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THE NATURE AND SIGNIFICANCE OF
THE FIRST SERBIAN INSURRECTION, 1804-1813*

Recently historical science has been giving increasing attention to the contribution of the Balkan peoples to European and world history. The successes of the socialist countries of the Balkan Peninsula and their growing role in the international arena is raising interest in study of the national liberation wars and revolutions in this region and in the revolutionary and patriotic traditions of the Balkan peoples, including the First Serbian Insurrection against the Ottoman yoke.

In the 1820s contemporaries of this uprising naturally wrote about it as part of the revolutionary events of the day. At the very dawn of his career, the young Leopold Ranke, then close to the liberal salon of Warnhagen von Ense, in Vienna, made the acquaintance there of Vuk Karadžić, a figure in the Serbian insurrection, and in 1828, using the latter's stories and written sources, wrote his book The Serbian Revolution (Die Serbische Revolution). (1) It was specifically the conversation with Karadžić that inspired Ranke to write this work. (2) His book did in fact bring the Serbian Revolution into the purview of world

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history and made it widely known in Europe.

Ranke understood the revolution in Serbia as a national liberation uprising of a [subject] people. The early work of this German historian on the Serbian insurrection was highly esteemed in Yugoslav and world historiography. Interest in it has not been lost even now, all the more so as it recorded not only written evidence but also the oral tradition of the Serbian Revolution, proceeding from Karadžić. (3) Later, however, at the peak of his glory and honor, Ranke, loyally serving the ruling classes, became much more conservative, close with Bismarck, and an ardent supporter of the Prussian monarchy. By this time the word "revolution" was already odious to him. He removed it from the second and third editions of his work (1844, 1879), replacing it by such expressions as "war of liberation" (Befreiungskrieg) and "disorders" (Unruhen). (4)

In the kingdom of Serbia itself the insurrection of 1804-1813 was not termed a revolution. Major attention back then went to biographies of its leading figures, the founders of the later dynasties, and to legislative documents and the historical preconditions for the constitutional institutions that were subsequently established. (5) The socioeconomic conditions under which the insurrection broke out were hardly studied at all and to this day have been inadequately researched.

After the triumph of the socialist revolution in Yugoslavia the view that the insurrection of 1804-1813 was a revolution again found its way into Yugoslav historiography, but now in a deeper sense. The insurrection of 1804-1813 began to be looked upon not only as one of national liberation but also as a social one against the oppression of the Ottoman feudal lords. The attention of researchers was attracted by the fact that F. Engels referred to the First Serbian Insurrection as a "revolution." (6) To the founders of Marxism, in contrast with Ranke, the word "revolution" signified a sociopolitical overturn, connected with the transition from one social system to another. In the widely known work by Academician V. Čubrilović, The History of Political Thought in Serbia (Istorija političke misli u Srbiji u XIX v.), and in other of his writings, the insurrec-

tion of 1804-1813 is not only called "the Serbian Revolution," but it is pointed out that it led to destruction of the feudal Ottoman system in Serbia (7), i.e., a class evaluation of the insurrection is given.

Ever deeper studies of the sociopolitical character of the First Serbian Insurrection of 1804-1813 and of its place and role in the history of the revolutions and national liberation movements of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries have been made in current Yugoslav and Soviet historiography during recent decades. However, in our opinion, the general features common to revolutions of this period, and those that were unique to it alone and were distinctive and particular, have not yet been investigated.

The accumulation of documentary material and a major joint Soviet-Yugoslav publication (8) create the preconditions for further, deeper, and more detailed explication of the causes, goals and class character of the First Serbian Insurrection as one of the revolutions of the beginning of the nineteenth century. They also permit us to examine the roles played in the insurrection by the rural administrative, commercial, and clerical elite and by the masses of the people, the national-liberation and antifeudal trends among them, and the significance of the support Russia gave to the insurrection. The symposium of Yugoslav and Soviet scholars on the First Serbian Insurrection held in Belgrade in December 1980 furthered the analysis of a number of problems.

The accumulation of an enormous amount of material for comparative historical study and for the typing of bourgeois revolutions and national movements of the era of capitalism's triumph and consolidation in the most developed countries of Europe and America at the end of the eighteenth and in the beginning of the nineteenth centuries provides an important prerequisite for much deeper study of the insurrection of 1804-1813 and for an understanding of its place in history. Only such a comparative analysis, demanding extreme care, permits identification and definition of the common as well as the distinctive features of the Serbian Insurrection of 1804-1813 as one of the

revolutions of the early nineteenth century. This is the goal of the present article.

More than anything else the national liberation nature of the insurrection attracts attention — a feature differentiating it from a number of revolutions of the seventeenth, eighteenth, and early nineteenth centuries, which did not possess this feature.

Not all of the bourgeois revolutions of this era were of the national liberation type. It is known that a number of bourgeois revolutions occurred in countries not under foreign domination (England, France, Spain). Internal causes, i.e., the more or less substantial development of capitalist relationships within feudal society, gave rise to these revolutions; they were not directed against a foreign yoke. An established nobility existed in these same countries. Then a capitalist class had arisen, or a stratum of landlords ("the new nobility") had become bourgeois, and a clearly expressed bourgeois ideology had been born and shaped. Democratic bourgeois currents presented themselves, albeit to differing degrees, in religious or secular guise. The lower strata of the people were actively engaged in, and often exercised a guiding influence on, the course of events. France offered the most vivid example of a revolution that was not simply capitalist, but popular — a bourgeois democratic revolution. As Lenin wrote, the distinguishing feature of the latter type of revolution was that "the mass, a majority, of the people, the bottom-most 'lower depths' of society . . . rose as an independent force, and placed upon the entire course of the revolution the imprint of their demands, their attempts to build the new society in their own way in the place of the old one being destroyed." (9)

In Spain, in the Italian states, in Russia, and in the countries of Latin America, the nobility was powerful at the beginning of the nineteenth century and the bourgeoisie was weak. Under such conditions these countries were marked by a distinctive phenomenon: revolutionary sentiment and activity within the nobility appeared as part of the struggle against feudal and absolutist reaction. This was not possible in Serbia. In Spain,

Portugal, the Italian states, and Latin America democratic forces were weak or totally lacking during the first quarter of the nineteenth century, and revolutions were consequently unable to take on a bourgeois democratic character, although major revolutionary insurrections of the masses of the people occurred.

In the European colonies of America, the struggle against foreign feudal and colonial oppression played the main role in the revolutions for liberation at the close of the eighteenth and during the first quarter of the nineteenth century. Such events as the U.S. War for Independence and the struggle of the Spanish colonies in Latin America were long regarded merely as uprisings and wars of national liberation, or merely separatist movements. Only in the last few decades have historians of Marxist orientation interpreted them as distinctive kinds of bourgeois revolutions of national liberation. In these countries, as a rule, an established capitalist system founded on free hired labor did not exist. Everywhere the influence of the indigenous patriotically minded nobility was great. The capitalist class's level of development was negligible, existing chiefly in commerce. The situation was further complicated by the presence of Negro slavery and, in Latin America, by peonage and the oppression of the local native inhabitants, the Indians. The owners of landed estates, mines, and placer operations often combined in themselves simultaneously the features of the serf-holding landlord, the slave-owner, and the capitalist merchant.

