important of these, Hydra, Spetsai, and Psara, became

vital for the revolution as centers for the organization of a naval force and for supplies. North of the Isthmus of Corinth the Greeks were also able to hold Misolonghi, Athens, and Thebes with the surrounding area. Misolonghi became particularly significant. The revolt remained concentrated in this restricted area. Outbreaks in other parts of the Greek-inhabited lands were suppressed. The problem for the Ottoman government was to subdue this section. Its armies, setting out from Thessaly and Epirus, normally operated from Rumeli and from there organized campaigns into the Peloponnesus.

In the first period of the revolt, from 1821 to 1825, the rebels were able to hold their main positions. Aided by their close knowledge of the sea, they managed to organize very effective naval forces against Ottoman sea transport. These fleets operated more as pirates than as a formal fighting unit, but they did maintain contact with the outside world. Although the Greeks were thus able to meet the external threat of the Ottoman troops, they were to prove less successful in dealing with their internal problems. In fact, whenever pressure from the Ottoman military lessened, the revolutionary leaders turned against each other. Parallel with the struggle against the Ottoman Empire, we find in the Peloponnesus the outbreak of a civil war between the forces who had previously joined to support the uprising.

After the outbreak of the fighting the need to provide some sort of central authority was recognized. Also at this time, chiefly because of the reprisals taken against Greeks by the Ottoman authorities, prominent Greeks from the outer Greek world began to arrive in the country. They brought with them their more sophisticated political experiences, their better formal education, and often a belief in many of the political principles of the French Revolution. In June, 1821, Demetrios Ypsilantes, the brother of Alexander, arrived. The appearance of the Phanariote Alexander Mavrokordatos was also to prove politically significant. Ypsilantes now favored the convening of an assembly and the formation of a unitary state with a centralized leadership. Supported by the military leaders, in particular by Theodore Kolokotrones, he sought to place himself at the head of this government. In December, 1821, an assembly meeting at Epidaurus established a government and in January, 1822, issued a constitution. Here the civilian elements, the islanders and the Peloponnesian notables, with Mavrokordatos particularly prominent, were able to gain the regime that they wished. The model for the constitution of Epidaurus was the French Directory; the aim was specifically to prevent the concentration of authority in the hands of one man. The executive power was invested in a five-man committee headed by Mavrokordatos. Realizing that the real strength of the state remained in the regions of Greece, Mavrokordatos soon withdrew to Misolonghi to create a firm local base for himself. This government, dominated by no-

tables and islanders, was not respected by Kolokotrones and his military and peasant followers.

In December, 1822, a second national assembly was held at Astros. Here some attempts were made to centralize the government, but the chief concern of the members was Kolokotrones. In an attempt to assure civilian control of the military actions, Kolokotrones was deprived of his military command. He reacted by kidnapping some members of the government and forcing others to flee. Two centers of authority now appeared. Kolokotrones held the important city of Nauplion; the civilian representatives settled at Kranidi where they were in close touch with Hydra and Spetsai. Here a government was formed under George Kountouriotes, who represented the islands and was the wealthiest man in Greece. He was joined by Andrew Zaimes, a Peloponnesian notable, and John Kolettes, who was to be important in future Greek politics. A Vlach from Epirus, Kolettes had come to the Peloponnesus in 1821. He had previously been connected with the court of Ali Pasha, and he had great influence among the military men of Rumeli. In the future he was to stand for the interests of that area.

In the struggle between the two centers the advantages lay with the civilian group at Kranidi, which was closer to a legitimate political authority. Its victory was assured when it received a British loan in 1824. Kolokotrones himself surrendered Nauplion in return for a sum of money. Despite this settlement the Greek political scene did not stabilize. At the end of 1824 civil war broke out again. The islands and Rumeli now fought against the Peloponnesus; soldiers from Rumeli made devastating raids into the Peloponnesus.

By 1825 the Greek and Ottoman forces faced a stalemate. The Porte could not crush the revolutionaries in the Peloponnesus and Rumeli; the rebels had not enlarged their area of control and they had squandered their resources in internal fighting. This balance was broken when Mahmud II decided to call in his vassal Mohammed Ali, the pasha of Egypt. This action was to change the entire situation in the eastern Mediterranean and to lead to foreign intervention.