On the Balkan Peninsula, under conditions in which the Ottoman Empire had gone into decline and was experiencing a deep internal crisis in Serbia (in the Belgrade pashalik), there were features both similar to and highly different from the above-mentioned types of revolutions and national liberation movements. The Serbian Insurrection of 1804-1813 was one of those East European revolutions that was primarily directed against the feudal, national, and religious oppression of foreign conquerors, in this case, the Ottoman yoke. In Serbia were to be found complicated and very cruel forms of Ottoman military-feudal oppression. The sipahis (the very highest elite), who were

feudal lords either Turkish or from the ranks of the Bosnian begs [Bosnian notables who were Slavic Muslims – D.J.R.], lived primarily in Belgrade, rarely making appearances on their landholdings (sipahiluks), and received a tithe from the crop and a head tax (glavnitsa) from peasant families. The peasants paid either in cash or kind the fixed annual tax on grapevines (tulumina), on pigs (zhirovitsa), and on honey. They provided butter, delivered firewood and hay, and labored in their masters' fields. A portion of the peasants paid all these dues in money, this being called the otsek, which was a one-time payment of 10 groshi per married man, an alternative that eased matters considerably. (10) Men called chiftlik-sahibis (11) cruelly exploited the peasants. They took one-ninth, over and above the tithe due the sipahis. A head tax (haratch) on every Christian male aged 7 to 70 was paid into the sultan's treasury, plus the porez, a tax exacted each autumn and spring from every family. (12) In economic terms, the feudal oppression was burdensome in itself, but the lives of the rayahs [Ottoman subjects – D.J.R.] were even more severely burdened by the arbitrariness and plunder engaged in by the Turkish authorities and troops, and every conceivable kind of violence, ruination of churches and other forms of oppression. The Janissaries were particularly ferocious and plunderous. Their temporary removal after Russia's and Austria's wars with Turkey at the end of the eighteenth century slowed the maturing of the revolutionary explosion in Serbia by a few years.

At that time no well-established capitalist system based on the hiring of free labor existed in Serbia. Patriarchal principles existed in rural life, accompanied by a noticeable differentiation of a local rural administrative elite (knezy, kmety, village elders), who usually controlled commerce as well. Pig-raising was the branch of agriculture that yielded the largest amount of marketable product. The feudal Ottoman ruling class was concentrated mainly in the towns and fortresses. There was no Serbian local nobility whatsoever (13) or any developed bourgeoisie, although a prosperous rural stratum already had taken shape and had become involved in

trade. The embourgeoisied rural elite grew rich on pig-farming and also controlled the collection of taxes, from which it extracted considerable profits.

Under circumstances of a semi-patriarchal order in the countryside, the illiteracy of virtually the entire population, and the small size of the intelligentsia (primarily clerical), the political and legal ideas of the secular philosophy of the bourgeois Enlightenment of the eighteenth century had not yet reached Serbia. More importantly, neither had bourgeois democratic principles and theories in the form in which they were known in the bourgeois revolutions of the West at the end of the eighteenth and in the early nineteenth centuries.

In our view, one finds no direct influence of the French bourgeois revolution of the late eighteenth century in Serbian sources, although it was quite noticeable in the western lands of the South Slavs, particularly during the Napoleonic wars. This fact also demonstrates that the causes of the insurrection were rooted in the internal conditions of Serbia's development.

There can be no question, however, that a national patriotic consciousness rose in Serbia at the close of the eighteenth century. Ideas and projects for Serbian autonomy appeared, primarily during and after the war of Russia and Austria against Turkey in the late 1780s and early 1790s. In Serbia the influence of Orthodox clerical ideology and of the religious, ethnic, and cultural similarities with other Slavs, particularly the Russian people, manifested itself.

At the beginning of the nineteenth century, Ottoman feudal oppression was complicated by the decay of the military and administrative power of the oppressors, the arbitrary and anarchic behavior of the Janissaries, and the invasion of bands of kircalis [Ottoman irregulars who turned to banditry — D.J.R.], who created a standing threat to life and property and led to the physical extermination of part of the Serbian population, primarily members of the local self-government entities and the prosperous trading and administrative elite. Thus, the anti-feudal and national liberation features common to many revolutions developed in Serbia under concrete local conditions

with all their distinctive features.

From the standpoint of comparative history, these are the most important general and distinctive features of the circumstances in which the Serbian Revolution of 1804-1813 developed. The following are obvious from what has been stated: the independent and profoundly internal nature of the causes of this revolution, the incorrectness of the prevalent nineteenth-century view of the Serbian national liberation movement and cultural renaissance as phenomena called forth by external influences, not to speak of prevaricatory versions from Turkish, French, or Austrian sources which often declared this movement to have been the result of efforts of foreign agents, particularly of Russian "agents." The untenability of such notions is obvious.

Yugoslav historiography, particularly the most recent writings, sheds light on the deep roots of the First Serbian Insurrection. The research done there has gone through various stages, from emphasis by Serbian historians of the roles of particular leaders of the First and Second Serbian insurrections (often under the influence of the dynastic sympathies of particular writers) to an effort at broader explication of the socioeconomic roots and popular character of the Serbian Revolution of 1804-1813, which, as has already been stated, cannot yet be considered a task that has been carried out to the full. Soviet historiography also places primary importance on the independent national, social, and political sources of the insurrection.

It is necessary to keep in mind the fundamental significance of the independent preconditions, goals, and character of the Serbian Insurrection as well as that of other national liberation movements and revolutions on the Balkan Peninsula in analyzing the foreign-policy orientation and connections of the leaders of the insurrection, the various groupings among them, and also in shedding light on the activity of Russia's military and diplomatic representatives in Serbia, and on the intervention of the Austrian border authorities in the source of events.

Activists of the national liberation movement in the Balkans

sought to take advantage of the contradictions between the Ottoman Empire and the great powers, particularly Russia, Austria, and France, for their purposes. As we know, Austria did not wish to support the Serbian and other uprisings in the Balkans, fearing their influence upon the peoples oppressed by the Habsburgs, while Napoleon had no intention of leaving even vestiges of Slavic statehood in the Balkans (Dubrovnik, for example).

The Russian government had the greatest interest in supporting the Serbian and other national movements. It likewise acted in its own interests and to the degree its capabilities permitted, but objectively the degree of convergence, and in part coincidence, between these interests and the strivings of the Balkan peoples compelled them to place their greatest hopes specifically upon Russia. Naturally, the influence of such facts as the ethnic, linguistic, and religious closeness of the Serbs and other South Slavic peoples with the Russians, and their traditional ties to Russia, also played a role. Russia's direct interest in the success of the Serbian Insurrection and in supporting the Serbs and other Balkan peoples in the course of the wars with the Ottoman Empire was of great significance. Numerous studies by Soviet scholars have demonstrated the connection between this political course on Russia's part and the conquest of the northern shore of the Black Sea by populating these lands with sedentary landholders and by developing maritime commerce in the Russian South. Landlords, merchants, and the agricultural and artisanal populations, particularly in the southern portion of the empire, all had an interest in this. (14)

Although in scale and influence upon the worldwide revolutionary process of that time the Serbian insurrection was considerably less significant than those in Western Europe and America, it was of immense importance to the Balkan Peninsula, where Serbia at the beginning of the nineteenth century proved to be the first major hotbed of a national liberation movement against the Ottoman yoke which developed into a bourgeois national revolution. The prerequisites for a bourgeois national revolution had matured in Greece, but prior to

the Serbian insurrection it was only on the Ionian Islands that an attempt had been made to recreate an independent national Greek state, and this came about not as a result of an insurrection but under the direct influence of the liberation of the Ionian Islands by the Russian fleet. In Bulgaria, too, conditions for a bourgeois national revolution had not come into being by the beginning of the nineteenth century. The First Serbian Insurrection also had immense importance for the emergence of a Serbian bourgeois national state and for the South Slavic population of the Austrian Empire.

An analysis of the demands of the insurrectionists, the role of the military-administrative and commercial ruling class of the Serbian countryside, and the democratic, antifeudal, national liberation tendencies of the entire mass of the peasantry in this insurrection has decisive importance in uncovering the socio-political and national character of the Revolution of 1804-1813. It is important to consider to what degree the strivings of the rebels were capable of realization, what the attitude of the sultan's government was toward them at various stages in the insurrection, and how the forced compromises of the leaders of the insurrection with the Porte arose. It is necessary to clarify exactly what was accomplished in fact in the course of the struggle against Ottoman feudal oppression in socioeconomic, primarily agrarian terms, how the founding of agencies of political and administrative authority in the course of the insurrection proceeded, and what resulted therefrom, i.e., the beginnings of the establishment of the new bourgeois national Serbian state. To provide an exhaustive answer to all these questions on the basis of present knowledge of the sources would mean to write a large and fundamental work on the Insurrection that would cope with all data now known, and with proper consideration of the course of events over the entire territory of the country and the entire international situation. It goes without saying that the present article lays no claim to doing this. Its purpose is to record only the most important things that have now been done on the theoretical plane with respect to the history of the First Serbian Insurrection, on the basis of the achieve-

ments of Yugoslav and Soviet scholars.

It is worth noting that the signs of maturation of revolutionary events common to all revolutions were evident in the very preparation of the Insurrection of 1804-1813, namely, the emergence of a revolutionary situation and the appearance of all the criteria thereof, "a crisis at the top," exacerbation of the calamities suffered by the people to a level beyond the usual, and extraordinary events that serve as the spark for the revolutionary explosion.

In the Belgrade pashalik the emergence of a revolutionary situation can be ascertained circa 1801. The crisis "at the top" or of the Ottoman government was expressed in the Porte's loss of control over the Janissaries and its being compelled to agree to their return to the pashalik virtually at their own will. This was followed by new ferocious acts of oppression on the part of the Janissaries, an increase in feudal dues, and in acts of arbitrary behavior and violence, which led to a sharp worsening of the conditions of life of the Serbian population and placed a considerable portion of the knezes [territorial chiefs elected by village elders — D.J.R.] under threat of extermination. (15) The murder of many knezes or what came to be known as the "slaughter of the knezes" proved to be the extraordinary event providing the immediate impetus to the insurrection. A special feature of the situation was the fact that the new insurrectionists joined forces with the guerrillas (haiduks) [outlaws with a romantic reputation in popular lore — D.J.R.] who previously had taken to the woods. The invasion of detachments of kircalis under Husants-Ali complicated the situation further and at the same time weakened the position of the Janissaries. Helpless for all practical purposes, the Porte hoped that its disobedient forces would destroy each other by internecine warfare. The overall consequence was a situation threatening the extinction of a considerable number of Serbs. Thus, all the criteria of a revolutionary situation, the appearance of which Lenin described as a universal law of the maturing of revolutions, were present in one distinctive form or another in Serbia on the eve of the First Serbian Insurrection of 1804-1813.

The goals of the rebels were set forth in a number of documents, analysis of which leaves no doubt about the antifeudal and national liberation character of the Serbian Revolution. As early as May 10 (April 28), 1804, the rebels transmitted demands at a meeting organized by the Austrians at Zemun that the dayis [Janissary officers — D.J.R.] be removed from Belgrade and that no new chiftliks [hereditary-type holding of Ottoman cavalry — D.J.R.] be established in the future. Further, the Serbs insisted that the Ottoman authorities not engage in vengeance, not engage in malfeasance, and that they exact tribute, land and soul taxes strictly in accordance with the Hatti-Sherif of 1793 — that they take what was due the vi-ziers, the sipahis, the voivodes, and judges, but no more. (16)

The demands of the insurrectionists were reflected in agreements by individual Serbian poglavars (leaders) with the Ottoman authorities of some towns and fortresses. The Serbian poglavars Bogićević of Kubats and Savić of Trišić became the rulers of the town of Yadro. They concluded an agreement with the Turkish captain-pasha by which the Turks were forbidden to appear in the villages or set up chitluks (chiftliks). The Serbs, for their part, were to pay only the haratch and porez and once a year bring the tithe and head-tax to the sipahis, and were to conduct their own courts. (17)

The conditions concluded between the rebels and the commander of the Turkish fortress of Šabac on April 19, 1804, were more moderate. They provided that the Turkish and Serbian authorities would administer justice jointly and that both Turks and Serbs could move freely from town to town and engage in commerce. (18)

In petitions submitted to Sultan Selim III in April and May 1805, the rebels demanded that the rayahs be permitted to pursue their affairs freely, cultivate land, trade without hindrance, build churches and monasteries and in general live "by their laws." In another address to the sultan, November 30, 1805, the rebels petitioned further that the Serbs be assured "peace and safety" and "civil happiness," i.e., a stable order and the rule of law, and that the attack upon them being prepared by the

pashas of Travnik and elsewhere not be allowed to occur. The address emphasized that the Serbs were warring not against the sultan but against "his rebels," the Janissary mutineers. (19) The insurrectionists put forth demands to limit feudal oppression, for freedom to cultivate the soil and to engage in crafts and trade, and advanced a plan to create an internally independent autonomous Serbian principality.

In the same documents the insurrectionists petitioned that an official in charge of tribute (muhazil) be sent to Belgrade instead of a vizier, that the people choose its own supreme knez, and that local ober-knezes be elected for the lower geographic administrative units, the kadiluks, i.e., that the country be governed by the prosperous Serbian ruling class that led the struggle of the entire population for liberation against the feudal and national oppression of the Ottoman yoke.

The documents of the Serbian Revolution vividly express the ideas of political autonomy for Serbia as a self-governing principality. This testifies to the insurrectionists' striving to re-establish a Serbian national state. These thoughts were set forth in appeals to the sultan and to the Russian and Austrian courts and in certain other sources.

There can be no doubt that the insurrectionists confined themselves to a demand for autonomy only because they still lacked the strength to win total independence. At that time it was not possible to count on support from other powers, not even Russia, for a completely independent Serbia.

The international situation in the beginning of the nineteenth century was not particularly favorable for the Serbs. Russia was allied to the Ottoman Empire and could not help them openly, while Austria and France had no interest at all in helping the Serbs. The fact that the insurrection broke out in so complex an international situation emphasizes even further its independent socioeconomic and political national liberationist sources.

From the very outset, the Serbian Revolution sought to establish itself on the international arena, and initiated its own diplomacy, which in our view was conducted independently and

quite artfully, despite the absence of professional experience, and sometimes by uneducated people who were, nonetheless, quite wise, and endowed with will and common sense.