Mohammed Ali placed a high price on his services. He was promised the island of Crete, and his son Ibrahim Pasha was to become the governor of the Peloponnesus. Crete was taken with little difficulty. In February, 1825, an Egyptian army landed in the Peloponnesus. The undisciplined Greek soldiers could not match the trained and modern Egyptian troops. The Greeks now paid the price for the years they had wasted in internal strife; they were not prepared to meet a major assault. Parallel with the Egyptian operations in the south, the Ottoman army pressed the attack in the north. In April, 1826, the major stronghold of Misolonghi fell; in June the Acropolis in Athens was in Ottoman hands.

The revolution appeared lost. Only a major foreign intervention could save the Greek cause.

The decisive importance of foreign, that is Russian, intervention in Serbian affairs and the disastrous effect of Alexander's denunciation of the revolt in the Principalities has already been shown. The Russian attitude toward the Greek national movement, however, was extremely complex. Alexander I was indeed at this time strongly conservative, and in Europe he joined with Metternich in demanding the repression of revolutionary activity. He was nevertheless the tsar of a country that had obligations toward Orthodox Christians and had already made claims to be the protector of the Orthodox population of the empire. The hanging of the patriarch and the massacre of Greek populations were not actions that could be so easily tolerated. The suppression of a political rebellion could be allowed; a Holy War was another matter. Russian economic interests were also involved with the fate of Greek shipping in the Black Sea and the Mediterranean. The civil war had disrupted commerce and made the seas unsafe. In the summer of 1821 the worsening of diplomatic relations between Russia and the Porte led first to an ultimatum and then to the severing of relations. In these negotiations the Russian government showed itself primarily interested in the protection of Orthodoxy and in conditions in the Principalities rather than in a movement for Greek liberation. This emphasis in the Russian attitude was to continue. In the first years after the Greek revolt began neither Russia nor the other European powers wanted a war in the Balkans over the issue.

Although Russian attention lessened after 1821, interest in Greek affairs in the West began to rise. In August, 1822, George Canning followed Robert Castlereagh as prime minister in Britain. British policy still called for the maintenance of the power and prestige of the Ottoman Empire as a check against Russia, but Canning was more flexible in his attitude. The revolt was also upsetting British commerce in the area and having an unsettling effect on the Ionian Islands, which were under British protection. When the Porte was unable to stamp out the rebellion, the British government felt itself drawn into the affair. What it wished to avoid at all costs was the establishment of an autonomous or independent Greece under Russian control. Canning now came to adopt a policy that called for cooperation with Russia and then with France on Greek problems. The aim was to bind the two powers in order to prevent them from acting in a manner damaging to British interests.

The British as well as other governments also had to face a strong wave of public opinion. The Greek cause was immensely aided by the great movement of romantic Philhellenism. All of the leading statesmen of Europe from London to St. Petersburg had received a classical educa-

tion. They, like the other educated members of their society, tended to see in the modern Greeks the direct descendants of their schoolbook heroes. They imagined a noble, brave, and beautiful people, closely resembling classical sculptures, battling frightful Muslim hordes. Moreover, the first Greek constitutions were liberal in form and adopted from western models. European liberals thus saw in the revolt a social and political struggle sympathetic to their persuasions. Philhellenes came from all segments of society. Many, particularly from the German states, came to fight in Greece. Most influential for the Greek cause was to be the support of the Bavarian king Ludwig I and the poets Byron and Shelley. In Russia the religious note of embattled Orthodoxy was added.

On the basis of British self-interest and popular support Canning began to take a series of measures. In 1823 the Greeks were recognized as belligerents; this gave them certain advantages in naval warfare. In 1824 the City of London granted the Greek government a loan with a face value of three million pounds. This transaction was characterized by fraudulence and maladministration; nevertheless, it gave some British financiers a stake in Greece's future. Other loans were to follow. Even more significant was Canning's move toward cooperation with Russia. Certainly, both London and St. Petersburg had many interests in common in the Greek question despite their antagonism in other areas. Neither liked the involvement of Mohammed Ali; both had been harmed by the commercial interruptions and wanted peaceful conditions restored.