Serbia had a common border with the Habsburg holdings, and Karadjordje began by pledging his loyalty to the court in Vienna, so as to protect the insurrection on its Austrian flank. In May 1804 he informed Vienna, through the Austrian border authorities, that he was ready to transfer Serbia and its fortresses to the supreme authority of the Austrian court via a stadthalter from the House of the Habsburgs (20), and if this proved undesirable, that he "in the name of the entire nation" would turn for aid to another power in order to "tear a Christian people away from Turkish slavery." Naturally, Karadjordje understood perfectly well that Austria would not make this move for fear of trouble with Russia, and would not desire to subordinate Serbia to itself. His maneuver proved quite skillful. On the eve of its new war with Napoleon the court of Vienna confined itself to advising the Porte to display moderation, even refraining from undertaking mediation between it and the insurrectionists, and then informed St. Petersburg of the requests the Serbs had made. Austria's position this time, as after the war of 1787-1791, did not ease the position of the rebels, but only resulted in new disappointment. Karadjordje and the other chieftains were extremely dissatisfied with the position taken by Austria, regarding it as ungrateful and inhuman, and they wrote the lord Jovan Jovanović that it was necessary to seek help from the Russian tsar. (21)

The dispatch of letters and then of a Serbian deputation to St. Petersburg with pleas for political and military assistance and diplomatic intercession with the Porte almost immediately followed the appeal to Vienna. On July 15, 1804, the Serbian military leaders wrote Alexander I from their camp near Topchider that the Janissaries wanted to exterminate the Serbs. They requested financial aid and intercession with the sultan to grant autonomy to Serbia, expressing readiness to pay tribute in such a situation, and appealed to the bonds of "common religion" and kinship "of language and blood." (22) Information

reached the Russian ministry of foreign affairs that the insurrectionists were demanding that Serbia become an autonomous principality like Moldavia and Wallachia, whose privileges were protected by a Russian guarantee. (23) In an address by the Serbian insurrectionists of November 15 (3), 1804, to A. A. Czartoryski, in charge of the Russian ministry of foreign affairs, the desire was expressed that Serbia "be converted to a state of political independence, under Russia's direct and immediate protection, after the example of the Republic of Seven Islands (24), while preserving inviolate the existing obligation to the sultan to pay the moderate tribute due him." (25) These words clearly show the influence of the support Russia had given the struggle of the Balkan peoples against the Ottoman yoke upon the political views and plans of the leaders of the Serbian Revolution. The importance of the Russian policy with respect to the Ionian Islands and the Danubian Principalities now manifested itself. The Russian minister was commissioned to counsel the Porte to grant self-administration to Serbia. (26) Russia began to aid the Serbs financially, and as early as December 1804, 3,000 Dutch chervontsy were sent to Karadjordje through the hospodar [governor — D.J.R.] of Wallachia. More substantial assistance in arms, money, and training officers was extended after the beginning of the Russo-Turkish War. (27)

Despite the Serbs' assurances that they were prepared to continue paying tribute if granted autonomy, the Porte stubbornly rejected all the Serbian demands, and only after the decision to engage in war with Russia, moved to sign a peace treaty with the Serbian plenipotentiary, P. Ičko, on August 3, 1806. Ičko's credentials and the conditions to which he put his signature are well known. (28) This was a compromise, far from satisfactory to the Serbs. The article of greatest importance to the peasants, which replaced dues payable to the sipahis with an annual cash payment in one lump sum, the otsek, was postponed until it could be considered in Belgrade jointly with the sipahis. This made further bureaucratic delay possible. (29) The Porte agreed to remove permanently from Serbia "the unbridled troublemakers," i.e., the Janissaries and kircalis,

and recognized the leader of Serbia as the head of the nation, with the title of bash-knez. Ičko secured a guarantee of the right of the knezes to levy taxes, a stipulation of the sizes of their armed detachments (from 15 to 50 men), and limitations upon the Ottoman garrisons in the fortresses. The authority of the pasha was not to extend farther than Belgrade, and he himself was to be named by the Serbs and was to keep his guard of 500 men in four towns — Belgrade, Smederevo, Šabac, and Užice. The Serbian plenipotentiary gave his main attention to the interests of the military-administrative elite of Serbian society. But after the outbreak of the Russo-Turkish War of 1806-1812, the insurrectionists renounced "Ičko's peace" and resumed their military operations in the hope of aid from Russia and the winning for Serbia of more complete autonomy or even total independence.

At the same time the Serbian elders continued their attempts to gain support from Austria as well. On February 10, 1805, they presented a plea to Emperor Franz I for protection, but without result. (30)

In 1806 Karadjordje and the Serbian Governing Senate asked Peter I, ruler of Montenegro, for aid against Bosnia, from which Turkish begs were operating against the insurrectionists. (31) The Montenegrin apparently had plans of his own to make use of the insurrection of the Serbs and the dissatisfaction of the Hercegovinians with the Ottoman yoke. (32)

Montenegro sent to Russia in the spring of 1807 a project for establishing a Slavic-Serbian kingdom in the Balkans, to include a number of Albanian towns, and others in Boka Kotor, Hercegovina, Dubrovnik, and Dalmatia, Serbia, and Bosnia, with the title Tsar of the Slavs and Serbs to be added to that already possessed by the Russian Emperor. (33) Because it was totally unrealistic, this utopian plan gained no serious attention in St. Petersburg nor at the headquarters of the Russian Army. Plans for the rebirth of the Serbian state had appeared earlier as well. (34)

In 1807, when the Russian army essentially alone continued the war against Napoleon, the Russian government was in need

of more exact knowledge of the situation on the Balkan Peninsula. A Russian commissioner, the Marquis Paulucci, who had a good knowledge of the situation in Dalmatia, was dispatched to clarify the situation in Serbia and meet with Karadjordje and other Serbian representatives. The results of their negotiations were recorded in the form of a memorandum of the requests of the Serbian side [the Paulucci-Karadjordje Convention – D.J.R.], dated June 28, 1807, but this document [despite the title] did not acquire the force of a convention. Paulucci feared, and not without reason, that Napoleon's operations would soon lead to the defeat of the Russian Army, and he would not make the decision to promise anything to the Serbs and sign his name to it. This document recorded the plea to take Serbia under Russia's protection and to send a "viceroy of the land," who, acting in the name of Alexander I, "would bring the people into decent order" and "would arrange things in accordance with constitutional procedures," but that persons of Greek nationality should not be named to military and civil posts. (35) Land should not be given over to the ownership of pomeshchiki. The remaining conditions pertained to the desired scope of Russian military aid.

The points in this document on the land and the recognition that Serbia was in a state of civil and political disarray are quite significant. They testify that a threat of the return of the chitluk-sahibis and the sipahis still existed.

It should be noted that after 1804 the chitluk-sahibis were not mentioned in documents pertaining to the insurrection. Apparently they had fled and no longer dared to make an appearance in Serbia even after 1815. The insurrectionists' demand that large-scale landed properties not be established in the Belgrade pashalik had been expressed as early as 1804. (36) Vuk Karadžić wrote that from 1805 or 1806 onward the chitluk-sahibis dared not exact levies, and that none were collected later either, under Miloš. The question of the sipahis was more complicated. One may hypothesize that many saved themselves by flight, and part remained in Belgrade or returned there in 1815. There are no data in the sources which show them to

have exacted levies during the years of insurrection. Karadžić says that the sipahis collected them up to 1832, but probably disregarded the years of the First Insurrection. (37)

In the very course of the insurrection disagreements rapidly grew worse among groups of leaders oriented toward Russia and Austria respectively. A struggle for power followed.

Stratification and contradictions among the masses of the peasantry on the one hand, and the elders, the knezes, on the other hand, likewise intensified. The rural bourgeoisie were also members of the rural military-administrative machinery. They collected levies, had armed detachments under their command, burdened the peasants with dues to their own advantage, and seized control of trade. (38) According to the historian A. Arsen'evich-Batalaki, in 1811 and earlier all elders inflicted kuluk, i.e., corvee labor, upon the people. (39) It was probably impossible to make do without this, for otherwise they would have been unable to perform their duties under conditions in which there was no government-paid administrative machinery. At the same time, the kuluk also was used to enrich the administrative, commercial, and military ruling class of the Serbs. Internal stratification, political and civil chaos, the lack of regular courts, and quarrels among the chieftains, plus arbitrary behavior on their part, weakened the insurrectionists. There was need for urgent measures to enable the class and national liberation character of the Serbian Revolution to advance, and for organs of government to be created in Serbia as quickly as possible.

The Russian government and military command had an interest in strengthening the unity and political organization of the insurrectionists. They desired the most rapid possible creation of regular organs of governmental and administrative authority in Serbia, strengthening of the powers of the state, and along with this, limitation of arbitrariness, the transfer of part of the right to make laws and the executive authority to the Governing Council (40), and an end to the quarrels among the chieftains. K. K. Rodofinikin, actual state councillor (deistvitel'nyi statskii sovetnik) by rank, was sent to Serbia from the

staff of the Russian military command. His Greek origin and haughtiness were certain to cause dismay among the Serbian chieftains, although Rodofinikin desired to firm up the political situation in Serbia and the influence of those leaders of the insurrection who had a Russian orientation. (41) To him, the position taken by Karadjordje seemed inconsistent, but as early as the fall of 1807, Rodofinikin reported that "Black George is now entirely devoted to Russia, for he understands that without strong assistance from her things would be difficult." (42)

The Serbs could not have triumphed over the Ottoman oppressors without Russia's aid. Military cooperation with the Serbian insurrections in the war with the Ottoman Empire also was important and advantageous to the Russian government and high command. Rodofinikin sought to strengthen the faith of the Serbian elders that help from Russia would be forthcoming. He was exceedingly fearful of the growth of Austrian influence upon the Serbian chieftains, particularly after the Peace of Tilsit and later during the armistice between Russia and Turkey. The disagreements and struggle for power among the Serbian elders worried the Russian command greatly. At the same time, the Russian government and the new commander-in-chief, A. A. Prozorovskii, saw no real possibility for supporting the desire of part of the Serbian insurrectionists to achieve the creation of an independent Serbian kingdom, never mind the incorporation therein of various other South Slavic lands, inasmuch as Austria and Napoleonic France would never allow this. (43)

Rodofinikin's explanations that all that could be considered was an autonomous Serbian principality under the sovereignty of the sultan initially produced severe grumbling among the chieftains. But attention was soon focused on the drafting of a constitution, called the "Principles of the Serbian Government" (44), promulgated on August 8, 1807.

Sources confirm that the draft of Serbia's governmental organization was not worked out by Rodofinikin himself, but was the result of his negotiations with the Serbian elders, headed by Karadjordje. It should be pointed out that the meeting with Rodofinikin in Belgrade occurred after the defeat of the Rus-

sian Army at Friedland and the signing of the Peace of Tilsit, at a time when the Serbian chieftains were alarmed by the prospect of a strengthening of Austria and France and the retreat of the Russian force under General Isaev in Wallachia. Relations between the Serbian elders and Rodofinikin were quite complicated.

Displeased by the fact that it was now impossible to count on the dispatch of new Russian military forces, Karadjordje did not wish to initiate talks with Rodofinikin by visiting him, and even declared wrathfully to an official sent by the latter, "You all ought to be killed. I need troops, and I don't see them. What use will the man sent here be? Why did he come, and what does he have to offer?" Rodofinikin went to see Karadjordje. Their meeting began coldly, but then took on a businesslike and confidential character. Karadjordje and the other elders were concerned regarding the definition of the status and organization of the new agencies of power in Serbia and sought a promise that Russia would seek Serbia's full independence from the sultan.

An unjust attitude toward the Serbian elders is often evident in Rodofinikin's reports. He also was not objective in his evaluation of the personality of Karadjordje. Rodofinikin above all else emphasized the competition of other chieftains with Karadjordje, his explosive nature and passion for vodka, although he likewise took note of his intelligence and courage, as well as his gift for military matters.

Not only the disputes among the chieftains but also their desire for personal profit in resale of arms, collecting taxes, and burdening the peasants with dues for their own benefit all alarmed Rodofinikin. He condemned as well the severe treatment by the Serbs of the families of the Turks expelled from Serbia. (45)

Rodofinikin understood that in the situation that had arisen after Tilsit, neither Austria nor Napoleon would permit complete independence for Serbia. He declared to the chieftains that "it would be difficult to expect total independence at the first try" and that for the Serbs "it would be better to remain

under the supreme authority of the Porte until the proper time comes." According to him, he imposed nothing upon the Serbs but "found himself compelled" to draw up, jointly with the elders, the draft of a system of governmental organization for Serbia, formalized by the seal of Karadjordje, and then sent by him to the Russian commander-in-chief, Prince A. A. Prozorovskii. (46)

The increasingly sharp quarrels among the elders caused Rodofinikin unease. After General Isaev's Russian force retreated, rumors spread that Russia "had ceded Serbia to the Austrian court" and some chieftains were inclined to turn to Napoleon with a plea to place Serbia under his protection. In this connection, Rodofinikin wrote the Russian commander-in-chief that it was important for Russia "to preserve its influence in Serbia." (47)

A number of the proposals in the draft of the Serbian Constitution, worked out with Rodofinikin's participation, were not at all the fruit of abstract thinking, but rested upon the system of order that had taken shape. The proposals facilitated the establishment of organs of central and local authority in Serbia on an indigenous internal basis. However, Rodofinikin's attempt to plot a path toward the artificial creation in the country of a caste of nobility consisting of the "senators" did not accord either with conditions there or with the interests of the people, was clearly reactionary and simply absurd. The draft of the constitution was formally signed by Karadjordje in agreement with the elders. It would seem that it should have been made public and gone into effect. But this did not happen. (48)

Apparently the chieftains of pro-Austrian orientation were dissatisfied with the attempt to introduce a legislative document that openly reinforced Russia's influence in Serbia. There was a sharp increase in pressure from Austria, which did not desire the consolidation of a new principality that relied upon Russia.

There is evidence that internal stratification among the insurrectionists created the need first of all to calm the dissatisfaction of the peasants with their new exploiters — the elders.

An address by the Governing Council to the people, dated September 10, 1808, contained an appeal to submit complaints against elders who had seized control of commerce and grown rich at the expense of the poor. (49) It should be noted that even the founding of judicial agencies in Serbia proceeded in such fashion that justice was entirely in the hands of the knezes, merchants, kmets, clergy, and rich peasants. It served primarily the interests of the embourgeoised rural ruling class, which produced dissatisfaction among the poorest section of the peasants and the haiduks. (50) Under these conditions, it would have been quite out of place to proclaim that Serbia would have a class of nobles in the future.

It must be taken into consideration that Prozorovskii took a very critical attitude toward many of Rodofinikin's proposals both regarding the internal organization of Serbia and with respect to its future boundaries. On the demand of the commander-in-chief, Rodofinikin sent him a detailed memorandum with his own ideas regarding the establishment of boundaries that would incorporate the earlier Serbian kingdom, Bulgaria, Bosnia, and Croatia, and the procedure to govern the Serbs' commercial and political relations with other states. The untimeliness and rashness of many of these proposals induced doubts in the mind of Prozorovskii, who was a cautious military leader and a subtle politician. He agreed that it was desirable to establish a senate and firm government by a prince to be chosen by the people, but concluded that princely power must most certainly become hereditary, with the condition that a Russian consul or agent would restrain the prince "from committing deeds in conflict with Russia's interests." The possibility of a joint guarantee "of the status of Serbia and its new constitution" by the French and Russian courts, as proposed by certain elders, seemed acceptable to Prozorovskii, but he found Rodofinikin's proposal that a Russian detachment be stationed in Belgrade to be unrealistic. The fortress garrisons had to be Serbian, and Serbia itself should continue to be under the protection of the Porte, with payment of a tribute to the latter. (51)

Rodofinikin's notes, with commentaries by the commander-in-chief, were sent to St. Petersburg. Discussion of them dragged on. A. N. Saltykov, assistant Minister of Foreign Affairs, sent a message that Alexander I was entirely in agreement with the field marshal's opinion that restoration of Serbia's ancient boundaries was impossible under the current circumstances, and one could hope for no more than to give the Serbs "a decent boundary and a few fortresses." (52) The Russian government was compelled to reckon with the unacceptability of the Serbs' requests vis-à-vis Austria and Turkey.