In 1825 Alexander I died and was succeeded by the more conservative Nicholas I. Nicholas proved to be an even greater opponent of revolutionary movements than his brother had been; he was also more decisive in his actions. Canning used the occasion of the coronation to send the Duke of Wellington to Russia. There, in April, 1826, the Protocol of St. Petersburg was signed. The two powers agreed to mediate between the Greek rebels and the Ottoman government with the aim of establishing an autonomous Greek state.

The signing of the agreement signified that Russia would cooperate with Britain on the matter of Greece. This question was not, however, of prime concern to the Russian government; the affairs of Serbia and the Principalities always took precedence. Russia now turned to settle the issues that had arisen in connection with these regions. In March, 1826, the Russian government sent an ultimatum claiming that conditions in Serbia and the Principalities were in violation of the treaties. The Porte was directed to remove its troops from the Principalities and to restore the situation that had existed prior to the Greek revolt. The stipulations of Article 8 of the Treaty of Bucharest were to be carried out in Serbia.

Once again the Ottoman Empire was in a period of severe internal crisis. In June Mahmud II, after careful internal preparation, finally

took the great step of abolishing the janissaries. Although this measure was essential for the safety of the state, the Ottoman military forces were temporarily in disarray. The Porte could thus not easily resist the new demands that Russia now pressed. Therefore, in October, in the Convention of Akkerman, the Russian government received the terms that it had demanded. This agreement was of profound significance for future Serbian and Romanian affairs. Russia's position as the protector of these areas was acknowledged, and thus her right to interfere in their domestic affairs.

Meanwhile France had joined Britain and Russia in a common diplomatic front. The French government could not stand aside and allow a major Mediterranean crisis to be mediated without its participation. The French king, Charles X, was also a Philhellene. In the Treaty of London of July, 1827, the three signatory powers agreed to try to secure an autonomous Greece through mediation between the Porte and the rebels. The allies, however, did more than sign documents. They now cooperated in establishing a naval blockade of Greece designed to prevent communication between Egypt and its troops in the Peloponnesus. In October, 1827, the combined allied squadron entered the Bay of Navarino where a Turco-Egyptian fleet lay anchored. Shots were exchanged and general fighting broke out. As a result the entire Ottoman fleet was sunk. This action, planned by neither participant, inaugurated a chain of events that led to direct Russian military intervention in the Balkans.

The Navarino engagement occurred at a low point in Greek fortunes. Athens had fallen and the Egyptian troops were victorious. Moreover, the official British reaction to Navarino was not heartening. Canning had died two months before, and his successor, Wellington, condemned the allied action and in effect reversed Canning's policy. Wellington now allowed Russia and the Ottoman Empire to go to war. Angered by the Navarino episode and by other events the Porte denounced the Akkerman convention. War broke out between Russia and the Ottoman Empire in April, 1828. Although the Greek question was not really at issue between the two powers, the war did decide the question of the Greek national state.

After a difficult campaign in the Balkans, the Russian army finally reached Adrianople. There in September, 1829, the belligerants signed the Treaty of Adrianople. At this time the Russian government faced the question of whether it should seek the partition of the empire and its destruction as a truly independent power. It was decided that the state should be maintained, but that Russia should attempt to dominate it. The terms of the peace were thus not hard. Russia took her reward for victory in territory in the Caucasus and a confirmation of her protector-

ate over Serbia and the Danubian Principalities. The treaty also provided for the settlement of the Greek question by international mediation.

Meanwhile, political conditions had improved temporarily in Greece. The Kountouriotes government had been replaced by one under Zaimes after the fall of Misolonghi. Kolokotrones remained a problem. A third national assembly was held in 1827 and drew up the Constitution of Troezene. It also took the important step of inviting Capodistrias to come to Greece as president. Two British Philhellenes, Sir Richard Church and Alexander Cochrane, were chosen to head the Greek military and naval forces.

Capodistrias arrived in Greece in February, 1828. He had been dismissed from Russian service in 1822 and had been living thereafter in Switzerland. In Greek politics he had the support of Kolokotrones and his followers and of the Peloponnesian notables. An experienced administrator, he recognized that the country needed a strong, stable government and the support of the great powers. As a result of his past career and his acquaintance with European liberal political thought, he attempted to organize Greece according to the theories of the time. He wished to establish a centralized, bureaucratic administration which would govern the land justly with due regard for the interests of all of the social groups.