In St. Petersburg it was clear that the courts at Vienna and the Porte were unwilling to recognize the independence of Serbia, and therefore that "Russia should strive to maintain overriding influence over the Serbs and not permit other powers to participate equally actively in the affairs of that people." Further instructions were "To let the formation of a Supreme Council or Senate go forward without explicit participation in this by Russia, and therefore not to solicit participation for a Russian agent at such a session, which would eliminate the excuse for a French agent demanding the same privilege for himself." It was pointed out that it was necessary to avoid anything "that might offend that people's self-esteem," and above all to preserve its "confidence" by not imposing upon the Serbs proposals with which they did not agree. Thus, the Russian government manifested considerably greater respect and discretion in relation to the Serbs than did Rodofinikin or even the more cautious Prozorovskii. It also becomes clear why the draft constitution of Serbia sent by Rodofinikin with the seal of Karadjordje was not approved by St. Petersburg. (53)

In 1809 Saltykov again confirmed that it was necessary to act without directly intervening "in Serbia's internal affairs" but so that "no other powers" dared to intervene in them. Alexander I promised that if there were a desire for this on the part of the Serbian people he would, at a future time, agree that Napoleon "jointly with Russia" guarantee the status of Serbia, but held that at present there was no "need to make a proposal to this effect." (54) In May of the same year, Pro-

zorovskii was instructed to transmit another 10,000 chervontsy to the Serbs. (55)

Thus, Rodofinikin's plans for a constitution were unacceptable both in Serbia and in St. Petersburg. As early as December 14, 1808, another document of a constitutional nature was promulgated — the recognition of Karadjordje as Vrhovni Knez (Supreme Chief) while the legislative power was divided between him and the Governing Council. (56) This document did not even mention the establishment of a nobility.

The Russian commander-in-chief, Prozorovskii, particularly counselled Karadjordje to constrain arbitrary acts and adhere to law and order, that no one should be deprived of life or property without a decision to that effect by the supreme chief. The disputes among the chieftains were undermining his authority and the strength of the insurrectionists. (57) Consequently, it cannot be asserted that Rodofinikin or Prozorovskii had played the decisive role in organizing the top and local authorities, particularly the judicial system in Serbia. But much of their counsel assisted in this process, which developed, all in all, on the basis of local national traditions and conditions, and in which Russia did no more than cooperate. (58) This was a new attempt, after the case of the Ionian Republic, at introducing and supporting constitutional institutions abroad, i.e., an attempt to adapt itself to the new conditions of the epoch. (59)

The Russian government and its high command had no intention at all of leaving the Serbs to the tender mercies of the Porte. Russia continued its military aid to Serbia right up to 1812. In 1808 a major-of-engineers in the Russian service, Gramberg, sent for this purpose, helped the Serbs fortify the citadel of Belgrade and taught them the building of entrenchments, for which "the Council of the Serbian people gave its thanks to Prozorovskii by a letter of July 15 (3), 1808." (60)

Gramberg highly appraised the bravery and endurance of the Serbian warriors and their "ability to defend themselves unto the final extreme." (61) Prozorovskii sought from vizier Mustafa promises not to occupy Serbia with Turkish troops, agreement to regard [the Serbs] as being under "the protec-

tion" of Russia and "inviolable until peace is decreed." (62) The Russian commander-in-chief also demanded that Karadjordje block thoughtless actions by the Serbian partisans, particularly voivode Vel'ko, against Turkish settlements, fearing that this would push the Porte to military invasion of Serbia. (63)

Prozorovskii sent Serbia a wagon train with 6 cannon and 720 rounds of ammunition for them, 2,917 muskets, 1,000 sabers and pikes, and permitted Rodofinikin to spend 7,000 chervontsy for the purchase of horses by the Serbs for military needs and for other expenditures. (64) Rodofinikin was to distribute these arms by agreement with Karadjordje so there would be no squabbles and malfeasance on the part of individual chieftains. (65)

The fate of the Serbian Revolution was at stake, and the situation of the insurgents sharply worsened after the threat of Napoleon's offensive began, followed by his actual invasion, which compelled Russia to make peace with Turkey and withdraw its troops from the Balkan Peninsula to the western boundaries of the empire. (66) By the Treaty of Bucharest, 1812, the Porte committed itself to preserve the autonomy of the Serbs, to assure an amnesty, and to decide matters of internal administration and questions of limitation of taxes "jointly with the Serbian people," but these conditions were not adhered to.

The Porte did not delay making use of the withdrawal of Russia's forces to the West for the war against Napoleon. Ottoman troops mercilessly suppressed the First Serbian Revolution. In the international arena, the routing of the Serbian insurrections dealt a powerful blow to Russia's influence on the Balkan Peninsula. However, it was only temporarily that the Ottoman feudal counterrevolution triumphed in Serbia in 1813 (67), and it was unable to destroy all the fruits of the insurrection. In 1815 the Russian government addressed itself to the Porte with a demand that it cease its retribution in Serbia. As previously stated, the chitluk-sahibis and part of the sipahis did not dare to return to Serbia, while the rest had to reconcile themselves to a moderate rent (the tithe).

All in all, the tasks of the Serbian bourgeois national revolution were far from resolved. Preparations for the Second Serbian Insurrection proceeded under conditions of a ferocious struggle for influence among the chieftains, and accelerated social stratification among the embourgeoisied military-administrative ruling class and the rural trading bourgeoisie on the one hand, and the masses of the peasants on the other. It was in this situation that the authoritarian regime of Miloš Obrenović began to take shape during the Second Insurrection.

It follows to some degree that identification of the character of the Serbian uprising cannot, in our view, be entirely unambiguous. Undoubtedly, the Serbian Insurrection of 1804-1813, having begun as a national liberation movement, was transformed in the course of a thirteen-year struggle, into a bourgeois revolution against the absolutist-feudal Ottoman yoke. Generally speaking, the peasantry, the entire people, and the entire young Serbian nation then coming into being took part in it. The revolution cleared the way for the development of the capitalist system in Serbia and therefore in that respect it was bourgeois or more precisely, bourgeois national. Its principal motive force was the peasantry, as the capitalist class had only begun to make an appearance. The tendencies among the peasant masses, and their desire to eliminate feudal dues and landlordism were doubtless democratic, but these democratic strivings could not be reflected to the full in the demands of 1804-1806. They did not go beyond abolition of the chiftliks and replacement of dues to the sipahis by a moderate payment, although the flight of the sipahis and chitluk-sahibis offer eloquent testimony to the intentions of the risen masses to eliminate totally the foreign feudal exploiters.

Leadership of the insurrection was always in the hands of the military-administrative elite of the rebels and the rural bourgeoisie. The partisans' military leaders either merged rapidly into that elite or lost influence.

Thus one may state that democratic tendencies among the masses of the people, i.e., primarily the peasants, desirous of

complete abolition of feudal oppression, manifested themselves in the Serbian Revolution of 1804-1813. In documents of a constitutional nature, the supreme authority of the knez was treated as the power of the leader of the people. It was provided that knezes, oberknezes, and the verhovni knez were to be elected. All this corresponded to democratic principles, although it rested not upon the constitutional theories of the West, but primarily upon Serbian rural patriarchal traditions, and in no way contradicted the leading role of the administrative and military ruling class of the rebels and the rural bourgeoisie.

The course of the First and subsequently of the Second Serbian Insurrection led to the establishment of the dominance and further enrichment precisely of this prosperous military-administrative agricultural and merchant elite of the Serbian people and the authoritarian rule of Miloš Obrenović. A struggle for constitutional and agrarian reforms, which increasingly cleared the road for capitalism, then began.

Thus, inasmuch as the leadership of the movement did not fall into the hands of the rural folk "plebeians," they were not able to place a clear imprint of their demands upon the course of events. Therefore one can hardly claim a basis for regarding the Serbian Revolution of 1804-1813 as bourgeois democratic on the whole, although the democratic strivings of the people did manifest themselves in its course as a national-liberation and antifeudal revolution clearing the path for capitalism. The participation of the entire people, the peasants, as the fundamental motive force of the revolutionary events, was vividly expressed. This matter can, of course, be rendered more precise as one studies the details pertaining to agrarian relationships, and can serve as the subject for further discussions. But the indisputable historical significance of the Serbian Revolution at the beginning of the nineteenth century consists above all else in its struggle for national independence, laying the path for development of the country along bourgeois national lines and for reestablishing its national statehood in the form of a Serbian bourgeois national state in the period of the triumph and consolidation of capitalism. It also provided

the impetus for other national bourgeois revolutions in the Balkans. It should be noted that in the West and in America many revolutions that did not become bourgeois democratic on the whole likewise included democratic antifeudal actions on the part of the peasantry, who for various reasons were unable to place their imprint upon the entire course of the revolutions and transform them into bourgeois democratic ones. These peasant actions did not exercise directing influence on the course of events. Nonetheless the significance of these revolutions for the creation of new landlord-bourgeois national states and for the struggle against feudalism was enormous. Also great was the significance of the Insurrection of 1804-1813 as a Serbian peasant and bourgeois national revolution of liberation against foreign feudal and absolutist oppression, occurring at the beginning of the last century. Its traditions are the glorious traditions of the revolutionary struggle of the South Slavic peoples for national liberation. At the same time they are memorable pages in the history of cooperation between the peoples of Russia and Yugoslavia.

Notes

1) L. Ranke, Die Serbische Revolution. Aus serbischen Papieren und Mitteilungen, Hamburg, 1829.

2) S. A. Nikitin, "Karadzhich i Ranke," in the collection Problemy istoriografii, Voronezh, 1960.

3) See L. Ranke, Srpska revolutsija, Belgrade, 1965, with an introductory article by Dr. V. Stoiančević. Afterword written by N. Radacić: "Rankeova kontseptsija srpske istorije." The translation of Ranke's work into Serbo-Croatian was from its first edition.

4) The third edition appeared as we know under the title Serbien und die Türkei in neunzehnten Jahrhundert (in L. Ranke, Sämtliche Werke, vol. 43-44, Leipzig, 1879). In the introduction to this edition of the book, Ranke takes a condescending attitude toward Vuk Karadžić as a "born barbarian" but a gifted person.

5) S. Novaković, Tursko tsarstvo pred srpski ustanak, Belgrade, 1906; same author, Ustavno pitanje i zakoni Karadjordjeva vremena, Belgrade, 1907; M. Vukičević, Karadjordje, vols. 1-2, Belgrade, 1907, 1912; M. Gavrilović, Miloš Obrenović, Belgrade, 1908, and others.

6) See. K. Marx and F. Engels, Soch., vol. 9, p. 32.

7) V. Čubrilović, "Istorija političke misli u Srbiji u XIX v.," same author, "Srpska revolucija 1804-1815 gg.," in Istorija Beograda, vol. 2, Belgrade, 1971.

8) Pervoe serbskoe vosstanie 1804-1813 gg. i Rossiia, kn. 1, 1804-1807 gg., Moscow, 1980.

9) V. E. Lenin, Poln. sobr. soch., vol. 33, p. 39.

10) V. Karadžić, Srpski rječnik. U. Bechu, 1852, pp. 702, 820-27, ff.

11) Chiftlik-sahibis were gentry holding farms (chiftliki) purchased from sipahis.

12) V. Karadžić, op. cit.

13) It existed in Greece, particularly on the Ionian Islands and in Morea. Therefore the Greek patriots included revolutionaries from the nobility.

14) For further detail see A. L. Narochnitskii, "Rossiia, Serbiia i Chernogoriii v nachale XIX v.," Novaia i noveishaia istoriia, 1980, no. 3, pp. 54-55.

15) In a letter to the Russian minister A. Ia. Italiiskii, of May 3, 1804, the Serbian chieftains complained that the Janissaries had been burning churches and monasteries, did not give recognition to Christian clergy, forcibly converted women to Islam and compelled them to marry, compelled the payment of taxes higher than those established by the firman of 1793, and seized livestock and property (Prvi srpski ustanak. Akti i pisma na srpskom eziku, kn. 1, 1804-1808 gg., edited by R. Petrović, Belgrade, 1977, pp. 70-71; Pervoe serbskoe vosstanie i Rossiia, pp. 24-29). In the petition of the Serbian people to Sultan Selim, May 1, 1805, we read that "our sipahis were the cause of and bear the guilt for all our misfortunes" for they had come to terms with the Janissaries and gained control of Serbia. These complaints emphasize even further

the antifeudal aspect of the Serbian Revolution (Pervoe serbskoe vosstanie i Rossiia, pp. 116-19).

16) See Pervoe serbskoe vosstanie i Rossiia, pp. 68-71.

17) V. Karadžić, Prvi i drugi srpski ustanak, Novi Sad and Belgrade, 1960, p. 108.

18) Pervoe serbskoe vosstanie i Rossiia, pp. 21-22.

19) See M. Vukičević, Karadjordje, kn. 2, pp. 240-41; Prvi srpski ustanak, kn. I, pp. 122-24.

20) R. Bogišić, Razbor sochineniia N. Popova "Rossiia i Serbiia", St. Petersburg, 1872, pp. 117-22.

21) Pervoe serbskoe vosstanie i Rossiia, pp. 35-36.

22) Prvi srpski ustanak, kn. 1., pp. 85-88.

23) Letter from L. G. Kiriko to A. A. Zherve, Sept. 8, 1804, and from Zherve to Czartoryski, September 14, 1804, in Archives of Russia's Foreign Policy, Fond Posol'stvo v Konstantinopole, 1804, File 861, Sheet 77 (copy). Published in Pervoe serbskoe vosstanie i Rossiia, pp. 48-50.

24) Reference is to the Ionian Republic as a protectorate of both Russia and Turkey.

25) Published in part in the volume, Vneshniaia politika Rossii. Seriia 1 (cited hereafter as VPR), vol. II, Moscow, 1961, fn. 121, pp. 669-70, and also in M. Vukičević, Karadjordje, kn. 2, pp. 192-94.

26) VPR, vol. II., docs. 74, 82. For details on Russia's position, see A. L. Narohnitskii, op. cit., and also Balcanica, Belgrade, 1979.