Immediately Capodistrias encountered a great deal of opposition; he was never popular with the peasants. He was also unable to control the distribution of the land. During the revolution Ottoman property that passed into the hands of the rebels, including the estates, was divided among those who held the political and military power: the notables and the military leaders. It was not shared among the peasants. In foreign relations Capodistria's position was weakened by the fact that both Britain and France unjustly considered him a Russian partisan.

Despite his difficulties Capodistrias did provide the necessary strong direction in Greek affairs. Unfortunately, he was assassinated in October, 1831. The next administration was headed by three men: Agostino Capodistrias, the brother of the president, Kolokotrones, and Kolettes. These divergent leaders soon quarreled, and the country was again plunged into a state of political anarchy. The failure of the Greeks to form a stable, lasting administration accounts for the form of government finally given the country by the great powers. It also helps explain why Greeks were allowed so small a political role in the first administrations established in independent Greece.

As political conditions degenerated in the country, the diplomats conferred on the future of Greece. It will be noted that the fundamental decisions, that is, those concerning the form of government and the person of the first ruler, were made by France, Britain, and Russia and not

by representatives of the Greeks. The great powers now determined that Greece should be independent, not autonomous, but that the state should receive very reduced boundaries. It was also to have a monarchical form of government. The question of a constitution was left undecided. The important agreement for Greece was signed in London in February, 1830. The independent kingdom established in this treaty was expressly placed under the guarantee of the three powers.

The next task was the selection of a ruler. The crown was first offered to Leopold of Saxe-Coburg. Though he initially accepted, he later refused because he was not satisfied with the boundaries of the state or with the financial arrangements. He was also not encouraged by Capodistrias. The choice of a ruler was to prove difficult since the powers had agreed that no member of one of their ruling dynasties could hold this office. Finally, in 1832 the governments agreed on the selection of Otto, the seventeen-year-old son of King Ludwig of Bavaria. Otto arrived in Greece in 1833 with a new European loan and with the boundaries of the state finally set at the Arta-Volos line. He adopted the Greek form of his name, Othon.

By 1833 a Greek state with a foreign prince had thus been established. Despite the fact that the territories allotted included most of those held by the insurgents during the revolution, only about 800,000 Greeks inhabited the area. Three-quarters of the Greek people remained under Ottoman rule. Moreover, notwithstanding the apparent success of the revolutionary movement, it can be argued the Greek nation as a whole lost more than it gained. The privileged position previously enjoyed by the Greeks in the empire has already been emphasized. This situation changed after the revolt in 1821. Greeks continued to serve in high posts in the Ottoman service, but the prize offices were lost, in particular the *hospodar*ships of Moldavia and Wallachia, and with them the preeminent Greek position in the Principalities. In general, Greeks were now looked upon with suspicion and hostility by the Ottoman authorities. The effect was also felt in commercial and financial circles. In Constantinople Armenians replaced Greeks as the predominant element in banking. In the supplying of state and military needs Bulgarian merchants gained a stronger role. The Greek merchant communities remained, but their special position was lost. In addition, Greek shipping, on which so many fortunes had been based, had been severely damaged and had to be rebuilt. Equally tragic for the countryside was the legacy of ten years of civil war and revolt. Large areas, particularly in the Peloponnesus, were completely devastated and their population decimated.

A final negative aspect was the role that the three protecting powers were henceforth to play in Greek internal and foreign affairs. Although Greece, unlike Serbia, was now an independent state, she was to be subject to a degree of foreign interference almost as vexatious as Ottoman

control had been. As already seen, Russia had by this time established herself as the recognized protecting power in Serbia and the Principalities, but these states had the advantage that they were dealing with one government. Greece, in contrast, had to deal with three powers who usually carried on radically opposing policies in their relations with Athens. Of the three Britain, with her paramount seapower in the Mediterranean, was in the strongest position. As will be shown, however, both France and Russia also exercised great influence on the future of the country.