27) A. L. Narohnitskii, op. cit., p. 60.

28) Pervoe serbskoe vosstanie i Rossiia, pp. 262-64.

29) Ibid.

30) Prvi srpski ustanak, kn. 1, pp. 109-11.

31) Ibid., pp. 175-77.

32) On September 24, 1804, the knezes of Hercegovina appealed to I. P. Miletić in the name of the people with a plea to aid in bringing Hercegovina under the protection of Russia: Pervoe serbskoe vosstanie i Rossiia, p. 52.

33) Letter of Hercegovinian Archimandrite S. Ivković to the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs, A. Ia. Budberg, May 14 (2),

1807, in Pervoe serbskoe vosstanie i Rossiia, pp. 356-57.

34) Stratimirovich's plan of 1804, and others.

35) V. Bogišić, op. cit., pp. 193-96 The Serbian representatives apparently wished to conclude conventions with firm obligations on both sides, but this goal was not attained because Paulucci did not sign it. He wrote Budberg as follows on this "convention": "Inasmuch as I was cautious enough not to propose anything and not to sign anything, it may be regarded only as requests, and depends upon the desire of His Imperial Majesty to support them or not." The tsar did not give his approval to the document in question. Paulucci's letter to Budberg, received August 12 (July 31), 1807: V. Bogišić, op. cit., p. 192. Also see VPR, vol. III, Moscow, 1963.

36) Demands of the Serbian elders transmitted to the representative of the sipahis in Zomun, May 10 (April 28), 1804: Prvi srpski ustanak, p. 68; V. Karadžić, op. cit., pp. 667, 826-27.

37) A. Arsen'evich-Batalaka wrote that the sipahis system was abolished only in 1833 (Istorija srpskoga ustanka, vol. 1, Belgrade, 1898, p. 61). Article 49 of the Hatti-Sherif of 1838 on the regulations of the Serbian principality abolished corvee (kuluk), while Article 59 read that never again would there be sipahiluks in Serbia. For the text of the Hatti-Sherif see L. Ranke, Istorija Srbije po serbskim istochnikam, Moscow, 1857.

38) Pervoe serbskoe vosstanie i Rossiia, pp. 431-34; V. Bogišić, op. cit., p. 270 ff.

39) Istorija srpskoga ustanka, vol. 1, pp. 58-61, 376. Quite interesting is a comparison made by Rodofinikin on the basis of personal observations of the dues and levies upon the Serbs before and after the insurrection. From his notes on this it follows that the tax burden upon the Serbs was smaller after the insurrection, but the number of taxpayers increased. Under Ottoman rule "each family paid up to 40 piastres per year, and there were 20,000 such families, a number that has now doubled... In addition, males aged eight and above payed a haratch of three piastres each, while a tenth of each crop of grain taken from the ground, and of grapes also was subject to collection; there likewise was a tax on two yoke of cattle; up to

80 piastres are now payable in customs duties, for the chiefs themselves have undertaken to collect this as tax-farmers, while under the Turks the figure was nearly twice as high. Since the insurrection began the people have paid one-tenth of the grain annually, which was collected from them only once for common needs, yielding up to half a million piastres, plus every twentieth sheep and goat for the troops." Rodofinikin held that "if the freedom of that people is recognized," Russia would have to negotiate from the Serbian government a condition that neither a prince nor any other person would have the right to use the people for their own work, i.e., for their personal farms, whereby the Serbian peasants would receive "a gift of the greatest mercy from Russia." (Rodofinikin's memorandum of November 14 (2) 1808, in V. Bogišić, op. cit., pp. 271-72.)

40) S. Novaković, "Ustavno pitan'e i zakoni Karadjordjeva vremena," pp. 29-36.

41) For Rodofinikin's proposals, see A. L. Narochnitskii, op. cit., p. 62; V. Bogišić, op. cit., pp. 196-207.

42) Rodofinikin to Prozorovskii, November 9, 1807, in V. Bogišić, op. cit., pp. 431-34.

43) On May 11, 1807, A. Ia. Budberg wrote Karadjordje that Paulucci was being sent to the latter "to inform himself about your needs and equally about ways of deriving the greatest benefit from unity of action between the troops of His Majesty on the Danube and the fearless soldiery led by yourself," V. Bogišić, op. cit., pp. 161, 203, 310.

44) Ibid., pp. 204-207.

45) V. Bogišić, op. cit., pp. 200-202.

46) Ibid., pp. 202-203.

47) Ibid., pp. 208-11.

48) Ibid.

49) Prvi srpski ustanak, kn. 1, p. 381. The appeal was addressed to the population of four sipahis: Šabac, Valjevo, Zvornik, and Užice.

50) Order of the Governing Council on establishing courts in towns and villages, and on their composition and duties. See

Prvi srpski ustanak, pp. 302-303; L. Papavoglu, Krivichno pravo i pravosudje u Srbii 1804-1813 (Prilog pitanj i kharaktera Prvog srpskog ustanka), Belgrade, 1954.

51) Rodofinikin to Prozorovskii, November 14 (2), 1808, in V. Bogišić, op. cit., pp. 263-74.

52) See Prozorovskii's comment on the cited memorandum by Rodofinikin, in V. Bogišić, op. cit., p. 264. At the close of 1808 the Serbian deputies petitioned Prozorovskii to restore the Serbian kingdom, with Bosnia, Hercegovina, the Banat and Sirmia to be added to it, but the commander-in-chief, "declaring to the deputation that these projects were nothing but crazy delirium, returned them," V. Bogišić, op. cit., p. 310.

53) VPR, vol. IV, Moscow, 1965, doc. 191, pp. 424-26.

54) Saltykov to A. A. Prozorovskii, Feb. 13 (1), 1809, in V. Bogišić, op. cit., pp. 287-89.

55) Saltykov to A. A. Prozorovskii, May 24 (12), 1809, *ibid.*, pp. 289-90.

56) Prvi srpski ustanak, kn. 1, pp. 405-6.

57) Prozorovskii to Karadjordje, May 25 (13), 1808, VPR, vol. IV, doc. 110.

58) As Karadžić has written, as early as the end of 1804 high Russian officials in St. Petersburg counselled the Serbian deputation that had come to the Russian capital (Matvei Nenadović, Jovan Protić, and Petru Čerdaklii) to create in Serbia a council of elders as organ of governmental power. See V. Karadžić, Pravitel'stvuiushchi Sovet' serbski za vremena Karadjordje, U Bechu, 1860, pp. 1-2.

59) A. L. Narohnitskii, "Rossiia i napoleonovskaia politika gegemonii (sop-rotivlenie i prisposoblenie)," Voprosy istorii, 1978, no. 8.

60) V. Bogišić, op. cit., pp. 216-19.

61) Memorandum from Gramberg to Prozorovskii, July 8 (June 26), 1808, *ibid.*, p. 226.

62) Prozorovskii to Alexander I, received October 23 (11), 1808, *ibid.*, p. 228.

63) Prozorovskii to Karadjordje, September 12 (August 31), 1808, *ibid.*, p. 233.

64) Prozorovskii to N. P. Rumiantsev, received October 23 (11), 1808, *ibid.*, pp. 238-41.

65) Rodofinikin to Prozorovskii, September 14 (2) and 17 (5), 1808, *ibid.*, pp. 242-45.

66) For fuller detail, see A. L. Narochnitskii, Rossiia, Serbiia i Chernogoriia v nachale XIX v.

67) See V. Čubrilović, *op. cit.*